John Thornton

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE.

CONTAYNING THE Greateſt and moſt Remarkeable Conſiderations ſeruing for the Managing of Publicke Affaires.

Diuided into three Parts.

THE FIRST CONTAYNES THE MEANES to ſettle an ESTATE. The ſecond, the meanes to preſerue it. And the third, the meanes to encreaſe it.

WRITTEN IN FRENCH BY ONE of the *Ancient* Counſellors to the *moſt Chriſtian Kings*, HENRY *the Fourth, and* LEVVIS *the thirteenth.*

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TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE *RICHARD*

Lord *WESTON*, Lord High Treasurer of *England*, Earle of *Portland*, and one of his Maiesties most Honorable Priuy Councell.

Right Honorable:

THey were the words of the wisest King & best knowing man, Pro: 11.14. *That where no Counsell is, the people fall, and where many Counsellors are, there is health*: Which words he almost reiterates to strengthen that position: *Chap.*15.22. *Without Counsell thoughts come to nought, but in the multitude of Counsellors there is stedfastnesse.* And it was the saying of *Cicero*, the excellent Orator, and Statesman of *Rome*: *Non vi-*

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ribus, aut velocitate, aut celeritate corporum, res magnæ geruntur, ſed conſilio authoritate, & prudentia. Cormenanus lib reg. & rer. &c. cap. 18. telleth vs, that it was obſerued by the moſt skilfull Architectors of the ancient times: The broader and higher they propoſed their buildings, the more ſolide and deepe they layd their baſſes: ſo (ſaith he) ſince none are more eminent amongſt men then Princes, or beare more waight vpon their ſhoulders then Kings, meete it is they ſhould haue the beſt Counſellors, on whom to leane as vpon a firme and ſtedfaſt foundation, to diſpoſe as well of matters which belong vnto State as Religion: And ſuch *Oſorius* tells vs, *lib. 7. de Reg. inſtit*: Ought to be *maximo ingenio præditi, bonis Artibus exculti, longo rerum vſu periti: In Hiſtoriis diligentiſſimè verſati, neque præſentia tantum ſagaciter odorantes, ſed longe in poſterum, quod vtile futurum reipub. ſit, coniectura prouidentes.* With a gracious King are we bleſt: with ſuch a Counſell is he furniſht: who (as *Rabanus* in one of his Epiſtles informes vs:) in plaine things ſearch what may be myſticall and obſcure.

In

In ſmall (ſeeming) matters what may be of moment, by what is neare, to coniecture of things remote; and out of parts, to gather a whole, by which mature conſideration they know as well readily to vndertake them, as ſpeedily to diſpatch them: Now knowing your Lordſhip to be ſuch an one, namely, a *Counſeller* and *Stateſman*, euery way accompliſhed; Afret transferring theſe *Remarkeable conſiderations, for the management of publique Affaires*, from the naturall *French* into our moderne *Engliſh*: And further being moſt aſſured, that your *Greatneſſe* hath euer bin accompanied with *Goodneſſe*, and your *Wiſedome* with *Clemency*, it hath bin a great imboldning vnto me, to make a dutifull preſentment thereof to your *Gracious perusall and Patronage*, not to the purpoſe that theſe can be either your *Direction* or *Inſtruction*, (as being frequently conuerſant in all the paſſages of this Nature) but rather to expreſſe ſuch things to your view in our Natiue Dialect, which I know you to bee moſt expert in, in the Originall. Needleſſe it were to teach *Typhis* how to ſteare a Ship,

or inſtruct *Antomedon* to guide a Chariot, ſhould I apprehend any ſuch ambition, I muſt neceſſarily incurre the aſperſion of impudence, or expreſſe ſuch palpable Ignorance as might draw me into a iuſt imputation of folly: But Right Honourable, ſuch is my Modeſty, that by ſtudying to bee free from either, I may euade the aſperſion of both: onely deſiring your Lordſhips beſt conſtruction of theſe my weake and vnpoliſhed labours, which preſent themſelues ſo rudely into your preſence, whoſe more weighty imployments can ſcarcely allow any retyred Houre, to caſt a ſecond Eye vpon that, (howſoeuer Naturaliz'd) which (no doubt) you haue formerly peruſed in the Natiue. Notwithſtanding, Honourable Sir, preſuming vpon your knowne *Gentleneſſe* and *Generous Diſpoſition*, I humbly proſtrate my ſelfe with theſe my imperfect labours to your moſt *Iudicious Cenſure*, whoſe leaſt diſtaſte is able to ſtifle the hope of the ſuruiuing thereof euen in the *Infancy*, and whoſe fauorable approbation hath power to giue it life vnto all poſterity:

Your Honours moſt humbly deuoted

Edward Grimeſton.

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FINIS.

THE

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE.

CONTAINING THE greateſt and moſt Remarkeable Conſiderations ſeruing for the Managing of Publicke Affaires.

PART. I. OF THE NECESSARY MEANES to Eſtabliſh an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Eſtabliſhing and forme of an Eſtate; and of the diuerſity of the gouernments thereof.

THE Conſiderations which may ſerue for the mannaging of publique affaires, are of two ſorts. Some are drawne from generall Rules and Maximes, the which are vſually followed and obſerued in the gouernment of Eſtates; and the others from Circumſtances, which fall out in particular occurrents. For as we may not ſo relye vpon

the firſt that we not examine and exactly weigh the particularities of a buſines which may be obſerued, be it in the Perſon which muſt aſſiſt; or in the cauſes, motiues, means, place, time, and other circumſtances: So we muſt not tye our ſelues ſo confidently to theſe laſt, as wee deſiſt from the firſt. If neceſſity doth force vs ſometimes to diſpence, it muſt be in ſuch ſort, as we reſerue a way to returne againe, and to repaire the buſineſſe.

Wee cannot preſcribe any thing certaine for theſe laſt circumſtances, all in particulars which are infinite, and depending principally vpon the ſufficiency and particular experience of him which examines ſuch affaires. Many haue written others, ſome of which ſuffring themſelues to be tranſported with curioſity, haue mingled Doubts and Queres more fitting for a Schoole, then profitable to make vſe of. But my deſigne in this Diſcourſe is, to gather from the Anciens and Moderns, (who haue treated vpon this Subiect) that which I haue found moſt fitting for vſe and the preſent Eſtate.

An Eſtate what it is.

That which they truely call an Eſtate, is no other thing but an order, by the meanes whereof many Families and Comminalties are gouerned, hauing for their end the good of all in generall. But we may alſo call an Eſtate, theſe Families and Comminalties drawne together vnder one gouernment, and be it in the one or the other ſenſe, we may ſay that all the generall conſiderations, which may ſerue for the managing of publique affaires, tend either to the eſtabliſhing, or to the preſeruation, or to the encreaſe of an Eſtate.

Of the eſtabliſhment of an Eſtate.

For an eſtabliſhment many things are neceſſary, whereof ſome muſt be ſetled among our ſelues, and others with ſtrangers; as alliances, intelligences, and correſpondencies, wherein conſiſts the care of affaires abroad. Among our ſelues there muſt be eſtabliſhed and regulated the forme of the Eſtate, Religion, Councell, the manner of commanding the force, and the Treaſure, or Reuenewes ſufficient

ſufficient to ſatisfie the Charges, and ſupply the defence, of the Eſtate.

The forme of Eſtates is diuers, according to the number; the dependants and the right of thoſe which Command, & according to the diuers qualities & diſtinctions of thoſe which obey. According to the nũber of thoſe which command, Eſtates are diſtinguiſhed principally into three ſorts. Of the formes of an Eſtate.

The firſt is that, in the which one commands alone without Companion, the which wee call Principality. The ſecond is that where the moſt eminent and apparent Men (which make the leaſt part of the Eſtate) haue the Soueraignty, the which we call Seignoury. The third is that, whereas the people, or the greateſt part of them vnder the Name of people command; and this may be called a popular Eſtate, or a Common-weale.

But euery forme of Eſtate is gouerned diuerſly: ſo as of Principalities one is called Royall, when as ſome one commands according to the lawes of Nature, and the lawes of the Country, leauing the naturall liberty, and the property of goods to euery one in particular, hauing for their principall end the publique vtility: and in this manner moſt of the Weſterne people of *Europe* are gouerned. Diuers ſorts of principalities. Royall.

The other is Seignourial, in the which the Prince is made Lord of their goods and perſons, by the right of Armes and a iuſt Warre, or by the Cuſtome of the Country, gouerning his Subiects as the Maſter doth his ſlaues; yet not ſtraying from the lawes of Nature: And this gouernment (although it be rough and tedious) is held lawfull, if the conqueſt be iuſt. For where there is a ſubiect to make Warre, they hold that the force is iuſt betwixt two Soueraignes, which haue no ſuperiour to decide their controuerſie; and that he may preſcribe what Lawe hee pleaſe to the weaker. In this manner are ruled and gouerned all the people of the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, of *Affrick*, and a good part of the *Leuant*; and euen in *Europe* the the *Muſconites* and the *Turkes* gouerne in this manner. Seignouriall.

Tyrannicall. The third is vnlawfull and Tyrannicall, in the which he that commands, hath no other ayme but his owne priuate profit, and hath no care of that of his Subiects; and for his greatneſſe, reuenge, or auarice violates all Diuine and Humane lawes: ſo as he liues in continuall diſtruſt of his Subiects, and intreates them with all rigour and ſeuerity againſt Iuſtice. I ſay againſt Iuſtice, for that we may not cenſure a Prince to be a Tyrant by his ſeuerity, the which a good Prince is ſometimes forced to practiſe againſt the cuſtome of his Subiects; Neyther by his guard of ſtrangers, which they entertaine not only for ſafety, but for the obedience, ornament, and attendance of his Maieſty: Neyther by his abſolute commands, the which are more to be wiſht for of a iuſt Prince, then the flattering intreaties of Tyrants, who draw after them a feare of an ineuitable reuenge.

Of a ſeignoury A Seigneury which is gouerned according to the lawes, is called lawfull; as that of *Venice*, and of many Townes in *Germany*. But being gouerned by few men, we call it Factions; as that of *Athens*, vnder the Thirty Tyrants whom *Lizander* eſtabliſhed: That of *Rome* vnder the Ten men, and afterwards vnder *Caſar*, *Pompey* and *Craſſus*, and laſtly vnder the *Triumuirat*.

Of a popular Eſtate. A popular Eſtate is alſo gouerned diuerſly. For either the affaires are in the hands of the common people; and then it is rather a tumult and an Anarchy, then an Eſtate; as *Athens* was gouerned, after that *Pericles* had taken from the *Areopagites* the power of iudging: Or elſe the people referre the gouernment to the aduiceof ſome men whom they haue choſen amongſt them; whoſe power and charge is limited to a certaine time, to the end that euery man ſhould haue meanes to command in his turne; or elſe their Offices continue during life, to the end that by this continuation, they may make themſelues the more capeable of affaires. In certaine places, and in certaine affaires of importance, or of alliances, peace, or warre, euery one

of

of the people giues his voyce, being aſſembled altogether in Common; as in ſome Cantons of the Suiſſes; or diuided by Pariſhes, Trades, Families, Companies, or Cominalties, as in old time at *Athens* and *Rome*.

Chap. 2.

Of the aduantages and diſaduantages of a Popular Eſtate.

Experience hath taught vs, that wee may ſubſiſt in all theſe formes of Eſtate. But as there is nothing permanent in this World, through idleneſſe and negligence the order is many times corrupted, and the State ruined, the which proceeds from the imperfections and defects which are found in all theſe Eſtates. Wherefore he that will ſettle an Eſtate, muſt conſider carefully of the aduantages and diſaduantages which are found in either forme.

The aduantages which they giue to a popular Eſtate, is Iuſtice and Equallity, or without fauour or reſpect of perſons; reducing the ciuill conſtitution to the Lawes of Nature, which makes vs all Equall. Thus in cutting off the auarice of ſome, and the arrogancy of others, loue and friendſhip is entertained amongſt them, euery man enioyes the publicke good; and all being imployed in affaires, this kind of Eſtate is commonly moſt fertile in great perſonages: The handy-crafts man by his imployment in offices makes himſelfe a great Orator and a great Captaine. Yet many haue held a popular Eſtate to be the worſt, and moſt imperfect of all the formes of Gouernment. For this equallity which they ſo much eſteeme, is againſt nature, the which giues more graces to ſome and leſſe to others: And if it be well obſerued, there ſhould be neither Magiſtrate nor officer that ſhould

Aduantages of a popular eſtate

Diſaduantages of a popular eſtate.

haue ſupriority aboue the reſt: and this inequality ruines friendſhip in ſtead of maintayning it. As for the publicke, there is no Eſtate worſe gouerned then a popular, there all things are ſold as in a Faire (as *Plato* ſayth) being gouerned by men bred vp and giuen to gaine. Men moſt commonly furious, if they be not terrified, and in their feare irreſolute in all their actions, nothing ſecret, and difficult to be drawne together at need; and whom in many Eſtates, they haue bin forced to inuite them to aſſemble for the diſtribution of the publicke mony amongſt them.

Their aſſemblies are alwaies full of diſorders, varieties and inconſtancy: the ordinary defects of a multitude. Wiſe men dare not ſpeake, fearing the fury of the people, who alwayes lay their faults vpon their Gouernors; and Fooles crying out loudeſt carry it. If you do not hold the people in ſome feare of ſtrangers, ſtirring vp ſome Warre againſt them, they will forge a Ciuill; there being neuer any quarrell or enuy ſo great, as amongſt thoſe which are equall; be it to ſupplant one another; or for that the one cannot liue without the other. The need which they haue one of another, being the principall bond of ordinary friendſhip: and they are inconſtant, being of an humour which cannot continue long in quiet; vnleſſe there be ſome number of Citizens, who hauing credit and agreeing together, ſtay the violence wherewith the people ſuffer themſelues commonly to be tranſported. The Suiſſes, which are gouerned in this forme of Eſtate, are aſſiſted by the Country, to the which no man hath any great deſire, and which of it ſelfe is ſtrong by the nature of the people, who are very groſſe and nothing ambitious; being diuerted from dreaming of innouations by their drunkenneſſe, wherein they ſpend more of their time, then they haue remayning, and would be neceſſary to thinke of, for the moſt quarrelſome and huſie: Beſides going to the ſeruice of Princes, and by

Of the Suiſſes.

the

the vnion made among the Cantons, who being separated from the Soueraignty, one cannot attempt against all the rest, for want of intelligence; and one attempting against the Cantons hee should haue to deale with them all.

CHAP. 3.

Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Seignoury.

THe Estate of many Lords, seemes to hold a meane betwixt a Principallity and a popular Estate, being neither subiect to the tyranny of one alone, nor to the confusion of a multitude: And the Soueraignty being giuen to the wisest, many see more then one, and few resoluing better then a multitude; it seemes that this kind of Gouernment should be most desired. And if rich men haue the Gouernment, there is no doubt, but the Estate wilbe better preserued: Hauing alwaies bin held profitable, that such as receiued most losse by the ruine of the Estate, should likewise haue the greatest share in the gouernment, as hauing the same interest with them of the Estate. Aduantages of a Seignoury.

Yet experience hath taught vs, that this forme is not more assured then a popular Estate, for where there shall be many gouernours, there will alwayes be diuersity of opinions; And euery one abounding in his owne Iudgement, (especially such as haue greatest authority) will finde out occasions of Disputes in their deliberations, and breed factions in the Estate. Their resolutions will be many times discouered, and being profitable to giue the gouernment to one more worthy, if in a Principality they are many times troubled to find one that is capeable, with more difficulty shall they picke out many, which Disaduantages and inconueniences of a Seignoury.

may be capeable and worthy of this Command.

And if they will say that one may supply the defect of another, this would be difficult among equals; The voyces being numbred and not weighed: And admit this might be done, yet it were not good for the Councell, which must consist of a greater number then ordinarily the Lords are. But for the command which depends vpon a resolution of diuers opinions, of men equall in power and credit, it cannot well be but in one head.

Likewise in a combustion and trouble, they haue found that the Command of one alone was necessary, and that it was very vnsafe in a time full of Iealousies, Difficulties, and Distrusts to impart the gouernment of affaires to many. The *Lacedemonians* vpon this occasion created their *Armoste*; The *Thessalians* him whom they called *Archoes*; The *Mitileniens* their great *Achimnete*; At *Rome* they created the *Dictator*; At *Venice* their great *Providator*.

Besides all these inconueniences, a Seignoury as well as other formes of Estates, is not onely exposed to strangers, but more to the Enterprises of a multitude, whom they must content or keepe them in awe by force. To content them without yeelding vnto them part of the Estate, were very difficult, and it were impossible to admit them to offices, without danger to change the Seignoury into a popular Estate, as it happened at *Rome*. To retaine them by force, were no safe thing: and admit it might be done, yet the distrust they should haue of them, would be a cause that in the least warre attempted against strangers, they would make vse of this occasion, to take Armes and to shake off the yoake.

In this feare the Lords durst not traine vp their Souldiers to Armes; and entertaining strangers to mannage the warre, it is to be feared they will get credit among the people. If they giue the charge of this conduct to one of their Lords, vpon the first discontentment he shal haue against

againſt the reſt, or vpon the leaſt ambition that ſhall creepe into his braine, he will diſ-vnite himſelfe from them, and make himſelfe the head of a party. So as this kind of gouernment cannot ſafely vndertake a War, without danger of ruine. So whether for the diuiſion which may grow among them, or for the weakeneſſe of power diuided among many; or be it for the difficulty to agree and reſolue; Or be it that the Subiects many times know not whom to obey; Or for that affaires which ought to be kept ſecret, are moſt commonly divulg'd: This kind of gouernment is none of the ſafeſt.

Of the Seignoury of *Venice*, and by what meanes it maintaines it ſelfe.

And that which hath cauſed the Seignoury of *Venice* tō continue ſo long, and to preſerue itſelfe againſt the Enterpriſes of the people, hath not bin this order ſo much, as the policy which the Magiſtrate hath vſed; imparting ſome petty offices to the people, yea, and ſome of the greateſt, as that of the Chancellor; contracting alliances with them contrary to the ancient opinion of the *Roman* Ariſtocracy, which forbad ſuch marriages; borrowing from them to oblige them to maintaine the Eſtate; diſarming them wholy; giuing them liberty in all ſorts of pleaſure, to make them pliable; giuing vnto the rich the right of Burgoiſie, and chooſing ſome among the Cittizens to be made Gentlemen, to the end they might liue in hope one day to haue an intereſt in the Eſtate. And thus ſatisfying the Nobility with honours, the People with reſt and commodities, inuring their Subiects to warre as little as may be, eſpecially by Land; ſuppreſſing ſpeedily all warre with ſtrangers, and factions among themſelues, entertaining a neutrality with Princes, not wedding any quarrels; and changing party as their intereſt change, thus they maintaine themſelues.

Chap. 4.

Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Principality.

Aduantages & disaduantages in a Principality.

A Principality hath its Defects as well as a Seignoury or popular Estate. The first is the change of Princes, which bring with them new Designes, new Lawes, new Ministers, new Friends, new Enemies, a new manner of liuing, and new Alliances.

The second is the danger of falling into Ciuill warres by the diuision of such as aspire to the Crowne, especially if there be a right of election: and in the succession, if the Prince be an Infant, there will be a diuision for the gouernment betwixt the Mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselues. So as they haue beene often forced to auoid this Inconuenience, to giue the breeding of the Child to the Mother, and the gouernment of the Estate to the neareſt Kinsman. And if there be a Tutor, there is danger lest he make himselfe Maister of the Estate, as hath beene often seene among the *Macedonians*: If there bee many, they are reduced to the inconueniences of many Lords.

If the Prince be young, and freed from a Gouernour, young men cause him to commit a thousand disorders, and to reiect all sorts of good Councell: And if he be warlike, he will hazard his Subiects, his Estate, and Person: If hee be subtill and wicked, hee will settle a Tyranny: If he be cruell, he will make a Butchery of his Subiects: If he be luxurious, hee will trouble the holiest Marriages of his Estate, which is a thing which doth most passionate the people: If he be co-

uetous

uetous or prodigall, he will be an exacter; and if he be ſimple and ignorant, it will be much worſe, ſuffring himſelfe to be gouerned by men of no merit, who for their owne priuate intereſt and greatneſſe, will attempt all manner of villanies vnder his authority. Yet not withſtanding theſe inconueniences, it is moſt certaine, (as hath beene ſayd) that a ſoueraigne commaund cannot ſubſiſt, (to ſpeake properly) but in one perſon alone; as they ſay that many ſee better then one alone: But to reſolue, to conclude, and to commaund, one will doe it better then many. As for Alliances of Princes, they doe not alwayes dye with the Princes, there being treaties which are made from one Eſtate into another. And in regard of the Princes minority, when it happens, the affaires are not alwayes found diſpoſed to Innouation; and according to the occaſions they may preuent the miſchiefes which happen by this defect.

The other inconueniences are rather particular vices of the Prince, then defects of the Gouernment, and vices dye with the Princes perſon, but not the vices and abuſes of Lords in a Seignoury, nor of a multitude in a popular Eſtate, for that Communalties neuer dye: But contrariwiſe as they are perpetuated by ſubrogation, ſo by contagion the abuſes which enter into theſe companies, paſſe from one to another.

That the people haue no cauſe to deſire liberty in a principality.

And in regard of liberty, which is the foundation of other Eſtates, being onely deſired to hinder great men from oppreſſing their inferiours, this may be prouided for by Iuſtice, the which being duly executed in a Principality, the people hath no Subiect to deſire liberty: for that this deſire would onely tend to an Anarchicall licenciouſneſſe, which would make them more miſerable then iuſt and lawfull ſubiection. But that which makes the people vnable to iudge of the liberty which is in a iuſt Principality, is that true liberty conſiſting in not to be wrong'd,

no

no man doth acknowledge himselfe bound to him that doth not wrong him.

Chap. 5.

A consideration of the setling of the forme of an Estate.

By their defects and aduantages which are found in these three kinds of gouernments, we may afterwards iudge (adding thereunto the consideration of the inclination of the people) of the particular manner of liuing, and of the condition of the people and affaires, the which ought to be setled rather in one place then in another. Among men that are equall and impatient of Rule, as your Sea-faring men be, and such as dwell in Mountaines and Forrest, by reason of the austerity and roughnesse of their manners and liuing, a popular Estate would be more proper then any other. *Themistocles* desiring to settle a popular Estate in *Athens*, aduanced Sea-faring men, and gaue authority to Marriners. *Cato* sayd that the *Macedonians* deserued to be free, for that they could not be restrained vnder the rule of him that would command them.

If there be an inequality, one part being richer then the other, and that wealth hath bred some dependance and respect of the meaner sort towards the great ones, a Seignoury and gouernment of few may be well established amongst such men.

If in this inequality there be a Diuision or Discord, some being vnwilling to yeeld to others; and that there be found some one that hath more power and credit, they must of necessity settle a principality.

After a Battaile lost, or some other disgrace happened, a people being amazed, finding no Councell in themselues, they

they willingly referre the diſpoſition of their affaires to him or them which promiſe to preſerue them. So as in ſuch an incounter it is eaſie in ſteed of a popular Eſtate to ſettle a Seignoury or a principallity. As contrariwiſe, a multitude hauing had ſome good ſucceſſe, and growing inſolent, it fals out that making no accompt of their Lords, they change the commaund of few into a popular Eſtate, or into a Principallity, if he by whoſe meanes, this good Fortune hath befalne them, hath credit, conduct, and courage ſufficient to make vſe of his good Fortune.

I will adde, that a fearefull and timerous people giuen to their pleaſures, little carefull and incapable of affaires, are better gouerned and more happily by a Prince, then by any other kind of gouernment. Where as contrarywiſe, a people that is rough, auaritious, preſumptuous, and hardy, do vnwillingly yeild themſelues vnder a principallity, if it be not very moderate, or altogether warlicke, in the which abſolute commaunds are ſupported by force.

It may likewiſe be ſayd, that a Principallity is maintayned better in a great Eſtate, conſiſting of perſons of diuers qualities; and a ſmall Eſtate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Gouernment: for that in a great Eſtate, being neceſſary to trayne vp the Subiects to Armes to defend it, it fals out vſually, that he which is maſter of the Forces, makes himſelfe likewiſe maſter of the Eſtate; as it hath hapned at *Rome*, and in many other Common-weales.

Contrariwiſe, a Prince in a ſmall Eſtate is many times forced to become a Tyrant, and ſo much the greater and ſeuerer Tyrant, as the extent of his Tyranny, that is to ſay of his Country, is the leſſe, hauing no meanes to draw from his Subiects (without great oppreſſion) ſo much mony as he ſhall haue need of for his defence, to the which all his Subiects would contribute willingly

their

their perſons and meanes, if they were reduced to a republique or popular Eſtate.

Chap. 6.

Of the dependance of Eſtates one of another.

THe forme of Eſtates is diuers, according to the dependance of thoſe which commaund. For although we treate onely of Eſtates that haue all ſoueraignty ouer their Subiects; yet there are which depend in ſome ſort of another, and others which doe not hold, as they ſay, but of God and their Swords, hauing no dependance of any man.

Wherein conſists the dependance of eſtates one to another.

Eſtates depend of another by tribute, duty, honour, protection, or penſion. By tribute, when as beſides the tribute which they owe to ſome other Soueraignes, the other markes of Soueraignty remaine. By duty, when according to ſome obligation they owe ſuccours to ſome one, be it in money or men. By honour, when as ſome Soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another, yet without preiudizing the others rights of Soueraignty. By protection, when as ſome one hath put himſelfe into the protection of another to defend him; whereby he is ſayd to depend on his protector.

As for a Penſioner, he ſeemes to depend no more of him that giues the penſion, nor to be inferiour to him, then the other is to him. For although he ſeemes inferiour receiuing the penſion, yet the other in giuing it, makes ſhew that he hath neede of his ſuccours: And when as *Honorius* treated with the *Gots*, and made them his penſioners. *Lampadius* oppoſing himſelfe, ſayd, that it was a paction of Seruitude, by the which they made the Emperour tributary to the *Gots*. Yet *I* hold that this ought to

to be iudged by the quality and power of the Eſtates, and by the particular conuentions. For the ſuccours may be ſo great in regard of the penſion, as we might eaſily diſcerne who had the aduantage in this treaty, and in like manner if there were any neceſſity in the one, to doe that which they had ſtipulated from him; and that what they deſired of another, were left to his free will: whereupon knowledge of the cauſe the firſt ſhall be inferiour to the laſt.

The markes of Soueraignty which remaine, not withſtanding theſe dependances are, to giue a law to all in generall, and to all in particular, without the conſent of any that are greater, equall or inferiour: To inſtitute the principall Officers: to make leuies of money and men: to diſpoſe of the principall affaires, not yeelding an accompt to any man: to giue pardon to condemned perſons aboue the rigour of the Law: To iudge definitiuely and without appeale, to hold this power of himſelfe, and from no ſuperiour: To declare Warre and treate of Peace; to diſpoſe of the Treaſure: to coyne Money, to caſt Artillery, to build Fortreſſes and ſuch like. The markes of Soueraignty.

CHAP. 7.

Of the forme of Eſtates according to the right of thoſe which commaund them.

THe forme of Eſtates is likewiſe diuers, in regard of the right of ſuch as commaund: and accordingly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull, as well in a Principality, Seignoury, as a popular Gouernment. The lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs, be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it, or by a iuſt conqueſt, or elſe that which is deferred by the Lawes, the which hath eyther followed ſucceſſion,

Succeſſion, Election, or Lots. The Lot is more proper for a popular Gouernment, for that all things are equall; and they ſeldome make vſe of it in the Gouernment of a Principallity or a Seignoury. Yet *Saul* was made King by Lot: And *Alexanders* Succeſſours after his death diuided his Empire by Lot. At *Venice* they draw them by Lots which are to chooſe the principall Magiſtrates. But ſuch eſtabliſhments are not ordinary.

Succeſſion and Election are the moſt ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a Principallity and Seignoury, whereof it is neceſſary to know the aduantages and inconueniences, which we may hope for, or feare.

Chap. 8.

Aduantages and diſaduantages of an Election in a Principallity.

Inconueniences of election in a principality.

THe Election in a Monarchy or Principallity is dangerous, for the miſeries which the interim or vacancy doth vſually breed, whileſt they are about to chooſe a King, the Eſtate remayning in an Anarchy, without Lord or Gouernour: Like vnto a Ship without a Pylot, which owes his ſhipwracke to the firſt Wind. For in the meanetime Theeues and Robbers, vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new King, commit a thouſand Villanies: as is often ſeene the See being voyd at *Rome*, or, as in *Poland*, ſo as the puniſhment ought to be doubled, for the exceſſe which is committed during that time.

Beſides this, in the purſuit of the Election, you ſee many factions, whereof the leaſt is ſufficient to ruine the Eſtate: the which not able to be reconciled, they frame parties, which delay the Election, and continue the intereigne, with the diſorders which accompany it.

But

But if eyther party chooſe whom they thinke good, then growes a Ciuill Warre, which continues long after. This hath bin ſeene in the Election of Popes and Emperours: and the Empire hath bin voyd eighteene yeares, after that *William* Earle of *Holland* had bin ſlaine. For although that *Alphonſo* the tenth King of *Spaine* were choſen, yet he refuſed this quality, for the apparent danger, to take the charge of an Eſtate, expoſed to the will of Subiects, to the enuy of Princes, and to the violence of the ſtranger: And in the meane time the wicked exceeded in all villany. Moreouer in the Election, an ouerture being made of many, if they fall to force, the moſt cunning and raſh would carry it, and the moſt vertuous would not hazard themſelues. If they make themſelues Competitors, and will containe themſelues within the ordinary bounds, he ſhall neuer be choſen againſt the hot purſuit of others, who at need know well how to free themſelues. And be the Election made of one of the Country, or of a ſtranger; yet there are great inconueniences of either ſide.

Among thoſe of the ſame Country, there wilbe alwaies iealouſie, and the one will neuer obay the other: And although they be not all equall in Wealth and Vertue: yet they will ſtill preſume themſelues to be ſuch. If they make choyſe of a Forraigne Prince, his manners being different will not be pleaſing: he will aduance thoſe of his Country, in whom he hath greateſt confidence. If there fall vnto him another Kingdome by Succeſſion where he may commaund more abſolutely, he will leaue the Electife to ſome Leiutenant: Or if the two Eſtates be neighbours, with the one he will make the other ſubiect. They will alwayes be in diſtruſt, that he will aduance his Country-men, and deprriue them of the right of Election; and he on the other ſide, will grow iealous of his Subiects, if he hath that deſſigne: and to purchaſe their good wills, and reduce them to what he deſires, he will

giue and ingage vnto them the demeanes and Reuenewes of the Eſtate, as ſome Emperours and Popes haue done. Behold the inconueniences of an Election.

Aduantages of an election.

The aduantages conſiſt more in imagination then in Effect: for to ſay, that they chooſe the better, it is a thing which indeed ought to be, but cannot be effected, by reaſon of practiſes, Factions, and Ielouſies: and withall I will adde, that the peoples ayme, which hath followed this meanes of Election, hath not bin alwayes to chooſe the moſt vertuous and wiſe: But ſome haue had reſpected to Nobility only; others to age, as the *Arabians*: others to the greatneſſe of the body, as in *Æthiopia*: and the *Scythians* (if we may beleeue *Ariſtotle*) made choyſe of him that dranke beſt.

A conſideratiõ in the election.

Notwithſtanding what defects ſoeuer may be in an Election, yet if it be receiued into an Eſtate, it muſt be maintayned: and they to whom the charge is giuen to make the Election muſt among other conſiderations aduiſe to make choyſe of a Succeſſour, that is vnlike in nature and diſpoſition to his Predeceſſour, to the end that of two diuers diſpoſitions, there may be a well tempered order in the Eſtate, there being no humor, how wel compoſed ſoeuer it be, which bends not towards ſome vicious Extreamity, from the which by this meanes they retyre the gouernment of the Eſtate: and withall they grow weary to ſee continually one manner of proceeding, the which is neuer ſo Exact, as all the Subiects can reſt ſatisfied: So as by the ſociety of one humor ſome grow diſtaſted, and others are diſcontented, wherby a diſorder may grow. It is therefore Expedient by this variety to retayne the Eſtate. Yet it is a thing wherof they think leaſt: and we vſually ſee, that although the Election be free; yet they make choyſe of him who naturally ſhould ſucceed, if he be of age capable to Command: And this they do to preuent the Enuies and partiallities which the choyſe of one of another houſe may breed.

CHAP.

CHAP. 9.

Of Succeſſion, diuerſly practiſed in Succeſſions.

THe other meanes to come vnto the Gouernment of an Eſtate receiued by the Lawes, is Succeſſion the which is diuerſly practized: For the Commaund is referred to men and women indifferently: or to men, to the excluſion of women.

The Commaund which is referred incluſiuely to men and Women, hath for its Foundation the Law of Succeſſions, and the Equallity which is betwixt man and Woman; yet this is alſo diuerſly practized: For eyther the Commaund is deferr'd to Women, according to the order and degrees of Proximity, obſerued in ordinary Succeſſions: Or only in defect of Males, aſwell in the direct as the Colaterall Line, vnto the fourth degree incluſiuely: As it was reſolued by the Cardinals for the Realme of *Naples*, as it appeares in the Inueſtiture of *Alphonſo* of *Aragon*, in the Yeare 1345. and of *Ferdinand* in the Yeare 1458:

And although that this Succeſſion of women to the gouernment of Eſtates be receiued in a manner by all the Eſtates of *Chriſtendome*: Yet ſome haue reiected it; there being no queſtion of the poſſeſſion of an inheritance, but to commaund a Nation: the which ſeemes to be againſt the ſtayednes and modeſty which ought to be in that Sex; againſt the Lawes of nature, which hath giuen force and prudence to men; and againſt the Law of GOD, which hath made the Woman ſubiect to man. They adde hereunto Inconſtancy, Fragillity, and looſneſſe, vices much to be feared in this Sex, and, of great conſequence in an Eſtate, their weaknes expoſed to the force of Strangers, and to the contempt of Subiects, who will not fayle to calumniate the

Reaſons for the which they exclude women frō the gouernment in ſome eſtates.

Princeſſe if ſhe doth not marry : And if ſhe marries (the which is neceſſary to haue an aſſured Succeſſor) it muſt be eyther to one of the Country or to a Stranger. She will vnwillingly marry to one of her Subiects, as well for that ſhe will thinke ſhe hath diſhonoured her ſelfe; as for feare leaſt her other Subiects, eyther Equall or greater then he with whom ſhe hath married, would grow into ſome iealouſie; the which would breed contempt, and afterwards diſorder.

If ſhe marries a Stranger, he ſhalbe enuied of his neighbours and ſuſpected by his Subiects, neither can he hold his life aſſured to commaund in a ſtrange Country, vnleſſe he hath Forces & Forts whereof he is the maſter. He will likewiſe commaund the Eſtate; and the better to aſſure himſelfe, he will aduance his owne, and keep backe thoſe of the Country : An inſupportable thing to all Nations of the World. Theſe are partly the Reaſons for the which they Exclude Women from the Gouernment in ſome Eſtates.

Diuerſity in the ſucceſſion of Males.

There are alſo ſome diuerſities in Eſtates, where as the ſucceſſion of men to the gouernment is only receiued, aſwell for the diuiſion, as for the order of ſucceeding. For the diuiſion ſome haue allowed it : and in the firſt and ſecond Race of the Kings of *France*, it was practized : But the diuiſion which grew thereby, taught the *French*, that the Commaund ought to be in one alone, and that it could not be diuided without ruine of the Eſtate. The ſame is at this day obſerued in *England*, *Scotland*, *Spaine*, and *Hungary*.

For the order of Succeſſion, ſome haue receiued none but thoſe that were Legitimate; others for want of lawfull iſſue, haue admitted Baſtards in the direct line, to the excluſion of Colaterals. And for the order of Succeſſion amongſt the Legitimate, they haue alſo found diuers opinions; aſwell in the direct Line, to know if the ſonne of the Eldeſt ſhould ſucceed his Grand-father to the

the Excluſion of his Vncle; as in a Colaterall Line, that is to ſay whether in the Succeſſion of a Colaterall, very remote, he which is deſcended from the Eldeſt branch, ought to be preferred to others which are much neerer in degree. The which *Baldus* decided long ſince, for the Succeſſion of this Realme, in faueur of the *Bourbons*, who repreſented the Eldeſt branch, that of *Valloys* failing: God hath confirmd it, in bleſſing the Armes of K. *Henry* the 4. with a miraculous proſperity, to attaine to this eſtate.

CHAP. 10.

Of vſurpation, or an vnlawfull Commaund.

AN vnlawfull Commaund is called Vſurpation, the which is eyther made by one alone, or by few men, or by the Faction of a multitude. That which is done by one alone, is eyther practized vpon a Prince, or vpon a Seignoury, or againſt a Popular Eſtate: And he which attempts is a Stranger or a Subiect. I will not lay open the manner of their proceedings, nor the meanes which an Vſurper ſhould hold. It is too common a Science, and too much practized in theſe dayes, the which deſerues rather to be forgotten then taught, for the miſeries which it doth procure, not only to the preiudice of thoſe, whom they may ouermaſter; but likewiſe to thoſe which are thruſt on to ſuch interprizes. For if there be difficulty to prepare the affaires, and bring them to an end, there is no leſſe to maintaine himſelfe. And it is moſt certain, that there is more difficulty for a Prince which hath vſurped the liberty of another, to preſerue him ſelfe in his vſurpation, then it is for a multitude which haue recouered their liberty, to maintayn themſelues. For if in a people cuſtom to be guided makes meſt commonly the liberty where into they haue bin ſet vnprofitable, not knowing

Of the miſeries it doeth procure, and the difficulties they encounter.

what gouernment meanes, nor hauing any vnderſtanding of the Eſtate; like vnto a ſauage Beaſt, which had bin fed in a Serraile or Cage, being once eſcaped knowes not whither to goe, hauing not beene accuſtomed to feede like others, and not knowing whither to retire, is made a prey to the firſt that will captiuate him or inchaine him: Yet it is more difficult to ſettle a Principality, for this new greatneſſe is ſubiect to the enuy of Neighbours, and the hatred of Subiects; who ioyning together, chaſe the Vſurper more eaſily away, then he entred into this new Eſtate. Whereas a multitude which hath recouered their liberty, hath no cauſe to feare the hatred of Subiects, ſeeing that all receiue benefit by this Enterprize: And the enuy of Neighbours is ſometimes pacified by the hatred they beare to him whom the people haue expelled in regard of his bad carriage.

Moreouer in a new Common-weale euery man contributes freely, and thinkes that what he payes is for his owne particular profit: Yea the greateſt contribute willingly, for the deſire they haue to attaine vnto ſome honour by their contribution. Contrariwiſe an Vſurper hath difficulty to finde money to maintaine himſelfe, and entertaine his Eſtate, vnleſſe he vſe violence, which doubles the hatred of his Subiects againſt him. There are an infinite number of other difficulties proceeding from the new Command of a new Lord, with whom the people cannot ſo eaſily accommodate themſelues. So as for the ſetling of this new Principality, it is neceſſary that he reſide himſelfe vpon the place, to the end he may the better ſee the diſorders, and preuent them ſpeedily. For by this meanes the Subiects ſhall haue more occaſion to loue him, or to feare him if they doe ill; and he that would aſſaile the Eſtate, will reſolue with more difficulty.

The vſurpations which are made by many, or by the people vpon their naturall Prince, are no leſſe vniuſt; for that they happen not moſt commonly, but after the bad gouernment

gouernment of the Prince. They are in ſome ſort iuſtifi-ed by the iniuſtice of his actions. That is likewiſe as vniuſt, which is attempted againſt a Seignoury by the people, the which moſt commonly growes from the Iniury of the Lords againſt their Subiects: who being aſſiſted by ſome one of the Lords, who ſeparates himſelfe from the reſt to ioyne with them, preuayling in their Enterpri-zes, they commonly change the Seignoury into a tyran-nous Principality.

And it is neceſſary that in all theſe changes there ſhould be Iniuſtice, and likewiſe violence: vnleſſe the change were made as at *Venice*, the which in the beginning was gouerned by the people; and afterwards the gate being ſhut to thoſe which had retired out of the City, and neg-lected the Offices of the Eſtate, vnto thoſe which had them, afterwards they made an Eſtate of many Lords, without any iealouſie or violence. The ſame happens vſu-ally in all popular Eſtates, which inſenſibly change into a Seignoury, whenas they receiue Strangers, and impart no Offices vnto them. For theſe by ſucceſſion of time encreaſe and multiply: and contrariwiſe the Families of he ancient Inhabitants being onely imployed in the char-ges of the Warre and State, diminiſh, ſo as the gouern-ment is found in the hands of the ſmaller number.

It hath happned ſometimes, that the greateſt part of the Lords hauing beene defeated in Battaile, the people haue changed the Seignoury into a popular Eſtate: as the *Tarrentins* did, after the Battaile which was giuen againſt the *Iapiges*, in the which in a manner all the Nobility of *Tarrnetum* dyed. Finally it is in him that will giue a new forme to an Eſtate, to accommodate himſelfe according to the occurrents of affaires, and therein to follow that whereof the people may be moſt capeable.

CHAP. II.

Of the diuerſity which is found among Subiects in an Eſtate.

The diuers conditions of subiects diuerſifies the force of the eſtate.

BVt this will not be ſufficient to giue forme to an Eſtate, to regulate and preſcribe the number, with the right and dependance of thoſe which ought to commaund: You muſt likewiſe haue a care to the diuerſity which is found vſually among thoſe which muſt obey, according to the which they muſt many times carry themſelues diuerſly. But for that it would be too long a ſearch to examine particularly the diuers qualities of Subiects, it ſhall ſuffice to make mention of thoſe chiefly which ſerue in the gouernment.

Of Bond men.

The firſt diſtinction of Subiects is, that they are all free or Bond-men. The Bond-man is he whom the right of Warre hath made ſubiect, or that is borne of a Father that is a Bond-man. In old time the Maſters had power of life and death ouer them: but the cruelty they vſed, cauſed this power to be cut off. In the end Chriſtianity hath aboliſhed it amongſt vs, for the charity which ought to be among men, and by this meanes hath preſerued Eſtates from an infinite number of dangers, whereunto they were ſubiect; for that Bond-men being ill intreated, might fortifie an alteration, or attempt themſelues, as *Spartacus* did. Wherefore ſome of the *Roman* Senate deſiring to diuerſifie the habite of Bond-men from ſuch as were free, one of the wiſeſt Senators let them know the danger, if the Bond-men came to number themſelues: For they will ſoone free themſelues of their Maſters, for the facility they ſhould haue to conſpire by the ſigne of their habits.

Yet ſome vnder colour of making priuate men to be better ſerued, and to cut off the infinite number of Vagabonds,

bonds, Idle perſons, and Bankrupts, who after they haue conſumed their eſtates, pay the world with nothing; haue held it fit to bring Bond-men into an Eſtate. But this is ſo farre from hindring and cutting off the number, as it would augment that of Theeues. For a Bond-man hauing once eſcaped, will be alwayes forced, (not daring to ſhew himſelfe) to retire among Theeues: and he is no wiſe Politician that chaſeth Theeues out of an Eſtate, but he that keepes them from entring.

In regard of free Subiects, ſome are priuiledged, ſimple Subiects and bound to all the Lawes: others are priuiledged and exempt from ſome one: ſome for their Age, others for their ſex; ſome by particular fauour, or by the prerogatiue of their charge and vocation; and others are bound to ſome duties of honour or aſſiſtance more then the reſt; as feudataries and vaſſals. Of priuiledged Subiects.

Of ſimple Subiects, ſome are Originaries, the reſt are Strangers. The Originaries are thoſe which are borne in the Eſtate, enioying all the Lawes. As for Strangers, they are intreated diuerſly in the world. For they draw ſome eyther to people the Country, or Townes newly built; or to weaken their neighbours, or to gaine good wits, who may ſerue eyther for Traffique, or in the War, or for the inſtruction of Youth, and in this caſe they are moſt commonly priuiledged. Others come of themſelues, eyther for that they are chaſed out of their Countrey, or with an intent to benefit their Eſtates. In this caſe they are ſo farre from being priuiledged, as all liberty to diſpoſe is taken from them; and dying, that which they haue accrews to the Prince and State, if they haue no Heire remayning there. Of ſimple Subiects. Of ſtrangers.

Behold the diuerſity of their conditions which obey, diuerſifying the gouernment. But the forme of the Eſtate may be alſo conſidered by the diuiſion they make of Subiects, according to the diuerſity of their vocation or profeſſion.

CHAP.

Chap. 12.

Of the diuersity and distinction of Subiects, according to their vocations and professions.

Diuers orders of Subiects,

In many Estates the Subiects are distinguished into three orders: As in *France*, into that of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the third estate which is the people. This distinction is followed in a manner throughout all *Europe*, and taken from that of the ancient *Gaules*, who were distinguished into Drindes, Horsemen, and the common people. In *Ægypt* there were Labourers, Priests, Shepheards, men at Armes, and Artizans. The *Arabians* were diuided into Priests, men at Armes, and Labourers; who made three distinct bodies. In some Common-weales they haue beene distinguished otherwise, as at *Venice*, into Gentlemen, Cittizens, and common people: and the Gentlemen into ancients, new and last, or more new: Yet this last distinction makes but one body. At *Florence* they had the great, the popular, and the populace.

But among all distinctions those are very considerable, which are reduced vnder certaine bodies, Colledges, and Comminalties, whereof some are religious, as Conuents, Abbies, and Chapters: Others are politicall and ciuill, ordayned eyther for Commerce, or for the safety of a Towne or Countrey, or for Councell and Iustice. Other Comminalties are composed of Trades and Artizans, diuided by Brotherhoods or Companies; the which *Numa* brought first into *Rome*, to quench the faction of the *Sabins* and *Romans*, and to re-vnite these two people into one, taking away the first diuision by this second Distinction; which being reduced into many parts, mingled one with another, was much lesse dangerous. And afterwards

afterwards *Tarquin* the proud, to take away all signes of this ancient Diuision, mingled their Ensignes.

The like course hath bin followod to re-vnite the Estate of *Genoa*, afflicted at one time by many Diuisions: That is to say, by the *Gnelphes* and *Gibelins*; the Nobility and the people; and that of the *Adornes* and *Fregoses*. For to vnite the people diuided into so many factions, they made a mixture of the one with the other, in making a department of Twenty eight families, vnder the which they reduced the rest; although they carryed not the name of the family, neyther were formerly of the same party. In other Estates they haue diuided the people by Parishes or quarters: and in other by Families.

The Subiect for settling of such and the like Diuisions of the people, must be eyther to let them vnderstand more easily the Soueraignes command, or to retire from them their approbation or advice, vpon some propositi-on that is made vnto them: Or for that factions haue already brought in such distinctions, as they are forced to countenance and allow them: Or else as *Numa* did, to take away the name of a distinction more preiudicial to the Estate: Or to ease the Prince of some part of his care: or to giue assurance to the people of good vsage, in making choise of a good number among them, for the managing of affaires which concerne them in particular: And these diuisions are very considerable, as also their power and authority with the people, and their dependance of the Prince their Soueraigne, as making a part of the forme of the Estate.

The subiect of the establishing of Comminalties and companies in an estate.

For in some Estates the Soueraigne cannot resolue any thing of importance, without these Comminalties, or some of them: as the King of *Poland* without the Senate. In others he resolues; but his resolution must be allowed by them, to the end it may be imbraced by the people. In others he resolues in certaine things in the which the Comminalties haue but one voyce: as likewise in

That the Prince ought not to croſſe the Comminalties, nor ſuffer them to attempt any thing aboue their power.

in certaine things the Comminalty reſolue without the Soueraigne. But as the Soueraigne ought to eſtabliſh this temper in the Soueraignty, according to the diſpoſition of affaires and perſons: ſo being once ſetled, he muſt haue a care not to croſſe it vnſeaſonably; leſt that in ſhewing himſelfe a concurrent in ſome things, he make himſelfe by the ſame meanes equall to his Subiects, whereof this Comminalty is compoſed, which will be alwayes ſupported by others. As in like manner he muſt haue a care that they attempt not any thing that is aboue their power, hindring them vpon the leaſt occaſion; and in the beginning: for it is the ordinary of ſuch Companies, to vſurpe as much authority as they can, and to grow bold by ſufferance.

CHAP. 13.

Of Religion.

Of the efficacy & neceſſity of Religion in an Eſtate.

AFter the eſtabliſhing of the forme of the Eſtate, the moſt conſiderable is that of Religion: For it is the cauſe of good order and good Fortune; And Fortune the Mother of good ſucceſſe: And ſo ſhe is not onely the foundation, but the cauſe of the preſernation and greatneſſe of the Eſtate.

Although a people vnable many times to be reſtrayned but by feare, yet there is not any thing more naturall, nor more iuſt, nor of greater efficacy in the minds of men, then that which proceeds from the Reuerence which we owe vnto God. And whereas the feare of God is wanting, of neceſſity the Eſtate muſt run to ruine; or it muſt be ſupported by the feare of a Prince, who ſupplies this defect: who although he were ſuch a one, (the which is difficult) yet this Prince fayling, the feare would likewiſe be wanting, and by conſequence the obedience; for that

for that the Successor can seldome inherite this Authority which dyes with the person.

Moreouer many things presenting themselues in an Estate, which he must doe, or hinder, and which cannot be perswaded by any reasons which may be alledged, men by their insufficiency not able to satisfie themselues; and force on the other side being a dangerous instrument handle, which doth harme as soone as good, the authority of man being not powerfull enough, we must of necessity haue recourse to the authority of Religion, which amongst people fearing God hath no reply. Wherfore most men which haue desired to effect some great and extraordinary matter, haue made vse of this meanes, as the most powerfull, were it for the setling of Estates, or for the reformation. Which is the reason that in most part of Religions they obserue infinite acts of policy, the which the people would easily slight ouer, were they not restrayned by the respect of Religion. This care then for the setling of Religion, is one of the chiefe in the Estate, for that it ought to be established with all purity, and without abuses: and where we shall finde any brought in already, we ought to cut them off; whereof the principall are diuersity of opinions, blasphemy, carelessnesse, and superstition. *Of abuses in Religion.*

We will first treate of the chiefe meanes which haue bin obserued in the setling of Religions.

CHAP. 14.

Of the meanes held in the establishing of Religions.

THe establishment of Religion is eyther made by extraordinary meanes, exceeding the discourse of man, or by humane courses. The first haue not bin imployed but to settle the true Religion; and the

the latter haue serued as well to settle superstition and impiety as the truth.

Extraordinary meanes for the establishing of true Religion.

The extraordinary meanes are miracles and Martirdome; euery man perswading himselfe that the Constancy they see in one that suffers, cannot proceed but from the particular assistance of God. For although that in Paganisme, they haue seene many Murtherers of Tyrants, and others of all conditions, which haue endured vnspeakable torments with great patience: Yet one age of Christianity would furnish many more examples, then all the time that Paganisme continued. This constancy then which cannot be attributed but to a Diuine assistance, euery man thinkes he hath reason to beleeue, that what they say that suffer so constantly, proceeds from God, and is true.

As for Miracles, some are reputed such, for that they are contrary to the common order of Nature; and others for that they are against the common opinion, who iudging one thing impossible or difficult, makes him to seeke by prayers, vowes, and promises, succours from aboue, the which succeeding according to our desire, we take the euent for a testimony of his power, whom as God we haue inuocated to our succours, and begin to acknowledge him for such.

Adad King of the *Axumites*, a people beyond *Egypt*, hauing promised to make himselfe a Christian, if he wone the victory against the King of the *Homerites*, who for the most part were *Iewes*; hauing obtained it, he sent to demand Bishops and Doctors from the Emperour *Iustinian*, to instruct him and his people, who sent him *Marcionarius* from *Alexandria*. *Clouis* after the Battaile wone against the *Germans* neare vnto *Cullen*, made himselfe a Christian, with the remainders of the *French*, who had not yet imbraced the Christian Faith; according to a vow which he had made before the Combat, the which he held very dangerous for him; and thus he esta-

blished

bliſhed the Chriſtian Religion among the *French*, diſpoſed thereunto by this victory, the which being vnexpected by them, conſidering the great number of their Enemies, they could not attribute it but to his power, to whom their King had made a vow.

CHAP. 15.

Humane meanes for the ſetling of Religion.

AS for humane meanes they depend partly vpon the diſpoſition of the people, amongſt whom they meane to ſettle Religion, and partly of the quality of ſuch as deſire to eſtabliſh it.

The diſpoſition of people cõſiderable for the ſetling of Religion.

For the diſpoſition of the people, the firſt conſideration we muſt make, is of their diſpoſition. For ſome are barbarous; others ciuillized. We call them commonly barbarous which gouerne not themſelues as we doe, and according to our opinion. So the *Grecians*, and afterwards the *Romans*, called all other Nations barbarous, although that *Aſia* had ciuillized the *Grecians*, and the *Grecians* had taught the Lawes and Sciences to the *Romans*. By the like folly there are ſome *Italian* Writers, who ſpeaking of the *Germans*, *French*, and *Spaniards*, call them by this name; although there be not any of theſe Nations that yeelds inciuility or policy to *Italy*.

who are properly called barbarians.

Our meaning is not to extend Barbariſme ſo farre, but to call thoſe Barbarians, in whom is obſerued a Brutiſhneſſe, Ignorance, Stupidity, and an inſupportable rudenes of manners, be it in Religion, or in their manner of liuing, and apparrell, or in their habitation, or in the form of their gouernment.

Barbarians in Religion.

Of Barbarians in Religion, ſome acknowledge not any Diuinity, and yet they are giuen to Enchantments and Sorceries:

Sorceries: As ſome Hiſtorians write, that anciently the *Huns* were, when they came foorth of their Country; and that many of thoſe *Northerne* people are yet. And in *America* the *Braſiliens* and *Cycimeques*. Others haue ſome kind of Religion or rather Superſtition, but ſo farre from Reaſon, as it is no difficult thing to confute it. Others worſhip a plurality of Gods, yet not acknowledging any one for the ſoueraigne Creator. Others acknowledge a Creator, but they worſhip the Sunne for a Creator, or ſome other Creature, as in *Cuſco* and *Mexico*, and theſe two laſt kinds of Barbarians haue their Ceremonies, Feaſts, and Solemnities, better Regulated then the two firſt. There are others which adore Idols, whoſe ſacrifices in like manner are ordred. Beſides theſe we may hold for Barbarians, ſuch as haue another foundation of Religion then we haue.

Of the Authors of moſt part of Religion at this day.

There is a Rabby, which writes that there hath bin foure Law-giuers, which haue diuided the VVorld by their opinions, from which moſt part of Regions at this day proceed. The firſt is *Moſes*, the ſecond *Ieſus Chriſt*, the third *Mahomet*, and the fourth *Manes*: And this man ſuppoſing two principles or beginnings, the one good and the other bad, and attributing the ſuperior part of the VVorld to the good, who can do no Euill, and therefore ought not to be prayed vnto; and the lower part to the bad, to whom they muſt addreſſe themſelues to preſerue them from Euill, is held to be the Author of that abhominable adoration of the Diuell, receiued in a manner throughout all the Indies, where he hath ſowed his poyſon. Of theſe foure beliefes, the Chriſtian Faith being the only true, we may call the reſt Barbarous.

Barbarous in the manner of their liuing.

Barbariſme in the forme of liuing, is limited by vs in thoſe which liue like bruit Beaſts, without any manuring of the Land; and either feed vpon wild Beaſts or of Mans fleſh: As the *Popians* in *America*.

Barbarous in their cloathing

Barbariſme in the manner of their apparrell, conſiſts in the nakedneſſe of the whole

whole Body, or the greateſt part thereof as is ſeene in the Eaſt and Weſt *Indies*, and in part of *Affrica*.

Behold the habitation barbarous, not onely of thoſe which haue no certayne place of dwelling, creeping into hollow Trees, or on the top of them, or into Caues, as they find commodity; whether they liue ſeparated or in Company: but alſo of ſuch who like vnto the *Tartarians*, dwell in the fields vnder Tents, or in their Wagons, changing place according to their pleaſure. As for Barbariſme in gouerment, it is obſerued by the want of Heads, Order, and Policy, where they chooſe no Commanders but in time of war, like ſome people of *America*.

Barbarouſnes in their habitation.

Barbarous in gouernment.

By this diuerſity of Barbariſme, it is eaſie to iudge that the manner of proceeding for the ſetling of Religion, ought to be diuers. For it is certayne, that they which by their manner of liuing are more like to Beaſts then Men, ought to be made capeable of Humanity; and that to ſuch as by their nakedneſſe, ſhew that they know not what belongs to honeſty and ſhame, they muſt firſt teach them to know it, before they ſeeke to make them comprehend what Religion is. In like manner they which wander, ſcattered and diſperſed one from another, muſt be drawne together into Comminalties and Policy, ſo farre as their Nature will beare it: And they which wander ſometimes in one place, and ſometimes in another, muſt be ſtayed and ſetled in a certayne abode, to haue commodity to inſtruct them.

That the manner of proceeding for the ſetling of Religion ought to be diuers.

Then commiug to their ſuperſtitions, where they may confute the abſurdities by ſerious Reaſons, if they be capeable; or by ieſts and ſcoffes they ſhall make them grow into contempt of their opinions, falling firſt vpon thoſe whoſe foundation is weakeſt. If there be any thing good in ſome point of their opinions, or that hath any conformity with the Religion they meane to eſtabliſh, or is indifferent; they need not feare to alow of it: contrariwiſe this may ſerue for the ſetling of true Religion. S. *Paul*

at *Athens* tooke occasion to speak of Iesus Christ vpon the Altar, which was dedicated to the vnknowne God. The Apostles to gayne credit among the Pharises (who made the greatest part of the *Iewes*) spake dayly of the dead: the which the Pharises heard the more willingly, for that in the beleefe of this Article the *Saduces* were opposite vnto them. It hath much auayled for the setling of the Catholique Religion in *America*, to finde amongst those Idolaters certaine Ceremonies, which in the outward shew doe much resemble those of the Catholique.

The Nunnes of the Sunne at *Cusco*, a Towne of *Peru*, made certayne Cakes of the flower of *Mahis*, mingled with the blood of white Sheepe, which they offered in Sacrifice, and of this Cake they gaue a peece to euery Stranger that was present, who eate it in signe of Alliance, Confederation and Deuotion to the Inga; and promised neuer to doe or say any thing against the Sunne or the Inga: And this solemnity was performed twice in the yeare, in *September* and *December*. Processions at *Mexico* were in vse: and in *Peru* there were Priests, destinated to heare confessions after the manner of penitentiaries. They counterfeited the Mystery of the Trinity, worshipping three Statues of the Sunne, the one they call, *the Father Sunne*, the second *the Sonne Sunne*, and the third *the Brother Sunne*.

In like manner they had three Images of *Cuequa Bigia*, which is the God of Thunder, the which they distinguished in like manner by Father, Sonne, and Brother. They likewise made vse at *Nicaraqua* of a Crosse, which was there worshipped to obtaine Raine. Finally, these exteriour conformities, although applyed to a bad vse, haue beene great preparatiues to imploy them to better vse.

So must part of those which haue sought to settle some new Religion, haue desired rather to borrow the

the name of the establishment from the ancient, or from the reformation, then to terme themselues Authors of a new opinion; which in a poynt importing the Saluation of Man, vnder this Name of Nouilty had beene suspected. And *Mahomet* himselfe, although farre from the beleefe of Christians, yet not to discontent them, except the principall poynt which is the Diuinity of IESVS CHRIST) hath spoken of him with great Reuerence: And in regard of him, he sayth, that he was come to reforme that which his Disciples had innouated in the Law of IESVS CHRIST.

Propheſies aud predictions which may haue some reference to the setling of Religion, doth likewise dispose the minds of those that are to receiue it. The promise of sending of the *Messias*, stirr'd vp the minds of the *Iewes* to acknowledge Iesus Christ to be he which had beene promised. And the Oracles of the *Sibylles* was a great meanes to make the *Grecians* and other Gentles acknowledge that he was the Sonne of God. *Mahomet* falsifying the passage by the which Iesus Christ promised, to send the Paraclet or Comforter, sayth, that it was of himselfe; that IESVS CHRIST meant to speake. In many parts of *America* they had many predictions and prodigies, which fore-ran the comming of the *Spaniard*, and prepared them to change Religion.

Propheſies dispose a people to the setling of a new Religion.

Heauy burthens and rigours, be it that they proceed from the gouernment, or from Religion, may dispose a people to a milder Religion, if they thinke to be releiued by this meanes. *Boniface*, Arch-bishop of *Mentz*, laboured much in preaching to them of *Turingia*, to make them Christians, and in the end not able to win them by the hope of Eternall life; but hauing demaunded of him if making themselues Christians, they should be freed frō the tenths they payd the King of *Hungary*, he promised

Heauy charges and burthens dispose a people to change Religion.

and vnder his leading hauing vanquished the *Hungarians*, they became Christians. The yoake of the Kings of *Peru* and *Mexico*, insupportable to their Subiects, made the conquest of those Countryes more easie to the *Spaniards*, and likewise the aduancement of Christian Religion much more mild then the superstition, to the which the Diuill had subiected those Nations.

The *Hebrewes* which were in *Ægypt*, being miserably intreated, yeelded easily to the Religion which *Moses* taught them, vpon the promise he made to lead them into a Land abounding in all things: although that afterwards forgetting their misery, they return'd somtimes to idolatry.

The diuersity of opinions in the Religion receiued, may open a Gate to another which they would establish; for that from this diuersity growes incertainty in the mindes of men; whereby if another be presented, better accompanied with shew, it is more easily receiued. Nothing did so much fauour the opinion of *Mahomet* in *Asia* and *Affricke*, as the diuers heresies which were then crept into all the *Leuant*: especially those which concerned the Trinity, and the nature of Iesus Christ; as that of the *Mahometites*, *Nestoriens*, and *Ariens*, and the doubts which grew of eyther side vpon this Subiect: But *Mahomet* to free himselfe from these, found no shorter course, then to deny the Deity of Iesus Christ, and by this meanes to ouerthrow the beleefe of the Trinity: But that which helpt most to the aduancement of this opinion, was, that he did accommodate the Rule he made for manners to sensuality, ouer-ruling whatsoeuer concerned Christian or Iewish-authority, and forbidding nothing but that which the *Arabians* and Southerne people, among whom he liued, might well forbeare, as Wine.

Indifferency of Religion prepares to a change.

Likewise to receiue all sorts of of opinions indifferently, as they doe in *China*, may greatly helpe to the bringing in of a new Religion, for the liberty there is to treate openly without feare of blame; the which is likewise fa-

uoured

uoured by the incertainty of mens minds, which is ordinary in this multiplicity of opinions.

Reuolts and Ciuill warre doe likewiſe diſpoſe a people to receiue a new Religion, as well for that force helps the eſtabliſhment, as for that the head of a party may countenance his Armes with this pretext, and by an opinion diuers to that of others, hold thoſe of his party more firme vnto him, and better vnited among themſelues: which is a conſideration which *Tacitus* (ſpeaking like a Pagan) ſayth that *Moſes* had in the ſettling of his Religion among the *Hebrewes*.

Reuolts and Ciuill Warre diſpoſe to the change of Religion.

An vnreſtrayned liberty among a people ſomewhat Ciuill, and to open a contempt of Religion, diſpoſe them no leſſe to receiue a new, then too great rigour and auſterity. For beſides that man hath in him ſome certaine ſeeds of piety, the which he cannot long ſuffer to lye vnfruitfull, ſo as he degenerates ſometime rather into ſuperſtition then Religion: The contempt of God brings with it ſo many other inconueniences in a ſociety and ciuill conuerſation, to the which the Magiſtrate cannot preſcribe a Remedy; as the firſt which preſents it ſelfe with a ſhew of Sanctity, and a deſire of reformation, is well entertayned and heard by all men: and his opinion is the better receiued, for that the contempt of the ancient giues him place in the minds of men. So the opinion of *Homer* in the Law of *Mahomet*, being growne into contempt among the *Perſians*. *Iſmael Sophy* ſetled that of *Hally*, fill'd with many auſterities and Ceremonies. And in the Chriſtian Religion, God hath frō time to time raiſed vp great perſonages, to reſtore it by the holineſſe of their liues, and their good examples, when as it ſeemed moſt contemned and reiected.

As alſo exceſſiue liberty and contempt of Religion.

It is likewiſe no ſmall aduantage for the aduancement of a Religion in a great extent of Country, to finde it reunited vnder one Prince, as the Chriſtians did the Romane Empire: For the Example of the

The re-vnion of a Country vnder one Prince, makes the eſtabliſhment of Religion eaſie.

Prince and the chiefe about him, which they may gaine, drawes all the reſt ſuddainly after him : Whereas if the Country were deuided into many Eſtates, there would be as much trouble in the one as in a great Empire. Moreouer great Courts are more Ciuill, and more diuerſified with men of diuers ſorts of Condition, of which they may draw a good number, fit to receiue a new opinion. The facility they haue had to conuert the *Mexicains*, and *Peruans*, reduced vnder great Kings ; and the difficulty there is yet to conuert the *Braſilians* and *Cicimeques*, which haue not any, witneſſe it ſufficiently.

Theſe are the principal Encounters which may diſpoſe a people to receiue a new eſtabliſhment. But with this diſpoſition the quality of thoſe which ſeeke to bring it in, and the courſe they meane to obſerue, muſt be proportionable.

CHAP. 16.

Of Parts neceſſary in thoſe that will bring in a new Religion.

Parts and qualities neceſſary to the bringers in of a new Religion.

MAny parts are neceſſary in ſuch men : but the principall are authority and credit, courage, knowledge, or ſufficiency of wiſedome. The authority or credit, growes either from Dignity, Sanctity or force ; for the dignity it is certaine that the example of Princes and Great men, ſtrikes a great ſtroake in ſuch eſtabliſhments ; and the more if they themſelues become Miniſters and labourers in ſuch actions by publique exhortations. *Yſaphat*, ſonne to *Aſa* King of *Iuda*, ſent Preſts with ſome of the chiefe of his Court, throughout all the Prouinces of his Eſtate, to make them receiue the Law of God. *Oſuala* King of *Northumberland*, deſiring to bring the Chriſtian faith into his Eſtate, demanded

ded a Preacher from *Donvald* King of *Scotland*, who sent him *Aydan*: who being ignorant of the Saxon Tongue, this King serued him for an Interpreter to his people. The like in the time of our Fathers did the King of *Congo* in *Affricke*, seruing as an Interpreter to certaine Religious men, whom *Emannel* King of *Portugal* had sent vnto him to preach the Gospell. *Godscald*, Prince of the *Vandales*, who depended of *Aldemburg*, deliuered vnto his people in the Country Language, that which the Priests and Bishops had preached in *Latine*. *Iagellon*, great Duke of *Lituania*, hauing made himselfe a Christian to be King of *Poland*, in the yeare 1386. took such a liking to this Religion, as he himselfe preached to the *Lituanians* to conuert them. Some haue written, that *Sicebueles* King of the *Visigots*, conuerted by exhortations fourescore and ten thousand *Iewes*, for the which in the decretales he is called most religious.

We must not doubt but the authority of *Moses*, who was a great Captaine, and had made War long against the *Æthiopians* for the Kings of *Ægypt*, did assist him much to free the *Hebrewes* from Seruitude, and to make them receiue the true Religion.

Holinesse of life is so corrupt and licensious anage, giues credit to him that makes profession. This meanes is particular to Iesus Christ and to his Apostles, who being borne of an abiect condition according to the World, haue aduanced themselues by their holy and miraculous actions, aboue the greatest powers of that time. *Ismael Sophy* was desirous in the establishing of his opinion, to make vse of this voyce: But force and other humane meanes, haue contributed more then his exteriour Deuotion. Holinesse of life.

They which could not imitate his Sanctity, haue bin forced to purchase to themselues authority, to suppose Miracles and Dreames, and after the manner of *Minos*, *Sertorius*, and other Law-giuers of times past,

make the World beleeue that they had a particular communication with God, as *Mahomet* did, who had tamed a Pygeon, the which came picking in his Eare before the people, to the end he might perſwade them by this ſhew, that the Holy Ghoſt changed into a Doue, did ſuggeſt vnto him the fooleries of his Alcoron. But among the demonſtrations of a holy life, nothing doth ſo much draw the people as auſterity, to the which the Commons will hardly beleeue, that any man will ſubmit himſelfe, for ambition, vanity, or lying. And yet there haue bin Phyloſophers in times paſt, which without any deuotion haue affected it, to giue credit to their opinions; and many times the ambition of ſuch men is greater, then of ſuch which openly contend for Crowns and Kingdomes: The firſt doing like men that Row, which turne their backes to the Ports where they deſire to arriue.

As for force, it is of all the meanes by the which a man may purchaſe authority, the moſt powerfull; the reſt without its aſſiſtance ſucceeding ſeldome. Yet we haue found by Experience, that it hath bin of ſmall vſe in the ſetling of Religion, if the force hath not bin ſuch as it can receiue no tollerable oppoſition, and that the minds of men haue not bin formerly diſpoſed to change: and yet withall this, we find not any example, valeſſe it be in ſome petty Eſtates.

Charlemaine, who ſought to imploy it agaynſt the *Saxon*, without this preparation aduanced little, although he ioyned Prudence with Inſtruction to force, for the ſetling of the Chriſtian Religion among thoſe people: And after he had attempted all meanes, for his laſt remedy, he was forced to transferre a great number of them, into *Flanders* and *Brabant*, and to draw from thence Chriſtians to mingle amongſt the Idolators, which remained in the Country, and continued there long after.

The Turke hath done the like, hauing drawne many of his

his Religion which were in *Asia*, to plant them in *Europe*, and transported a great number of Christians which were in *Europe* into *Asia*. And yet we see that hitherto the Turke hath wholy expeld the Christian Religion out of his Estate, although he hath imployed many other meanes.

Hence we may conclude, that if with Force, which receiued no opposition, he could not preuaile; it is a meere madnesse for certaine men ignorant of the Affaires of the World, to propound to make vse of Force against those, who fortified with intelligence among themselues, and good Conduct, may not only defend their opinion by Force; but also indanger the ruine of the Estate. But reseruing to treate more particularly of this Question hereafter, I will come to another kind of Force or constraint, which depends vpon the Authority of the Magistrate, and concernes the punishments and burthens, and the exclusion of Hereticks and Infidels from honors.

As for punishments, it workes no greater effect then armed Force, which is vsually ioyned vnto it; and sometimes these punishments borne with Constancy, produce a contrary effect to that which was expected; as we will relate more particularly hereafter the Reasons. As for heauy burthens, although they seeme more mild, yet we may well feare the inconuenience.

From the example of Martyrdome, which is in punishments, if they conuert not speedily, heauy burthens ruines them by little and little. St. *Gregory* writing to Bishop *Ianuyer*, for the Conuersion of the Peasants of *Sardinia*, aduiseth him to charge them with Taxes and Labour. In *Spaine* they haue done the like with the Moores, who not withstanding haue multiplied. The Turke, besides the exclusion from honours, which is a meanes ioyned to that of heauy burthens, practizeth the like with the Christians, taking Tribute of their owne children.

Charle-

Charlemaine vſed it againſt the *Hungarians*, after that he vanquiſhed them, leauing the Idolators nothing but their Liues, and giuing their goods to ſuch as would become Chriſtians. Sometimes the excluſion from honours, without any heauy burthen, hath preuailed much for the conuerſion of great men, and of a meane condition, among a people ambitious of honour. *Ingo* Prince of the *Vmides*, receiued none to his Table but ſuch as made profeſſion of the Chriſtian Religion, preferring the meaneſt before the greateſt of another Religion.

Sufficiency. Sufficiency conſiſts in the Knowledge and abillity to inſtruct and diſpute. Inſtruction is made eyther by word or writing: And that which is done by word, is eyther publicke or priuate, in ſuch places where they feare that the beliefe, which they ſeeke to eſtabliſh be not allowed in the beginning; or when as they deſire to winne ſome great man, whoſe example may ſerue for the conuerſion of others. They vſe priuate Inſtructions, as a preparatiue to publicke, the which is done by Preaching, or by publicke Lectures of Bookes concerning the Diuine Seruice: As the Law of God was anciently taught by the Reading thereof before the people. And as among the Chriſtians they Read the Epiſtle and the Goſpell, with the Simball of the Creed; ſimple meanes and without affectation; and of no leſſe edification (if in this ſimplicity they cauſe them to be vnderſtood by the people) then the Preaching of ſome, who deliuer many times their owne Fancies more then the Goſpell.

Inſtruction.

In times paſt they found it not ſtrange to Tranſlate the Holy Scripture into the vulgar Tongue. *Netgher*, a Religious man of Saint *Gal*, vnder the Abbot *Bernard*, Tranſlated the Pſalter in the French tongue, which was then but rude. *Alfred* King of *England* did the like into his Langnage: *Heſtad*, alſo King of *England*, cauſed the Holy and Sacred Scriptures to be conuerted and turned into Engliſh: And *Beda*, (called the Venerable,)

Tran-

Tranſlated the Goſpell of Saint *Iohn* into Engliſh.

In Preaching two things are neceſſary: the one to vnderſtand the vulgar tongue in the place where they Preach perfectly: the other is to bring ſome exteriour ornament to perſwade. The firſt Ieſuits that went into *Iappon*, for that they raſhly vndertooke this Enterprize, before they did well vnderſtand the Language, in ſteed of inſtructing they were laughed at, by reaſon of the many incongruities and errours they committed in this Language. Diſputation requires an actiue Spirit, to ſatisfie all difficulties that may be encountred in ſuch matters. But order is very neceſſary; wherein two poynts are eſpecially to be conſidered. The one is, that it is more eaſe to oppoſe a Religion, whatſoeuer it be then to maintayne and defend it, for all Religions hauing in them ſomething which is aboue the capacity of mans vnderſtanding, it is no difficult thing to contradict ſuch a beliefe by humane reaſon. VVherefore they muſt firſt ſhake the opinion receiued, before they come to plant a new. The other poynt is, in ſuch diſputations to begin with things knowne, and confeſſe of eyther ſide, to come vnto thoſe which are contradicted and not yet receiued. Preaching.

This meanes of Inſtruction is the mildeſt, and moſt proper to attaine to the ſetling of Religion, how much ſoeuer it differs from the opinion receiued, and amongſt what people ſoeuer: Eſpecially if they beginne to teach young children, before they haue bin inſtructed in the old beliefe. The Ieſuits, ſeeing they could not preuayle in the conuerſion of the *Braſilians*, a nation altogether brutiſh and inhumane, they could find no other remedy, then to draw their children vnto them by gifts, and kind vſage, and this people ſuffred them to go the more willingly, for that they alwayes brought backe ſome thing, beſides inſtruction which they receiued. In *Peru*, in the beginning they made vſe of poore blind men, Inſtruction a powerful meanes for the bringing in of a Religion.

men, who being receiued by them and well vſed, went afterwards vp and downe repeating that which they had learned: and ſeeing nothing they deliuered it to all ſorts of people indifferently, with more aſſurance then if they had bin cleare ſighted.

The opinion of *Aly* in the Law of *Mahomet*, which hath beene imbraced by the *Perſians*, was diuulged, (as the Hiſtories of that Country relate) by thirty thouſand ſlaues, which *Tamberlaine* had giuen to *Tegel*, predeceſſour to *Iſmael Sophy*, to cauſe them to be inſtructed in that beliefe. *Charlemaine*, erected many Colledges and Seminaries of piety among the Idollaters whom he had Conquered, and retayned twelue children of the Saxon Princes, as Hoſtages, to cauſe them to be inſtructed in the Chriſtian Religion. The Turke takes the fifth of all the Chriſtian children, and cauſeth them to be bred vp in the Law of *Mahomet*. The *Xerif* ſeized vpon *Morocco* and *Fez*, hauing by Pilgrimage, and the ſhew of a holy life, gotten ſome credit among the Moores: He bought a thouſand ſlaues, which he bred vp in his opinion, grounded (as he pretended) vpon a more pure interpretation of the *Alcoran*: and hauing inſtructed many with ſuch Diſciples; and his ſonnes hauing ſome aduantages againſt the Chriſtians, turned their Armes againſt the Kings of *Fez* and *Morocco*, and ſetled themſelues in their places with their Religion.

Prudence.

Prudence, is next to Piety, the principall part which they ſhould haue, which vndertake ſuch an enterprize, and ſo much the more neceſſary, for that many times an indiſcreet zeale hinders his function, and ruines that which he would Eſtabliſh. And although that the counſels of theſe zealous perſons ſucceed ſometimes; which notwithſtanding is but ſeldome, God hauing giuen prudence to men, to ſerue them for a guide; all hauing not deſerued that God ſhould daily imploy his power to worke miracles,

That the zeale of Religion muſt be accompanied with conduct and Prudence.

Ana-

Ananias hauing perſwaded *Iſates* King of the *Adiabones*, and his mother to receiue the Iewiſh Religion, held it fit that he ſhould forbeare to cauſe himſelfe to be circumciſed, vntill he had diſpoſed his people. But *Eliazar* the *Gallilean* preſt him to do it, and not to preferre the feare of men to the grace of God. Which was the aduice of a Diuine more zealous then diſcreet; the which although it ſucceeded well at that time, their ſpirits being better prepared then the Prince expected; yet it were dangerous to follow it in all Encounters. For the Apoſtle commaunds that zeale ſhould be guided by Knowledge. We know in our time, that this raſh zeale hath done more harme to the Catholicke Religion then good.

I doubt, whether to this inconſiderate zeale we ſhould not attribute that opinion, which ſome haue of the greatnes of the ſpirituall power, by the which and their Rules, they miniſter cauſe of Iealouſie to all temporall powers, the which they ſubmit vnto it, agaynſt the ancient beliefe and the cuſtome of former ages. A proceeding quite contrary to that of Ieſus Chriſt; whom the Iewes deſiring to ſurprize by this meanes in the crime of high treaſon, and to bandy the Magiſtrate agaynſt him, declared openly, that his Kingdome was not of this world; and commaunded to yeild vnto *Ceſar* that which was *Ceſars*, although he were a Tyrant, and an Vſurper of another mans liberty. Of Spirituall and temporall powers, and their iuriſdictions.

After him his Apoſtles haue ſpoken of the ciuill Magiſtrate with honour and reſpect, commaunding to obay him; and it cannot be found, that by vertue of the Spirituall power, they haue aduiſed to attempt any thing agaynſt the Magiſtrate. It is true, that among Chriſtians, the Spirituall power hath beene alwayes much reſpected; but only when it hath beene practized in matters which are meerely Spirituall, the which looſeth the dignity and grace, which is due vnto it, when it deales in matters which are temporall terrien.

Theſe

Theſe be the bounds which haue alwayes beene ſet in *France*, betwixt the Eccleſiaſticall Iuriſdiction and a Regall power: and with this diſtinction the Chriſtian Religion, hath beene preſerued aboue a thouſand yeares in *France*, without any blemiſh. But inconſideration or ambition, which is vſually blind, hath proceeded further, to breed a Iealouſie among all Chriſtian Princes. For by a conſequence altogether abſurd and fooliſh, they would make the VVorld beleeue, that the obedience of the Subiect towards his Prince, the which being a temporall thing, cannot be reputed but temporall, may be prohibited by the Spirituall power, the which notwithſtanding hath no power nor Iuriſdiction ouer temporall things. The which is a meanes not only to hinder, that ſuch Princes as are diſtracted from the ancient beleife; do not re-vnite themſelues, ſeeing they cannot do it without diminution of their authority and power: but alſo makes others, which are not yet ſeparated (to free themſelues from this ſubiection) leaue it, or fauour all which oppoſe themſelues to this Doctrine, neuer inſiſting vpon the errors, which they may adde thereunto.

The obſeruation of ceremonies of an ancient Religion, facilitates the ſetling of a new.

There is as little wiſedome to croſſe the Rules of a receiued pollicy, if they were not altogether impious: neyther muſt they preſſe to change the Religion of the conſcience, if without impiety this apparence may be preſerued. The ancient Chriſtians, made no difficulty to apply vnto the Diuine Seruice, many of the Iewiſh and Pagan ceremonies. In diuers changes of Religion hapned in our time, *Luther* in *Germany*, and *Peter Martyre* in *England*, haue carried themſelues more diſcreetly, hauing retayned the greateſt part of the ceremonies of the Catholicke Religion, approoued therein; then they which haue made their Religion bald, and deſtitute of all ornament; and to make it the more ſauage, and to ſeeme more different from the common beleife, they haue changed the names and termes, by an indiſcreet vanity.

Behold

Behold part of the principall conſiderations which they muſt obſerue in the ſetling of a Religion. Let vs now ſee how we are to carry our ſelues to preſerue the ancient beleife; amidſt the diuerſitie of other Religions which are crept into the Eſtate.

Chap. 17.

That the diuerſity of Religion is dangerous in an Eſtate: how they ought to carry themſelues to preſerue the ancient Beleife, in the diuerſity of Religions crept into the Eſtate.

In old time the Kings of *Ægypt*, entertayned this diuerſity in Religion among their Subiects: Some worſhipping a Dogge, others a Bird, and ſome a Crocadile with other things according vnto their fancies: which was a tyrannicall practize; to the end their Subiects might not agree to controule and reforme their Actions.

But it is certayne that if in the Concord of an Eſtate, conſiſts the good and quiet of the Subiects, it is more expedient to re-vnite themſelues all in one Religion when they may. For Religion is the cyment which binds the Quick-ſiluer, that drawes together all the members of the Eſtate into one perfect vnion: And contrariwiſe there is nothing that doth more diſ-unite a people, then the diuerſity of opinions, or the vſe of diuers ceremonies in matter of Religion. Hence haue proceeded the moſt violent and furious paſſions, that euer troubled an Eſtate, and the life of men: And in this poynt all other intereſts are ſo implyed, as it hath drawne with it all that, which makes a part of the honours, goods, and fortunes of men. For Religion the children haue left the Fathers cauſe; ſeruants haue denied their maſters ſeruice, and

There ought to be but one Religion in an Eſtate.

Diuerſity of Religion dangerous in an Eſtate.

and subiects their fidellity to Princes. Finally all naturall rights and offices of humanity haue ceased, whereas Religion hath resisted: Euery man esteeming that which he followes to be the most pure, and the true manner of worship, and condemning all that which is not conformable to his beliefe.

It must bee auoyded euen in light things.

VVherefore we must flye this diuersity, euen in light things: for that a multitude being vncapable to iudge of things by themselues, nor by reason or motion in Religion, suffring themselues to be carried away by chance and apparent shewes, contrary to that which Faith should perswade them, aboue the perception of their vnderstanding: when they haue once shaken some opinion which he had in Reuerence, he presently falls into the like vncertaynty of the other peeces of his beliefe; which haue no more authority nor ground with him, then those which they haue already shaken.

How they must gouerne themselues to preserue the ancient beliefe, in a diuersity of Religions.

Finding then this diuersity in an Estate we must consider whether it be little or great. If it be small, and the parties of the new opinion weaker then that of the ancient Religion, be it in number of men, or in retreats of intelligences, it wilbe no difficult thing to suppresse them: No more then if in a great Estate, this opinion had not taken footing but in one corner, or in one or two Prouinces; as that of the *Albygeois* had done in *France*. For the rest of the Estate being secure, it is easie for the greater party to suppresse the lesse, by the conquest of these Prouinces. But if this opinion hath crept into all the parts of the Estate, although they that follow it make the lesser number, yet we must consider if we are in the beginning, or in the strongest fit of the disease.

Of the rooting out of Heresie and new Religion in the breeding, and how they ought to carry themselues.

In the beginning such weeds are to be pulled vp as soon as they grow, the which must be done by secret Executions, and not as they haue vsually practized by publicke punishments; if it be not of some opinion that is very difficult to perswade: For that the Example of Martyr-

dome

dome mooues many to pitty, makes others obstinate, and drawes some to be more curious to examine the reasons, for the which a new Preacher, who hath nothing in shew but what is holy, suffers so constantly: and few will perswade themselues, that any man will for so small a matter loose his life with so much dishonour; and so by this gate many enter into that Comminalty: so as in stead of retyring the people by the example of punishments, they inuite them: as being certayne that the terrour thereof, workes a contrary effect in a new opinion, which hath a shew of sanctity, and of the truth and falshood whereof they may doubt, then in other crimes, the which are generally condemned in all men. For to search the bottome of euery mans conscience, were to kindle a fire in the Estate, add to discouer a mischiefe, which were more expedient to hide, and whereof the scandall were dangerous. We haue seene many Realmes and Principallities preserue themselues in peace, with the exercise of two different Religions; but there was neuer any but hath bin ruined by the course and continuance of Ciuill wars: and the conditions by the which they may make two Religions agree together, would not only be lesse hurtfull to an Estate, but more supportable to priuate persons, then the best ciuill war, which shalbe attempted vpon this subiect. For although there may be some found amongst Heretickes, who, eyther for want of Instruction in their new opinion, or for want of courage, thinke to be perswaded by Force, that they do meritoriously suffer the paynes which they endure, and therefore were easie to reduce: yet I will say that in such affayres, for that a firme perswasion must preceede the resolution which such men haue taken to change their first manner of liuing, in a poynt which doth wholy import their saluation; it is dangerous to imploy Armes. For some striking sayle, and continuing amongst vs, serue vnderhand to those of their party by many meanes; if it were but only in giuing aduice or dispersing

The tollerati6 of two Religions in an estate are lesse hurtful then a ciuil Warre.

of bruits, which may assist their affaires. Others which haue more generosity, perswaded of the iniustice of the harme which they cause them to suffer, continue resolute and obstinate: being the ordinary of the spirite of Man, to grow more resolute the more it is resisted, and giues way when there is least opposition. For the more that that man loues his liberty, and yet abuses it, the more he hates seruitude and constraynt, in the which notwithstanding he carryes himselfe better then in the enioying of his freedome.

Warre against Hereticks fortifies their party, and giues them aduantages.

All men tend naturally to the contrary of that which is desired of them, and affect more willingly that which is forbidden. Feare and necessity maintayne men best in their Duties. They force them to know themselues, to resume courage, to allie themselues together, and in the end to frame a party within the Estate; which vpon the least good successe which shall befall it, (Fortune not alwayes assisting the greater number) it fortifies it selfe, as it proceeded from the Iustice of their cause, and that GOD fought for them; so as by this good successe many being perswaded to follow it, they encrease the number of their partizans: and it falls out most commonly, that the discontented, and such as desire to worke their owne ends, ioyne with them. Moreouer, this Sect, as I haue sayd, being dispersed ouer all the Prouinces of an Estate, and the Prince not able to haue Armies in them all, whilest that he assailes them on the one side, they attempt vpon another, surprizing some place of importance; or standing vpon their defence, they cause an Army to ruine itselfe most commonly before some paltry place.

I will adde hereunto, that if they be the weaker in number, they will be found in effect the stronger by their vigilancy and intelligences which they haue one of another: For that Vnion is most commonly stronger in a meane number, then in a greater; and in an opinion receiued

ceiued by their owne choice and election, then in that which is receiued by custome, in the which man shews himselfe vsually more negligent. Besides this, the intelligence is better obserued amongst men that are assayled, or that feare to be so, by reason of the necessity of the defence, then among the assailians. For to assayle (proceeding from a free will, they are sooner wearied then the defendants.

Moreouer, there is nothing more dangerous for a Prince, then to make tryall of his forces against his Subiects, if he be not well assured of the successe. This were to arme and shew the Lyon his pawes to fight against his Master, to make himselfe the Head of a party, making the head of the contrary faction equall to his power. And it hath bin alwayes held a Rule of State, that the most powerfull should neuer make an Enterprize vpon the weaker, without assurance of the euent. For the weaker is alwayes in feare, that the stronger can doe any thing, vntill he hath made tryall of the contrary; and when they finde how far the forces of the stronger may extend, he falls in his reputation. Wherefore in this case the best aduised Princes haue done like wise Pylots, who slip their tacklings in a storme, knowing that the resistance they should make, would be the cause of a generall shipwracke. But if he forced of necessity to goe to Field vpon this quarrell, and that their courages puft vp too much, cannot be humbled but by Armes; he must before they haue gotten any aduantage, graunt them tolleration of their Religion, in places where they may giue the least scandall, to such as are opposite vnto them, and in all other things make them inferiour: The which they will yeeld the more easily vnto, for that in this first beginning, there is nothing but the conscience that doth threaten them; and hauing found their owne weakneſſe, they will be content to haue gotten this point, neuer refusing places out of the way for their exercise: for that by this

It is dangerous for a Prince to arme against his Subiects, if he be not assu- of the euent.

A good aduice to weaken the party of a new sect or Religion.

meanes they ſhall bee more aſſured, leſſe expoſed to the view of their Enemies, and by conſequence leſſe ſubiect, to their ſurprizes.

To draw vnto him the heads of a new Religion,

As for the ambition of Commanders, it will bee eaſie to preuent, for that they will bee vſually few in number, in entertaining them by promiſes, preſents, and hopes; hauing a watchfull eye ouer them, and imploying them abroad in honourable charges and affaires, yet where they may neither get credit, nor doe much harme; and the reſt which deſire to bee aduanced to honours, and yet haue ſmall power of themſelues, they may feede them with hope, that in changing their opinions, they may attaine to that which they deſire. This being done, the reſt will bee eaſily maintained, in hauing a care that they which follow the Princes Religion, and are fauoured by the Prince, may not doe them any wrong or iniury in hatred of their opinion.

Inſtitution of Commanders.

They may by the ſame meanes, erect Seminaries, to breed and inſtruct a good number of perſons in the true Religion; Out of which they ſhall chooſe ſuch as are moſt ſufficient and capable, and whoſe liues may ſerue for an example of well liuing, to place them in Eccleſiaſticall dignities.

Orders of Knights to defend and maintaine the ancient Religion.

In certaine Realmes they haue vſed to make orders of Knight-hood, whoſe chiefe profeſſion was (when it was neceſſary to vſe force) to maintaine their Religion by Armes, and they had for their recompence many benefices, which wee affected vnto them; which inſtitution is not to bee neglected, for that there are two ſorts of thoſe which ſtraie from the true Religion. The one agree vpon the foundations, but they contend vpon the interpretation; and theſe may bee inſtructed: The others doe abſolutely denie the grounds, whereby the Doctrine of Religion is ſupported. Theſe not able to bee drawne by the inſtruction of the true Religion, there remaineth nothing but miracles,

and

and a Diuine Interpretation, which are Supernaturall meanes, whereof God doth not make vſe to all perſons: and force amongſt humane meanes. Wherefore theſe Millitary orders of Knights, may profit much in an Eſtate, and may alſo inuite thoſe of a new opinion to ſubmit themſelues vnto the old, to the end they may be partakers, or their children, of theſe honours and Recompences.

To draw vnto them the moſt learned & capable of a new Religion.

Moreouer, it will not be inconuenient, that a Prince which raignes in an Eſtate deuided in Religion, ſhould labour by preſents and promiſes, to draw vnto him the moſt learned and capable of ſuch as are contrary vnto his Religion: And in caſe they will returne, to aduance ſome of them to great dignities, to the end he may bind them the more by the preſeruation of their dignity to mayntayne the Religion, and to giue experience to others, who wilbe inuited by this Example. For what ambition ſoeuer they ſhall diſcouer in him that ſhalbe aduanced, hauing gotten Authority, the Example of his aduancement, will make others thinke of it. And if the Prince can deuide them in opinions, or otherwiſe he ſhall do well; for that the weaker the body of this Seſt ſhalbe, the leſſe cauſe the Eſtate ſhall haue to feare; and there growing ſome diuerſity of opinions amongſt them, he ſhall fauour that which approacheth neereſt to his Religion; or by this deuiſion he ſhall endeauour to make them weaker, and more reſolute what they ſhould follow.

To beat downe and ruine the temples leaſt frequented.

But when he ſhall ſee a Seſt grow old, and that the abuſes ſhould begin to diſtaſte moſt part of them which follow it: He may do like vnto *Theodoſius*, who ſeeing the Temples of the Pagans in a manner all abandoned, he cauſed ſome to be beaten downe, and the reſt to be applied vnto the deuotion and ſeruice of the Chriſtian Religion.

Not to diſpute of Religion.

Mahomet had found a remedy to preſerue his Religion from

from these innovations, forbidding them to Preach or dispute: the which if it had beene well obserued, there had beene such a diuersity of Sects, in the Interpretation of his Alcoron.

But a Duke of *Muscouie*, to keep his Religion intire and vnfoyled, the which is grounded like to ours in the Administration of the Sacraments, and in the Preaching of the Gospell, caused all the Homilies and Sermons of the Holy Greeke Fathers, to be turned into his Language, to be repeated publickly in the place of Preaching, and read particularly by the Subiects: freeing himselfe by this meanes from the ignorance of the multitude, and from the nouelties which Preachers might haue brought in, in publishing their inuentions and dreames; and by this meanes confirming his Subiects in the beleife of those holy Fathers. Wherefore the principall end must be, to keep the ancient Religion, to haue but one, if it may be, to hinder a new one from taking footing in an Estate, and in case we cannot effect it without troubling the vniuersall peace of the Subiect, we must gouerne our selues as I haue formerly spoken.

Let vs come to other disorders which commonly happen in Religion, the which wee must fore-see in its establishments, to preuent them when they shall happen.

CHAP. 18.

Of disorders which happen in Religion: and of the meanes to preuent them.

Blasphemy. BLasphemy consists in periury, and in scandall, or detraction. Periury is when we call God to witnesse of a lye, Scandall is when wee mocke at Religion.

Care-

Carelesnesse regards chiefly the seruice of Religion, and is the more to be feared, for that by this degree they mount to impiety. For Religion consisting more in affection and zeale, then in discourse; when as the heat of zeale is growne cold, Religion is lost by little and little. Careles̄nes in Diuine seruice.

The third abuse is Superstition, withdrawing the beliefe made to the seruice of God, and bringing in scandalous things of no moment. Superstition.

As for the first, which is Blasphemy, they must establish rigorous punishments: and to hinder the second, which concernes Diuine seruice, it must be enioyned very strictly. But the remedy of the last, must come from the care of Prelates, who for this effect ought to be chosen vigilant and Religious; and they must be prohibited from bringing in of any new thing, vpon pretext of Deuotion and Piety, neyther in the beleife nor in the Ceremonies of Religion, without exact knowledge of the cause. As for that which concernes the ground of priuate Mens consciences, we must leaue it to the duty of Ministers, who being chosen good men, there is no doubt but they whose consciences they gouerne, would be so in like manner. Remedies agaynst Blasphemy and negligence. Against Superstition.

Chap. 19.

Of the setling of a Councell of Estate, and of the qualities and number of Councellors.

THe forme of the Estate, and Religion being established, there followes the setling of a Councell; wherein two sorts of persons are to be considered, that is to say, they which Counsell, and they which are Counselled. In those which Counsell, we must know the qualities which are necessary Of a counsell of estate.

for them; in what number they ought to be; the power which is giuen them; and the order they are to obserue in giuing their opinions: For to examine affaires, it is done according to the ability and capacity of euery one of them.

Qualities of Councellors of estate.

The first quality of a Councellor of Estate, is to be old, and to haue experience. I ioyne these two together, for that experience cannot be but in a man that is already ancient, and age without experience would be here vnprofitable: for that in such affaires the knowledge of the particular humours of Princes, of people, and of great men is most necessary: the which cannot be obtayned but by a long experience: the which although it be not repugnant vnto reason, yet it hath a different meanes of vnderstanding the affaires, whereof they cannot haue a certaine light, to make a coniecture of that, which with reason would be fitting to doe vpon the point which they will put in execution, if they haue not first seene the tryall in some other place.

Age and experience.

Authority.

Moreouer, age will adde much more authority and credit to the resolutions of a Councell, consisting of ancient men, then if it were composed of young, how sufficient and capable soeuer they were, who cannot haue the reputation of good Councellours: For such as shall be as young as they, will thinke they are as well aduised; and such as are more ancient, will hold themselues to be wiser. And in matter of Estate, opinion hauing no lesse force, but many times more effect then truth; there is nothing more dangerous, then that the Subiects should haue an opinion, to be wiser then their Gouernours. So as the presumption being alwayes, that the older are wiser then the young, there is no doubt, but they are more propper for Councell, and more resolute for a long exercise, to heare, weigh, and resolue of great affaires.

A great difference betwixt an old Councellor and a young.

There is another difference betwixt ancient and young Councellors. These last hauing their blond hot, and

and hauing neuer beene deceiued by Fortune, insist commonly vpon Councels, which haue more magnificence and shew then safety. Whereas on the other side, old men as well by reason of their naturall coldnesse, as of their experience, the which by the course of their life they haue gotten, to haue executed many things in vaine the which they could not bring to a good effect, they, more willingly imbrace the safest party, misfortune causing them to bandy their spirits, and to open their eyes to discouer the danger. The which young men cannot, doe so well, who haue not had experience of the variety of Fortune, nor haue obserued the circumstances of such particular accidents. A most necessary thing in a man that will giue Councell; a small circumstance of more or lesse, doth many times cause a great variation in affaires. This experience being onely found in ancient men, their aduice ought to be esteemed the better. Yet I meane not to speake of such as are come to a decrepit age. Age fit for Councell, must be strong and vigorous, to the end that the resolutions of a Councell of such men may not be too dull and timerous.

cellor of estate and young, for that which concernes Councell.

Wherefore with these ancient men that are cold and slow, it will be very fit to mingle some of a middle age, approaching to 50. yeares; and that both the one and the other past their time in many imployments, in the which they haue seene diuers sores of affaires treated and negotiated, and haue therein made knowne their discretion, fidelity, and industry; and by this meanes giue assurance, that they are worthy and capable to hold this ranke, without staggering or falling For a Councellor of Estate must be an honest man, faithfull to the Estate, and firme in his resolutions; yet without wilfulnesse and obstinacy: a most dangerous plague in a Councell, where it is necessary sometimes to obey the storme, to strike sayle, to leaue the ordinary course, and retire sometimes into the Hauen, to the which in the end they will sayle when they see

A mixture of old and young Councellors of estate.

Discretion, fidelity, and resolution in a Councellor.

Wilfulnesse a dangerous vice in a Councell of estate.

ſee the Wind proſperous. And although there be ſome one thing reſolued, yet if it diſcouer ſome apparent danger, it is not againſt cuſtome to change opinions. For Prudence doth not conſiſt in an obſtinate will, to doe a thing reſolutely; but amongſt many different parties which Fortune preſents vnto vs, to chooſe the beſt and the moſt commodious, to attayne vnto our end. Wherefore ſome haue bin of opinion that they ſhould propound that a little before, which was to be reſolued vpon; leaſt that doing otherwiſe, and ſome one hauing bin of a bad aduice, without due conſideration, he ſhould not grow obſtinate vnſeaſonably, and ſtriue to maintayne his opinion, rather then to leaue it. Yet in affaires whereas they that haue credit, are intereſſed, it is not fit to make the propoſition, if they be not aſſured to be able to reſolue it ſpeedily: otherwiſe it would giue them meanes to make parties and factions, and to prepare hinderances and lets.

Hee muſt be without ambition and not depending of any.

A Councellor of Eſtate muſt likewiſe be without fauour to ſome, or hatred to others, or ambition for himſelfe; hauing no other ayme but the publique good, and that he depends not of any other Prince, be it by fealty or homage, or by obligation or by penſion: but rather that he runne the ſame fortune with the Prince whom he ſerues; to the end he may know, that it concernes him to ſuffer the euill, and enioy the good, proceeding from the Councell which he hath giuen. *Marc. Anthony* the Philoſopher and Emperour, ordayned that the Senators of *Rome*, which were not *Italians*, ſhould at the leaſt haue the fourth part of their Eſtates in *Italy*, to make them more carefull, to thinke of the preſeruation of the Prouince, where the ſeate of the Empire remayned. And *Pliny* writes that *Traian* the Emperour had formerly decreed, that ſuch as ſued for any Benefices, ſhould haue the third part of their Lands in *Italy*; not holding it reaſonable, that ſuch men ſhould make

make vse of *Rome* and *Italy*, as of a retreate, and not as of their Countrey.

Yet I would not herein set a generall Rule, there hauing bin many found, who although they had their retreate else-where then in the Estate of the Prince whom they serued, haue notwithstanding carryed themselues faithfully, vpon hope that if they should lose the goods which they enioyed in the Estate of their Master, yet they should alwayes haue meanes to liue else-where. And contrariwise we haue seene some which had not any retreat but in the Estate of their Prince, whom the good fortune of the Enemy hath made carefull to enter into treaty to saue their Estates; the which happily they would not haue done, if they had meanes to liue else-where. It is likewise certayne, that in affaires where we haue no interest, we iudge much better, then when as we put our interest in Ballance with our opinions in Councell.

He that lookes ouer Gamesters, and is not possest neyther with the hope of gayne, nor the feare of losse, will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game then he that playes: And he that in a Councell hath not any feare to lose his Estate, and who brings neyther affection nor passion, will alwayes take the most honourable party: And he which hath any interest preuented by his owne opinion and feare, will willingly incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue himselfe.

A Councellor of Estate must not be too suddaine and rash, for that precipitation of its nature, is blind and indiscreet; a good deliberation hauing need of time, to make a good resolution, being impossible in a short time to consider & weigh the inconueniences duly: and withall precipitation cannot come but with indiscretion, or little iudgment; & both the one & the other hurtful in councel.

A Coûncellor must not bee rash and precipitate.

Irresolution is another vice, into the which he must be very careful not to fal. for he must resolue vpon one party, and

Irresolution a dangerous vice in a Councellor and to be auoided.

and forget all the rest; lest that by remembring them, he doth not breake and dull the vigour of the minde, necessary for the due execution of great Enterprizes, and withall the constancy which he must bring in matters that are doubtfull and difficult: neyther must he thinke that there is lesse difficulty in the party which he hath left, then in that which he hath chosen.

The causes thereof.

In some one ignorance to be able to examine affaires causeth irresolution; and these ought to be reiected from Councell. Others are Enemies to inconueniences; So as although that with reason they ought to imbrace the thing which is propounded vnto them; yet being amazed with the paynes and difficulty, which doe alwayes accompany great affaires, they remayne in suspence and doubt, whether they should endeauour to attempt it.

Subtilty.

Other haue such subtill spirits, that to all things that are propounded, they finde contrary reasons; and being (as often it happens) of small courage, they neuer (vnlesse it be vpon necessity) resolue; And they neuer want reasons to couer their fearefulnesse, the which will euer haue more power ouer them then reason, and experience to haue many times trembled in vaine. For resolution proceeds not from the spirit, but from the courage: And these men are so much the more dangerous, as they are more subtill and cunning, and haue more dexterity to couer their difficulties.

He must not be too confident.

But as he may not be resolute, so must he not be so confident of himselfe, as he stop his eares to the aduise of others; or that relying vpon our owne forces, we doe not draw into consideration those of our Enemies, yea sometimes hazard and fortune, which hath a good share in the greatest actions, to the end we may fore-see that which may happen. For distrust is the Mother of fore-sight, and fore-sight the Mother of safety.

Other qualities necessary for a Councellor of Estate.

Patience.

Patience is another quality, very necessary in a Councell of Estate, not onely to endure opinions contrary to his owne, but also to haue his reasons weighed, blamed,

and

and contradicted, and to heare many follies which grow amidst their discourses, euen from great Personages. He must heare I say with patience, or without Iealousie or desire to be followed in his opinions; and not to doe as many which please themselues, to be the Authors of a new ouerture, who with a spirit of contradiction, full of bitternesse, trouble themselues to reprehend the reasons of such of the Councell as are their Enemies, be they neuer so good. A vice altogether insupportable. Yet notwithstanding it is not forbidden, to draw into agitation the reasons of another: but it must be done with respect; and thereby he shews that he doth not seeke to diuide or surprize the resolution, but it sufficeth him to haue his reasons vnderstood, and the inconueniences of a contrary opinion. Besides these qualities which concerne the iudgment of integrity, a Councellor of Estate must know how to explicate himselfe, and to make his reasons be vnderstood: and they which of purpose obscure their reasons and intention, for the vncertaynty of the euent, are bad Councellors, which vnderstand not what belongs to Councell: for that good Councell is measured by the reasons, and not by the euent, no man being answerable for that which happens against all discourse and reason. Eloquence.

But aboue all things it is required to be secret: for a Councell diuulged, profits no more then a Mine blowne vp. Wherefore it is necessary that the number of Councellors of Estate, should not be great: for in a great number this inconuenience is ordinary. Secrecy. Of the number of Councellors of Estate.

It is likewise good to change Councellors often: for that being necessary they should be instructed in affaires, it would fall out that their charge would end before they should be able to see those which were begun, finished, and before they should vnderstand the course and proceedings; the which is necessary to settle a iudgement: This course notable to be so well represented by the report which others might make, but they might faile in some particulars Of the change of Councellors of Estate.

particulars, whereon they might ground their opinions. But if for the quality of the Estate it be necessary to change them; at the least they must prouide in such sort, as the Councell be not changed all at an instant: but hauing ordayned a certayne time for euery Councellor to assist, their charges must expire at seuerall times, and the greatest part of the ancient must remayne to instruct the new in affaires, who growing ancient in their turnes, shall instruct others that shall enter.

Of the great nuber of councellors of estate to be imployde else-where.

And if through the ambition of some, the Councell of Estate (which ought to consist of a small number) be too full: the which doth vsually happen in sicke and corrupted Estates, it shall not be vnfitting to imploy them else-where, attributing to the greatest part of these Councellors, some Iurisdiction which may approach in some sort the affaires of Estate; as *Philip* the faire King of *France* did of his Parliament: *Charles* the Eight with his great Councell, and as they doe at this present with the Priuy Councell. This meanes is not new, but hath bin anciently practized by *Tiberius*, *Nero*, and some other Emperours towards the Senate of *Rome*, making them to forget by little and little the knowledge of State affaires, by the attribution of a contentious Iurisdiction, which was in the end established by *Adrian* in this Senate, in forme of an ordinary Iurisdiction.

CHAP. 20.

Of the plurality of Councels of Estate. Of the power of Councell, and of the order of giuing their Opinions.

Of many Councels of estate.

IN *Spaine* there are many Councells of Estate, distinguished according to the diuersity of Realmes and Prouinces, which are vnited to that Crowne. They may

may likewise in erecting many Councels to facilitate the expedition of affaires in a great Realme, imploy the more honest men profitably, and preuent surprizes; distinguishing them according to the diuers parts of the Estate, which are, Religion, Iustice, Warre, Policy, the Treasure, the care of Gouernment, and the intelligences as well without as within the Estate: This last ought to be annexed to the Soueraignes person, accompanied with few, least that a great number should breed confusion, and discouer the secret.

As for that of Religion, it should haue care to maintayne Religion in Reuerence: and if there were many which they were forced to tollerate, it should serue to cause them to liue in peace one with another, and to decide their differences. That of Iustice should not be imployed but to order the differences of Iurisdictions, and to iudge those, whereof Iustice should be forbidden to take knowledge.

That of Warre should serue to regulate the Souldiers both Horse and Foot, prouiding for the Munitions, places of strength, Ships of War, Garrisons, and generally of all that which may depend of a Military order and care. That of Policy should order the Commerce and Trade with the manufactures, and should make all establishments necessary, for aboundance, the safety, the beautifying of Townes, the assurance of wayes, and the commodity of Riuers. That of the Treasure should regulate the leuies of money, the assignations, and all that which concernes the dispensations of the Reuenewes of the Estate.

Yet there being many affaires so vnited, as they seeme to belong as well to one Councell as another; to auoyde the contrarieties of Ordinances, if many Councels should take notice of one businesse, the most expedient would be, that these Councels should haue no other charge, but to examine that which should be propounded vnto them, and

The meanes to auoyd the contrariety of Ordinances.

and to cause the diuersity of their opinions to be reduced to writing, with the reasons of eyther side; the which should be read in a Councell composed of the heads of all these Councels, and of two other Councellors of eyther of them, chosen by the Councell it selfe, according to the quality of the businesse; All which being assembled for the reading of the sayd opinions; they should haue no more to doe, but to resolue the businesse thus digested and examined.

I know that in an Estate, whereas all things are ouerruled by the head of one or two, who desire to gouerne the Prince, he that should attempt any thing for the good of his Estate, they would presently perswade him, that these Councels would be so many comptrollers which he should giue vnto himselfe: That he was sufficient to prouide for all, and that all must depend vpon his will, and not oblige nor subiect himselfe to another mans Reason. But vnder pretext of maintayning the Princes Authority, these people seeke to continue their owne to worke their ends, neuer representing the Princes affaires but by a crosse meanes, which may serue their owne designes: they ingage him many times in Councels, which proue very preiudiciall to his honour, reputation, and Estate.

The power of a Councell.

In regard of the Councels power, it ought onely to consist in giuing Councell, and not to command; Commandment being inseparable with the Soueraignty: And in Estates, whereas Councellors commaund that which they Councell, they may not onely be termed Councellors but Soueraignes, and if the decree or sentence seemes to haue any command in it; yet it is certayne that without the Soueraignes commission, no more then the sentence of the Iudge it cannot be executed.

A consultatiue voyce.

In some Councels they haue receiued two kind of Lawes: and they haue giuen power to some to make an ouerture of some affaires, the which hauing bin propounded by them, they retired, and left others to deliberate; the which

which they call a consultatiue voice. Others had powes only to deliberate, and to resolue, but not to propound. A deliberatiue voyce.

Wherefore to take away this superioritie in a Councell, and to entertaine an equallitie among Councellors, the which is of great force to maintaine the libertie of opinions; it is fit that the Councellors should haue a consultatiue and deliberatiue voyce. Yet forasmuch as it is necessary to propound, and to bring some order in all sorts of Companies; it is fitting that hee which hath something to propound, should impart it to him that holds the first place in the Councell, prouided alwayes that hee hath no interest. Equallity among Councellors.

There is another diuersitie for the order of opening, either beginning by the greatest, and of most authoritie in Councell, to the end that the younger and least capable, might more easily choose the best party, and the soundest reasons: Or in beginning to take the voyces of the youngest and inferiours, and causing them of most authority to giue their opinions last; least that the libertie of aduice might not bee cut off by the authority of great men, who are factious and ambitious, and admit no contradiction. Order ingiuing their opinions.

Which two kindes of deliuering their opinions may bee practized according to the equallity, that is among the Councellors. For if they bee equall in power, it seemes most fitting that the most sufficient should deliuer their opinions first; Whereas contrarywise if the Councell be mingled with great Lords, and men of a meane condition; they which haue least power, must deliuer their opinions first; yet causing them which haue only a consultatiue voice, to deliuer their censures first, who prepare the way to such as haue a deliberatiue voice, representing vnto the Councell all the reasons of either side, and propounding their owne aduice: In doing whereof if they erre, they shall bee reformed by the others without Iealousie; for that an ambition to speake,

drawes after it many times the enuy of some, and the iealousie of others. *Augustus* demaunded their opinions without obseruing Ranke, or Age, to the end that euery man should be attentiue to the propositions that were made; and without staying for the aduice of next neighbour; he might be alwayes ready to deliuer his owne.

I will adde one thing, whereof we must haue a speciall care in Councell, which is to call into the deliberation of some businesse of hazard, they to whom we are to giue the Execution. For it seemes that calling them, it will make them more cunning and aduised to auoyd the dangers which may fall out in the Enterprize, the which they meane to recommend vnto them. Yet it may be of such a nature, as the difficulties which they shall feare; will present themselues in the Execution, may discourage them and make them grow cold, in danger to giue ouer the Enterprize. Behold that which ought to be principally considered in those which giue counsell.

CHAP. 21.

Considerations for the Prince, which is to be Counselled.

AS for him that is to be Counselled, we must consider his sufficiency, the manner of demaunding Counsell, to receyue it, examine it, to resolue and Execute it.

Sufficiency and Capacity necessary for a Prince.

In regard of Sufficiency, they haue alwayes held that there are three sorts of persons. Some haue such a vigour of Spirit, as they alone can better resolue their affayres, then a whole company would do; in the which besides the feare that the secret would be diuulged, the number of good men would be so much the more rare, as they

of

of whom it is compoſed are great. Others haue not this vigour or Spirit; but a naturall docillity to heare the aduice of others, and a iudgment to diſcerne good from Euill: And theſe, as they are inferiour to the firſt, ſo are they Superiour to the laſt; who not able to take aduice in their owne heads, and contemning the aduice of others, know not how to make choyſe of the founder party.

And although it ſeemes that the firſt haue not any need to ſeeke the counſell of another; yet aſwell to free himſelfe from preſumption, as to giue the more authority and credit vnto their Enterprizes, they muſt communicate them; and confeſſe that Sufficiency is neuer ſo great in any one perſon, but that many may adde ſomething vnto it. And although that this Sufficiency be very commendable, yet it is dangerous in a Prince, who eaſily fals into preſumption; and it ſeemes that the docillity which is found in others, yeilding an Eare to Counſell, is the more ſafe. Yet if theſe bring not Iudgment to diſcerne good from euill, this meane Sufficiency would be as dangerous, as if he referd himſelfe wholy to the Counſell of others: which is an Inſtrument, whereof they haue ſomtimes made vſe to ruine many Eſtates; for that where the Councell ſhall conſiſt of incapable men, aſwell as the Prince; a thing which vſually fals out, when as the Counſellors are choſen by him, for that euery man ſeekes his like; and we much acknowledge ſome Sufficiency to iudge of that of another man, to make the Election: and in this caſe the Eſtate is the ſooner drawne to its ruine, when as the number of Counſellors is greateſt. But if they whom the Prince hath called to his Councell, he worthy and fit to ſupport the burthen of the Eſtate; & that the Prince be not capable to make choiſe of good parties and occaſions, and to adde the conduct which ſha be neceſſary in the executions; this councel wilbe fruitles to him. Beſides, the Counſellors of Princes are accompanied

with iealouſie one againſt another; and tending all to one end, they finde out many times publique Councels, and make them ſerue to their owne priuate intereſts, ſtriuing by many cunning practiſes, to fruſtrate the Deſignes, and to hinder the increaſe of reputation one of another. Whereby it happens, that the Prince hauing not (for the little ſufficiency that is in him) that authority among his Councellors which were neceſſary to keepe them in awe, and to hinder the courſe of theſe Diuiſions; nor yet iudgement to diſcouer the particular Deſignes of euery one; he remaynes among ſo many Councellors, rather confounded and irreſolute, then counſelled. Beſides, that in ſuch a Councell of Wiſe men, and full of valor, which ſerue a Prince of little vnderſtanding, there is neuer ſo much Friendſhip and Affection as were to be deſired in Councellors. For that ſeeing their Prince more inwardly then other men, and knowing his imperfections and weakneſſe better, the order of Nature beares it, that in the end they fall to contemne him, the which afterwards doth eaſily turne to hatred; for that the Miniſter which hath ſome merrit in himſelfe, ſcornes to obey a man incapable of his Greatneſſe, and vnworthy of his Fortune, long. After hatred and contempt followes the infidelity of Councellors; ſo as the Prince muſt eyther be ſold, or turned vp and downe according to the occaſions of the will of thoſe which ſhall be about him, who in their Councell will haue more regard to their particular aduancement, then to the greatneſſe of their Maſter.

A Prince then that deſires to raigne in his Eſtate, muſt make himſelfe capable to gouerne, and manage affaires: not that I would aduiſe a Prince who hath ſufficiency in himſelfe, to haue no man about him to giue him Counſel; but rather I beleeue that one of the greateſt foundations of his reputation is, when they ſhall haue an opinion that his owne iudgement and proper intelligence

of

of affaires, is aſſiſted by a wiſe and faithfull Councell; which is the thing for the which he muſt moſt labour.

But this Councell how wiſe and aduiſed ſoeuer, muſt alwayes be ſurmounted by the iudgement and capacity of the Prince, ſo as they muſt rather ſerue for an acceſſary, then a principall in the gouernment of the Eſtate: that in commaundments they acknowledge themſelues inferiour to the Prince, and not carry themſelues as equals: that in occaſions and affaires of importance, they may rather haue power to alter, and to make knowne the difficulties and inconueniences, but not to reſolue: And in a word, the Prince hath neede of ſo much ſpirit, as his Councell may aſſiſt him to gouerne, but not teach him to raigne.

We will therefore conclude, that as a Prince hath neede of himſelfe, to maintayne himſelfe in life, ſo hath he neede of a good Councell, to maintayne the affaires of his Eſtate: and as without it he cannot be termed a man, ſo without Councell he cannot be held a Prince.

Of the manner to demaund Councell.

Wherefore hauing made choyce of thoſe which may Counſell him, he muſt carefully take occaſion to demand their Councell: that is to ſay, neyther too long before the Enterprize, leaſt it ſhould be diſcouered; nor too late, for feare that the Councell ſhould proue vnprofitable. And if he doubts that the buſineſſe will not be held ſecret, being propounded in a full Councell, or that ſome of his Councellors for the intereſt of ſome great man, dare not deliuer their opinions freely; and he may receiue their aduice ſeparately and in ſecret, and reiect the reaſons contrary to the Councell which they haue giuen him, to the end he may the better iudge what party he ſhall embrace; without tying himſelfe to number the voices, but rather to weigh him; for affaires of Eſtate ought not to be gouerned according to the plurality of voices, if the reaſons of eyther part be then ſo ſtrong, as they are vncertaine what party they ſhould follow.

But aboue all things a Prince muſt haue a care in affaires of greateſt importance, not to diſcouer euen vnto his Councellors of what opinion he is: Leaſt that they which counſell him ſhould rather ſeeke to furniſh him with reaſons to confirme his opinion and to pleaſe him. For Councellors ought to declare freely what they hold in their conſciences honorable for him, and ſafe for his Eſtate.

Some one would oblige the Prince to aſſiſt himſelfe at all manner of Councels, aſwell to take knowledge of all the affaires of his Eſtate, as to diſcouer the capicity of his Councellors, to hinder factions which grow in Councell, to moderate the paſſions and iealouſies of his Miniſters, to giue more Authority to his Reſolutions, and by his preſence to cauſe the affaires to be treated of with the reſpect and grauity that is requiſite and neceſſary.

Yet there being many things which are treated of in the like Councels, depending of Iuſtice, policy, or the Treaſure; beſides that this would ouer-burthen the Prince, in making him to imploy the greateſt part of his time in theſe affaires; he cannot do it without abaſing his Authority and Maieſty too much, by this too frequent communication; and it will ſuffice, that he aſſiſt at moſt important affaires, or at thoſe whoſe reſolution may increaſe his Reputation, contenting himſelfe to prouide for that which concernes Peace or Warre, with the ſafety and quiet of his Eſtate.

And to preuent the inconueniences which happen daily in Councels, where the Prince doth not aſſiſt, and to draw the ſame aduantages without aſſiſting, which he ſhould haue by his preſence being there, the courſe obſerued by the Grand Seigneur is ſomewhat conſiderable. For in the place where they hold the Diuan or Counſell, there is a window, by the which (without being ſeene) he may heare all that is ſpoken and paſt in his

Coun-

Councell: So as his Councellors vncertayne whether their master heare them or not, obserue the same respect, the same modesty, and the same manner of proceeding, which they will do in his presence: and after they haue held the counsell, they go and make report vnto him of what hath past; the which they dare not deliuer falsly, not knowing whether the Prince haue heard them. And thus he is informed of all that hath beene propoun ded in his Councell. and heares himselfe if he will, or by some other, the reasons of all sides; and then after the reports which is truly and certaynely made vnto him, he presently resolues without any denunition of his Maiesty.

The Prince hauing demaunded the aduice of his Councellors, he must receiue it from them all with an equall countenance; without hating him, which hath giuen him bad counsell: vnlesse he discouer some malice. For Councels hauing no force if they be not allowed by the Prince, he hauing found them good, it is a signe that he hath iudged, and hath beene mooued by the same reasons, like to him that gaue them. So as the errour of iudgment hauing bin common to both, the blame and the fault ought not to be imputed vnto the Councellor alone: And for that they haue neuer in any Estate established recompences or punishments for good or bad counsels; which are held such commonly not by the reasons, but by the euents, whereof no man can be any way answereable. To receiue counsell.

We must therefore diligently Examine, an aduice or counsell; consider the thing in its selfe, with all the circumstances and dependances; preferre the safety of the Estate to all other considerations; and then to seeke the profit by honest courses, which consist in all the the parts which we represent in this treaty, very necessary for the establishment, preseruation, and increase of the Estate. To examine.

Afterwards the Prince muſt duly conſider of the Execution of that which they counſell him; for the Councell being of doubtfull things, he muſt aduiſe whether Fortune may haue a greater ſhare, in that which he meanes to vndertake, then wiſdome: and if he finds that he hath more need of Fortune, he muſt beware how he imbarque himſelfe, eſpecially if the contrary ſucceed to that which he deſires, he incurres more loſſe, then he can hope for profit, ſucceeding after his deſire.

But if neceſſity reduceth him to this poynt, that he muſt eyther looſe or hazard; it were better to tempt Fortune, the which although it did not ſucceed, yet at the leaſt he ſhould haue this contentment, to haue done what lay in him. Otherwiſe, he may not lightly imbarque himſelfe in a dangerous Enterprize, although that at the firſt ſight the perill be not ſo neere. For beſides the danger that euery bad reſolution carries with it, it draw es-after it likewiſe to maintayne it, an infinite number of ſuch like, for that things cannot remayne alone, but are bound one vnto another, and inchayned togeather.

Wherefore we may not haue ſo much reſpect vnto the preſent, as we forget the future. For although that the accidents of Fortune are in ſuch variety, and ſo frequent, as they may hinder vs from a certayne fore-ſight of the future: and that to haue regard to an imaginary feare of a thing which may be or not be, it ſeemes that this were to imbrace the ſhaddow, and to leaue the body or ſubſtance.

Yet the greateſt part of Errours which are committed in deliberations proceeds from this, that men ſuffer themſelues too much to be carried away with the affectiõ of the preſent; the which how little ſoeuer it be aſſiſted by Fortune, it ſeemes that it hath alwayes greater force and vigour, then the ſtrongeſt reſpect we can imagine of

of the future. Wherefore he muſt ſhew himſelfe very ſtayed in ſuch affections, and as for the affection of the preſent, he may not forget the conſideration of the future: but he muſt accuſtome himſelfe to ſet that which is to come before his Eyes, with ſuch a reſentment and apprehenſion, as if he ſaw it or toucht it. So he may not for a feare a farre off, forbeare to remedy a preſent miſchiefe.

He may not likewiſe ſuffer himſelfe to be carried away by any Example that is alledged, if all the particularities do not concurre. For although that theſe comparisons may ioyne at ſome corner, and that all things hold by ſome ſimilitude or likeneſſe: yet there are very few Examples which do not hault: And the relation which is drawne from Experience, is many times defectiue and imperfect, if it be not aſſiſted by diſcourſe and Reaſon.

Then hee muſt examine the quality of the perſon which giues the aduice, eſpecially his intereſt, and aboue all things he muſt refuſe to counſell a flatterer, and inuite him that counſels, to ſpeake freely and with courage.

If for the reſpect of the greatneſſe of the Prince who is counſelled, it be neceſſary to flatter him; the Prince ſhall conſider, if the flattery of him that counſels him, (who muſt ſometimes vſe, as they ſay, words of ſilke) proceeds from cunning and ſubtilty, which the Councellor doth vſe to perſwade him to that which is for his good; or with a deſigne to get credit by his pleaſing, he enters into this flattery: For in this laſt caſe, the Prince muſt ſtoppe his Eares, and open them to him that ſpeakes freely, there being no condition of men, that haue ſo great need of true and free aduertiſements then Princes, who vndergo a publicke life, and are to ſatisfie and content the opinion of ſo many people, which as they are accuſtomed to do any thing that

Of the flattery of Counſellors and how the Prince ſhould auoyd them.

that may diuert them from their courſe, they finde themſelues inſenſibly ingaged in the hatred and deteſtation of their Subiects, for occaſions many times which they might well auoyd, without any intereſt of their pleaſure, if they had beene aduiſed and directed in time.

But the manner whereby moſt Princes liue at this day, few men are found that will practiſe this Trade, being the office of true Friendſhip towards the Soueraigne, in a rough and dangerous tryall; So as they muſt not onely haue much affection and freedome, but alſo courage. Flattery is far more ſafe; for that by pleaſing, it ſeemes they draw neare vnto Friendſhip: and for that it is more agreeable to him whom they flatter, it is alſo more eaſie for him to practiſe that meanes to flatter.

Of the truth & liberty which ought to be in Councellors.

Contrariwiſe Truth and Liberty, as if they approached neare to contempt, cannot be ſo ſafely practiſed with a Prince. They haue their circumſcriptions and limits: and many times it falls out, that (as the World is) they leaue truth in the eares of Princes, not onely without fruite, but with preiudice to him that ſpeakes it.

Of the prime Miniſters of an eſtate.

If then the Prince will aſſure himſelfe on that ſide, he muſt encourage one or two of thoſe which approach neareſt vnto him, and whom he knowes to be beſt affected, and freeſt from contempt of him, to deliuer freely vnto him in what manner they receiue his actions; and he muſt chooſe ſuch men of a meane fortune, and are notwithſtanding ſatisfied and content, to the end that on the one ſide they may haue no feare to touch their Maſters heart to the quicke; leaſt they ſhould thereby loſe the courſe of their aduancement; and on the other ſide being of a meane condition, they may haue the more communication with all ſorts of people. A Prince is not to be credited, when he brags of his courage, to attend the encounter of his Enemy, for the ſeruice of his glory; if for his profit & aduancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words; hauing no other effect nor aime but to pinch

pinch him by the Eare, the reſt of the operation being in his owne hands.

A Wiſe act of the firſt Miniſter of an eſtate to diſcharge his duty.

Wee reade in the Turkes Hiſtorie, that a Baſſa called by his Maſter to the gouernment of the Eſtate, and made Vezir, which is the firſt charge of the Empire next to the Grand Siegnour, holding himſelfe not very capable of this charge, hee drew certaine Perſons ſecretly vnto him, who had charge to collect whatſoeuer they heard ſpoken in the Citie of *Conſtantinople* touching the gouernment of the Eſtate, to relate it vnto him: And by this meanes being aduertized of all that was found good or bad, and of that which they deſired to bee done or not done, hee gouerned himſelfe in ſuch ſort, and without the helpe of any other Councell, all things ſucceeded to his deſire, and accomodating his actions to the will of the people, hee was admired by them, who before held him to bee vncapable of this charge.

This may be practized by the Prince; but yet hee may not forbeare to make choiſe of a good Councell, to examine the propoſitions of that which by this meanes they haue diſcouered, to bee deſired of the people. In this manner it ſhall bee eaſie for a Prince to reſolue, bee it that hee take the aduice of euery one ſecretly and apart; or being aſſembled, hee cauſe them to deliuer their opinions openly, to the end that by the communication of their aduiſoes, the reſolution may bee more eaſie to take, either in following the greateſt number of voyces, or in making choice of his opinion that ſeemes the beſt; and the reſolution taken, the execution muſt follow with all poſſible ſpeede; Celeritie making all things eaſie, as well for that of it ſelfe, it is actiue and full of vigour, as for that it giues no leiſure to croſſe a buſineſſe in the execution, before they can oppoſe it.

CHAP. 22.

CHAP. 22.

Of the forme of Commanding.

THe fourth eſtabliſhment to bee made in an Eſtate, is the forme of Commanding, in the which wee muſt conſider two things; the power of the Commander, and the iuſtice of the commandement.

Of the power. The power of him which commands is either ſoueraigne or inferiour. The commandement of the ſoueraigne is, either generall, or particular: The generall conſiſts in the lawes which the ſoueraigne eſtabliſheth, vnder which wee comprehend the ordinary orders, cuſtomes aud ſtatutes.

Of the law. The law is as it were a pledgeand a generall ſafetie, which Princes giue vnto their ſubiects, for the entertainement of contracts, and their courſe of liuing, which ought to be maintained and obſerued, eſpecially amongſt them for the generall good of the Eſtate. For reaſon alone which God hath put into man, being vnable to retaine him within the bonds of his dutie, and cuſtome to liue ill, hauing made ſo great an impreſſion in him, as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him; it hath beene needfull to imploy the authority of lawes, and the force of the Prince, to reduce euery man to reaſon, for feare of puniſhment, and by the Eſtabliſhment of certaine rules, to a ſure order in the Eſtate, and to confirme iudgments in Iuſtice. In effect it were dangerous, to leaue all to the iudgment of men, in the multitude whereof will grow a confuſion of opinions, if they had not ſome rule which they ought to follow, and they might more eaſily bee carried away by hatred or fauour: the which cannot happen to Law-giuers, who making lawes

Lawes for the future, are not tranſported with any priuate paſſion but for the publique. For although that the Iudges were wiſe and without paſſion, yet it is more eaſie to finde a ſmall number of wiſe men which eſtabliſh the Lawes, and the forme of iudging, then to finde ſuch a number as is neceſſary to be Iudges. Moreouer, the Lawes are made with mature deliberation, and Iudgements are giuen ſuddainly according to the occurrents of affaires: ſo as the rule is more ſafe taken from the Law, then if the Prince gaue it himſelfe.

The Lawes are of diuers ſorts, according to the diuerſity of Subiects, for the gouernment whereof they are made. For ſome rule the power of Offices and Magiſtrates, as well Eccleſiaſticall as Ciuill; and diſtinguiſh the function of their Charges, their Iuriſdiction, honour, and preheminence one vpon another. Others rule the Treaſure; others the military Diſcipline; others the generall Policy; others Iuſtice, as well in regard of the quality of perſons, of contracts, treaties, and commerce among men; as for the puniſhment of Crimes, the order and forme of proceeding in Iudgements by the parties and Iudges. Some are made to containe the Subiect in his duty towards the Prince and Magiſtrate, and to maintayne Concord and Peace. Finally, the Law muſt haue for his principall end the good of the Eſtate, and to prouide for all the parts thereof, and for the inconueniences that may annoy it, and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it: Otherwiſe the Reuerence which hath cauſed it to be receiued, would part and be ſeparated from ſuch commandments, and there would remaine nothing but the ſole authority and power. For although they ſay, that the will of the Prince is a Law; yet this muſt not be vnderſtood of all that comes into his fancy and will to doe; but onely of that which he may iuſtly deſire: for that the Lawes ought to be made and publiſhed, to amend and correct the nature of things, for the which they meane to eſtabliſh

Diuerſity of lawes.

The ayme and end of the law.

ſtabliſh them, and not to ſecond the appetite of him that makes them: We muſt therefore conſider in making of Lawes, the qualities which muſt concurre in a Law. The first is, that it be according to publique honeſty, obſerUing the dignity of perſons and thi gs: that it be iuſt as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend, which is the publique good onely, as for the authority of him that makes it, who in eſtabliſh ng it, ought not to exceed the power that is giuen him. There is another quality which concernes the forme, to the end that Equality and proportion may be kept, as in the impoſition of Iudges: for otherwiſe it were not a Law, but a violence, to the which in conſcience we are not bound to obey, but onely to auoyd ſcandall and ſedition. It muſt likewiſe be peaceable and quiet according vnto Nature, and the condition of ſuch as ought to obey, and are Subiects, grounded vpon naturall reaſon, and accommodated to the quality of affaires, and the cuſtomes of the Countrey. For there are lawes which are good in one Country, but would not be ſo in another. The Lawes in like manner muſt be fitting for the time, being neceſſary to gouerne the Eſtate, as a pilot doth his ſhip, according to the wind that blowes, and not lightly eſtabliſhed. Moreouer, the Law muſt be profitable to all, or to the greateſt part; plaine, leaſt its obſcurity breeds ſome errour; briefe, and according vnto ſome without preface, with the commandment onely.

Qualities conſiderable in the eſtabliſhing of lawes.

Of the ſhortneſſe of the law.

Yet others are of a contrary opinion. For although that the principall intention of the Law ought not to be to teach the reaſon for the which it is made, no more then the Phyſitian, who is not called by the ſick Patient, to giue him a reaſon of his preſcriptions, but to cure him, hauing more need of health then Doctrine: yet for that they make Lawes for men capable to vnderſtand that which is neceſſary for the publique good, the Prince ought (as a common Father) not onely to make knowne vnto his people the end of the Law, but alſo the reaſon, that he may know

that

that the Ordinances of his Prince are no lesse full of reason then command. It is true, that when as by such mildnesse and humanity the Prince preuayles nothing with his Subiects, then he may with a sufficient excuse vse his absolute commaund: For his duty binds him to practise all meanes to moue and induce his Subiects to well doing, yea, to imploy force, the which in it selfe is not bad, if it be well vsed. For although that the Lawes ought not to be against men, yet they are made to commaund men; and for that pleasure doth many times deceiue men, delighting in things which are pernicious and hurtfull; the Prince in making a Law, must not haue any regard to the pleasure or displeasure which his Subiects may take: but it shall suffice him, that those things which he ordaynes or commaunds, may be good and profitable to the publique. Yet this is not to say, that he should not proceede in those courses which may breed a popular contentment; but contrariwise he must haue this principal obiect after the good of the Estate. Behold what we are to follow in the establishment of a Law, let vs now see what we are to fly. Of the absolute command of the Prince.

CHAP. 23.

What we are to auoyde in the establishing of Lawes.

AMong other things we must haue a speciall care not to establish any Lawes but such as are very necessary. The multiplicity of Lawes is rather a testimony of confusion then good orders: For few Lawes suffice to entertayne good men in their Duties, and to punish the wicked if they be well obserued. The number of Lawes proceeds commonly from two causes, the one is the ambition and vanity of those which cõmand, who to gaine the reputation of wel ruling, will Of the great number of lawes, and the causes thereof.

will prouide for all, yea for matters of ſmall moment. The which is a cauſe that being of this quallity, they are not obſerued, and the people accuſtoming themſelues not to obay Lawes of ſmall importance, they afterward do eaſily diſpence with themſelues from doing that which Lawes of greater importance commaunds. Wherefore it is better to leaue the care of ſuch great and weighty things to the Magiſtrate, who may prouide according to occurrents.

The other cauſe, from whence the multitude of Lawes do vſually proceed, is the bad inclination of the Prince, who hauing an intent to domineere ouer the Magiſtrates & publiek, in his particular appetites and affayres, makes what Lawes he can to offend in particular, eyther thoſe whom he feares or ſuch as he hates: or of that, from whence he thinkes he may draw ſome profit for his owne particular.

Of the obſeruation of lawes.

I come vnto the obſeruation of Lawes, without the which, the eſtabliſhment were fruitleſſe. To this obſeruation two things are neceſſary: the example of great men, and of thoſe which commaund; and Seuerity. For as the Lawes preſcribe vnto Subiects the rule of well liuing, ſo the Prince ought to giue an Example for the obſeruation and entertaynment of the Lawes: And the Prince is called the liuing Law of the Eſtate, not only for his intelligence and power to make a Law; but alſo for the obſeruation of that, which they teach by way of commaundment, the Prince by his Example commaunds it. When I ſay the Example of the Prince, I ſpeak not of his perſon alone, but of thoſe of his trayne, of his neereſt Fauourites, and of the greateſt perſonages: For it would little mayle him to obſerue the Lawes, if he ſuffer the great men of his Court to break them. Wherefore he muſt haue an Eye, for that the Subiects of a meane condition cannot receiue a greater contentment then to ſee the actions of great perſons conformable to the common

common rule, conceiuing an opinion thereby to haue ſome equality and participation with them, in acknowledging them equall in this obedience.

Of ſeuerity.

As the example of the Prince ſerues to inuite men to doe well, ſo ſeuerity retires and hinders thoſe (whom impunity might abandon) from doing euill. This ſeuerity notwithſtanding doth not extend to ſearch out and puniſh the moſt ſecret offences; but thoſe which may be the cauſe of bad example. Likewiſe it is certayne that the puniſhments ordayned by the Lawes, are more in regard of the ſcandall then for the Crime, whereof God is the principall reuenger, and not ſo much to puniſh the offence paſt, as to ſtrike terrour into the wicked for the future, by the rigour of puniſhment, not to commit the like fault. And although the intention of the Law be not to hinder any man, yet for that men ſometimes commit errours, which deſerue (eyther in regard of the perſon which commits them, or for ſome other good reſpect) compaſſion and mercy: in this caſe the Prince may moderate the rigour of the Law by a fauorable temper, or giue him an abſolute pardon, if the Subiect deſerues it; and that herein he cannot bring impunity in other things, or in equality which breeds ſcandall to good men to the preiudice of the Eſtate.

When the Prince may diſpence with the lawes,

For this effect pardons muſt not be too frequent, but for a Subiect that is full of merit, and they muſt be pleaſing to the moſt part. But when he ſhall be forced to ſhew himſelfe ſeuere, as it is neceſſary ſometimes, that in the diſobedience of the Subiects the Prince ſhou'd be rigorous; if puniſhment may be called rigour: this rigour ingendring vtually feare, the which ſeldome accompanied with loue, he muſt amidſt his actions of ſeuerity, extend his bounty to good men: and then the feare which was full of hatred, will bee conuerted into Reuerence. This ſhall ſuffice for that which concernes the generall commands of the Soueraigne, which

How he ought to gouerne himſelfe in ſeuerity.

are made by Lawes, Ordinances, and other ſuch kinde of commands.

CHAP. 24.

Of the Princes particular Commaunds.

AS for the particular Commaunds which are made vpon occaſions which happen dayly, the forme is in a manner equall: for that it ought to be conſtant in that which they haue firſt vndertaken to eſtabliſh, and not to change vpon euery difficulty which may happen, but contrariwiſe they ſhould ſtriue to ſurmount all the croſſes which may preſent themſelues. This forme of Commaund ſhalbe like vnto the other accompanied with ſeuerity; being needfull to preuent diſobedience in ſmall matters: for that this vice like vnto others, growes by degrees. But aboue all, hee which commaunds, muſt deale in ſuch ſort, as the Soueraigne commaund may depend wholy on him, and beryed to his Perſon: not that the Prince ſhould therefore draw vnto himſelfe all the gouernment, and the whole managing of the Eſtate: forbeſides that he ſhould find himſelfe ouer-burthened, and that in the multitude of affaires there will be many ill cared for, and worſe executed, he ſhould charge his Principality with enuy; and his ſubiects ſeeing themſelues depriued of the adminiſtration of Offices, would grow cold in the affections which they ought to beare him. But the Soueraigne authority ought not to be imparted to any one, nor the diſtribution of Recompences and Offices, nor the abſolute cõmand of forces; leaſt that he to whom the Prince hath giuen this power changing his affection and will, ſhould take occaſion to attempt againſt the Eſtate, hauing the commodity

of

of ſuch an aduantage: whereof there are but too many examples Hiſtories.

We haue treated of the Commandments of a Soueraigne power: Let vs now obſerue the forme of their Commaund, whoſe power is inferiour, and to whom the charges of the Eſtate are diſtributed, to haue care and to watch ouer that part of the Eſtate which is committed vnto them.

CHAP. 25.
Of Magiſtrates.

IT being neceſſary that of all the parts of an Eſtate, there ſhould not any remayne without gouernment; one alone being vnable to imbrace all; being likewiſe vnfit, that the Soueraigne ſhould be troubled in matters which may be done better by thoſe which are inferiour vnto him: it hath beene held neceſſary to giue order, that this ſupreme authority, yet without ſuffring any demunition, ſhould be diſperſed into many parts; and that power ſhould be giuen to a certayne number of men, to heare, ordayne, or prouide particularly, for affaires of leaſt importanee, and the which are all ſo many branches of the Soueraigaty, out of which they grow, and are ſupported as by their ſtemme, and by the which reciprocally the Soueraignty brings forth flowers, leaues, and fruits.

The diſtinction of theſe inferiour powers is diuers, according to the diuerſity of the parts of the Eſtate. For ſome are ordayned to free the Prince from the care and particular ſafety of the Prouinces, and to watch ouer them; as that of Gouernours: Others haue the care of Religion: Others of Warr; Others of the Treaſure; Others of Policy; others of Iuſtice; Others of Iudgements, which muſt be giuen vpon the controuerſies of priuate

Diſtinction of Officers & Miniſters of an Eſtate.

persons, or for the punishments of crimes; Others must haue an eye to the affaires abroad; as Embassadours or Agents; Others are destinated to assist the greatnesse of the Prince, to dispose of his house and traine, and to serue him in his Court.

And as euery one of their parts is subdiuided into many others; so according to these subdiuisions, the charges are in themselues distinguished into functions: and in this diuersity there are some which haue power to command, proceeding from the sole authority of the Prince, or from that of the Lawes, the which haue attributed this power to the Office. Others are erected for the seruice of the Estate; Others for the execution of commandments.

Some hauing distinguished publique Offices, according vnto honour, iurisdiction, and command. For some are without honour, iurisdiction, or command; and in this ranke they place all those which are destinated for the seruice or execution of the superiours commandments, as Registers, Notaries, Cryers, Sergeants, Trumpets, and such like. Others are with honour, yet without power to command or to iudge; as Embassadours, Councells, and secretaries of Estate, Receiuers of the Treasure, and most part of the Officers of the Princes trayne. Others haue honour and iurisdiction, but no power to command, as Prelates. Others haue honour and power to command, but no iurisdiction, as the Consuls in old time at *Rome*, and at this present the gouernours of Prouinces, and the Kings Procurators. Others haue honour, iurisdiction, and power to command, and these are properly called Magistrates.

CHAP.

CHAP. 26.

Of the differences betwixt Officers and Commiſſaries.

IT were a fruitleſſe thing to buſie my ſelfe here, to Diſcourſe particularly of the duties and power attributed to euery publique office: For that it is diuerſly practized, not only in ſeuerall eſtates, but alſo in the ſame Eſtate, as it is held moſt expedient for the publique good, to increaſe the power of the one, and to diminiſh that of another. And relating only that which is moſt generally obſerued, I will content my ſelfe to adde vnto theſe former diſtinctions one other, which is drawn from the forme in the which a power is giuen to thoſe which are imployed in publique charges.

For charges are giuen eyther by Office or by the way of Commiſſion: If in an Office, he that hath the charge is called an Officer: If by Commiſſion he is tearmed a Commiſſioner. The charge of an Officer is regulated by the Law, or by the Edict of the erection of the office: and by the letters of Commiſſion the charge of a Commiſſioner is limitted. This difference is betwixt an Officer and a Commiſſioner, that the charge of an Officer is ordinary, and hath a perpetuall courſe, although that in regard of the perſon the Exerciſe be limitted to a certayne time. and the charge of a Commiſſioner is extraordinary, and reuokable at the good pleaſure of him that hath giuen the Commiſſion. Of officers & Commiſſioners and of their difference.

There are foure things to be conſidered in a Commiſſion: The perſon from whence it proceeds; the Direction; the Charge; and the time when it is to expire. In regard of the firſt, Commiſſions proceed either from the Soueraigne, or from his Officers, or from other Cómiſſioners deputed Conſideratiõ to be made vpon a Cõmiſſion

Of the person from whence it proceeds.

deputed by the Soueraigne, who may commit, there happening some lawfull act, vnlesse it bee forbidden, or there be a question of State, or of the life and honour of some persons. For in this case they cannot sub-deligate.

Of the direction of a Commission.

For the direction, a commission is directed either to an Officer, or to a priuate person: If to an Officer, it is either a thing depending of his Office; and in this case, the letters are neither Executorie of his dutie, then letters of commission, if the time or place be not changed; and differs from that which is mentioned in the Edict of the Execution of the Office. In this concurrence, the ordinary knowledge is to bee preferred before the commission; euen as the qualitie of the Officer is preferrable to that of a Commissioner, and the actes of the Officers more assured then those of Commissioners. But if it be a matter which belongs not vnto them, in regard of their Office, and that there bee a difference in some circumstance; then he cannot get it as an Officer, but onely in qualitie of a Commissioner.

Of the charge of a Commission.

In the charge we must consider the end, for the which it is giuen vs; and the power wee haue by it. The end concernes either the instruction, or the knowledge of some businesse: And the power regards the decision, iudgment or resolution, and the commandement for the execution of that which we haue resolued. I call instruction all that which is to bee done, to bring a businesse to an Estate ready to be resolued and determined. The knowledge giuen vnto a Commissioner, is either of fact or of right: or of both together, wherein hee shall carry himselfe, as wee will shew by and by, treating of the duty of the Magistrate towards the commandement of the Prince: the power to iudge is giuen either definitiuely, & without an appeale, or without execution if there be an appeale; or els with power to put in executiõ that which we haue resolued, notwithstanding any opposition or appelation, and

and without preiudice thereof. For the power of Command, either it is giuen the Commiſſioner for the execution of that which hee had ordained; or the Commiſſioner is commanded to execute that himſelfe, which another had decreed, hauing no power to command a third: And this laſt kind of Commiſſion, is directed to inferior Officers, who are ſimple executioners of the commandements of their ſuperiors.

The duty of a Commiſſioner.

From the conſideration of that which I haue ſaid wee may gather, that the duty of a Commiſſioner is to regulate himſelfe, according to the termes of his Commiſſion, the which he may in no ſort exceede. For although that this generall clauſe bee inſerted to carry himſelfe according to the quality of perſons, and as hee ſhall ſee matters diſpoſed, hee may adde or diminiſh to the inſtructions that are giuen him in writing, according to his wiſedome and diſcretion: Yet this muſt be vnderſtood of the acceſſary of his charge, and of the ſmalleſt matters, for of thoſe which are important hee may not diſpoſe without ſpeciall command. For although they referre it to his wiſedome and diſcretion; yet the ignorance of a Commiſſioner were not excuſeable, this clauſe being to bee vnderſtood according to the examination of an honeſt and ſufficient man, eſpecially when it concernes the publike good of the Eſtate.

Of the time when a Commiſſion ſhould expire.

It remaines now to know when the Commiſſion expires. It ceaſeth, if he which granted it comes to die: if the thing or perſon for the which the charge is giuen, bee no more in being: If hee which hath giuen the Commiſſion reuokes it; if the Commiſſioner during the Commiſſion, obtaines an Office or Magiſtracie, equall to him who granted the Commiſſion, ſo as the buſineſſe bee entire; or that being begunne it may bee left, without preiudice to the publique or to priuate perſons.

Chap. 27.

Conſiderations vpon the Eſtabliſhment of Officers and Magiſtrates.

THeſe diſtinctions knowne, many other poynts are to be conſidered in the Eſtabliſhment of thoſe, to whom this power of Commaund vnder the Soueraigne, or to manage other affaires concerning the Eſtate is attributed, be it by Office or Commiſſion; but principally we muſt conſider the number of thoſe that are to be imployed: The authority of him which hath eſtabliſhed and imployed them; the qualities of thoſe whom they put into offices; the forme of proceeding in theſe Eſtabliſhments; the time they ought to remayne in Authority; and finally the duty of principall Magiſtrates, aſwell towards the Soueraigne and the Lawes, as to other Magiſtrates that are equall or inferiour, and towards particular perſons.

Of the number of officers.

The number of Officers or Miniſters in one charge is blamed by many; and yet it is more ſafe to commit a buſineſſe to many then to one. First, for that they watch one another, and as it were through iealouſie, euery man ſtirres vp his companion to Execute his charge the better: And moreouer it many times happens, that after they haue made Election of ſome, they do not anſwere the opinion that was conceiued of them; in which caſe there being many, one helpes and releiues another. The more they are, the more difficulty they wilbe corrupted; and if any be, their corruption ſhall haue the leſſe force to commit a bad act; one alone, or few hauing no power to deceiue many, and it is a difficult thing that all ſhould agree together to deceiue.

That it is more ſafe to commit a buſineſſe to many then to one alone.

Moreouer the ordinary inconueniences, as ſickneſſe

or

or other naturall hinderances, befalling a Miniſter, if he be alone, his charge (which it may be is neceſſary for the publique) will remayne in ſuſpence and without exerciſe, and the publique affayres by this meanes delayed, not without preiudice to the Eſtate.

As for the plurality of Officers, which growes from the plurality of Charges, the charges being diſtinguiſhed one from another, ſo as they cannot be confounded; ſo as this plurality is ſo farre from being hurtfull or preiudiciall vnto the Eſtate, as it is profitable. By this meanes no part of the Eſtate is neglected: you content and pacifie the ambition of many, who liuing priuately in idleneſſe, would ſeeke to imploy themſelues in ſome innouation: and you bind them to the preſeruation of the Eſtate, for that they would feare that an alteration would change the order, and by conſequence impayre their authority.

Inconueniences growing from the plurality of offices; and the meanes to auoyd them.

But as in this diuerſity of charges, we muſt prouide that confuſion may not trouble, neyther the Officers in their charges, nor priuate men in their buſineſſe: We muſt auoyd irreſolution which is ordinary in a multitude, and the tediouſneſſe of affayres, which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another. Irreſolution wilbe aduoyded, not in reducing the affayres to the Knowledge of one alone, or of two, but to a competent number, according to the quality of buſineſſe, and thoſe muſt be vnequall, to the end that the plurality of voyces may decide the buſineſſe, and that they may not be ſubiect to be diuided in opinion. The teadiouſnes would be auoyded in cutting off the degrees of thoſe which are to take Knowledge one aboue another; and it ſeemes that two degrees would ſuffice. But they muſt auoyd in the one and the other, a plurality in the charge of the treaſure of the Eſtate, where the people is oppreſt, by the fees or rights attributed to Officers: the which may be done by two meanes. The firſt in giuing more honour vnto Offices, and leſſe wages and fees: And the other

other in giuing them hope to aſcend by degrees vnto greater dignities.

This meanes likewiſe will ſerue to make the greateſt affect and ſeeke the meaneſt Offices, making them know that they cannot come to the greateſt before they paſſe through the others; and there will alwayes remayne a place for the Princes fauour, making choyſe of one among many which are in the ſame charge, to rayſe him vnto a greater dignity, and this order may alſo ſerue to cauſe the affayres to be mannaged with more Integrity. For they which deſire to aduance themſelues, will feare that doing otherwiſe they ſhalbe reiected when they deſire to riſe. In like manner the Capacity wilbe greater in ſuch, as ſhalbe aduanced to more eminent charges. For that hauing paſt through many degrees, they will haue more knowledge, both of the affayres and of the manner how to mannage them.

CHAP. 28.

Of the creation and nomination of Magiſtrates, and Officers.

The creation and choyſe of officers, muſt be made by the Soueraigne only.

THE Magiſtrate or Officers, euen the principall ought to be made by the Soueraigne, being one of the greateſt markes of Soueraignty. The which I meane not only for the creation and erection of offices, but for the choyſe of perſons: there being no greater errour (although ordinary in Princes) then to relye vpon ſome other, for the choyſe of a man to aduance him to ſome Office.

And we muſt not wonder if they be ill ſerued, although their intent be good; nor if the Lawes be ſo ill executed: For that hauing no will to take the paynes

Paines, to ſearch out and examine the merite of their principall ſubiects; they cannot diſpoſe of Offices proportionably to their Natures and capacities. For beſides that there is a difference, in regard of the vnderſtanding betwixt affaires of importance, and thoſe of leſſe moment in the Execution: there muſt be more courage in the greater, and leſſe ſubtilty in the leſſe: which are two principall parts which ſeldome ioyne together: no more then in Iron tooles, where we ſee that a knife for that it hath the edge finer, will doe an effect that a Hatchet cannot doe; and he that will imploy a Hatchet like vnto that of a knife, he ſhall make it vnprofitable to cut any hard ſubſtance, wherein they imploy it vſually: ſo as they muſt imploy euery toole to the vſe for which it is made.

That the charges muſt be diſtributed proportionably, according to the nature and capacity of them.

Foralthough that affaires ought to be mannaged by diſcretion, and not by inclination: yet it behoues the wiſdome of the Prince, to know that moſt part of the affaires of this world are gouerned more by inclination then otherwiſe. Wherefore he muſt cunningly make vſe of this defect. For Nature hath giuen to euery mans condition ſome good thing in exchange of ſome defect which is found in him: if it hath giuen to ſome one a flowneſſe to begin, it hath likewiſe imparted an obſtinacy to continue and finiſh the worke, ballancing his negligence with perſeuerance. To thoſe which by Nature ſhalbe ſuddaine and haſty, and who in regard of their impatiency, ſtriue to doe things out of ſeaſon; ſhe hath giuen hardineſſe, by the meanes whereof they haue effected great matters.

Theſe Defects being common among men, the Prince ſhall accommodate himſelfe, and diſtribute the charges according to euery mans humour and inclination; and to treate a buſineſſe, it ſhall ſuffice to informe him whom he meanes to imploy, of the grounds and ſubſtance of the buſineſſe, and to leaue the reſt to him to mannage according to his naturall inclination, be it graue, modeſt, ſeuere, or otherwiſe;

otherwiſe: for that they may vſe diuers meanes tending to the ſame end; and if it be forced, the buſineſſe wil not ſucceed. But in making choyce, he muſt conſider, that the humour and ſufficiency may be proportionable to the buſineſſe, and to the humour of thoſe with whom he is to treate. The ſame muſt be obſerued for all thoſe whom they imploy in charges and publique affaires.

Principall qualities required in an officer & Magiſtrate.

And although it were to be deſired that in the mannaging of affaires, they might haue men that were diſcreet, and of great ſufficiency: yet for that theſe two qualities doe ſeldome meete together in ſo high a degree as were to be deſired; it were better to chooſe them of a meane vnderſtanding, ſo as they be honeſt men: for that his ſharp ſubtilty proceedes from choller, to the which ſuch men are ſubiect to ſuffer themſelues to be tranſported for a ſmal matter. And moreouer hauing a good conceipt of themſelues, and a bad of others, they can hardly agree with any man. Beſides they are vſually of ſmall fore-ſight, for the little leaſure their promptneſſe giues them; and for the paſſion which blinds them, they are many times deſirous of nouelties. For neuer allowing theſe orders which are made with a mature deliberation and their quickneſſe of ſpirit, furniſhing them with others, which in their opinions ſeeme better; they ſtriue to purchaſe beleefe, and in this attempt they ſometimes cauſe trouble.

They which are of a meane vnderſtanding, ſupport the accidents which happen more eaſily; and when as they finde themſelues in an Eſtate well ordred, and gouerned by good Lawes, they maintaine themſelues long. Such men moſt commonly are inclined to Fleagme. And if by a breeding contrary to their nature, they haue not beene ſtirred vp to ambition, they obey more willingly then the reſt; for that their humour being groſſe, the impreſſion which nature hath bred, is more firme, and the deſires and appetites ſtronger.

The vices and

But in chooſing Magiſtrates and Officers, they muſt not onely

onely conſider the vertues of Men, but alſo the vices and naturall defects, which they may haue; and to obſerue if theſe defects be ſo powerfull, as they may hinder him in the exerciſe wherein they meane to imploy him. As for example, in a Iudge, there is no doubt but a iuſt Man for his Iuſtice ought to be choſen; but if hee be fearfull, aſſure your ſelfe, if hee be to giue ſentence againſt ſome great man, he will leaue Iuſtice to adhere to ſafety. Moreouer a Magiſtrate muſt loue and vnderſtand the Lawes: For louing them hee will obſerue them; and louing and vnderſtanding them, hee will make others capable to obſerue them.

defects are as well to be conſidered as the vertues, in the election of Magiſtrates and Officers.

But to make the choyce of Officers eaſily, the meanes would bee (as wee haue formerly ſaid) to make many degrees, and to chooſe out of the laſt degree, him whom they meane to aduance to the next, and ſo from degree to degree: For they ſhould know by their actions what they would bee before they make choice of them.

An eaſy means to make a good choice.

This ſhall ſuffice for the principall qualities of Magiſtrates and Officers. Let vs now come to the forme of making them.

CHAP. 29.

Of the forme and manner to Create and make Magiſtrates and Officers: And of the time of their Charges.

THey are made either by election or by lot, or by both together. The election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooſeth whom hee pleaſeth, which is the ordinary manner in all principalities; or elſe it is referred to many; and is done either by voice, or in lifting vp the hand and voice; or by billets or by beans. The Lot is caſt, either vpon certaine Citizens,

Three kinds of creating and making Magiſtrates.

By election.

By lott.

Citizens, out of which they will chooſe ſome one to imploy in ſome charge; or vpon all thoſe which are of the ſame age or the ſame condition, out of which they will likewiſe by Lot draw one or two to aduance them to ſome Office. The Lot and choyce concurres together diuerſly. For either they chooſe a certaine number by voices, out of which afterwards they deſire to draw one to bee an Officer; or hauing drawne many by Lot, they giue them power to chooſe one amongſt them, which is held moſt capable.

By lot and election together.

In this difference it is to be obſerued, that the diſcontent of thoſe which are not choſen is the leſſe, when the Lot proceeds the choyce, then when the choyce goes before the Lot. Wherefore in places whereas hatred is irreconcilliable, it were better to make vſe of this laſt kind, then of the firſt.

Let vs now ſee what time Officers ought to remaine in the exerciſe of their charges. This is diuerſly obſerued. In ſome Eſtates they continue them during life: In others they are limmited to a certaine time. In ſome for a yeere; in others for two; and in others, although they were continued in their places during life, yet being many in the ſame charge, they made them ſerue alternatiuely one after another.

The continuance of Officers is either for life or a certaine time.

They which haue beene of opinion to make Officers temporary, and not to continue them during life, had for their principall conſideration to abate the inſolence and pride which a long command brought with it; as alſo to haue meanes to call Officers to an Accompt, hauing giuen ouer their charges, fearing they ſhould not bee able to draw them ſo eaſily, being ſtill in authority: In like manner to preuent the impunity of thoſe, which had tranſgreſſed in their Offices. To make many partakers of the Eſtate, not onely to ſatisfie the ambitious, to cut off diſcontments; but alſo to recompence many good men, & to make more capable of affairs, & to ſtir them vp to the care of the publique.

Reaſons and conſiderations to make Officers for a time.

publique. Some alſo haue beene of this opinion, to hinder that the gouernment might not bee vſurped by few men, who would make the reſt ſubiect: hauing beene often ſeene by many examples, that the continuance of command hath made vſurpations eaſie, not onely vpon popular eſtates, but alſo in principalities and ſeignouries; the Offices and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimonicall in many eſtates.

Reaſons and conſiderations to perpetuate Offices during life.

They which would perpetuate them, haue had other conſideration: For that making the Magiſtrates Annall, or for a ſhort time they leaue their Offices before they are informed of their duties; ſo as the Eſtate falls alwayes into the hands of vncapable men, and by theſe ſuddaine and frequent changes, moſt part of affaires remaine vndecided, Warrs begunne left vnperfit, Suits and differences laid by, and puniſhments and executions delayed. There is another conſideration, which is, that the time being ſhort, the Merchants ſtudy to doe their buſineſſe ſpeedily: and this change brings nothing, but new ſtarued horſ-leaches, which muſt be filled; whereas they which are already full by their offices, might giue more eaſe vnto the people.

And as from new ſeruants growes the enuie of Families, ſo from new Magiſtrates proceeds the fall of Eſtates, which bring new Councells, new deſignes, new Lawes, new Cuſtomes, new Edicts, new kinds of liuing, and new Iudgements. *Tiberius* to withdraw the greate men of *Rome* from the knowledge of publique affaires, and to aſſure thoſe the more whom he imployed in Offices, hee continued them during life. Wherefore to auoid the greateſt part of the inconueniences which are found in either party; you muſt conſider the forme of the Eſtate, and the humour of the ſubiects.

The change of Officers and Magiſtrates neceſſary in a popular Eſtate.

Popular Eſtates are maintained by the continuall change of Magiſtrates, to the end that euery one according to his qualitie may haue his part, as they haue in a ſouereigntie, and that equallitie (the nurſe of a popular Eſtate)

Eſtate) may be the better entertayned by the annual ſucceſſion of Magiſtrates; leaſt that the cuſtome of commaunding long, ſhould cauſe ſome one to deſire to ſeaze vpon the Soueraignty: the which is a conſideration which they ought to haue in Seignouries, and Eſtates gouerned by few perſons.

In Principallities it is not needfull to teach Subiects to Command, but to obay. And being neceſſary to retayne them in their duties, they cannot aſſure themſelues but of few to maintayne the reſt. Yet to preuent that the continuance of a great charge ſhould not make ſome one dream of the vſurpation of the Eſtate, they may in continuing other Officers in their places, ballance the power of great men, in giuing them companions as great as themſelues: or after the expiration of ſome time, to cauſe them to paſſe from one charge to another, which hath more honour but leſſe power. Wherfore ſome haue held it fit, to diſtinguiſh the charges whereon the force depends, from thoſe to whom they wil giue authority; and to make others aboue them, who ſhall haue more honour then authority or power.

Meanes to preuent the vſurpation of the Eſtate by the continuance of officers in great charges.

This courſe is obſerued by the Pope and the Seignoury of *Venice*. The gouernments depending on the Church, the authority is giuen to a Clergy-man for the gouernment, but the force is committed to another, who depends immediatly on the Pope; yet hauing charge, in that which ſhal concerne the gouernment, to aſſiſt the reſolutions of him that hath the authority. In gouernments depending on the Seignoury of *Venice*, a Gentleman of the Commonweale commaunds: and for the Forces a Captayne of the Seignoury, who hath charge to aſſiſt him. But in neyther of theſe Eſtates, the Gouernour and he which commands the Forces, are not linckt together, as the one would fauour the vſurpation of his Companion. For as the Gouernour would not allow of his vſurpation that commaunds the Forces, for that it cannot be done but againſt his authority:

The practize of the Pope and Seignoury of Venice, in the diſpoſition of great charges to preuent vſurpation,

ſo

ſo he cannot expect and aſſiſtance from him, fearing that hauing made this ouerture, and the other making ſhew to yeeld vnto it, being Maſter of the forces, the authority of the Eſtate and gouernour being weakned by this enterprize, he would chaſe him away, and make himſelfe Maſter of the gouernment. And theſe charges being not the moſt honourable in an Eſtate, but there being others more eminent, thoſe which enioy them, ayming at the honour of the others, ſtudy not to ſettle themſelues there; but contrariwiſe ſome affect to be made Cardinals, and to be drawne from thoſe places, and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe Offices of the Seignoury.

Kings who haue but one ſort of people to imploy in gouernments, make vſe of other meanes, ſome make gouernments triennall, and not onely the gouernments of Prouinces, but alſo of Cittadels and Forts, cauſing that theſe depend not on the others; but in certaine things, and accompany the Gouernour with forces; which are not particularly at their deuotion, but onely ſo farre forth as the Gouernours ſhall contayne themſelues in the Princes ſeruice. But if the Gouernours cannot be changed, they may change the forces which ought to aſſiſt them. The practiſe of Kings & Princes vpon the ſame ſubiect.

But foraſmuch as the Prince ought to be Maſter, and diſpoſe freely of great places, it ſeemes that hee might giue them for a certayne time; and the affaires ſo requiring it, they might continue them to the ſame perſons, if he thought it fit; if not hee might take them into his hands, and deliuer them to others, without any cauſe of diſcontentment to thoſe from whom he had taken them. For this expreſſe limitation of time would worke two effects: The one that they which are aduanced to theſe places; entring into them, would reſolue to leaue them: the other, that being certayne they muſt goe forth, they will neuer thinke That the chaſge of principall Officers & Magiſtrates is neceſſary for the ſafety of the Prince & peace of the people.

to become Maſters, and ſettle themſelues: whereas the time not being limmited, euery one will ſtriue to continue in his place, and there to build his deſignes; but alſo will deſire to bring in after him ſome one of his Children or Kinſmen. And if the Prince deſires to retire him, he muſt buy his place of him, or cauſe it to be bought by ſome other; which is to bring in a venality, more ſhamefull and dangerous in an Eſtate, then any other abuſe that can bee imagined. We will therefore conclude, that this change in the gouernment of Prouinces, and the command of great Troupes or Companies, be it of Souldiers or others which haue great authority in the Eſtate, is neceſſary for the ſafety of the Soueraigne, and the peace of the Subiect.

Prudence required in this charge.

But for that in doing this altogether, they which would deſire to continue in their charges, might plot together and trouble the Eſtate, to maintayne themſelues; he muſt change them one after another, cauſing the time of their charges to expire at diuers termes.

That you may not giue great commands in a Prouince to thoſe that were borne there.

There is another conſideration which hath beene diſcreetly and wiſely made in great Eſtates, not to giue great commands in a Prouince to thoſe which are Natiues, not onely to auoyde the Iniuſtices which ſuch perſons may commit as well in fauour of their Kinſfolkes and Friends, as in hatred of their Enemies; but alſo to auoyde the contempt of his Authority which giues theſe charges, which proceeds commonly from the Ielouſie of thoſe of the Countrey, who hold themſelues equall, and ſometimes greater then he that is aduanced. But if he that is made Gouernour bee ſo great, as they needе not feare this Ielouſie, yet the Prince muſt make vſe of this meanes, to auoyde the ſwelling authority which hee may get in the Prouince by his owne meanes, or by that

of

of his Kinſfolkes and Friends, to the preiudice of his Maſter. Our ancient Ordinances conformable therein to thoſe of the *Romans*, had therein very well prouided, eſpecially in regard of Bayleifes and Seneſchals, who were the ancient Gouernours: But they haue beene and are yet very ill gouerned and obſerued.

It auayles not to ſay, that to facilitate the obedience of Subiects, they haue beene forced to take this courſe; the Subiect obeying more willingly one of his Prouince, who hee thinkes would haue the ſame affection like himſelfe for that which concernes the good thereof, the which a Stranger and vnknown vnto him would not doe, whom he imagines to be vnlike in humour and will. For this were to make the Prince ſubiect to his Officer, and to make the obedience of the people depend more on the credit which the Officer hath, then of the Authority which the Prince ought to haue ouer his Subiects, who obey not the Prince, but ſo farre forth as it ſhall pleaſe the Officer; and the Officer loſing his credit, the Prince ſhall be no more obeyed.

But if in a new Eſtate to ſettle himſelfe, it is very fitting to make vſe of thoſe which haue moſt credit with his Subiects, the Princes authority hauing not yet taken roote in their minds; but I will not thereby inferre that he muſt continue it: but contrariwiſe this authority being acknowledged, to ſettle it abſolutely, the obedience muſt immediately depend, and they muſt obey the Officer ſo farre forth as he hath authority from the Prince, and not for the particular credit he hath among the people.

CHAP. 30.

Of the duty of the principall Officers and Magiſtrates.

AS for the ſupport of the body, it is not ſufficient that the Head be in good Eſtate, but the other members in like manner muſt doe their function: So in an Eſtate, it is not ſufficient for the Prince to doe his Duty, but the Officers, and eſpecially the principall Magiſtrates of the Eſtate, ſhould likewiſe doe theirs.

But I ſhould be tedious, if I would relate here all the whole Duty of euery Officer: onely I will deliuer in generall termes that which concernes the Duty of ſuch as haue Iuriſdiction and command together, or the one and the other diuided; as thoſe which are more conſiderable and worthy of obſeruation in the manniging of the Eſtate. Their Duty is conſidered in foure diuers ſubiects: eyther towards the Lawes, or towards the Soueraignes Commandments; or towards the other Magiſtrates; or towards priuate perſons. Vnder the Name of the Lawes we comprehend the Ordinances and Cuſtomes, which oblige the generall. For the regard of Ordinances, the Duty of the principall Magiſtrates is, to examine thoſe which they will make, in that which belongs to Iuſtice, decency, and publique profit and commodity; and from the conſequence to make their remonſtrance vnto the Soueraigne before they declare or publiſh them, if they finde any thing to bee reformed and amended..

Wherein the Duty of Officers and Magiſtrates doe conſiſt.

Of the duty towards the lawes.

As for thoſe which are already receiued, they muſt cauſe them to be ſtrictly obſerued, and reſtore the old

old aboliſhed for want of vſe, before they put them in execution: otherwiſe it would be a very vniuſt thing, and reſenting tyranny, after they had for a long ſeaſon contemned an Ordinance, to proceed ſuddainly againſt thoſe who hauing not obſerued it, had made a breach: The common errour being not onely excuſable, but alſo held for a Law, if the Law of Nature doth not reſiſt.

But for that the Lawes are not ſufficient to gouerne an Eſtate, for that they ordayne onely in generall, the Law-giuer, or Prince being vnable to fore-ſee an infinite number of particularities which happen in affaires: For this cauſe the Magiſtrate is eſtabliſhed, to examine the particularities, and to accommodate the Law thereunto by a iuſt and vpright interpretation; the which is taken eyther from the words of the Law, or from the intention of him that made it, or by the induction or concluſion which may bee drawne from it.

How the Magiſtrate ought to carry himſelfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law.

In regard of the words of the Law, you muſt obſerue theſe Rules: Firſt, not to take them nor interpret them contrary to the intention of the Law-giuer: Secondly, you muſt ſee if the other clauſes of the Law doe correſpond and agree with the interpretations which we giue. But if by reaſon of ambiguity, and the diuers ſignifications of words, there be obſcurity, they muſt ſeeke the proper ſignification either from the common manner of ſpeaking, or from that which was peculiar to him that drew the Law; if it did not plainely appeare, that the intention of the Law-giuer had beene wholy contrary to the proper ſignification of words.

If there bee found a double interpretation, taken from the propriety of words, and the common vſe of ſpeaking; they ſhall follow the mildeſt; and if the words bee obſcure, they muſt haue recourſe

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to custome, and to that which is practised in that regard. But if the interpretation be notwithstanding doubtfull, they must follow that which shalbe most proper for the matter, to the which it must be referr'd. And if notwithstanding all this they cannot draw any interpretation suitable to the businesse, or to reason; he must cause it to be interpreted by those who haue made the Law; or cause a declaration to be made by the Soueraigne. Thus the Magistrate must carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law. But in the interpretation of the intention of the Law, there are other Rules: eyther they restrayne the Ordinances to certayne cases, or they extend them to many others then those which are specified. They restrayne the ordinances commonly, when as the reason which seemes to haue beene the cause of the ordinance, doth not extend but to certayne cases, and ceaseth in all the rest, in regard of certayne circumstances; for the reason of the Law fayling, the disposition can take no place.

In the interpretation o the intention of the law.

But to seeke out the reason of the Law, we must consider, whether it be expresst by the Law it selfe, or gathered by the Interpreters; and to draw from thence the condition of things whereof the Law speakes, or if it be vncertayne. For if it be expresst by the Law, eyther the Law is formall in the case that it is in question, and then without doubt the Law must be followed; Or if it be not altogether formall, you must consider whether there be not some contrary Circumstances which hinder the reason of the Law, that it takes not place in the businesse that is in question: And they shall doe the like, if the reason be not expresst in the Law, of the execution whereof they treate, but in another fact vpon another subiect. But if the reason be gathered from Interpreters, you must see if they can yeeld no better: And then you must follow it, restrayning it, if it be particular, and extending it if it be generall. But if it be doubtfull, and ordaynes generally, you may not in this doubt in any sort restrayne the effect

of

of the Law, vnlesse it be in things that are odious and hurtfull: And whereas the Law shall bee limited in certaine cases, they must not easily extend it to others vpon pretext of equitie, vnlesse there were an Identite of reasons, especially in things which concerne the rigour of the Law, whereas the case not expresst is held for omitted. But in such occurrents, they shall gouerne themselues according to the common Law, to the which all the Ordinances, if it may bee, must bee referred; to the end that in all the Lawes of the estate, vniformitie may bee obserued, and naturall equitie followed, whereby all the actions of men should bee gouerned, and regulated.

Examination of the reason of the law.

Wherefore the case not being expressed in the Law, but onely the reason being knowne whereon the Law is grounded: It shall be easie to examine if this reason may take place, in that which presents it selfe, in concluding from the generall to the particular, from the principall to the accessary, and by the other meanes of induction. Thus allowing one of the contraries which haue no meane, wee may induce that the other is forbidden: And in like manner, if the Law forbids one thing to auoid a mischiefe which may follow; wee may induce that it likewise forbids all other things, which may breed the like mischiefe, although they be not expresst. And so many consequences may bee drawne from the Lawes, and referred to diuers examples, whereof the reason would be easie to applie from one to another.

That wee must stand to the authority of the law, and make no questions vpon equity.

Wherefore to recollect my selfe, and to explaine more at large what I haue said, as long as the Law is certaine, wee must stand firme to its authority, and make no subtile distinctions vpon equitie: For that the Laws are published to be obserued in their termes and tenor, and not to bee disputed of: I say so farre foorth as it is plaine and not obscure. But if it bee obscure, they shall follow the interpretation that is most receiued by vse; so as it bee not altogether contrary to naturall reason. But if vse

failes vs, wee muſt in the diuerſitie of opinions, follow that which is ſupported by example: yet wee muſt examine the example duly, to ſee if they agree in the cauſe, and principall circumſtances.

When as vſe and examples faile, they ſhall chooſe the opinion which ſhall approach neerer to naturall equitie then to rigour; and that which ſhall bee more conformable to the intention of the Law, then that which ſhall be drawne from the ſubtile interpretation of words: And that which ſhall bee taken from the true Interpretation of words, then from ſimilitudes and coniectures. For that all ſimilitudes halt; and coniectures neuer conclude directly: Or from that which ſhall bee receiued, or moſt conformable to that which the ancients haue held, for that we may not ſlightly leaue the opinion of the ancient. But when wee cannot iudge which opinion is the moſt iuſt, wee muſt conſider which is the ſafeſt, and that which is approued by moſt men, and by the wiſeſt, more ſortable to the buſineſſe that is in queſtion, and which hath in it leſſe inconuenience.

Of the execution of lawes and ordinances.

Behold how the Magiſtrate ought to carry himſelfe, in the interpretation of the Lawes. The other part of the Maieſtrates duty is the execution, for the which he muſt enter into other conſiderations: And firſt from what time the Law or ordinance ought to take place; when they bind the Subiect; and who they are that are bound. For the firſt, you muſt vnderſtand that the laſt ordinances, being contrary to the precedent, derogate from them: But the laſt cannot take place, but for differences to come, and not for thoſe which are decided, or hanging in iudgement by appeale. And the ordinance is in force from the day of the publication, and from that time it binds euery man for the future, which is for the ſecond point.

From what time the law or ordinance doth bind.

Who they are that are bound

For the third, the Princes law doth not bind the ſubiects which are gone to reſide in the territory of another Prince. Yet if the ordinance be prohibitiue, they muſt conſider if the

the prohibition or defence bee made in regard of ſomething, which is in the territory of him which hath made the ordinance: For then a ſtranger or the ſubiect of another Prince ſhou'd be bound. But if it bee in regard of perſons, that the prohibition is made and in faueur of the ſubiects; the Princes ſubiect is bound not to contradict it, although hee remaine in the territory of another Prince. But if it be in hatred of the ſubiect, hee that is out of the territory of the Soueraigne, which hath made the ordinance, is not bound If the prohibition be made for ſolemnitie, which they deſire to haue obſerued in ſome acte, it doth not oblige the ſubiect out of the territory of his Prince, for that in the obſeruation of ſolemnitie, they regard the place where the act is made.

As for other perſons whom the ordinance may bind, they muſt diſtinguiſh whether they bee named in the ordinance by their names, or ſpecified by their quallitie and condition, or if there be no deſignation. The name or the condition being ſpecified, the ordinance doth not extend to thoſe which are of another name, and another qualitie. But if there be no qualitie ſpecified, the ordinance bindes not only all thoſe which gaue conſent to the publication, but alſo ſuch as remaine in the place where it is obſerued, were they ſtrangers: whence this diſtinction proceeds, that in things that are perſonall, proceeding from contracts, ſolemnities, and acts of voluntary Iuriſdiction; they muſt follow that which is obſerued in the place of their abiding, but in that which is of the realitie of things; they ſhalbe bound to that which is receiued in the place where the thing is ſituated.

Of the force of lawes or ordinances.

Ordinances are in force, not for that they are written or iuſt, but in regard they are commanded and made by the Soueraigne. For hee that ſhould obey the Law onely for that it is iuſt, ſhould not obey it as hee ought, this Iuſtice being ſubiect to debate. So cuſtoms haue the force of law, for that they are receiued and alowed by the Iudgment of the

the people: And although there may be ſome exception, ſo as it be not againſt the Law of Nature, the Magiſtrate is bound to obſerue them, and to cauſe them to be obſerued by others.

Of Cuſtome.

But it is lawfull for the Magiſtrate to extend or reſtraine the Law with the reaſon in certayne caſes. Yet he hath not the ſame power with a cuſtome, the which conſiſting more in fact then in Law, and in the particular vſe then in reaſon, he muſt obſerue it with the circumſtances, with the which it hath beene receiued. To make a cuſtome to haue the force of a Law, three things are required.

Three things required to giue force to a Cuſtome.

The firſt, that it hath beene brought in from the beginning to be obſerued for the future. For you cannot authorize by this name that which ſome, (aymming at another thing, or by the indulgence or conniuency of the Magiſtrate) haue ſometimes done: For that a cuſtome cannot take its beginning from a caſuall or raſh vſe, but from an vſe continued by a common obſeruation.

The ſecond point neceſſary to authoriſe a cuſtome, is the reiteration of many the like acts; not ſo much to endure a plurality of examples, as a conſent of opinion, by the frequency of theſe acts; and by this conſent two Acts ſuffice to confirme a cuſtome.

The third and laſt thing required for the approbation of a cuſtome, is the time of tenne yeares at the leaſt; ſome hold thirty yeares that the conſent in this manner of liuing ſhould continue: And that Cuſtome ſhalbe of the more authority when it is fortified by the longer preſcription of time.

CHAP.

Chap. 31.
Of the duty of the Magiſtrate towards his Soueraigne.

THe Duty of the Magiſtrate towards his Soueraigne, conſiſts in the reſpect and obedience he owes, not onely to the Princes perſon, in whoſe preſence all the power of Magiſtrates is held in ſuſpence, as the Stars loſe their light in the preſence of the Sunne, (the Magiſtrates being not brought in, what power ſoeuer they haue, but to ſupply the preſence of the Prince, their Soueraigne) but alſo to the commandments of the Soueraigne: the which as they are of diuers ſorts, ſo the duty of the Magiſtrate, is to carry himſelfe diuerſly for the enrolling or verifying thereof. Wherein the duty of the Magiſtrate to the Prince conſiſts.

For eyther the cõmandment conſiſts in the knowledge of the Cauſe, and in this caſe the power of the Magiſtrate remaines entire: Or the commandment giues him knowledge of the right, but not of the fact: and in this caſe the Officer ought notwithſtanding to enquire of the fact, although the Prince had aſſured him to be well informed of the truth: vnleſſe he had expreſſely forbidden him to take notice: For then the Magiſtrate may not proceede: Onely he may (the fact being notoriouſly falſe) acquaint his Soueraigne with the truth, and yeeld to that which hee ſhould reply vpon his remonſtrances. But if the Letters did onely giue him knowledge of the fact, and not of the right and merite of the graunt; the Officer ought to obey, ſo as it be nothing againſt the right of Nature: If notwithſtanding if it be againſt the Lawes and generall ordinances, or that it may bring ſome inconuenience or preiudice to the Eſtate, or to a part thereof; he may make his remonſtrances, not once onely but twice or thrice. Of the commandments of the Prince, and how the Magiſtrate muſt carry himſelfe in the verification.

But

The Magiſtrate ought to obey the will of the Prince, although it were vniuſt.

But if notwithſtanding the Prince will haue the Officer proceede to the verification, hee muſt doe it, although the matter were vnlawfull. For although it bee certaine, that the Prince may not command any thing that is vniuſt, nor that is ſubiect to ſcandall or reprehenſion, or which may bee reiected by his Officer: Yet for that by the conſtraint, which the Soueraigne is forced to vſe, the ignorant multitude is moued to diſobedience, and to contempt of his Edicts and commaunds, as being publiſhed and receiued by force: The duty of the Magiſtrate is, not to bandy himſelfe againſt his Prince, what errour ſoeuer hee commits: For this were a Rebellion in the Eſtate, and to bandie the Feete againſt the Head. It were much better to yeild vnder the Soueraigne Maieſtie with obedience, then in refuſing the commaundement of the Soueraigne, to giue an example of Rebellion to the ſubiects.

The diſobedience of the Magiſtrate to the will of the Prince, is of bad conſequence.

There are ſome which proceeded farther, and hold, that if the Prince commandes the Magiſtrate to excuſe ſome wicked acte to his ſubiects, it were better to obey, and thereby to couer and bury the remembrance of a wickednelle already done; thenby refuſing to irritate and incenſe him to doe worſe, and to caſt, as they ſay, the helme after the hatchet: As *Papinian* did, who refuſing to excuſe the Parriſide committed by *Caracala*, on the perſon of *Geta*, cauſed this Emperour to exceede in all ſorts of cruelties; whereof hee felt the firſt fury: This reſiſtance hauing preuailed nothing, but brought an irreparable loſſe to the affaires of the Emperour, as well by reaſon of his death, as of that which followed.

The Magiſtrate is not reciuable to giue ouer his charge, rather then to terriſie the vniuſt commands of his Prince.

The Magiſtrate is not allowed to leaue his Office, rather then to publiſh the vniuſt will of the Soueraigne, for that it would bee a dangerous ouerture to all the ſubiects, to refuſe and reiect the edicts and will of the Prince, if euery man in his charge might leaue the Eſtate in danger, and expoſe it to a ſtorme, like vnto a Ship without a helme,

helme, vnder colour of an opinion of Iuſtice, which it may bee would bee affected by ſome fantaſtique braine, without reaſon, but to croſſe a contrary opinion. Wherefore in all Councels, they hold this rule, to make the Counſellors range themſelues to the two greateſt opinions. For although it ſeemes ſtrange, to force the conſcience of thoſe, to whoſe Wiſedome and Religion they haue referred a buſineſſe, to be examined, and to giue their aduice: yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the concluſion, it hath bin held moſt reaſonable, yea neceſſary, to vſe it in this manner: The rule of wiſe men which cannot faile, is, that of two vniuſt things they follow that which is moſt iuſt, and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater: Otherwiſe there would neuer bee an end of humane actions. If the command be ſo vniuſt, as without wronging their conſcience, they cannot paſſe it; ſome Magiſtrates to auoid the diſobedience, and not to charge their conſciences in verifying it, haue incerted; by the expreſſe commaundement of the Prince, many times reiterated.

Reaſons why the cuſtome of verifying the Princes Edicts hath beene brought in by the Magiſtrate.

The manner of verifying the Edicts, ordinances, and commands of Princes by the Magiſtrates, hath beene brought in, in ſome eſtates, to make the people more willing to obey them: Who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themſelues, and being more inclined to diſtruſt, and to calumniate the will of the Prince then approue it: And the Prince on the other ſide being inuiron-ned by importune Courtiers, who without any regard of duty, or of iuſtice, nor to the good of the Eſtate, ſeeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends, and to get them authorized by circumuenting the Prince: It hath beene held conuenient for the Prince, to cauſe his will to paſſe by ſuch ſolemnities, to the end they might bee receiued by the people; and that being examined and found contrary, or preiudiciall to the publique good, they might be refuſed by humble remonſtrances; which wipe

wipe away the diſgrace of the deniall: and ſerue the Prince for an excuſe, to free himſelfe from the importunitie, and iniuſtice of great men.

It remaines now to know, how an Officer ought to carry himſelfe in executing a command, if there comes vnto him a reuocation, the buſineſſe being begun. Some hold opinion, that if the execution be ſo much importing the Eſtate, as not being finiſhed there would happen ſome inconuenience, that notwithſtanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed: If not, hee muſt leaue the buſineſſe as it is. But for the firſt, it is neceſſary that the danger of the Eſtate be euedent and knowne to all Men, and not to the Magiſtrate alone, who might bee ſuſpected to haue proceeded lightly, or with ſpleene, paſſing on after the Reuocation.

How the Maſtrate ought to carry himſelfe in the execution of a commandement after a Reuocation.

Chap. 32.

Of the duty of Magiſtrates one towards another.

The duty of Magiſtrates, and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another, is regulated according to the power which they haue, whereof in moſt Eſtates they make three degrees.

The higheſt is of thoſe, who in ſome part of the Eſtate, haue power to determine without appeale. The Prince only may command them; the middle ſort obeyed theſe, and commanding thoſe which are of a lower degree, who haue not any command ouer the Officers, but only ouer particular perſons. Wee may call the firſt ſuperiors or principalls; the ſecond middle or ſubalterne; and the laſt inferiors. The firſt haue power to command all Magiſtrates and Officers, without exception; or only certaine Officers

Three degrees of Magiſtrates and the power of either of them.

Officers ſubiect to their Iuriſdiction. They which haue power to command all in generall without execution, ought not to be brought into the Eſtate, for the change that ſuch a power might vſually cauſe. For there being but one degree to climbe, and to make themſelues Maſters, ambition doth teach it ſpeedily; and euery man doth the more eaſily indure it, for that all men are accuſtomed to obey them.

The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magiſtrate is, to containe thoſe that are vnder him in the termes and duties of their charges; of whom he may be Iudge, and not they of him in qualitie of a Magiſtrate; but as a priuate perſon. And as for the Soueraigne, although they may iudge in their owne cauſe, to whom God hath giuen power to diſpoſe without Iudgment, as *Xenophon* ſaith; yet it is much more fitting for the Soueraigne, to ſuffer the Iudgement of his Magiſtrates, then to make himſelfe Iudge in his own cauſe; prouided alwayes that the buſineſſe doth not concerne the Soueraignty, or his particular perſon; but to the end that Maieſtie may not ſuffer diminution of its greatneſſe, or that the ſplendor of a Royall Name may not dazell the eyes of the Iudges: It hath bin wiſely aduiſed in ſome Eſtates, that the Soueraigne ſhould not plead but by his procuratour, and would neuer aſſiſt in Perſon.

The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magiſtrate.

That it is fiting for a Prince to indure the Iudgement of the Magiſtrate

And as in the power of the Prince, the power of Magiſtrates is held in ſuſpence; ſo in the preſence of ſuperior Magiſtrates, the power of Inferiors hath no effect. The which is vnderſtood, not only of ſuperiour heads and Magiſtrates, but alſo of their Lieutenants who are therein held the ſame thing, as being but one power diſtributed to two. Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot determine any thing, his chiefe being preſent. Yet the Magiſtrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his Lieutenant.

The power of a Lieutenant equall to that of the Magiſtrate.

The power of the Magiſtrate is of no effect out of his territorie.

But that which hath bin ſpoken of the power of Superior Magiſtrates ouer their inferiors, muſt be vnderſtood in their

their territorie, their ſeats, and in the limits of their Iuriſdiction, out of which they are but priuate men, without power or command.

Of two Magiſtrates equall in power and of the execution of their decrees in one anothers territory.

Magiſtrates which are equall in power, or haue no dependance one of another, cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another. But if there bee queſtion to execute the decree or Iudgement of one in the territory of another, they muſt vſe honeſt intreaties and clauſes of requeſt. Yet where there ſhall bee queſtion of the interpretation of a decree made by one Magiſtrate, another that is his equall may not take knowledge: For euery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will.

Of the execution of a ſentence giuen by the officer of a forraine Prince vpon anothers territory.

And in regard of the ſentence giuen by the Officer of a Forraine Prince, for the execution whereof in the territory of another, there ſhould be a Commiſſion of intreatie: The iudges of this Prince to whom the Commiſſion is directed, may not examine the Iudgement, leaſt the ſtranger bee induced another time to doe the like, and to diſſolue the Iudgements whereof they ſhould demand the execution; the which would bee done more through iealouſie of the Eſtate, then for any iniuſtice in them. Yet if there bee queſtion of honour, or life, they may not execute the Iudgements of forraine Magiſtrates, if they haue not knowne the merrite of the cauſe, and ſeene the informations. And Princes owe this reſpect one vnto another, for the good of Iuſtice, not onely to puniſh the wicked, which flie from one Eſtate into another; but alſo for the Exemplary puniſhment, which ought to be made vpon the places, are bound to yeeld the naturall ſubiect to his naturall Prince, vnleſſe the Prince to whom the fugitiue is retired, findes that hee is vniuſtly purſued; for in this caſe, he ought not to yeeld them: Yea he is forbidden by the Law of God, to reſtore a Bondman which is fled into another Mans houſe to auoid the fury of his Maſter.

But

But although the Magiſtrate may not command his Equals, yet in a body or colledge conſiſting of many equall in power, the greateſt part may command the leſſe. For in this caſe they that are ſuperior in number, are likewiſe ſuperior in power. So as the leſſer part cannot command the greater, nor yet hinder it. Yet one Tribune at *Rome* oppoſing, might hinder the acts of all the reſt: the *Romans* making a difference betwixt oppoſition and command; for that hinderance and oppoſition is leſſe then a command, and doth not induce any ſuperiority like vnto a command.

Of Magiſtrates equal in power in a body or colledge; and of their command one ouer another.

The difference betwixt oppoſition and command.

But Colledges hauing no ſuperiority one ouer another, they cannot haue any command, but they may well hinder one another; this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence, then from any ſuperiority. This may be grounded vpon the generall Rule of all thoſe which haue any thing in Common, amongſt which he that hinders, hath more force, and his condition in this caſe is better then his that ſeekes to proceede; and among many Lawes, that which forbids, is of greateſt force. But if before the Act, a Magiſtrate may hinder his Equall by oppoſition; yet after the Act he cannot doe it by any other meanes, but by appeale to the Superior.

That they may hinder one another by oppoſition before the act, or by appeale after the act, but not by command.

CHAP. 33.

Of the duty of Magiſtrates to priuate Perſons.

THe duty of Officers or Magiſtrates, to particular perſon hath two principall foundations. The one is grounded on the power which is giuen to the Magiſtrate by the Edict or Letters of Commiſſion: the other vpon the ſeemlineſſe which conſiſts in the particular

Foundations of the duty of Magiſtrates to priuate perſons.

carriage of the Magiſtrates perſon, to be able to maintaine himſelfe in credit, reputation, and authority, with thoſe ouer whom he is to command.

Diuers powers of Magiſtrates.

And although that the power of all Magiſtrates regards generally the execution of the Law, the which without the Magiſtrate were idle: Yet the power of ſome is more ſtrictly limited then that of others. For ſome are bound by the Lawes and Ordinances to command and vſe the power that is giuen them, in that forme and manner that is preſcribed them, without adding or diminiſhing any thing: And in this caſe they are but ſimple Executioners of Lawes. To others they giue more liberty, and leaue many things to their diſcretion and iudgement. Wherein notwithſtanding they muſt ſo gouerne themſelues, as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a ſpeciall command, or that may not be eaſily required, that they are not forced by ſome ſtrong and powerfull neceſſity, or an apparent danger. But in theſe things where the diuerſity of circumſtances is a hinderance that he cannot ſpecifie, or ſet downe in particular the power, as in the arbitriment of Princes, the Magiſtrate may according to his conſcience decree without a ſpeciall command. But therein he ſhall auoyde to affect the reputation of pittifull as well as of cruell: For cruelty although it be blameable, yet it retaynes the Subiects in the obedience of the Lawes: But too much Clemency cauſeth the Magiſtrate to be contemned, with the Lawes and the Prince which hath made them. Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pitty of the poore in Iudgment: But one of the things moſt requiſite in a Magiſtrate, is to make the grauity of offence knowne, as well to make offenders vnderſtand what they haue deſerued, as to induce them to repentance: And in doing ſo the puniſhment will haue leſſe bitterneſſe and more profit. Wherefore the principall Rule of the duty of a Magiſtrate to priuate perſons, is to vſe the power that is giuen him, well; and priuate

Of their duties to priuate perſons in giuing ſentence.

Of the obedience and reſpect of priuate

men

Men, reciprically owe him all obedience, in executing his charge, bee it right or wrong, ſo as he exceeds not the termes of his power or Iuriſdiction: For then they may contradict his ordinances by appeale or oppoſition; and if he proceeds, he muſt make a diſtintion, whether the grieuance be irreparable or not. If it may be repaired, they ſhall not oppoſe by fact, but by courſe of law: but if it be irreparable, they may oppoſe by fact, yea with force; not to offend the Magiſtrate, but to defend the innocent.

perſons to the Magiſtrate, executing his charge.

As for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto Magiſtrates, it is certaine that the Magiſtrate being wronged hee cannot be Iudge in his owne cauſe; vnleſſe it bee for ſome vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publiquely, in executing his Office: For in this caſe it is lawfull for the Magiſtrate being wronged to puniſh ſuch Men, for the offence done vnto the particular perſon of the Magiſtrate. For this reaſon if a Body or Colledge of Iudges hath bin wronged, they may cenſure and condemne thoſe which haue done the offence, not to reuenge the iniury done vnto them, but to the Eſtate, whoſe Maieſty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them.

Of the Magiſtrate wronged when and how hee may bee Iudge in his owne cauſe.

As for obedience, it ſeemes requiſite, that the Magiſtrate ſhould carry himſelfe to priuate perſons with all mildneſſe and patience; yet in ſuch ſort, as the dignitie of his place be not vilified; as it would be if he ſhould indure any indiſcreete words in his preſence, and not take exception: Or a countenance of little reſpect. But eſpecially, as hee ought not to ſhew himſelfe rough and difficult of exceſſe: So he muſt not grow familiar, laugh, or ieaſt with priuate men; but to ſpeake little, with diſcretion, without making ſhew of any paſſion of choller, Enuie, Icalouſie, or ſuch like, which may diminiſh the opinion which they haue of him.

Mildneſſe and patience required in a Magiſtrate.

Diſcretion and grauitie without paſſion.

Wherefore to collect in few words that which concernes the duty of Magiſtrates, they muſt learne to obey the Soueraigne, to bend vnder the power of their ſuperiors,

The dutie of Magiſtrates.

periours, to honour their equals, to command the Subiects, to defend the poore, to make head againſt great men, and to doe Iuſtice to all.

CHAP. 34.

Of the Iuſtice of Commanding.

Rules and conſiderations in in the Iuſtice of cõmandments.

AS the forme of commanding is diuers, ſo is the Diuerſity of power, which according vnto Iuſtice, obſerues diuers Rules to make the commandments iuſt. For in certayne things according to an Arithmeticall proportion, it makes all the Subiects equall: In others it enters into conſideration of the quality, and followes a Geometricall proportion: In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion, it neither follows an equality altogether, nor a ſimilitude; but taking a conſideration of other differences, it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord.

An harmoniacall proportion followed in many things.

And as that which they ſeeke moſt in the ſettling of an Eſtate, is Concord, which cannot be without ſome harmony or correſpondence of the parties one with another: This laſt proportion is followed in many things; as in the forme of gouernment, in the diſtribution of Offices, honours, dignities, and recompences; in the eſtabliſhment of puniſhments, and for the peace and greatneſſe of families, in Marriages and diuiſions of ſucceſſions.

An Arithmeticall proportion followed in others.

But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man, and in that which concernes the performance of promiſes, which they make one vnto another, or the Iudgement of that which belongs to euery man, whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men, of what quality and condition ſoeuer they be; they muſt obſerue an Arithmeticall proportion: and not to imitate *Cyrus*, who condẽned a little man that had too long a Robe, to giue it to a tall man,

and

and to take the tall mans which was too ſhort, inſiſtiug more vpon ſeemelineſſe then to Iuſtice.

But in the impoſition of charges which are burthenſome, and neceſſary for the ſupport of the Eſtate, they muſt obſerue a Geometricall proportion, charging the rich, who haue more to loſe by the ruine of the Eſtate, then the poore: the which in a manner is generally obſerued. For although that the Nobility ſeemes therin to haue more priuiledge in ſome Eſtates then the Country-man, by reaſon that he payes no Subſedies, and doth not contribute any thing by way of impoſition: yet the perſonall ſeruice which he doth many times performe at his owne charge, is much more then that which hee ſhould pay by way of Subſedy, if it were impoſed vpon him; beſides his perſon which he doth imploy, the which the Countrey-man doth not. And in this particular, a Geometricall proportion is obſerued, in that they leaue vnto the Gentlemen (who haue honour more in recommendation then the Clowne) honourable charges, the which giues them meanes to approach nearer vnto the Prince, and haue ſome honour in them: which is the reaſon which makes them more willing to endure the burthen, diſcommodity, and charge, which is farre greater then that which is impoſed vpon the Country-man. But as I haue formerly ſayd in other parts of the Eſtate, they muſt approach as neare as may be to a harmoniacall proportion, from whence proceeds that mixture which they make in moſt parts of Eſtates, of the Law, with the will and opinion of the Magiſtrate. The Law is made for all in generall, and all are equally bound to the obſeruation thereof, but the Law not able to foreſee all the circumſtances, the will of the Prince or Magiſtrate in its execution, muſt adde ſuch a temper, as there may not follow any inconnenience or abſurdity; and to bend according to the Circumſtances of the buſineſſe, and to regulate it according vnto naturall Equity, which is the ſoule of

A Geometrical proportion in the impoſition of burthenſome Offices for the ſupport of the Eſtate.

A mixture of the law with the will of the Prince.

the Law, the which in a Prince extends to declare and correct the Law according vnto reaſon; and in the Magiſtrate, to extend or reſtrayne it as the caſe ſhall require. And he that would haue the Law only take place in an Eſtate, he ſhould fall into an infinite number of inconueniences and abſurdities. For eyther he muſt make a Law vpon euery particular Fact that may happen; the which is vnpoſſible, and admit it were Feazable, it would breed a confuſion of Lawes: or elſe he muſt leaue many things vnprouided for, and in others commit many Iniuſtices, neuer inſiſting vpon the circumſtances, which are ſometimes contrary to the reaſon of the Law.

Of the temper a magiſtrate ſhould adde vnto the law.

There wilbe no leſſe inconuenience, if they ſuffered the will of the Prince or Magiſtrate to wander vncertainly, without any eſtabliſhment of the Law, whereon as vpon a Rule they might ground themſelues. For beſides the variety, diuerſity, or contrariety of ordinances, or Iudgments which might grow, the which in the end would make them to be contemned, they ſhould open a Gate to all violences and Iniuſtice. But as two Simples in extreamity of cold and heate, are ſo many poyſons; and yet compoſed and tempered one with the other, make a wholeſome Medicine: So by the mixture of the Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportions, which ſeparated would ruine the Eſtate, grows a harmoniacall accord and proportion which ſerues to maintayne it.

Of the diſtribution of Offices and dignities.

In the diſtribution of Offices and dignities, an equality cannot be obſerued, without Iniuſtice and preiudice to the Eſtate; all being not of one quality and capacity: And it might ſo fall out, that the moſt important and difficult charge, might fall vpon him that is leaſt capable; and an Office of no moment to him that is ſufficient. Moreouer if you will chooſe thoſe of one quality only, to giue them the charges, behold the reſt that are excluded wil be diſcontented; but all would be well ſatisfied, if they ſee that the Gate be not ſhut againſt them: and they would

would not take it ill, that as the Capable ought to be preferred before the incapable: ſo the Gentleman finding himſelfe as capable as the *Plebeian*, ſhould be preferred, and the rich before the poore, in Offices where there is more honour then gayne: and the poore before the rich, in thoſe where there is more profit then honour. And if the Offices be aſſociated or doubled, to make a harmony of the one with the other, they muſt mingle thoſe that haue where-withall to ſupply in one ſort that which they want in the other, otherwiſe there wilbe no more harmony then if they ſhould ſeparate the accords that are in time, the which would make no pleaſing ſound if they were not together.

Yet in this Subiect we haue a regard to merite, which is the bond, which may make the poore and Countryman equall, to the rich and Noble, being without merite. And therefore they muſt according to euery mans deſarts, giue the purſe to the moſt Loyall: Armes to the moſt Valliant: Iuſtice to the Honeſteſt: Cenſure to the moſt Entire: Toyle to the ſtrongeſt; the Gouernment to wiſeſt; and the Prelateſhip to the moſt deuout: notwithſtanding preferring in the equality of merite, ſuch as are beſt qualified to them that are leſſe.

We may ſay aſmuch of Rewards and Puniſhments, weighing not only the merite of the Fact, and the qualities of perſons; but alſo the circumſtances of time and place, or ſuch like. In regard of Peace of the marriages of Families, and the preſeruation of Houſes, it is likewiſe very neceſſary to ſupply the defect which is in the one, with the Exceſſe and abundance of the other. So there is no better Marriage (as the ancient ſayd) then of Riches with Pouerty: And among Marchants there is no ſociety more ſafe, then of a rich idle man, with a poore man that is diligent. And in the inequallity of the conditions of perſons, if there be not ſome quality to ſupply the defect of the meaner, there can be no accord. The mar-

Diſtribution of rewards & puniſhments.

riage of a rich Country Woman, with a poore Gentleman would hold firme, but of a poore countrey Woman with a poore Gentleman, they will easily disagree.

Harmony in the diuision of goods.

In like manner in the diuision of successions, it seemes this harmony ought to be kept. For as many inconueniences follow, leauing the disposition of goods to the will of the Man; who most commonly disinherits his Children vpon the first motion of choller, or makes choise of the most incapable to preferre him before the rest: So the Law which requires that the succession should be equally deuided, is vniust; for that the dignitie of families is lost, and a great succession deuided into many parts, comes to nothing. And the Law which hauing too much regard to the dignitie of families, adiudgeth all to one, or little to the rest, without doubt is nothing iust. But that which hath regard to the quality of goods, distinguishing those that are propper and hereditary to the house, and those which are newly purchased, giuing some aduantage to the elder aboue the younger, and to the Males aboue the daughters, regulating this aduantage according to the number of his Children, and leauing something in the free disposition of the Father, seemes to bee more iust, and more approaching to this harmoniacall proportion, which ought to be followed as much as may be, in all sorts of commands and Establishments. And this shall suffice for the forme of Commaunding, as well in that which depends of power, as of Iustice.

Chap. 35.

Of the Establishing of the forces of an Estate.

The order which ought to bee entertained in the setling of the forces, being more Military then politique, shall bee treated here succinctly.

The

The forces whereof wee meane to speake, are those by the which wee may repulse the attempts of our enemies; the which if the Estate bee Maritime, would be of two sorts, to the end wee may resist both by Sea and Land.

The prouision of armes and ships, is the first part of the force; some hold it the greatest treasure of a Prince; and *Iustine* writes that *Phillip* of *Macedony* made himselfe thereby fearfull of his enemies. I know that many haue held, that in a great Estate, there might inconueniences happen by this great prouision of Armes; for that hee that hath a will to mutine, to arme those of his faction, and to depriue the Prince of the meanes to make vse of this prouision, will make a designe to seaze vpon the place where it is kept. But by the same reason, wee must not draw together any treasure, to supply vs in an vnexpected necessity; nor to fortifie any places, least that comming to loose our money and our places, our enemy should grow the stronger, and wee the weaker. Prouision of Armes and Shipping.

But Wisedome preuents these inconueniences, the which wee must imploy to keepe these aduantages, and to make vse of them before the enemy comes to seaze of them: And if hee doth seaze of them, wee may not therefore conclude, that the prouision ought not to haue beene made; but that it is his fault that hath made it, not to bee able to keepe it. It is certaine, that a Sword or a Knife would cut him that knowes not how to handle it, but wee may not therefore say, that wee must neither make Sword nor Knife. So in all sorts of parties, there are inconueniences: But those which by foresight may be preuented, should not hinder vs from doing that, which may otherwise serue vs.

Vnder the name of Armes wee doe not onely apprehend that which serues a Man to couer him, and to assaile his enemy; but all carriages and necessary munitions for the Warre, bee it Offensiue or Defensiue; as Engines, Artillary, Armes offensiue or defensiue.

Artillery, Powder, Ladders, Bridges, Cordage, and such other things, whereof they haue need in many military Exployts, and which it concernes the wisdome of the Prince or Soueraigne to prouide, in such quantity, as when he shalbe assailed, or would inuade another, there may be nothing wanting, for not able to prouide such things in a short time, it were to be feared, that before he should recouer that which is necessary, his Enemy would get such an aduantage ouer him, as he shall hardly afterwards recouer it.

Quality of defensiue armes.

But laying aside the discourse of the diuersity of Armes and Engines of Warre, I will only propound some generall considerations for the Armes fit for men, whereof those which are defensiue ought to be light of carriage, (those that be heauy or pondrous commonly hindring more then they serue) difficult to pierce, and proportioned in such sort, as they may not hinder the necessary motions for a Combat.

That they ought not to be contemned.

Many relying too much vpon their Vallour, haue contemned this kind of armes, as fit for men that were affraid. Yet the *Roman* Armies, in the time of *Gratian*, hauing demaunded leaue to abandon their Cuyrasses, and then their Head-pieces; found themselues so weak when they came to fight with the *Goths*, as they were cut in peeces: whereby it appeared that armes make a part of the force, and I will adde, of courage. For besides, that Iron is more hard to pierce then the flesh, he that finds himselfe couered, takes more courage to ioyne with his Enemy, for that he is not so much exposed to blowes. They reproacht a Captaine; who armed himselfe compleatly, that he seemed to be affraid: *No sayth he, but I arme my selfe that I may not feare.*

Quality of offensiue armes.

As for offensiue Armes, they must be light, to the end they may not tyre or weary those that vse them, and likewise easie to manage; sharpe and well steeled, to pierce the better, and withall to continue the longer.

Of the Pike.

Some

Some demaund them long to strike a farre off. *Philopomen* causeth his men to vse the Pike: And *Iphicrates* made his Souldiers to carry them twice as long then they had formerly done. They attribute the victory of *Gostauus* agaynst *Christian* King of *Denmarke*, to the length of the *Swedish* pikes, which were three foote longer then those of the *Danes*. And *Guichardin* writes, that *Viteloso Vrsino*, with pikes a foote and a halfe longer then those which the Souldiers of Pope *Alexander* the sixt carried, wonne the battaile against them betwixt *Sarra* and *Bassan*. Others haue better allowed of short Armes, being of better vse in a strait or a throng; as *Cyrus* and the *Lacedemonians*.

Besides this, there are two sorts of offensiue armes: some to shoote, cast, or dart; and others which they hold continually in their hands; of both which kinds they must make good prouision, being all necessary in an Army. The *Parthians* haue many times vanquished the *Romans* with their Bowes, fighting a farre off: And the *Romans* as *Vegetius* writes, haue many times gotten great victories, by the meanes of certayne long darts, called *Marciobarbaz*. Two sorts of offensiue armes

There is another quality, which some haue desired in Armes, that they should be faire, gilt, and enricht, so as they may be pleasing vnto the Eye, thinking that this giues courage to the Souldiers; the which *Xenophon* and *Cæsar* haue allowed. Others holding that this was of no vse, but to kindle the auarice and courage of the enemy, haue thought it better to haue the armes without any ornament and bare, as those which strike more terrour.

To resolue the most expedient in this quality and contrariety, we must know those whom we meane to arme, and those against whom we are to fight. If the first by this vanity of ornament, are to be the more encouraged, and that the same vanity may breed admiration Of the beauty & ornament of Armes.

and

and amazement in the Enemy; it ſhall be fit to vſe it. But if we haue to deale with men which know what belongs to Warre, we muſt rather ſeeke horror then ornament in our Armes. Wherefore a Prince making prouiſion of Armes, he ſhall doe better to chooſe thoſe that are good then faire, and ſimple and plaine, rather then enricht, as well to auoide the charge in ſo great a prouiſion which it behoues him to make; as for that they are more durable, and no leſſe profitable then the other.

CHAP. 36.

Of Fortreſſes, and of their profit for the preſeruation of an Eſtate.

FOrtreſſes doe alſo make a part of the force of an Eſtate: and they which haue beene of Opinion, that they ſhould not build any, haue beene confuted both by reaſon and vſe: ſo as there haue beene few found, vnleſſe they were ſome petty popular Eſtate, that will follow their Councell. The *Grecians* and *Romans* who had leſſe neede during their Empires, then any other Eſtate, for that all ſubmitted themſelues vnder their yoke, entertayned Cittadels at *Corinth*, *Tarentum*, and *Rhegium*: And if the Capitoll had not beene ſtrong, the Empire of *Rome* had beene ſmothered in the Cradle by the *Gaules*.

The Eſtates in which are no ſtrong places, are conquered by one Battaile. *England* hath teſtified it; and the *Perſian*, relying onely in the great number of his Men, hath loſt in one battaile a great extent of his Countrey, the which the *Turke* hath ſince preſerued by Forts. For although that Fortreſſes alone cannot much aſſiſt an Eſtate, yet being ſeconded by Armes, they make it invincible; and there being no Armies on foote, they giue you leaſure

to

to raiſe them, and after a Route, to Rally your Men together to renew the Warre. Yet this is not to ſay, that the eſtate which hath moſt forts is the ſtrongeſt: For it is impoſſible to guard many well; and ſome being ill guarded, they proue more preiudiciall to the Eſtate, then profitable for the defence. It muſt therefore haue few, but well furniſhed with Men, Victuals, and Munition of Warre.

The ſituation of Fortreſſes neceſſary and profitable.

They muſt likewiſe bee in a neceſſary ſituation or at leaſt profitable. Neceſſary ſituations are thoſe which being vnfortified, make the Countrey to lie open, and expoſe it to the inuaſion of Enemies. Profitable ſituations are thoſe, by whoſe meanes they may guard a rich Towne and well inhabited, and may ſerue for a retreat vnto the people. They muſt likewiſe be remote from the heart of the Eſtate; to keepe the Enemy and danger farre from it, to the end that whiles the Enemy buſies himſelfe in aſſailing them, the reſt of the Countrey may bee in peace, and wee may haue means to prepare our ſelues to reſiſt him. And if the forts be not only farre off, but at the entrie of the Enemies Countrey, they will bee the more ſafe: For they will not only giue vs meanes to defend our ſelues, but alſo to annoy our Enemy in his owne Countrie.

They muſt bee farre from the heart of the Eſtate.

Forts ſtrong by ſituation and Art.

Beſides this, forts ought to be ſtrong both by ſituation and by fortification. Forts ſtrong by ſituation, are thoſe which are built vpon high and ſharpe Mountaines, and of hard acceſſe, or which are inuironed with Lakes, the Sea, Pooles, Riuers, and Mariſhes, and haue all commodities neceſſary for the entertainement and ſuccour of a Garriſon. Thoſe are ſtrong by hand, which are flancked to purpoſe, with a good Wall, a large and ſound rampire of Earth, with a broad and deepe ditch, and they muſt make more account of the rampire then of the Wall, and of the ditch then the rampire. A fort muſt likewiſe bee great, to the end it may bee capable of many Men for the defence, and to annoy the Enemy the more, and to be able to intrench themſelues within.

It

They muſt bee ſituated where they may bee relieued.

It muſt in like manner be ſituated in ſuch ſort, as it may be relieued, for ſoone or late they take that place by force or obſtinacie of a ſiege which is not relieued. Wherefore they haue held thoſe places ſtrong, which haue a Port of the Sea, hard to ſtop vp, and is not commanded. For this backe doore makes them as it were impregnable, hauing meanes dayly to receiue refreſhing of Victualls, Munition, and Men, and to diſcharge themſelues of their wounded and vnprofitable Mouthes for defence.

And although that the ſituation of a place be ſtrong for defence; and ſuch in ſome part as they hold it inacceſſable; yet they may not forbeare to adde what they can to make it ſtronger: For wee haue ſeene that many places haue beene taken, by thoſe parts which they had neglected to fortifie, for that they held them inacceſſable. So *Carthage* was taken by *Scipio* towards the Poole. *Antiochus* the great, tooke [illegible] by that part which was the ſtrongeſt, where he [illegible] there was not any Sentinel, ſeing birds to build their neſts there without any diſturbance.

Chap. 37.

Of the Warre-like Diſcipline.

The third part of the force of an Eſtate, conſiſts in the warlike diſcipline, that is to ſay, in Souldiers of good experience and well diſciplined. And herein wee muſt obſerue that the force doth not alwayes conſiſt in the number, but in the reſolution of the Souldier, and in the experience or conduct of the Commander. In all the battells which haue bin giuen, it is obſerued, that few men haue fought, and thoſe few, according to the reſiſtance that was made, haue won or loſt the battell; and as the kinds of armes make the Souldier ſtronger or more feeble, ſo they haue demanded what force is moſt

moſt beneficiall; eyther that on Horſebacke or on Foote.

Polybius ſayth, that it were better that our ſoote were a Moietie leſſe then that of our Enemie, ſo as wee bee ſtronger in Cauallerie, then if wee were equall in all: The which may be true in a Combate; hauing bin often ſeene, that when as the horſe are routed, the foote ſeeing themſelues farre from any retreate, haue beene forced to yeild ſometimes in groſſe, without ſtriking ſtroake: But in all the courſe of the Warre, it is moſt certaine that the Footmen do the greateſt ſeruice, were it but at ſieges and defences of places, and that they may fight in all places, which the horſemen cannot doe. Of the aduantages of Horſe and Foote.

Thoſe Nations which haue made vſe of Horſemen only, haue ſometimes gotten great Victories; as the *Parthyans* haue done: But when they were to beſiege or defend a place, they aduanced little. Alſo thoſe people which put all their forces in horſmen, doe it, for that they cannot keepe their rancks and order which is neceſſary for Footmen. And to recompence this defect, they make vſe of the violence of Horſe in a Combate, and of their ſwiftneſſe, and readineſſe in Enterprizes of War, which are executed more ſpeedily with Horſe then Foot, who march heauily.

But the better is, that the Armies of an Eſtate ſhould conſiſt both of the one and the other, that is to ſay, of Footmen to ſerue for the body of an Army; and Horſmen, for armes and leggs. Wherefore the Prince beſides the prouiſion of Armes, and other neceſſaries for War, muſt be carefull that the Cauallery may be well mounted, & prouide that they may haue horſes in his owne Countrey; for he cannot be termed ſtrong and powerfull in horſe, if he be cõſtrained to haue recourſe in that regard to his neighbour, who in time of war may faile him. An Army muſt conſiſt of horſe and foote.

I haue ſaid formerly that the force did not conſiſt in the number, but in the bounty and courage of the ſouldiers; yet

for

for that they are not all borne such, wee must choose as neare as we can, those which promise so much; and by Discipline make them such, and indeauour to instruct and trayne vp others. For the choyce many haue made a question, whether we should draw them out of our Subiects, holding that the Prince, which inures the Subiects to Warre, thrust himselfe into danger to receiue a Law from them; and haue held an opinion, that it was more safe to imploy Strangers. But there haue beene Princes which haue not imployed their Subiects indifferently, but onely the Nobility of the Country, as the Kings of *Poland* and *Persia*: the which haue made them strong in Cauallery, but weake in Foote. Some others hauing a distrust and iealousie of the Nobility, would make no vse of their seruice; but to make head against them, haue armed and put forces into the hands of some of the Common people. The *Turke* hath put his forces into the hands of Subiects of the Countries which hee hath conquered; but this hath bin in making them *Turkes* by Education. For causing the Children of Christians to be taken in their younger yeares, and to be instructed timely in the Law of *Mahomet*, breeding them vp to toyle and labour, vntill that they come to an age fit to beare Armes, they continue as naturall *Turkes*, not knowing other Fathers then the Grand Seignour, who haue caused them to be fed and brought vp; nor other Countrey then that, for the guard whereof they are entertayned.

Of the choise of Souldiers.

To decide this question, we must vnderstand that euery Estate is weake which cannot subsist of it selfe, and whose force depends of another: And he that supports himselfe wholy vpon forraigne forces of a Soueraigne and independant, he makes himselfe as it were a Subiect and dependant of another; and expoſeth his Estate, not onely to the inuasion of the Stranger of whom he depends, (being often seene that most part of those which haue called Strangers to their Succours, haue beene a prey to those which

Wee must imploy Strangers as little as may be.

which ſuccourd them:) But alſo the ſtranger fayling him either for that he is troubled to defend himſelfe, or for ſome other occaſion, he remaines at the mercy of his Enemy.

Beſides this, the ſtranger fights more for gaine and his owne priuate intereſt, then for any good will hee beares him. As gaine drawes him, the ſame gaine may diuert him, and draw him to the Enemy. The *Celtiberians* ſubborned firſt by the *Romans*, abandoned the *Carthaginians*; and afterwards corrupted by the *Carthaginians*, left the *Romans*. Imploying none but Strangers, the Enemy not able to hinder the leuie, may ſlacke and ſtay it in the greateſt neceſſity of the Prince: The which hath fallen out too often in *Swiſſer-land*, to the preiudice of *France*. And the Enemy inuading the Nation, from whence you draw your Souldiers, many times in your greateſt neceſſity, theſe Strangers are forced to abandon you, to goe and ſerue their Country; as the *Griſons* did, who were in the ſeruice of King *Francis*, when as *Iean Iaques de Medices* inuaded their Country. Finally, the treaſon, the Mutiny, ruine, and as I haue ſayd, the vſurpation of an Eſtate is more to be feared by the ſuccours of Strangers, then we can expect any aduantage.

Adde to all theſe conſiderations, that they are in fight, their Companies ill filled, fearefull, rude, and oppreſſors of the Subiects; to the great charge of the Prince, conſuming in the Leuie, and before they can ioyne with vs, much time and much money. But I doe not hereby inferre that we ſhould altogether reiect Strangers: For they may ſerue with our owne Souldiers; whom by this means we ſhall ſpare, and vppon whom we may ſettle our chiefe force; and not as ſome Eſtates doe, cauſe them to vndergoe all the toyle, expoſe them to aſſaults, and to all dangerous exploits, and diſpence with the Strangers.

Chap. 38.

Of the number of Souldiers in their ordinary trained Bands.

IT reſts to know what number of Souldiers ought to be entertained in an Eſtate. This cannot be truely regulated. For we muſt haue regard to that which the Eſtate may beare, and to his forces that may aſſaile vs.

Two ſorts of traine Bands.

Onely I will ſay, that in many Eſtates they haue eſtabliſhed two ſorts of traine bands. The one ordinary, conſiſting of men raiſed and bred vp to the War, hauing no other vocation or profeſſion. The other is ſubſidiary, compoſed of Men which haue ſometimes followed that profeſſion, or are capable to doit, with the which at need they may fill the Companies, or raiſe new, and who in time of peace ſhall imploy themſelues in their particular affaires, being ſometimes practiſed in Military exerciſes, when as the Commanders ſhall draw them together.

Of the number of Souldiers for the traynes and.

Returning then to the firſt, they muſt not be in great numbers; but the number muſt be ſuch, as they may reſiſt, as well to auoyde the charge of their entertaynment, as the mutinies and reuolts, which happen among ſuch men, when they feele themſelues ſtrong and in great numbers. And in a meane Eſtate ſowe haue ruled it to 6000. Foot, and 1200. Horſe; in a greater, double the number. But if they muſt diminiſh any thing, it were better to doe it in the Foote, which may be eaſily fill'd againe, then in the Horſe, which cannot be ſo ſoone raiſed, being neceſſary to ſpend money for their furniture, and time for the exerciſe both of Man and Horſe.

Of Subſidiaries

As for Subſidiaries, ſome haue thought that they ought rather to be retayned vnder ſome priuiledges, not preiudiciall to the publique, then entertayned with pay whileſt they

they doe dot ſerue. But it would ſeeme more expedient, to make them ſerue one after another three Moneths in the yeare, neare vnto the Gouernour of the Prouince where they ſhall liue, in giuing them pay for that time: During the which they ſhalbe practiſed in all ſorts of exerciſes, ſeruing to their profeſſion: and going out of ſeruice after their Quarter is ended, they ſhall leaue their Armes in the Towne where the Gouernour remaynes, euery man returning to his owne home, leauing the place to ſuch as are to ſucceed them. Being thus practiſed three Moneths yearely, you ſhall keepe them ſtill in Allarme, and they will be alwayes ready to march: And making them to leaue their Armes after the ſeruice, you ſhall haue no cauſe to feare any Mutiny: The which they may make more feeble in diuiding theſe Subſidiaries into no greater troupes then of foure and twenty Souldiers, which troupes ſhall not depend of any Commander but the Gouernour, or of him whom the Soueraigne ſhall at times commit: yet euery one hauing his Captaine apart, to trayne the Souldiers; and when as they meane to imploy them, they may reduce them into Companies of hundreds or two hundred men, as they ſhall thinke good; and may giue them a Captaine to command them, during the expedition. By this meanes for the full pay of a yeare of 6000. men, you may entertayne in your Eſtate 24000. Subſidiaries, trayned, practiſed, and ready to march, and aſſure your Prouinces againſt all ſorts of Mutinies. And if you will traine vp more without any charge, they may giue commandment vnto the Youth of the Towne where they ſhall practiſe, and thereabouts, vnto a certaine age, to come at the time, and to the place of the ſayd Exerciſes, where they may giue them Armes to practiſe with the reſt.

Order for their exercise in time of peace: and to hinder their Mutiny.

Of the number of Subſidiaries.

Meanes to traine the ſubiects of an Eſtate to Warre without any charge to the Prince.

This were, ſome one would ſay, to make too many Souldiers in an Eſtate, which might fauour a reuolt. But being diſarmed and reduced into ſmall troupes, their Captaines hauing taken an Oath to the Soueraigne

And to hinder a reuolte and mutiny.

onely, and the Souldiers not depending on them but for the Diſcipline, and not for the pay: And moreouer, being diſarmed, but when as they enter into ſeruice, there being but one fourth part that enters at a time in the Prouinces, the other three parts may ſerue to oppoſe againſt ſuch as being armed, would attempt any thing. So as with a little fore-ſight which they may vſe in this conduct, it will bee eaſie to diuert the inconueniences which they may conceiue of this order. There remaines now the forme which they ought to hold in leuies.

CHAP. 39.

Of the forme how to make leuies of Souldiers: Of the Place, Age, Stature, & Vocation.

The particular forme of the *Romans.*

THe *Romans* who could not haue their Souldiers depend wholy vpon the Captaines, obſerued a particular forme; which was that of a great number which were enrolled, the Captaines did chooſe one after another in their turnes: And in this manner the Companies were as it were equall both in force and valour of Souldiers. But the Captaines hauing little credit amongſt them, they ſaw many mutinies fall out among the Legions. The which was the cauſe that they found it expedient that euery Captaine ſhould make choyce of thoſe whom he was to command; being likely that they which preſent themſelues to be enrolled vnder a Captaine, would be more obedient vnto him, then they whom they ſhall enroll againſt their will.

Danger of a mutiny vpon the change of a Captaine.

The ſame inconuenience of a mutiny happens, when to a troupe conſiſting of old Souldiers, they giue another Captaine, then him vnder whom the Souldiers haue bin accuſtomed to fight: For this new Captain hauing no meanes to get credit ſuddainly, the leaſt ſubiect that preſents it ſelfe

to

to the Souldiers to mutine, they imbrace it, being not reſtrayned neytherby the reſpect nor feare of their Captaine. Yet an exact Diſcipline will eaſily helpe and remedy this.

Wherefore it ſeemes more ſafe, that euery Captaine make choyce of thoſe whom he is to command. I ſay choyce, to make a difference from the greateſt part of the leuies which are made at this day, into the which they receiue all ſorts of men. The which ought not to be; and no man ought to be admitted without an atteſtation from the place of his dwelling, of his quality and how he hath liued; to the end they may exclude all Theeues and Robbers, which creepe into the Troupes; and that the Souldier offending, they may puniſh him in his perſon, or in his goods, when he returnes into his Country. And to this effect the choyce being made, the Souldiers ought to be preſented to the Officer, or Commiſſary of the War, to ſee if they be of the quality required.

Of the choice which the Captaine ought to make of his Souldiers.

A good order if it were well obſerued.

And although wee may finde good Souldiers euery where; yet it ſeemes that not onely the ordinary, but alſo the ſubſidiary ought to be choſen and taken rather out of the Country then in Townes; for that in the Fields they finde them ſtronger and more rough, be it to ſtrike, or to endure the diſcommodities of the Warre: And the Subſidiaries which are not in continuall practice of the Warre, being diſperſed here and there, they cannot ſo eaſily draw together to make a mutiny; as they might doe if there were many in one Towne.

Of the place whence they muſt take the Souldiers.

As for the Age, they muſt chooſe them young, aboue Seuenteene or Eighteene yeares, and vnto Thirty or Forty, as well to haue the more agility, force, and courage, as to be more venturous, pliable, and obedient to the Commandments that ſhall be giuen them. For the ſtature, the greateſt and moſt manlike make the greateſt ſhew: But if in a little body they finde a ſtrong complexion and courage, they may not reiect him.

Of the Age of the Souldiers.

Of the ſtature.

Of his vocatiõ. But for that by their manner of liuing, they may settle a Iudgement of the complexion and force both of body and mind: They must haue a care not to choose Souldiers (but as little as may be) which are accustomed to some sitting Trade, that is soft and effeminate; but rather to choose them out of Trades, in the which they must be exposed to heate, and cold, to raine, winde, Sun; Or which are accustomed to bloud, to strike, to march, and to labour. The Leuies of men of Warre thus made, they must be trayned and gouerned. And thus much for the forces at Land.

CHAP. 40.
Of the forces at Sea.

THe like shall be also followed in the forces at Sea; In the which besides the order they must obserue for the building of ships, they must also haue a care to prouide a good number of Pilots and Marriners; and for the Gallies, to furnish and exercise their Rowers, whether they consist of Galley-slaues or voluntaries. For the which they must prouide in good time to accustome the Slaues to doe their duties, and to make the Souldier get firme footing at Sea.

These forces at Sea are so necessary in an Estate, that is Maritime, as without them the Prince cannot be termed strong nor powerfull. For besides that in a short time they may seaze vpon his Ports, before he shall haue any aduice of the Enterprize; and these being seazed, this Port being hard to stop vp the Enemy will keepe it long: He must make an accompt not to recouer any thing by the Commerce at Sea, but from the hands of his Neighbours, who will prescribe him a Law, and intreate his Merchants ill. Let vs now come to that which is necessary for the setling of the Reuenewes of the Estate.

CHAP.

Chap. 41.
Of the Riches of an Estate.

That the power of an Estate depends of its riches.

Every one agrees that to make an Estate powerfull, it must be rich; Riches being the principall sinews that supports it. For although that many poore Estates haue made themselues to be redoubted: Yet this hath rather happened by the diuision of their Neighbours, and the fault of some others, then for any aduantage there is in the pouerty of an Estate.

Of the *Lacedemonians.*

The *Lacedemonians* in their pouerty, during the diuision of the *Grecians*, haue beene for a time Masters of all *Greece*. But when as this diuision ceased, their greatnesse (which could not long subsist with this defect) decayed presently.

Of the *Venetians* and *Genuis.*

The *Venetians* and *Genuis*, although poore in the beginning, haue sometimes held a part of *Greece*; euen that which was neare to the *Archipelagus*: But this happened, during the diuision which was in the Leuant for the Empire of *Constantinople*.

Of the *Romans*

The *Romans* themselues in their pouerty, had no other aduantage; then the weakenesse and diuision of their Neighbours, whereof they could make better vse then any other, receiuing some into their City, ruining others; sending Collonies to neighbour Prouinces; allying themselues to those whom they could not easily vanquish, and making vse of their Succours and meanes; and finally establishing in conquered Countries, affaires, toles, and tributes, for the pay of their Souldiers, and for to supply the other charges of the Estate. And they haue beene so carefull to enrich their Citty, as many times this care hath made them shut their eyes to an infinite number of thefts and spoyles, which were practised against their

Ministers, whom they imployed in the Prouinces. It is then most certaine that an Estate cannot be termed powerfull, vn'esse it be rich. Yet euery Man doth not agree, wherein the wealth of an Estate doth consist. Some haue measured it by the great treasures; others by the reuenewes; and others by the fertillitie of the Countrey. But as there is no treasure so great, but a long Warre may exhaust; nor any reuenewes so abundant, but in a long and tedious enterprize, they may be forced to ingage them: so the fertillitie alone of an Estate would bee vnprofitable, if the publique had not meanes to make vse of it, and by gentle leuies to draw succours from priuate persons.

What is necessary for the riches of an Estate.

Wherefore besides the aboundance of all things fit for the life and seruice of Man; the parcimony or sparing of priuate persons, is necessary to make an Estate rich: As also the facillitie to make vse of their meanes. For as wee doe not call a Prodigall man rich, who spends all he hath: So what abundance soeuer there bee in an Estate, wee will not terme the Subiects rich, who by their ryot and excesse consume all this great abundance, taking from the publique the meanes to draw any succours from them.

Wherein the riches of an Estate doth consist.

Wee will therefore conclude, that the riches of an Estate consists in all things necessary for the life and seruice of Man; in the parcimony of Subiects; in the greatnesse of Lands and ordinary reuenewes; in the facillitie of ordinary leuies; in the gouernment of the Treasure, and in the Exchequer.

Chap. 42.

Of the causes of the abundance of the wealth of an Estate: That is to say Tillage: Manufactures and Commerce with Strangers.

Whence the aboundance of necessary things proceed

Aboundance in an Estate proceeds from three necessary things: From the Earth; from Manufactures, which comprehends all Manuall and Mechanicke Arts; and from the Commerce we haue with Strangers, vnder the name of Earth I comprehend the labour of the Land; the entertainement of Woods, Forrests, and Trees, which may by their fruitfulnesse contribute something to the vse of Man; The digging of Mines for mettall, stones, and minerall druggs.

Tillage well husbaded causeth aboundance.

As this point is the fountaine of all the riches of the world, so it ought to bee more carefully husbanded by the publique: And yet it is that which is most neglected, hauing left a libertie to euery Man to doe with his owne what he pleaseth, vnder a false proposition, that euery Man being carefull to find out that which will bee profitable vnto him, knowes how to husband his ground, so as nothing well bee vnprofitable: And yet experience teaches vs the contrarie. For most part of Lands being possest by the Nobilitie, Clergie, or others imployed in publique affaires, few reside vpon the Lands; so as they are occupied by Farmes, who enter like vnto gleaners, which draw what they can, hauing no interest in the future. And of those which reside vpon their Lands, some through ignorance, others by negligence or bad husbandrie content themselues with the reuenewes of their predecessors, being loth to take the paines, or complayning to aduance that, that should bee necessary to plant or clense a peece of Land that lieth waste to

The cause of the negligence thereof.

to dry vp a Marish, to settle a Race for breeding, or to doe such like things as may better their Demesus.

That it is not vnworthy of a Prince.

Some one it may be of little Iudgement will say, that this care is vnworthy of a Prince and of the publique. But to this wee may answere, that all Princes haue not so held it, *Massinissa* cleansed the greatest part of *Babary*. And in our time we know the improuements which the *Venetians* haue made in *Polesene* of *Rouigo*: That of the great Duke of *Tuscany* towards *Pysa* and *Arese*, and that of the Duke of *Ferrara*, in the Valley of *Comachyo*, and that which the Hollanders doe daily. Wherefore some haue held it fit, that the publique should take vpon them this care to quicken the diligence of some, by the orders which might be made, according to the places; and to punish the negligence of others, by Fines, Amercements, and Seisures of the Lands neglected.

Manufactures cause aboundance in an Estate.

As for Manufactures, the number of workmen giues the aboundance; but the good giue credit to the Marchandize. The great number would not be vnprofitable, but also hurtfull, if they were not good. To haue them such, you must seeke for them: And if wee haue them not among our selues, wee may draw strangers by Priuiledges, in giuing vnto some according to their industrie, some honest entertainement. To multiply the workmen, they may erect publique houses of all sorts of Manufactures, as hath beene propounded, in the which they may instruct the poore. And as this Establishment should bee chiefely made in their fauour, so the reuenew of these houses may bee taken vpon that which is affected by the Cannon, and ancient Ordinances for their Entertainement.

Some one, to the end they may banish idlenesse, which is at this present in Monasteries, (many persons vnfit for contemplation and study being therein, and many against

againſt their will) haue propounded to reſtore the antient Monaſtique diſcipline, which was to imploy in certaine workes and manuall Arts, at houers of leaſure, thoſe that were not fit for ſtudy and preaching. The which did alſo multiply manufactures. Others haue likewiſe beene of opinion, to bind the Maſters, who ſerue themſelues with young Boyes to cauſe them to paſſe a certaine Age in learning of a Trade: And ſo by theſe meanes an Eſtate in leſſe then twenty yeares, would bee furniſhed with more workemen then were needfull.

Commerce with the ſtranger cauſeth aboundance in an Eſtate.

The Commerce and Trafique which is made with the ſtranger, is the third point which produceth aboundance in an Eſtate, for the ſetling whereof there are three conſiderations to be made. The firſt is of things which we are to carry, and not to carry to the ſtranger. The ſecond is of things which wee muſt receiue from ſtrangers, and their entry into our Eſtate; or not to receiue them and to baniſh the Commerce. The third is the facillity and eaſe of Commerce accompanied with ſafety.

Three conſiderations for the Commerce.

Of Marchandize which we may and ought to carry to ſtrangers.

The Marchandize which we ought to carry to ſtrangers, with whom wee haue Commerce, are thoſe whereof we haue aboundance: Of which after the Eſtate is ſufficiently furniſhed, wee may allow the trade. As contrarywiſe, thoſe whereof wee haue want may in no ſort be tranſported; nor in like manner thoſe, whereof our Neighbours may make vſe to our preiudice; as Armes, Horſes, Sayles, and other things deſtinated to the vſe of the Sea or Warre.

Of the tranſport of Gold and Siluer.

The tranſport of Gold and Siluer is likewiſe forbidden in all Eſtates; but theſe prohibitions are very ill obſerued. And as they are neceſſary, to hinder the want of theſe mettalls, which are ſought after by all Nations, depriue vs not of the meanes to make vſe of them, for that they are hunted after by our Friends and Allies: So wee muſt haue a care, that it may not trouble

trouble nor altar the Commerce. And to ſpeake truth, theſe defences thus generall which they haue made, are impoſſible in the execution, ſeeking to maintaine the Commerce with our Neighbour: Vnleſſe it be, that we forbid to Negotiate otherwiſe then by exchange, and permutation of Marchandize. The which may be practized, in regard of the Marchandize, which is not very neceſſary, and not in regard of thoſe which are neceſſary for vs, and whereof we cannot paſſe. We are forced to haue recourſe to our Neighbours, and to take a law from them, in eyther giuing them other Marchandizes which may bee as neceſſary for them as theirs for vs, or in paying them ready money.

And in this laſt caſe many haue held, that the ſafety which might be added, was, to allow of the tranſport of Gold and Siluer, in giuing caution to bring backe within a certaine time the quantity in Marchandizes, for the which the tranſport hath beene allowed, the publique hauing no intereſt therein; preſuppoſing the neceſſity of this Marchandize, and that it cannot bee recouered by exchange from another.

Of raw ſtuffes. Among thoſe things which ought not to be tranſported out of an Eſtate, are rawe ſtuffes; but not manufactures, for that you take the meanes from your workmen, to imploy themſelues and to liue; and from your Eſtate the meanes to enrich it ſelfe by the meanes of manufactures, the which in certaine workes exceede the price of the ſubſtance. And they are ſo farre from ſuffering theſe ſtuffes thus rawe to goe vnto ſtrangers: as the Eſtate which knowes what belongs to husbandry, not ſatisfied with thoſe which grow amongſt them, draw them from their Neighbours, to put them in worke, and by this meanes to enrich themſelues, ſelling them thus wrought euen to thoſe who many times haue ſold them the ſayd rawe ſtuffes.

Behold the things which wee ought not to carry to ſtrangers,

strangers, by the which it is easie to iudge of those, which we ought to desire they should bring vnto vs. For if we retaine those things for the liberty which may come vnto vs, by the same reason, if wee want them, wee must seeke the meanes to draw them from our Neighbours.

Of the beginning of strãge Gold and Silner into an Estate.

And in regard of Gold and Siluer, the entire ought to be allowed: ut not the course of Forraigne Coynes among the people, for that there is not any assurance among Princes touching coynes, euery one seeking to deceiue his companion, and to draw the Gold and Siluer out of one anothers Estate, in raising the price of coynes more then they are worth in their Neighbours Estate, or in weakning the allay of their coynes, the stampe, greatnesse, thicknesse, and waight, remaineing still the same. So as giuing them entry, vpon an opinion they haue, that they are still according to the ancient standard, the people find themselues full, before the tryall can be made, and the abuse discouered: The which if you thinke to remedy in decrying them, and causing them to bee carryed to the Mynt, for the price of their bounty, your Subiects shall sustaine a great losse. On the otherside if you suffer this abuse to continue, they will by little and little draw all the good coyne out of your Estate, to reduce it to the weake Allay of your Neighbours, and then returne it vnto you againe thus satisfied. Wherefore to hinder this exchange of coyne, they shall hinder the course of forraigne coynes among the people, to the end that they which haue any, may carry them to the exchangers appoynted for that effect, who shal giue them the value esteemed according to their interiour bounty: And they carring them to the Mynt, as they shall be charged: They shall also clipp in peeces the forraigne coyne which they shall receiue, in the presence of those that bring them, and they shal be conuerted into currant coyne. So they needs not to feare the falsifications of strange Coynes,

That the course of forralgne Coyne ought not to be allowed in an Estate.

nor

nor the raising of the Prince: And they shall not be able to draw your currant money out of your Estate, but in bringing Merchandize to the value.

Marchandize whereof wee ought to stop the entry.

The things whereof wee must stop the Entry, and the Commerce in our Estate, are those which serue for ryot and excesse, the which is the chiefe meanes to impouerish an Estate; as pretious stones, exquisite perfumes, spices, not much necessary, and stuffes, the which serue only for Pompe and shew. But if the abuse bee so inueterate, as wee cannot hinder them by a prohibition, wee must charge them with such great customes and impostes, as the stranger may haue no desire to bring them, fearing hee shall not retire his Siluer, and the subiect to buy it, in regard of the deareneſſe. For although that some times this consideration doth not restraine the subiect, from buying such Merchandizes; yet by this meanes he growes poore, the publique shall bee the more rich by the great impostes, the which shall supply the place of punishments for excesse in priuate persons.

Chap. 41.

Of the facilities of Commerce.

The carriage of Merchandize.

As for the facillitie and ease of Commerce, it depends of many things, for the which it is needfull to prouide: And first for the commoditie of the carriage of Merchandizes by Water, Land, Cart, or otherwise; They must prouide to make the Riuers Nauigable: The Ports safe, to keepe the wayes and passages in good Estate, and due reparation, and free from Pyrats and Theeues.

Monopolis forbidden.

Noe to suffer any Monopole which may hinder the libertie of traffique: And if it bee discouered to punish it rigourously; to inuite Strangers to bring vs the Merchandize which wee

cannot

cannot want, by the discharge of Customes and imposts, as much as the necessity of the Estate will beare. Of the discharge of customes.

To Establish such Lawes for affaires, as there may bee faith and assurance amongst negotiators; and in case of difference, speedy and summary Iustice, especially in that which concernes strangers, who forbeare to traffique in a place, no lesse in regard of the tediousnesse of Suits, as for the treacherie of those of the Countrey. And for that a permutation cannot bee made without a certaine price set downe vpon Merchandizes, and that they cannot Negotiate with all sorts of people by exchange, but it is needfull to make vse of Money: The price and estimation thereof must bee certaine and firme; otherwise they should bring a confusion into the Commerce. But besides this, the interiour bounty and value of this Coine must bee easie to iudge of, not only by the waight, but by the eye and sound if it may bee. The which may bee done, if they resolue to make vse of the mixture of mettalls, no farther then it is necessary for a remedy, gold and siluer suffizing to make all sorts of Coine. Faith and assurance in affairs. Speedy Iustice. That Siluer & Gold are sufficient for all sorts of Coine.

For in regard of the Coine, if they will not diuide the marke of Siluer into eight thousand peeces, as they haue sometimes done in *Lorraine*, for the *Angenines*, which *Rene* Duke of *Arinou* and *Lorraine* caused to bee coined, whereof the two hundred were worth but sixe pence, and forty a souse of base French Money; they may reduce them to a third part thereof, to make the peeces more solide; which may bee stampt with a bodkin; making no vse of the Copper, whose price is vnequall and variable in all Countries, and moreouer is subiect to rust.

Contrariwise the price of gold & siluer hath changed little, & they haue inmpt'vsually in proportion, as one to two, little more or little lesse; & the marke of gold vallewed at twelue marks of siluer. *Herodotus* writes, that in his time a pound of gold was worth thirteene pound of siluer. I do not The price of Gold & Siluer, in proportion one of another,

not say, but there hath beene some Ages and some Provinces, in the which Gold hath beene dearer: But this hath not beene generall, nor of long continuance. Wherefore making the coynes of one Mettall, and of a certaine waight, greatnesse, thicknesse, and well coyned in the forme of a medaille that is cast as the *Grecians, Latins, Hebreans, Persians* and *Egyptians*, in old time did: It would be a hard thing to be deceiued.

To bring Marchants into credit.

There is another thing, the which doth greatly decay trading, which is, the contempt they make in many Estates of those which deale in it, holding this vocation to be sordid and base. So as they which have gotten a little wealth, retire themselues speedily, to imbrace an other vocation, to the which the people carry more respect and honour, then to this.

Trading at Sea profitable and honourable.

In truth wee must confesse, that there are certaine affaires which should be left to the poore and common people, to enrich them. But there are others which they only can execute that are rich; as that at Sea, which is the most profitable in an Estate, and to the which they should attribute more honour then they doe here: For if in all Estates they haue thought it fitting to inuite the Subiects by honour to the most painfull and dangerous Actions, the which might be profitable to the publique; This being of that quality, they should propound and attribute more honors to those that shall deale in it. And if Nobility hath taken its foundation from the courage of Men, and from their valour; there is no vocation in the which there is so much required as in this. They are not only to encounter and striue amongst men, but sometimes against the foure Elements together; which is the strongest proofe that can bee of the resolution of a Man. This hath beene the occasion, that some hath beene of opinion, that they should open this doore to Marchants to attaine to Nobility, so as the Father and the Sonne hath continued in the same trade; and to suffer Noblemen who-

who are commonly the richest in an Estate, to practise themselues (without preiudice to their condition) in this commerce at Sea, which would be more honourable vnto them, then to bee vsurers, or Banckers, as in *Italy*; or to impouerish themselues, in doing nothing but spend, and neuer gather. Hence will grow many aduantages both to the publike and priuate. To the publike, For that they that should deale in the commerce, hauing meanes, courage, and sufficiencie for this conduct, it would bee farre greater, putting more Ships to Sea and better armed, whereof the Estate at need might might make vse for its safety, and would carry the reputation of their Nation farre. The which they cannot doe, who beeing poore, and hauing no stocke but from others, haue not the courage to hazard themselues in a great enterprize. And for the particular, this commerce being wisely managed, what hazard soeuer they run, there is more to be gotten then lost: And if the Gentlemen apply themselues, without ruining themselues in expences, or importuning the Prince with demaunds, they shall doe more in one yeere at Sea, then in tenne at Court. It availes not to say, That a Gentleman will sooner turne Pyrate then Merchant. For holding that order which may be prescribed in their Imbarquing, they may so mingle them one with another, as it would bee a difficult thing that all should agree to commit a villany. Finally experience hath taught, and doth daily, that where the richest haue dealt in this Commerce, it hath enrich both them, and the Estate vnder which they liued: And at this day the examples of the *Venetians*, *Portugalls*, *Spaniards*, and *Hollunders* haue made it knowne vnto vs.

Aduantages which the publique and priuate should receiue if the Nobility gaue themselues to the Commerce at Sea.

These last being lesse rich then the others, but not lesse courageous and hardie, haue setled an order for the continuance of this commerce to the *East Indies*, which deserues to be knowne, which is, that after they haue found by many voyages, which some priuate Men haue made,

An order setled by the *Hollanders* for the continuance of the trade to the *East Indies*.

that they ruined one another by this concurrence; they aduised in the yeere 1602. to craue leaue of the generall Estates, to traffique into those parts before all others, during the space of one and twenty yeeres. The which was granted them, in regard of fiue and twenty thousand *Florins*, which they promised to pay vnto the Estate during the first tenne yeeres. Thus reduced all into one Company, *Amsterdam* had a Moietie, *Middleburg* in *Zeland* a fourth part; *Delphe*, *Rotterdam*, *Horne*, and *Enchusen* had either of them a sixth part: And the whole stocke of this vnion amounted to fiue Million of Liuers, or six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

For the direction of this trade, and the interest of the Associats, they haue established in either of these Townes a certaine number of Administratours: At *Amsterdam* twenty, at *Middleburg* twelue, and in either of the rest seauen. And if any one dies, the Chamber of the place names three, of which either the Estates generall, or the Magistrate of the Towne chooseth one.

These Chambers, choose seuenteene among the administratours: that is to say, *Amsterdam* eight, *Middleburg* foure, *Delphe*, and *Rotterdam* two, *Horne* and *Enchusen* two; and the seuenteenth is chosen alternatiuely, sometimes at *Middleburg*, and sometimes at *North Holland*: The which are called together to resolue ioyntly of how many Ships, and with what Equipage and furniture, they shall make the fleete which they meane to send, and to what Port or Coast they should goe. This assembly is held six yeeres together at *Amsterdam*, and afterwards two yeeres at *Middleburg*, and then againe at *Amsterdam*. By the conditions of the accord, the Ships must returne to the same Port from which they parted; and the spices which are left at *Middleburg*, and other Chambers, is distributed amongst them by the waight of *Amsterdam*; and the Chamber which hath sold her spices, may buy from other Chambers.

By

By this order they haue hitherto continued this Commerce with reputation, not as simple Merchants onely; but as if they were Soueraignes, they haue made in the name of the Estates an alliance with many Princes of those parts; As with the King of *Sian*, *Quadaen*, *Patam*, *Iohor*, the Heire of *Malaca*, *Bornean*, *Achin*, *Sinnatra*, *Baretan*, *Iocotra*, and other Kings of *Iatta*. They haue made themselues absolute Maisters of the Iland of *Amboyne*, where they haue setled a president which gouerns in their name. At *Banda* they haue a Fort for a retreate, where they must deliuer them the Spices at a certayne price. In *Ternate* they haue another, a Mile distant from that of the *Portugals*. At *Magniene* they haue three: At *Motire* one: At *Gilolo* they haue taken that which the *Portugals* had built.

The great reputation which they haue gotten by the meanes of this Trade.

From this example we will conclude, that the onely meanes to settle the commerce at Sea in a Nation, in the which the best purses will not hazard themselues in these Enterprizes; is to force the Merchants which trade at Sea in certaine places, to ioyne one with another, and not to make their traffique a part. For although that negotiating a part the gaine would be the greater, when the Enterprize succeeds happily: yet we must consider, that the losse which may happen, would wholy ruine him that attempts alone; And if in making a Company the gaine be the lesse, yet it is more assured; and the losse being borne by many, it is lesse to euery one that is interessed.

Means to settle the commerce at Sea in an Estate.

Thus diuiding the Trade according to the Coast and places where it is made, they may make diuers Companies; that is to say, one for the Trade of *Ginnee*; Another for the *Leuant* by the *Mediterranean* Sea; One for the East *Indies*; Another for the West *Indies* beyond the line; Another for that on this side the line; And one for *England*, *Norwage*, *Sweden*, and other Northerne Countries: forbidding them to attempt one vpon another.

and to all other priuate Subiects which ſhall not be of the company, to negotiate in thoſe places vpon great penalties

CHAP. 44.

Of Parſimony or ſparing,

That parſimony preſerues the riches of an Eſtate.

AS aboundance is the ſourſe and fountaine of the riches of an Eſtate, ſo parſimony is that which preſerues it, conſiſting in the cutting off of ſuperfluous and vnneceſſary things, part whereof come from abroad: ſo as hindering the Entry of thoſe, they ſhall prouide in that regard for ſparing. For if exceſſe creepe not in among the Subiects, the Stranger ſhall not grow fat, to the preiudice of the Eſtate, but the other Subiects ſhall taſte of the aduantage. Yet this is not to ſay, that exceſſe is tollerable, although that nothing goe out of the Eſtate, to the which the extreame pouerty of ſome, and the great wealth of others may breed much trouble. But if ſome growing poore by exceſſe, that which is loſt, is diuided into ſo many purſes, as the publique ſhall not be able to make vſe of the increaſe of their meanes, which receiue the aduantage by this exceſſe; this would be likewiſe worſe: For the others remayning poore, it would be ſo much aduantage loſt for the Eſtate. Whereas if he that ſpends, retayned his expences within the bounds of neceſſity, and conuenience without exceſſe, he ſhould be alwayes found to haue meanes to ſuccour the publique at need. But this moderation doth likewiſe import much for the ſafety of the Eſtate. For great men being they which vſually runne into theſe expences after they haue ruined themſelues, they are eyther a charge to the publique to bee maintained and entertayned by it: or receiuing nothing from the publique, they

Parſimony importeth much for the ſafety of an Eſtate.

they abandon themſelues moſt commonly to many innouations and enterprizes preiudiciall to the Eſtate. And therein ſome Princes are deceiued, who hold it a greatneſſe to entertaine this exceſſe in their Courts. It is onely meere vanity which ruines thoſe which follow it, and depriues them of the meanes to continue the Seruice, which the Eſtate might expect from them, if they gouerned themſelues otherwiſe: For that at the end of ten yeares at the moſt, a Gentleman growes ſo poore, as he is forced to retire, and to hide himſelfe in his houſe, and moſt commonly much indebted, being no more able to ſhew himſelfe in the Equipage of others of his condition. Whereas if Princes reſtrayned them, ſo as no man might ſpend more then his Reuenewes will beare, they ſhould be ſerued longer by their Nobility, and ſhould not bee ſo often importuned with demands, recompences, and reproaches, that they are ruined in their ſeruice. Wherefore be it in regard of Strangers, or in conſideration of the Eſtate, they muſt cut off exceſſe, but eſpecially that which brings with it the ruine of people and of great families. This Exceſſe is principally in great and ſumptuous buildings; in moueables, apparell, and ornaments of the perſon; In the traine of ſeruants and attendants, in ſhews; in Banquets and Feaſts, in Playes of ſhew and hazard. For the firſt, it ſeemes that the greatneſſe and ſumptuouſneſſe of buildings, turnes in ſome ſort to the benefit of the publique, and that they ought not to forbid it, but rather inuite euery man to build for the ornament of Cities and Townes. But as a generall prohibition would be ſomething preiudiciall to the publique; ſo the free and indifferent tolleration of this expence, is hurtfull not onely to the publique but to the particular. It ought to be allowed to a great man, and a rich Subiect, who hath few or no Children, to ſpare his Crowns, to imploy them in the Ornament of the publique. This cannot be termed Exceſſe. Neither would I hinder many Treaſurers

Againſt exceſſe

Where in exceſſe doth conſiſt.

Of exceſſe in buildings.

and partizans, who haue done their buſineſſe with the publique, and profited largely, to make the like expences. But if in ſtead of building of priuate houſes, they will raiſe ſome publique Edifices, I would eſteeme them the more: But yet I would deſire to adde two reſtrictions; the one, that they ſhould not build with any Materialls, but ſuch as are found in the Eſtate where they liue: The other to forbid them guilding and enriching with Gold or Siluer, which ought not to be allowed, yea, rather in publique buildings, there being nothing that doth ſo much decay Gold and Siluer in an Eſtate, as the like workes.

An order in the low Countries for buildings in Townes.

As for the common and priuate buildings, they may without this great expence prouide in building for the ornament of the publique, after the manner which they obſerue in many Townes of *Flanders* and the lowe Countries: where the order is ſuch, that he which meanes to build, takes not onely the plot from thoſe which are deputed to that end by the Magiſtrate, but alſo the proiect of the front, or face of the building, the which muſt anſwere vpon the ſtreete: The beauty whereof conſiſts more in a certayne proportion, then in any enriching eyther of ſtuffe or workemanſhip: And it ſhalbe moſt commonly made according to the front of ſome neare houſe, of ſmall charge, according to the which they ſhall rule them ſelues for the height and faſhion of the Doores, and other exteriour parts. So as in ſucceſſion of time all the houſes of a Streete (building according to this proiect,) are found alike, and by this reſemblance and proportion, they are very pleaſing vnto the eye.

From this policy there redounds vnto them another aduantage, which is, that the workemen by the eſtabliſhing of this order, being aduertiſed of the forme how they are to make the Doores and other parts which muſt anſwere vpon the Streete; they haue them ready long before: So as priuate men that will build, they haue preſently

presently raised their houses, which are for the most part of bricke, finding that little stone that shall be necessary ready cut. It is therefore easie to cut off this excesse, and to prouide for the ornament of Townes, in restraining euery man in his buildings according to his meanes, that the front may be answerable to the neerest houses, if there be obserued in them any proportion or pleasing prospective: Making the publique places spacious, the Streets large, straight, and long; yet in such sort as neither the great heate, nor cold may annoy passengers: for therein chiefly consists the beauty of a Towne.

Of the excesse of moueables.

The excesse of moueables, Apparrell, and other Ornaments of the person, must in like manner be cut off; as pretious Stones, Enamell, Embroideries, Stuffes of Gold and Siluer, and all strange Manufactures of great price. If they will adorne themselues with Gold, they may allow it in chaines without Enamell: in the which the losse cannot bee great: For the which the Ordinances of *France* haue well prouided, and the Magistrates very ill.

Excesse in a great traine.

That excesse which consists in a great traine of attendants, is excused vpon two considerations: The one which regards the commodity of those that will be attended, the other vpon the feeding and imploying of many men, the which being poore, and hauing no imployment, would be forced to steale or to dye for hunger, if they had not this retreate. In regard of the first consideration, if the number of Seruants were regulated according vnto the commodity, it were no excesse: But to feede many vnprofitable Mouthes, which wee might well spare without any want, it is vanity that makes vs doe it. As for the second, which is to imploy many profitable persons to all other things, this is so farre from doing good to the publique, as by this retreate they inuite many to be idle: which if they wanted, they would fall to learne some trade, or thrust themselues

A good order made by the *Venetians*.

into the Warre and serue the publique The *Venetians*, haue better then any other prouided for this point. For not able to regulate the number, which was necessary for the commodite of priuate persons, they haue cut off that which serued only for shew, which is the atendants in publique: Not suffering a Gentleman, how great and rich soeuer hee be, to be followed with aboue two seruants, giuing him libertie to haue as many in his house as hee shall thinke good. The which is the cause, that not able to make vse of this vaine traine in publique, euery man keepes but wht he needs in his house.

But as the ordinance is more easie to execute in a Towne, then in a Princes Court, where, for that the discommodities are greater, they haue need to be serued by a greater number, and must likewise satisfie the vanitie of the Court: The *Italians* and *Spaniards*, who are in this regard good husbands, seeing themselues forced to this traine for a time, make vse of Men whom they retaine with them, for daily wages; and knowing how much they are to giue them by the day, they are not tied to feede them, nor to keepe open house for them, as they doe in *France* and *Germany*: And going from Court, this troope is dismist, there remaining none but the ordinary traine; and thus they satisfie vanitie and good husbandrie altogether. I confesse that this point would bee hard to reforme in *France*, euery Man desiring to eate his meanes in good Companie. Yet there might be some course taken that might diminish their disorder.

Excesse in Feasts.

The excesse of Banquets and Feasts, is that which is most esteemed, especially among the Northerne Nations: But in effect it is the most superfluous and beastly. I doe not say but vpon some occasion, as in publique reioycing & marriages it is fit to make more expences then we doe in our ordinary course of liuing; but yet we must fly superfluity, & prouide principally for neatnesse, order, and

and seemelineſſe, which muſt bee regulated according to the number and qualitie of perſons whom you treate. Wherefore it imports the Eſtate and priuate Men much, that this ſhould bee reformed.

In regard of Playes, thoſe of hazard are forbidden in all Eſtates: But the defences are ſo ill obſerued, as many great families ruine themſelues thereby. As for Playes of ſhow, as Tilting, Turneyes, and Maſques; thoſe that may quicken the courage to Vertue, as the two firſt, ought not only to bee allowed, but the Nobility ſhould bee inuited vnto it; yet ſo, as the expence may not ſeeme greater then the vallour; carrying ſuch a moderation, as it may not ruine any Man; and in regard of thoſe which haue no other ground then vanitie or loue, and being apiſh followers, whereof moſt part of thoſe which haue imployed themſelues therein, haue beene afterwards aſhamed; they deſerue not only to bee forbidden, but ſcorned at as ridiculous. Wherefore theſe doores being ſhut, by the which the faculties and meanes of priuate Men flow away incenſably, there is no doubt, but thoſe ſtreames which runne from this abundance, whereof wee haue ſpoken, will ſo ſwell, that when the publique will make vſe, they may well doe it without drawing priuate Men into neceſſitie. Exceſſe of Play.

Theſe two foundations being laid, of the abundance of all things neceſſary, and of the parcimony of Subiects, wee muſt now ſpeake of the ſetling of the Finances, or ordinary Reuenewes, the which haue beene diuers according to the diuerſitie of Eſtates.

CHAP.

CHAP. 45.

Of the Eſtabliſhment of the Finaces, or ordinary Reuenewes of an Eſtate.

Of the ordinary reuenew of the Demeſus and of its Eſtabliſhment.

MAny haue Eſtabliſhed the principall reuenew of an Eſtate, or publique demeſus, which is the moſt honeſt, the moſt iuſt, and the moſt ſafe, there hauing beene certaine Lands and Demeſus reſerued, to bee let out to farme, and giuen to particular men for a time or in perpetuity, in paying the Rents and Reuenewes, wherewith they had beene charged towards the Prince. In ſome Eſtates this reſeruation hath beene of a Moietie, in others of the third part of the territory, and in others of leſſe.

This Eſtabliſhment is hard to make, vnleſſe it be by the meanes of a full and abſolute conqueſt, by the which it is lawfull for the Victor to preſcribe what Law hee pleaſeth to the vanquiſhed; bnt being once made, hee muſt bee maintained without any alienation; But likewiſe an ingagement and no alienation, for that the ingagement in the end growes to be an alienation, by meanes of the neceſſity which the Prince hath alwayes to be releiued vpon new affaires which happen. So as he is ſo farre from being able to redeeme it, as he is preſt to make new ingagements, the which being made for a farre leſſe value, then the alienation would be, the Prince findes himſelfe depriued of his Reuenewes for a ſmall releife; and it may be ſayd, that it had beene profitable to ſell, then to ingage. But to doe better, wee muſt not allow neither to one nor the other: And if hee cannot find money otherwiſe, hee muſt not ingage but the vſe of it for a certaine time, the which expired, the Prince may re-enter into his Demeſus.

That an alienation is not to be allowed much leſſe an ingagement.

The

The ſecond meanes, which they make vſe of to raiſe a ſtocke of Treaſure, are the entries, and going forth to Marchandize, Hauens and Ports, aſwell vpon ſtrangers as the Subiects: An ancient and generall courſe, iuſt, lawfull and moſt profitable, with the conditions which we haue mentioned ſpeaking of Commerce; which are not to ſuffer the trafique of things which are neceſſary for life, vntill the ſubiect bee furniſhed, nor of raw ſtuffes, to the end the ſubiect working them, they may draw profit from the manufactures: To ſuffer the trafique of thoſe which are wrought, and the bringing in of that which is raw by ſtrangers: But they muſt moderate the impoſts, of neceſſary things, which are brought vnto vs from aboad. Entries and going forth of the Eſtate.

Some likewiſe haue eſteemed Tributes, Gifts, and Penſions, which they receiue from ſtrangers, for an ordinary Reuenew. But this being not ſufficient for the entertainment of charges, it cannot bee called a ſtocke of Treaſury; although it may ſerue to increaſe the ſtocke. Tributes, Gifts, and Penſions.

The fourth meanes is in trafique which they may make in the name of the publique or Prince. As there are many trades vnworthy of a Prince or publique, ſo there are ſome which require a great ſtocke, the which may well bee allowed them. Yet it would ſeeme more profitable, in regard of the theft which Factors doe commit, to giue the money which they haue in reſerue, to thoſe which trafique, vpon good cautions and ſufficient aſſurance, with a meane intereſt (as they ſay *Auguſtus* did) then to trafique. Hence would grow three or foure aduantages. The firſt it would increaſe the publique money. The ſecond, it would giue meanes to priuate men to profit and gaine: And the third, that they ſhould ſaue by this meanes the publique money out of the hands of importune beggers, flatterers, and fauorites; and preuent the facility of a prodigall Prince. There is another kind of tra- Trafique in the name of the publique. To deliuer money at intereſt to marchants. Of the ſale of Offices.

trafique which is vſed in ſome Eſtates, the which is the ſale of offices and publique charges; which is not onely diſhoneſt, but moſt pernitious: And yet this abuſe is gone ſo farre, as this trafique is not onely receiued but carefully handled, as an ordinary ſtocke of the Treaſure.

The ſourſe and beginning of this abuſe.

To preuent it, it is neceſſary to know vpon what pretext this abuſe is crept in. As all new inuentions are grounded vpon publique neceſſities; ſo this hath beene aduanced vnder this pretext. Seeing that in regard of the multitude, of thoſe which might aſpire to charges, Princes referre themſelues to courtiers, and to ſuch as were about them, to make choyce of Officers; And Courtiers hauing no other ayme, then to worke their owne ends, propounded vnto Princes, thoſe which promiſe them moſt money vnderhand, to bee preferred before their Competitors: So as although the Prince did not ſell the Offices, yet they were venall, the profit going to particular men that were about them: They found it more reaſonable, ſeeing the abuſe was ſuch, and that growing from the ordinary careleſneſſe of the Prince, it would bee difficult to reforme; that the publique ſhould the trafique, by the meanes whereof it might be eaſed in ſome other charges, then to ſuffer it to bee done by priuate perſons.

In trueth this miſcheife is leſſe then it was, ſeeing the publique profits ſomething thereby; but yet notwithſtanding it is euill, and moſt preiuditiall to the Eſtate: For the which there is more remedy, but to quicken the vigilancie of the Prince, or of thoſe which haue charge of the publique, to make choyce of thoſe which are to bee aduanced: being more fit (for the Officers) to leaue vnto them the choyce and the Election, to the end that gratifying him whom they hold moſt fit to ſerue, hee ſhould be more bound vnto them, and ſhew himſelfe more obedient then he would be, if he had obtained it by his owne

merrit

merrit, or for money. But for that it is impoſſible that the choyce could bee made in the confuſion of ſo many Competitors, which might pretend to one Office: the Princes ſeeming to haue ſome excuſe therein, the meanes aboue propounded might ſerue for a Remedy, Eſtabliſhing many degrees in the Offices of euery profeſſion, aſwell in Armes, Iuſtice, the Treaſure; as Religion; and preſcribing a certaine time, that euery one ought to remaine in euery degree, before hee can pretend to mount higher; For that it would be more eaſie for the Prince, to chooſe out of the number of thoſe which had ſerued their time, him whom he pleaſeth, to aduance him to the next degree, there being ſome place voyd; then it is after the manner they now liue. And for all this they ſhould cut off nothing of the Princes fauour. For hee that is thus aduanced, ſhould be only bound to him and not to any other. Whereas hauing no meanes to bee knowne vnto the Prince but by the mediation of other perſons, whoſe knowledge he hath bought for ready money; hee is many times more obliged to the Groome then to the Maſter, for the fauour hee receiueth; but much more to his purſe: And by little and little the affection of Officers, towards the Prince, is loſt by theſe courſes, there being none of all thoſe which practiſe theſe meanes, but blames them, and eſteemes the Prince leſſe which ſuffers them, then if they proceeded another way.

Inconueniences which grow by the venallity of Offices.

The Prince ſhould bee better ſerued, not only with more affection and fidelity; but alſo with more diligence and ſufficiency. For the Officers comming to the higheſt and ſupreame degrees, they would be much more capable, as hath beene ſayd; And euery Man deſireing to make himſelfe knowne to his Prince, to bee preferred before his Companion, would ſerue with enuy, and indeauour to make himſelfe to bee obſerued by ſome ſeruice. Whereas the Officer in this venallity, hauing no other hope to aduance himſelfe then by his purſe, ſeekes what he

he can to profit, be it by right or wrong, to haue meanes to purchaſe ſome greater Office, wherein hee may benefit himſelfe better. But wee will leaue this reformation to another time, when they ſhall be more capable.

CHAP. 46.

Of Subſedies, of Extraordinary Leuies, Imports, and Loanes.

THe fift meanes to make a ſtocke for the Treaſure, is taken wholy from the ſubiects; whom they haue ſhorne after diuers manners in many Eſtates, and in ſome they haue flead them. This meanes cannot bee excuſed but vpon neceſſity: But if it bee neceſſary it is likewiſe iuſt; the ſafetie of the people and the preſeruation of the Eſtate being the Supreame Law.

Of Subſedies. The moſt ordinary manner to leuy vpon the Subiect, is by way of Subſedy, for the goods which he enioyes; the which alſo hath beene diuerſly practized, according to the diuerſity and condition of ſubiects and goods.

Diuers formes of Subſedies and Leuies. Clergie Men and the Nobility in ſome places, are exempted with their goods, of what condition ſoeuer they were. In other places they made the Subſedies reall, exempting the Feodall, or noble-lands; the perſons aſwell of Nobles as Eccleſiaſtiques, hauing ſubmitted themſelues to contribute for their rurall goods which they poſſeſſe. In ſome Eſtates and other places they haue exempted the Nobles and Eccleſiaſtiques, & the lands which they held in their owne hands; but they haue not exempted their Farmers.

To diſpute which is the moſt iuſt of all theſe formes of Leuies, were vnprofitable. For this Eſtabliſhment hath

hath not beene made according to the rules of Iudgement; but according to the facility and diſpoſition which they haue found in people, to receiue one forme more then another. Yet if any ought to enioy an exemption, it ſeemes that Gentlemen, who are bound to a perſonall ſeruice, and to contribute for the defence of the Eſtate, not onely their goods but alſo their liues, may with Iuſtice bee exempted from this kind of impoſition; ſeeing that the burthen which is impoſed vpon them, is much more greiuous and heauy then that of the Cannons.

Of thoſe which ought to bee exempted from Subſedies.

In regard of Clergie men, the reſpect and reuerence of Religion hath held them long exempt: But in the end in thoſe places eſpecially, whereas the Subſedies are perſonall, Iuſtice hath wreſted out of their hands, ſome ſuccours for the publique, whereof they make a great part; which ſuccours, although they be not called Subſedy, but a chautatiue graunt; Yet vnder a milder name it hath the ſame effect. As for others, ſome haue beene exempted, partly to preſerue the reſpect due vnto the Offices which they hold of the Prince; and partly to authorize and maintaine the Leuies, and to puniſh the diſobediences. Others haue beene exempt, for the feare of ſome ſedition and Rebellion, and for the good of peace onely: So as they vſe the like pollicy with them, as they doe with the Clergie; and draw Succours from them vnder the Names of Loanes and borrowing.

As for the place where the Subſedy is to bee leuied, eyther at the Mans dwelling houſe, or at the place where his Lands and Goods lye; Many hold opinion, that the moſt iuſt were, to leuy the Subſedy in euery place, where the man that is ſubiect to the Subſedy hath goods, by reaſon of the fraudes which are committed vſually by ſuch as haue goods in many places who ſeeing themſelues charged at the place of their abode with a great Subſedy,

Of the place where they are to make the leuy of the Subſedies.

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proportionable to the eſtimation of their goods, retire themſelues either to a Towne that is freed from Subſedies, or into ſome place where they pay not ſo much; whereby their Subſedy is layd vpon others. But if the Subſedy were layd vpon their goods, they ſhould cut off this abuſe, which doth much import the poore people.

Introduction of tolles, tributes, and impoſts.

Theſe difficulties are found in the laying of the Subſedy, as well in regard of the exemptions pretended by many conditions of men, as for the inequality and diſproportion in the laying thereof among ſuch as are ſubiect: and the faculties of euery one vpon whom it ſhould take hold, being vnknowne, it had miniſtred occaſion to ſeeke many other courſes, and to impoſe many duties ſometime vpon proprieties, ſometime vpon Legacies, and teſtamentory ſucceſſions, left to ſtrangers; vpon carriages as well by water as land; vpon Wine, Meale, Salt, and other Merchandize; vpon Contract, Seales, Waights, and Meaſures: Of which tolls euery man inſenſibly payes his part; the Merchant making the aduance of thoſe which are leuied vpon the Merchandize, the which hee retires afterwards from particular perſons which they buy of him.

Introduction for the rating of goods.

Yet ſome which diſalow of this diuerſity of poling and tributes in an Eſtate, holding a Subſedy the moſt iuſt, if it were well ordred, haue thought to bring in a certayne and ſetled order, whereby they might regulate themſelues in drawing from euery man the number of his goods. This order hath beene practiſed in many Common-weales; but neuer more happily, nor with more aduantage to the Eſtate, then in that of *Rome*.

Practiſed by the Romans.

To ſay that this expedient is more proper for a Common-weale, then for a principality, there is little colour, ſeeing that when it was eſtabliſhed at *Rome*, the Eſtate was gouerned by King *Sernius Tullius*; and continued vnder all the Emperours which ſought to gouerne iuſtly. And contrariwiſe the Tyrants which ſought by

Abolished by Tyrants.

the

the meanes of a ſmall number to gouerne, treade vnder foot, and oppreſſe others, to enrich ſome, and to impouerish others; Finally, to turne all ropſie turuey, for that they would not diſcouer their Iniuſtices, violences, and tyrannies; haue neglected this order, laying their exactions with more impunity vpon the weake, then if they were diuided among them all with a iuſt proportion.

To ſay likewiſe, that it were a hard matter to expoſe the pouerty of ſome to ſcorne and contempt, and the wealth of others to enuy; it is a very bad reaſon to hinder a good eſtabliſhment: For neuer man of vnderſtanding, in that which concernes his good, made any accompt of enuy or ſcorne. But beſides this we may ſay, that on the other ſide enuy would ceaſe againſt ſuch whom they held rich, and haue nothing; and the ſcorne againſt ſuch as haue ſome wealth, who notwithſtanding were held poore. It is certayne that the deceitfull Merchant, who hath a deſigne to ſteale the goods of another by playing banquerout, will ſay, that it is not good they ſhould know the courſe, traffique, and negotiations of Merchants, which conſiſt many times in papers and credit; nor that they ſhould diſcouer the ſecrets of Houſes and Families. But he that is an honeſt man, and will be knowne for ſuch, for a good husband, and not a deceiuer, will ground his credit vpon his Diſcretion, and not vpon the vncertainty of his affaires; and will alwayes take delight, they ſhould know his eſtate and manner of liuing: And there is no man which doth not more willingly lend an eare to a poore man, who ſhall be knowne for an honeſt man, and a good husband, then to a rich, which ſhall be held for a bad husband, and of little faith. Imaginary inconueniences of the nũbring of goods.

But in recompence of theſe imaginary inconueniences, an infinite number of aduantages redound to the Eſtate, by the eſtabliſhment of this order. For thereby they ſhould know who are prodigall, banquerouts, cozeners, Aduantages which will come vnto the Eſtate.

and Vſurers; how ſome gaine ſo much, and others ſpend: And moreouer, the penalties of Iudgements and condemnations, would be eaſie to regulate by the Iudges, according to the ability of euery mans eſtate. The deceipts which are practiſed in Marriages, Sales, Bargaines, and in all publique and priuate negotiations, would be diſcouered and knowne: An infinite number of frauds which are vſed touching Succeſſions and portions, would be auerred, without inquiery, or rather charges of Law; and they ſhould preuent falſhoods and falſe Witneſſes, which are practiſed dayly. But beſides theſe aduantages, to returne where we left, the facility wou'd be great in a neceſſity to draw ſuccours from the Subiects without iniuſtice, not oppreſſing one more then another; as it falls out vſually, ſome bearing the whole burthen, and others being diſcharged.

Of extraordinary leuies.

This facility of extraordinary leuies is the fourth point, which may cauſe an Eſtate to be held rich. For we ſhall in vaine bragge of the abundance of an Eſtate, and of the ordinary ſtocke of the treaſure: the which as wee haue ſayd, how great ſoeuer it be, may be exhauſted, and ſometime ingaged, if the publique in an vrgent neceſſity may not be releeued by ſome extraordinary leuy, which may be done without Iniuſtice, diſcontentment, or inſupportable oppreſſion of any part of the Subiects, which would draw after it reuolts, ſeditions, and intelligences with the Enemies.

This numbring of their goods being vnable to be brought in, to equall euery man in ſuch ſort of contributions, they muſt haue a recourſe to other meanes, the moſt iuſt and plauſible that can be deuiſed, according to the quality of Eſtates, and the condition of times, the which being vnable to ſet downe now in particular, it ſhall ſuffice to ſay generall, that the impoſition which extends it ſelfe vniuerſally ouer all the Subiects, of what condition ſoeuer they be, is the moſt gentle, the moſt profitable, and the moſt iuſt:

For

For that euery man paying, euery man payes the leſſe, then if it were leuied of a leſſe number; and yet it is farre greater; wherein it is more profitable to the Eſtate: And it is more iuſt, for that euery man hauing an intereſt in the preſeruation of the Eſtate, euery one is likewiſe bound to contribute. But the principall part of Iuſtice would be, if it be proportioned and layd equally among them that contribute, according to the proportion of euery mans eſtate; If the leuy be made without rigorous executions, eſpecially againſt the perſon. The contrary whereof doth vſually happen vpon leuie of the Subſedies, the which being impoſed vpon view of the Countrey, as they ſay, and without any certaine ground, the goods of euery man being vnknowne to direct them, and leuying it vpon the pooreſt, they cauſe them many times to dye in Priſon, which is a peuerty reſenting Barbariſme: Or to get ſome delay of payment, the poore man muſt ſatisfie the Auarice of Receiuers, and Sergeants, which ruine him by ſuch concuſſions, the which many times exceede the principall of the Subſedy.

But if ſome conſiderations be iuſt, to exempt certayne conditions of perſons, or that making the impoſition generall, ſome trouble is to be feared; they muſt haue recourſe to thoſe that are caſuall As after the Ciuill Warres at *Rome*, they ſetled the twentieth part of Succeſſions and Legacies, which were left to Strangers or Collaterals. And before in the time of Warre likewiſe, at the requeſt of the Conſul *Manlius*, they ordayned the twentieth part of infranchiſed men. Of caſuall impoſitions.

In *Scotland Malcolane* hauing ſold all the Kings Demeſus, the Eſtates of the Countrey agreed, that the Fees changing hand, ſhould pay vnto the King a certaine right of redemption.

Impoſitions likewiſe and cuſtomes may bee iuſtly layd vpon all that which may corrupt the manners Of cuſtomes & impoſitions.

ners of the Subiects, eyther to contayne them, or to baniſh them away. This reaſon was the cauſe that in ſome Eſtates they haue charged ſuits with diuers duties; and in others they haue only puniſhed them that fled from them, impoſing great amercements vpon them that fayled; and in others they haue puniſhed raſh pleaders, which loſt their cauſes; as at *Athens* and *Rome*. Thoſe likewiſe which may be eſtabliſhed without oppoſition, which come from ſome Body vnited and of authority, may be receiued for the facility of their eſtabliſhment, to the which they haue many times more regard in ſuch things, then vnto Iuſtice. But if the neceſſity be ſuch, as they muſt prouide a ſpeedy remedy, and that they cannot attend the time, which would be neceſſary for the eſtabliment, and the leuy of an impoſition: there is no other meanes, then to make vſe of voluntary borrowings, vpon thoſe that are beſt able, whom they ſhall pay at a prefixed time without fayling, to the end they may maintayne the credit of the publique, and that whenſoeuer the like neceſſity ſhould happen, they might finde the purſes of priuate men open to ſuccour him. But if he cannot finde money without intereſt, he muſt to the end to ſtay the courſe, prouide for the payment both of principal and intereſt by the ſame aſſignation, the which ſhall be deliuered into the hands of ſuch as lend, as well being aſſured by this meanes of their due, they might lend another time more freely: As for feare, that this aſſignation remaining in the hands of thoſe which manage the buſineſſe, it ſhould be otherwiſe diſpoſed of, whereby the the Prince ſhould not onely looſe his credit, but ſhould finde himſelfe at the end of the time charged with great intereſt.

Of voluntary borrowing.

CHAP.

Chap. 47.

Of the mannaging and good husbandry of the Treaſure: That is to ſay, of the ordring of the expences, and the cutting it off.

THe ground of the Finances being found, we muſt order the mannaging, which conſiſts in two principall points. The one concernes the huſbanding of it, the other the quality of the perſons which are to be admitted to this mannaging. The husbanding hath two parts, that is to ſay, the order and gouerning of the expences, or if it exceeds the receipt, the cutting off part of the charges.

Touching the order of the expence, if in all things that which concernes God, is to be preferred, the ſame muſt likewiſe be obſerued in the Treaſure. Wherefore the firſt Chapter of the expence, muſt bee of Almes, wherein he may not be ſparing. The Kings of *France* haue had goodly examples in St. *Lewis*, who founded and endowed Twenty eight Bodies or Colledges, as the Seigniour of *Ioinuille* ſayth; And had dayly in his traine one hundred and twenty poore, and in *Lent* two hundred and forty, feeding them with meate from his Table. So hee liued in great honour, feared of his Enemies, reuerenced by his Friends, adored by his Subiects, and after hee had Reigned Forty foure Yeares, hee left two Sonnes, whoſe poſterity haue Reigned, and doe yet ouer the *French*; and his Realme exceeding rich, and flouriſhing to his Succeſſor, recommending eſpecially vnto him, that hee ſhould bee deuoute towards Almighty God, and charitable vnto thoſe who are poore and miſerable. Almes doe neuer impouerish an Eſtate, nor a

Of the order of the expences.

Almes.

Charities of the King St. *Lewis*.

Almes doe neuer impouerish

family, but contrariwiſe they enrich them with all ſorts of bleſſings.

The freeing of charges neceſſary for the Eſtate.

The ſecond Chapter of the expence muſt be the freeing of the charges of the Eſtate, but firſt of thoſe which are neceſſary for its ſafetie; as the pay of Souldiers, Munitions, Artillery, Shipps and Veſſells of Warre, Repayrations and Fortifications of Townes and important places, entertainment of Spies, and finally all the Expences, aſwell ordinary as extraordinary, neceſſary to warrant the Eſtate, againſt the inuaſion of ſtrangers, or the reuolt of Subiects. Next muſt follow the Fees of Officers, eſpecially of thoſe, by whoſe meanes they hold the reſt in their duty and obedience, theſe making a part of the ſafety. Then follow the debts, which I place next to the neceſſary charges for the ſafety: For that if by the meanes of theſe charges, the Eſtate be not ſecure, the debts cannot be aſſured.

Of the Fees of officers and debts.

Recompences to the diſcharg of the Treaſure.

After theſe come Recompences; with which they ſhall not charge the Treaſure as little as may be, for the which the King muſt beſtow Offices and Dignities, and accuſtome all the great Men not to ſeeke any other kind of Recompence, which is of moſt ſhare and more durable, then that which is made by money. For a Prince which aduanceth ſome one to honor that hath done him ſeruice, he publiſheth the merrit of him whom he recompenceth, and his fauour withall, the which remaines continually in the mind of him that receiues it; And it laſts as long in the minds of the people, as they ſee him, who hath receiued it in this degree: And moreouer the remembrance which they haue, to haue ſeene a Man gratified for his merrit, many by this meanes are inuited to ſerue, ſeeing ſeruices ſo honorably rewarded: whereas to recompence in money, few know it, and the grace many times continues no longer then the money laſteth.

Thoſe which are made by offices and dignities are to be preferred before that which is done by money.

The Prince may likewiſe recompence his ſeruants, to the

the diſcharge of his Treaſure, in procuring eyther for them or theirs, marriages and alliances of aduantage; Not thereby to force his Subiects, for that were tiranny: But he that ſees himſelfe debarred of the Princes fauour, is glad ſometimes to approach by the meanes of the alliance of one, that is in grace with his Maſter, though otherwiſe inferiour in meanes, and family; Eſpecially when the inequallity is not ſuch, as hee may receiue ſome diſhonor by the alliance. Knowing then how to husband theſe kind of recompences, the greateſt part of great ſeruices will be rewarded; and recompences of ſmall ſeruices will be of ſo little moment, as they will not greatly charge the Treaſure.

After recompences follow gifts, the which muſt not be done at pleaſure: But as recompences are made for ſeruices done, gifts muſt likewiſe be for ſeruices, according to the quality and importance thereof, as alſo to the quallity, ſufficiencie, and power of the perſon, the Prince muſt moderate his bounty, and giue not to one alone, but to many, little, and often. I ſay to many, for that in giuing to one alone, the enuy is great, the grace little, and the ingratitude of him that receiues, may one day be hurtfull. I ſay little and often, eſpecially in money, which is ſoone conſumed, for that the great expence in gifts waſt the Treaſure, and accuſtome thoſe that receiue them, to moderate demaunds. Small bounties often reitterated, are as it were inſenſible; the grace is the more durable in the minds of thoſe which receiue them, and the deſire and hope in continuing the ſeruice to receiue daily, bind Men the more. I except the gifts that are made to Embaſſadours and Forraigne Princes, the which are done for reputation, and to ſhew the magnificence of him that giues them, or of his Eſtate, and may in no ſort bee omitted where they haue beene accuſtomed.

Gifts and gratifications.

A Prince muſt giue to many little and often.

* Election of publike houſes and Seminaries for inſtruction of youth, aſwell in the liberall Arts as Mechanick.

* The expence which followes, is that which hath

beene propounded by ſome, for the breeding vp and inſtructing of youth, to that whereunto they ſhall be found fit, (eſpecially the poore) as we haue formerly ſayd, by the Erecting of publique houſes, for manuall Arts, and all ſorts of manufactures: Whereunto may bee added the building of Seminaries for piety, and the ſtudy of Diuinity, and other learned vocations; and ſome for the exercíſes of honor and vertue of the Nobility. In many Eſtates they haue prouided a great number of Seminaries, for pietie and the ſciences; but the greateſt are ſo ill gouerned, as they are become vnprofitable, by the diſorder which is found in them.

Seminaries of piety.

Seminaries of honour for the inſtruction of Gentlemen.

As for Seminaries of honor and vertue, I meane thoſe places which are deſtinated for the inſtruction of the Nobility, which are to be imployed in Armes; in long and dangerous voyages; and in the managing of publique affaires: Whereof hitherto they haue made ſmall accompt. And yet the ſafety and reputation of an Eſtate, eſpecially of a principallity, conſiſts in thoſe of this condition: Who, if with that greatneſſe of courage, which is not naturall vnto them, they ioyne induſtry and prudence, which may be gotten by exerciſes and inſtructions, fit for their profeſſion; there is no doubt but many would haue beene more capable to ſerue the publique, then they are.

The profit of the ſayd Seminaries of honor for the Eſtate.

It were a great Art both of pollicy and wiſedome, if the Prince ſhould cauſe the young Gentlemen of his Eſtate to be bred vp in thoſe places, whoſe Fathers haue not the meanes to vndergoe the charge of ſuch an inſtruction, as is neceſſary for them of this condition: And there to entertaine thē at the charge of the publique, vnto a certaine Age, to be diſtributed & do ſeruice in the troups and garriſſons, affecting certaine places of honor vnto them, with ſufficient entertainment, to the which they may bee aduanced after they haue ſerued ſome time. For beſides that theſe Men, gouerning all the affaires of the Prince, they

they would be more faithfull vnto him : The Gentlemen who find themſelues burthened with many children, and who for feare to leaue them miſerable, become houſedoues, to husband both their liues and goods, would hazard the one and theother freely for the Princes ſeruice, and notbe diuerted for the care of their Children, whom they knew could not one day faile of preferment, aſweil by reaſon of the inſtitution, as for the beginning of imployment for the Princes ſeruice, which ſhould bee aſſured vnto them. And the charge which ſhould be made in theſe Seminaries, would be recompenced by the ſeruice, which the whole Nobility, would bee thereby inuited to do, willingly and freely to the publique: And the troupes, eſpecially thoſe of Foote, would beefound with more order, diſcipline, fidellity, and courage, being filled with young Men of good houſes, bred vp with honour and obedience, then they now are, being for the moſt part Men of no moment, Ryotous, and drawne together from all parts.

Expences for the cõmodity and decoration of Townes and Prouinces.

After all theſe expences, come thoſe which may ſerue eyther for the commodity, or the decoration of Townes and Prouinces; as conduits of Water, ſtructure of Bridges, repairation of wayes, Churches, Royall Pallaces, Pyramides, Tombs, Statues, Colloſſes, and other publique buildings : But with this reſtraint, neuer to enter into thoſe expences, vntill the ſparing of the ſõme which is neceſſary, be firſt made. For to multiply the Subſedies, to make Pallaces, more ſtately then neceſſary, were to leaue a remembrance of his tyranny, aad a perpetuall teſtimony to poſterity, that they haue built with the blood of the Subiects.

Cutting off Expences.

Behold the principall husbandry which conſiſts in the order of the expence. But the ſtocke of the Treaſure being not ſufficient, to beare all theſe charges, moſt part of which ſeeme neceſſary ; they muſt ſeeke the meanes to raiſe the Farmes, and fall to the cutting off of debts, eſpecially

cially of intereſts, of Fees, and of exceſſiue gifts, rather then to come (as they haue done in many Eſtates) to make new impoſitions. In an Eſtate where the Prince finds himſelfe ill aſſured of the will of his prime Men, they haue obſerued the courſe which *Eumenes* vſed, to borrow of thoſe that were ill affected, to the end that intereſſing them in the Eſtate, and the loſſe thereof, for feare of looſing their debt they helpe to maintaine it. But if they finde ſome hinderance to aſſure themſelues elſewhere, this meanes would be but weake. Wherefore a Prince muſt neuer borrow, vnleſſe it bee in an vrgent neceſſity: For there is nothing that doth ſo much harme to a bad husband, (as the publique is many times) then credit.

Of the iuſtice and neceſſity of cutting off of debts.

I know that many hold, that this cutting off of debts or wages is vniuſt: as in truth it is, if the Eſtate hath wherewithall to pay: But if the ſparing of the ordinary Reuenew be not ſufficient to ſatisfie, the neceſſity makes this cutting off neceſſary and iuſt. For to ſatisfie it by a new impoſition, were to repaire one iniuſtice by another more generall, & to draw moſt commonly from the poore to giue vnto the rich; which cutting off part of the intereſt of debts, will not preiudice ſo much, although it be great, as a Subſedie would do the Poore. I doe not ſay, that among thoſe to whom the Prince is indebted, there may bee ſome one found, to whom this cutting off would bee hurtfull: But for one of that quality among the Princes creditors, there would be fiue hundred of the poore reduced to beggery, if they ſhould by that meanes pay the debts due by the Eſtate: the which I vnderſtand of Eſtates which are already ouercharged with great impoſitions, and likewiſe with great debts.

CHAP.

CHAP. 48.

Of thoſe which ought to be imployed in the gouernment of the Treaſure.

AS for the quallity of thoſe to whom the mannaging of the Treaſure ought to be committed, if Men could be knowne, there is not any one, but would make choice to deliuer it into the hands of the moſt loyall : But making this choyce moſt commonly by hazard, I ſay that although we ſuppoſe him to be an honeſt Man, to whom wee will giue this charge ; yet we muſt not take neither a poore Man nor a needy, nor one that is too powerfull, nor of too great authority. The firſt for feare that through neceſſity he bee not inuited to rob vs ; and the other leaſt that he ſteale from vs too boldly, and hauing robbed vs, we are not able to call him to an accompt, and to puniſh his theſts.

Of the choice they ought to make of thoſe which are to manage the Treaſure.

There is beſides this an ordinary fault which is cõmitted in this ſubiect in many Eſtates, which is, that they make a trade of it apart, and profeſſion of the managing of the Princes purſe. So as he that enters into it, inſtructs himſelfe as to an Art to doe his owne buſineſſe ; the which he cannot doe but with the preiudice of the publique : Thus the elder they grow, the more learned they are, that is to ſay preiudiciall to the Eſtate. I doe much commend that ancient cuſtome of the *Romans*, to imploy young Men in the mannaging of the Treaſure, before they aduanced them to any other Offices : For this is to giue them occaſion to ſhew their diſcretion, and for the hope to bee one day ſomething more, to incourage them to doe their duties well, and to mannage the publique Reuenewes. Beſides, this youth is leſſe auaritious then another

A commendable cuſtome of the *Romans*.

Age,

Youth more fit for the mãaging of the Treaſure then Age.

Age, and more innocent, and leſſe hardy in deceipts, eaſie to be diſcouered: So as the *Romans* leauing them but a ſhort time in theſe charges, to bee aduanced to other honors, they came forth more innocent then they entred.

That experience is not ſo much neceſſary.

To ſay that a long experience is neceſſary in theſe places, to mannage them well, this were to endeare the trade. The greateſt pollicy in the Treaſure to ſerue the publique, is to haue no other but diſcretion; and to know how to write downe that which hee receiues and paies; to recouer that which he receiues not, hauing charge to make the recouery, and to follow exactly the commandements and ordinances of thoſe which haue power to ordaine. There is no factor in a ſhop but vnderſtands this. But I will confeſſe, that to know how to ſteale from the publique cunningly, and to couer and diſguiſe his theſts, he muſt haue a long experience of ill doing, be it to defend the falſhood of an acquittance, of the omiſſion of a receipt, of a falſe repriſall, of a diſguiſing of parties, and a ſecret compoſition with thoſe that are to receiue; with other courſes ordinary to thoſe which deale in this trade; Not meaning to taxe honeſt Men.

A forme to regulate Accomptants.

Some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts, and to hinder them that they may not maliciouſly (as it often happens) make reprizes, or to eaſe ſome more then others, or to vſe it for their owne particular, or for ſome other deſigne; haue held it fit to regulate their Fees proportionably to that which they are to receiue, and to diminiſh thẽ, according vnto that which they ſhall leaue in reprizes, to the end that being intereſſed in their owne particular, they would be more exact to make their receipts. Others haue giuen their receipt to make the abatments, with charge to make it good, and not to bring in any not ſoluable: The which would ſeeme more iuſt.

As for thoſe which ought to heare and examine the accompts,

compts, beſides the choyce that they are to make, of the honeſteſt men for this effect; it is neceſſary to bind them, to iudge according to certaine formes and orders, which haue beene held fit to hinder the abuſes which accomptants, or themſelues might commit: And eſpecially to draw particular Notes of the diſtribution of the Treaſure, which they ſhall enioyne the accomptant to verifie, vpon thoſe of the receipt and expence, without any meanes of diſpencing, for any occaſion whatſoeuer; but afterwards he may addreſſe himſelfe vnto the Prince, if there bee any reaſon to eaſe him.

Of Accompts and of thoſe which are to heare and examine the Accompts.

But as the Prince is not alwayes at leaſure, nor ſometimes of experience to regulate & direct his owne affaires; and that moreouer, hee is importuned by an infinit number of beggers, whom if he ſhould ſatisfie, his Treaſure would be found too ſhort: To free himſelfe of the hatred, which the deniall of ſo many demaunds might purchaſe him, and to diſcharge himſelfe of the importunity; the cuſtome is to ſend ſuch ſutors to a Councell conſiſting of rough and ſeuere men, more inclined to refuſe then to graunt; and who know how to moderate the denialls which they make, as they doe not depriue thoſe which are refuſed of all hope, to be ſatisfied in ſome other thing: For rough and contumelious denialls, may diſtaſt many, from imploying themſelues in the Princes ſeruice, although the Prince make not the deniall: For that as they loue the dogg for the Maſters ſake, it falls out often, that when the dogg bites too ſharply, in the end they take exceptions at the Maſter.

CHAP.

Chap. 49.

Of the Exchequer or ſparing of Treaſure.

Conſiderations which makes the heaping vp of Treaſure hurtfull to a Publique.

THere remaines to ſpeake of the Exchequer, the which ſome haue held hurtfull to the publique, euen that which is made to heape vp Treaſure, drawing apart great ſumms of Gold and Siluer, God forbidding it *Deuteronomy*. This many times hath cauſed ſome to attempt againſt Eſtates: As the ſonne of *Tygranes*, who beſieged *Sophene*, a Towne in *Armenia*, which *Pompeys* Army, to haue his Fathers Treaſure. Moreouer this gathering together ruines the Commerce and traffique of the Subiects; and doth not hinder the ruine of the Eſtate, when as the affaires are thereunto diſpoſed. *Sardinapalus* left forty Millions of Gold to thoſe which ſlue him. *Darius* left fourſcore to *Alexander* who vãquiſhed him. And many times the Father, who leaues much Gold and Siluer to the Sonne, leaues him withall a ſpeedy meanes to ruine him. For a young Man relying vpon his Treaſure, thruſts himſelfe into impoſſible enterprizes, which are aboue his forces; hates peace; contemns the friendſhip of his Neighbours; Enters into Warre not onely vnneceſſary and of little profit, but alſo hurtfull.

Yet cuſtome is contrary, as alſo reaſon, if we had the conſideration of heaping vp of Treaſure: For that to gather together money when as neceſſity doth preſſe, that were too late: For that the bruit of Armes, cauſing traffique to ceaſe, Tillage, and the gathering in of fruits, the cuſtomes and impoſts by conſequence would decay; and the Subiects (impoueriſhed by the lodging of ſouldiers, and the holding of the Fields) will be vnable to pay.

But

But there muſt be two conſiderations added for the gathering in of Treaſure. The one to make it equall to the other forces of the Eſtate, that is to ſay, of perſons, whom we may imploy, and of Munition of Victualls and War, which are neceſſary for vs; whereof wee muſt make a Magazine or ſtore-houſe before we gather Treaſure. For to hope that without it, the Treaſure alone which we gather will preſerue vs from ruine, were a vaine thing; and the examples aboue mentioned ſhew it ſufficiently. The other conſideration is, not to draw together ſo much Gold and Siluer, as it may incommodate the commerce and traffique of the Subiects: For this were to dry vp the ſpring of the Treaſure. If the Sea ſhould retaine all the waters of the Riuers which diſgorge themſelues into it, and not returne them to their fountaines, by conduits vnder ground; it would dry vp the Riuers, and in the end grow dry it ſelfe. Wherefore they which will ſhew any diſcretion in heaping of Treaſure, haue conſidered in groſſe the quantity of money, which goes forth and enters yearely into an Eſtate: And if there enters more then goes forth, they haue held that a Prince might lawfully, and without any intereſt of the commerce, lay vp yearely in his Exchequer, as much Gold and Siluer, as the entry exceeded the going forth. But if the entry hath not exceeded the going forth, they haue held and with reaſon, that the Prince ought not to lay vp any Treaſure.

Conſiderations neceſſary for the gathering of Treaſure.

Prudence and diſcretion neceſſary for the gathering of Treaſure.

But in this caſe there is another Remedy, of which we haue formerly made mention: which is, that after neceſſary charges are payed, the Prince hauing meanes to ſpare ſomething for his neede, he may diſtribute it vpon moderate intereſt to the Marchants of his Eſtate, taking neceſſary ſecurity, (as we haue ſayd *Auguſtus* did) to yeild it at a certaine time. For in this manner, the aſſurances being good, this ſupply would bee as ready as if it were in his Coffers: And the intereſt being ſuch as the Marchant may gaine thereby, the commerce is no way diminiſhed by

A Remedy to the end that ſparing may not hinder the Commerce.

by this ſparing, but rather augmented, and the Subiects and Prince enricht by this meanes.

Difficulties for the keeping of the Treaſure of Gold and Siluer.

But men haue beene much troubled for the guard of Treaſures of Gold and Siluer. The Kings of *Peru*, kept it in great Maſſies, of Gold and Siluer: The *Romans* in *Lingotts* in the forme of Tyles; The Kings of *Morocco* cauſed Maſſie Boules to be made, which ſet vpon the top of their Moſquees or Temples; Some (to be guarded more religiouſly) haue put them into Churches. As the guard in a Common-wealth is not vneaſie, ſo in a Principality or Monarchie it is moſt difficult. For they haue not ſo much cauſe to guard it from theeues, as from their owne Princes, who for their priuate pleaſures, or by the importunity of ſome flatterers, ſcatter that in one yeare, which their predeceſſors haue gathered in many. So *Caligula* ſpent in one yeare, ſeauentie and ſeuen Millions of Gold, which *Tyberius* (as they write) had drawne together: And *Carcalla* conſumed in one day, that which *Seuerus* his Father had ſpared in Ninteene yeares.

Wherefore as it is moſt fitting, that few men ſhould know what is layd vp in the Treaſure, leaſt that being too much, it ſhould prouoke ſome through Enuy to ſeeke to get it; or being too little, it ſhould make vs to bee contemned of our Enemies: So many haue held it fit, to ordaine not to touch the Treaſure, but in the great neceſſity of the Prince and State, and by the Councell of the Magiſtrates, of greateſt autority.

CHAP.

CHAP. 50.

Of treaties in generall, be it for the enter-view and parley of Princes, or by their Deputies and Embaſſadours.

Of the care & manaaging of affaires abroad.

ESTates are like vnto buildings raiſed high, the which although they bee built of good materials, and ſtrong Walles, yet to ſubſiſt long, they haue neede to be ſupported and vnderpropt without with Buttreſſes, Pillars, and Arches; For that being threatned as well without as within, they muſt bee rampired againſt all forces. Wherefore the care of the affaires of Strangers, eſpecially of his Neighbours, is moſt neceſſary for a Prince, and for any man that ſhall bee called to the Rule or Gouernment of the Eſtate.

How a Prince ſhould gouerne himſelfe with his neighbours

This Care conſiſts in three principall points. The firſt is how hee ſhall gouerne himſelfe with his Neighbours. The ſecond conſiſts in gaining ſome credit among them, to haue a part in their deliberations. The third and laſt, being vnable to paſſe without them, to get meanes to pierce into their Deſignes. The manner how to gouerne himſelfe with his Neighbours, depends of the manner of treating with them, and of the obſeruation of treaties, according vnto the which hee muſt gouerne himſelfe. The manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of perſons and of affaires. Yet there are ſome generall conſiderations which deſerue to be knowne.

Generall conſiderations touching the manner of treating.

The firſt is in the ouerture, which is made to treate, it many times happening, that of two Princes which are Enemies, the one will not ſeeke vnto the other for an Accord, ſo as the ouerture muſt bee made eyther

by some greater Prince, or by some Neighbour that is a Friend to both: and sometimes the Ministers of two Princes meeting accidentally together, if they be imployed. *Argenton*, and a Steward to the Duke of *Mantoua*, meeting at *Creal Carragio*, to condole in their Masters names for the death of Marquesse of *Montferrat*, made an ouerture for the treaty of peace, betwixt *Charles* the eight and *Lewis Sforse*. King *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* hath imployed Monkes to that effect, Religion giuing a free accesse to those of this condition, and liberty to speake and propound what they will. The Ouerture to enter into treaty being made, the Princes resolue to parley themselues, to the end the treaty may be more secret; or they depute Embassadours to that effect.

Of the enter-view of Princes, where they may be a rupture of the Friendship and good intelligence which they formerly had.

Many haue not allowed of this Enter-view of Princes, although they were Friends: And particularly *Philip de Comines*, obserues many examples of the meeting of Princes, who being formerly good Friends, haue become Enemies after this Enter-view. Yet I hold that in such affaires we cannot prescribe a certaine and generall Rule; Histories teaching vs, that other Princes haue parled, and yet no hatred hath ensued: So this depends rather of the Estate of affaires, and of the conformity and diuersity of humours, and manner of liuing, of the Princes and their people, then of the Enter-view. That of *Lewis* the twelfth of *France*, and of *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* at *Sanonne*, past fairely: As also that of the Emperour *Charles* the fift, with Pope *Clement* the seuenth at *Bolonia*; and that of the same Pope with *Francis* the first.

A Prince before he parles must haue a care not to procure Enuy or iealousie against him, nor to fall into contempt.

But it shall be discretion in a Prince, before he comes to that, to consider, if at this parley there may not something fall out that may breed iealousie or enuie against him, or that may draw him into contempt of him with whom hee treates. The Emperour *Maximilian* the first, hauing

hauing appointed a place and Day to parley with King *Lewis* the twelfth, came to the aſſignation. But fearing that he ſhould not appeare ſo well accompanied as *Lewis* the twelfth, whoſe trayne was in better order then the *Germans*, he auoyded this Enter-view, which might haue bred ſome contempt of him and his with the French; and ſought a pretext before he parted, or the King arriued, excuſing himſelfe vpon the Warre which the *Venetians* made in *Friuly*, whether it was neceſſary for him to tranſport himſelfe ſpeedily. The place of parley is likewiſe very conſiderable, as well for the ſafety, as for the honour which he receiues, whom they goe to finde in his owne Pallace.

The conſideration of the ſafety is commonly the principall. And the diſtruſt which King *Francis* the firſt had, that vnder pretext of a parley with the Emperour *Charles* and the Pope, whereunto hee was inuited during the hoſtage of his two Sonnes in *Spaine*) they would retaine him, made him refuſe to come. The ſame conſideration hath ſometimes beene the cauſe, that two Princes being Enemies, haue parlyed vpon a Bridge, made to that end vpon a common Riuer, with barres and ſhuttings betwixt them; leaſt that the Princes which parley, or thoſe which follow them, falling into conteſtation for ſomething, ſhould not attempt one againſt the other: As it happened at the parley betwixt *Charles* the ſeuenth, then *Dolphin*, and the Duke of *Burgundy*, who was ſlayne by *Tannequin Du Chaſtel*: which was the cauſe that this manner of parling was obſerued betweene King *Edward* of *England* and *Lewis* the Eleuenth. But *Lewis Sforſe* hauing demanded to haue the ſame forme obſerued and kept, being to parley with *Charles* the Eighth in his returne from *Naples*, they refuſed him, as to one who ought not to treate with the King as an Equall, to whoſe fidelity hee did wrong, to demand ſuch aſſurances. Yet this hath no certaine Of ſafety.

Rules: But they gouerne themſelues in ſuch things according to the confidence which they may take one of another.

The ordinary courſe is to chooſe for theſe Enter-viewes, eyther a neuter all place belonging to ſome common Friend; or a place vpon the frontire, or an Iland; to regulate the number of thoſe which ſhall accompany the Princes: And if the iealouſie bee great, they may ſpecifie the Armes, which euery one may carry in theſe Enter-viewes.

But if of two Princes, the one goes home vnto the other, he is bound to doe him the houour of his Houſe: And if the Prince be inferiour vnto him, hee muſt ſend forth the Chiefe of his Court to receiue him: But if he be his equall in quality, as being both Kings, although there be ſome debate betwixt them for precedence, if he come firſt to the place where the treaty is to bee made, hee muſt goe himſelfe.

In the Enter-view which was betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* at *Sauona*, which then belonged vnto the French King, *Lewis* the twelfth at the approach of *Ferdinands* Galley, (before he could land) entred into it, accompanied onely with his Guard; to teſtifie his confidence, and thereby to aſſure King *Ferdinand* of that which hee ſhould finde in him: And at their going to land, King *Lewis* left the right hand to *Ferdinand*, who lodged in the Caſtle, as the moſt honourable place; and himſelfe, went to the Biſhoppricke.

Which of two Princes vnequall in quality ſhould come firſt to the place of parley.

When two Princes vnequall in quality, parley, ſome hold that it is for the inferiour to come firſt vnto the place of meeting, there to attend the greater. Yet the contrary hath beene moſt commonly obſerued vpon this reaſon, that the leſſe ought to goe vnto the greater. So as he is to goe firſt vnto the place where the parley is to bee made: And this was particularly practiſed

ſed, at the enter-view of Pope *Clement* the ſeuenth, and King *Francis* the firſt, although that *Marſeilles* were in the Kings ſubiection.

It is preſumed that two Princes doe not meete for ſmall matters, the which doth many times put their Neighbours in Iealouſie of theſe Enter-viewes; they muſt finde out ſome apparant and important pretext, the which may bee publiſhed to free their Neighbours from all Iealouſie, vnder which they may treate what elſe they pleaſe. When Pope *Clement* the ſeuenth came to *Marſeilles*, to treate the Marriage of his Neece, with him that was afterward King *Henry* the ſecond; this treaty might haue beene croſt, if they had knowne the Deſigne; hee borrowed the pretext of a generall peace, and an Enterprize againſt Infidels, the which could not put the Neighbours in Allarme, carrying a faire ſhew, and hauing in it many particularities, which deſerued to be treated by mouth, be it for the taking away of all difficulties the more eaſily, or for the holding the buſineſſe the more ſecret.

What Princes ought to doe before their Enter-viewes, not to put their Neighbours in Iealouſie.

If they hold it fit to treate by Deputies and Embaſſadors, as it is the ordinary, the more ſafe will bee to chooſe a man of a meane condition, experience in Negotiations, and who vnderſtands no leſſe the Eſtate, affaires, and dependancies of him with whom hee treates, then the Eſtate and affaires of his owne Maſter: Neyther muſt he be intereſſed in the buſineſſe whereof he treates. This was an Errour, to commit the ſoliciting of the difference of the Duke of *Ferraria*, to *Alberto Pio*, Embaſſador for *France* with Pope *Iulio* the ſecond, who in ſteed of pacifying the ſayd Pope againſt the Duke, he incenſed and vrged him the more; fearing that if the ſayd Duke were reconciled to the Pope, hee would get the other Moiety of *Carpy*, which the ſayd *Alberto Pio* enioyed.

Of Deputies & Embaſſadors to treate with a Prince, and of the choice they are to make.

qualities of a Deputy or Embaſſadour.

Not to be intereſſed in the buſineſſe hee treates of.

I haue ſayd of a meane condition, for that the

Of a meane condition.

the great Men of an Eſtate are not fit, as well for the iuſt feare they may conceiue of them, that vnder colour of treating, they ſhould ſuffer themſelues to bee practiſed by the other ſide; as for that they haue ſometimes intereſts and reaſons, which concerne them in their particular, to the which they doe willingly accómodate the affaires of their Maſter, and to his diſaduantage: Beſides there is ſeldome found ſo much patience and ſufficiency in Men of this condition, as is needfull in ſuch Negotiations. Neither may they chooſe men of a baſe condition, as *Lewis* the Eleuenth did who imployed his Barber; leaſt that he with whom we treate, or his Deputies, doe not finde themſelues contemned by this choyce. Yet in ſecret treaties, they ſtand not much vpon the choyce, and theſe laſt are commonly moſt proper, as thoſe of whom they haue leaſt diſtruſt: Vnleſſe they hold it more fit to make vſe of Embaſſadors, which reſide with the Prince, with whó they meane to treate; of ſome Priſoner taken in the War, as the treaty of the League, made betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth and the *Venetians*, by *Andrew Gritty* then Priſoner to the King.

Of ſecret treaties and of the diuers intentions for which they are made.

Theſe ſecret Treaties are vſually made when there is queſtion to make a League one with another. They are made for diuers intentions: But moſt commonly to entertaine and deceiue him with whom they treate, or to ſurprize his enemy, or to aſſure himſelfe of two enemies which make Warre, treating with one ſecretly, and the other openly. Pope *Alexander* the ſixt, promiſed King *Ferdinand* by a breife, to aſſiſt him for the defence of *Naples*, in caſe that *Ferdinand* ſhould promiſe to doe the like for the Eſtate of the Church. The League which was treated betwixt *Lewis* the twelfth and the *Venetians*, was ſo ſecret, as neither *Lewis Sforſe*, nor the Pope, did euer know what had beene treated, vntill the Army was ready to march. The treaty of the ſame French King, which *Ferdinand* King of *Spaine*, was no leſſe ſecret, to breake the

the League betwixt *Spaine* and *England*, the King of *England* hauing sent a Herrald to the King of *Spaine*, to summon him to performe their League, who arriued at the same time when as the peace betwixt *France* and *Spaine* was proclaymed.

Pope *Leo* the tenth. Hauing made a League with the Emperour and the King of *Spaine*, treated with *Lewis* the twelfth, not by a Publique instrument, but by a scedule vnder his owne hand, to the end the businesse might bee carried more secretly, and that hee might assure himselfe of all sides. The same Pope treated afterwards secretly with the King of *Spaine*, for the defence of *Italy*: Yet meaning to entertaine King *Francis* the first, to slacken the preparations continued to treate with him, sometimes demanding one thing and sometimes another, to the end that the one being denied him, hee might haue a Subiect to breake when hee should see his time; and to make the French King beleeue, that necessity more then his owne free will, had induced him to treate with the Spaniard, with whom hee had long before made a secret treaty. And distrusting that the King would not yeild to that which hee should demand, hee made diuers ambiguous and irresolute answers. The same Pope made another secret League, with the Emperour *Charles* the fift against King *Francis* the first, and when he was forced to declare himselfe, made shew to treate a new with the Embassadour of *Spaine*.

It is one of the ordinary policies among Princes, and wherewith the best aduised doe sometimes suffer themselues to bee abused, to propound a treaty to betray his commpanion, Pope *Iulio* the second, to winne time to make his preparations against the Duke of *Ferrara*, he entertained King *Lewis* the twelfth, making shewe that hee would agree. The proposition of peace made by *Lewis* the twelfth vpon the difference

That they must stand most vpon their guards when they propound a treaty, and especially during the treaty.

for the Dutchie of *Millan*, was a meanes to chaſe the French out of that Dutchy, the generall of *Normandy*, hauing forborne vpon that Subiect to make a leuy of *Gryſons*, and thinking to ſpare the Kings money loſt that Eſtate. The ſame Pope *Iulio* the ſecond, to the end hee might buſie the ſame King, ſent his *Nuncios* to treate a peace, with power to conclude it, but with certaine limitations, which might breed a doubt of his intention. And hauing recouered his health, hee continued the ſame treaty, and at the ſame time made another offenſiue League with the *Venetians* and the King of *Aragon*, againſt the ſayd King. After theſe practiſes, the King of *Aragon*, and the King of *England*, kept the French King in doubt, of the League made by them, to the end they might hinder his preparations. The Emperour *Maximillian* the firſt, to haue meanes to reuenge himſelfe of the French King, by a fraudulent reconcilliation interrupted the treaty which was made betwixt the ſayd King and the *Venetians*, and hindred the preparations of Warre which the ſayd King might make, making ſhewe that he would treate a peace with him.

The Spaniards, to interrupt the League which was ready to bee made, betwixt the Princes of *Italy* and Pope *Clement* the ſeauenth, after the battaile of *Pauia*, propounded vnto the ſayd Pope to treate an accord. The which not onely hindred the League, and ſtayed the preparations of Warre which he might make; but alſo cauſed him to diſcharge the troupes which he had drawne vnto him for his ſafety. *Hugo de Moncada*, made other prepoſitions of an accord to the ſame Pope, to make him the more negligent to thinke of his defence.

Bourbon, leader of the Emperours troupes, entertained the Pope with an accord, whilſt the Army marched towards *Rome*. The *Gonfalonier* of *Florence*, to keepe Pope *Clement* from attempting any thing openly

ly againſt the Citty, entertained him with hope of ſome ſecret practiſes. The *Spaniard* (who in matter of State make no great difficulty to breake their faith,) doe more vſually practiſe this pollicie then any other Nation.

Alexander the ſixt, (as *Guichardin* ſaith,) to baſie his enemies excuſed thoſe things that he could not deny, and deuiſed thoſe were doubtfull, pacifiyng ſome with promiſes and good lookes, and aſſuring others by diuers meanes, treating with them a part, to the end hee might breed a iealouſiy among them, and diſvnite them.

Gonſalue in the treaty which hee made with the Duke of *Calabria*, ſware vpon the holy Hoſt, that hee would ſend him into *France* to his Father *Fredericke*. But the intereſt of State preuailed more with him, then the opinion of Men, or the feare of God; ſo as he ſent them into *Spaine*. Hee makes the like reckoning of the faith which hee had giuen to Duke *Valentine* by his ſafe conduct; Notwithſtanding the which hee ſent him Priſoner into *Spaine*; But *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* his Maſter ſent him backe. For hauing ſent *Philip* Arch-Duke of *Auſtria* into *France* to treate an agreement vpon the difference, for the diuiſion made of the Realme of *Naples*, betwixt him and King *Lewis* the twelfth, in regard of the limits and bounds; Notwithſtanding that the ſayd treaty had beene ſworne by the French King on the one ſide, and the ſayd Arch-Duke on the other, as procurator for the Kings of *Spaine*, And that they themſelues had likewiſe ſworne, vpon the holy Euangeliſt, and the Crucifix to confirme whatſoeuer he ſhould doe; yet vnder diuers precepts, forbare to ratifie it, to the end that the longer the French King ſhould remaine in this ſuſpence, the longer hee would ſtay to make his preparations to ſuccour his Men: who for want of releiſe, hauing bin forced to abandon the countrey, the ſaid Kings of *Spaine*, Notwithſtanding their ſolemne

ſolemne Oath, would heare no more ſpeech of ratifying the treaty made by his Sonne in law.

From all theſe examples we may gather, that during a treaty, wee muſt watch more carefully, and make our ſelues the ſtronger, not onely to fruſtrate our Enemies of all hope to ſurprize vs, but to the end that the conſideration of our forces may make vs obtaine conditions of more aduantage: And wee muſt not hold a treaty firme and concluded, vnleſſe it be ratified by the Prince with whom we treate; eſpecially if the treaty be made with a Prince whom they detayne Priſoner. For the force by the which he hath beene conſtrayned to promiſe, will alwayes diſpence him to re-aduiſe himſelfe. Pope *Clemens* the Seuenth, refuſed to ratifie the Conditions which the Duke of *Ferrara*, when the ſayd Pope was a Priſoner; ſaying, that it was an vnworthy thing, that a man in life ſhould approue of that which had beene done in his Name, whileſt he was dead. And King *Francis* the firſt excuſed himſelfe to accompliſh the treaty of *Madrid*, vpon the inhumanity which *Charles* the fift vſed towards him, to extort from him the Ceſſions which he made: All which tooke not place, although the King had giuen his Children in hoſtage. As in the parlies of Princes, the place where the enter-view is to be made, is very conſiderable; So is it in treaties of peace, which are made by Deputies. If it be to chooſe a League, there muſt be a conuenient place, not too farre from the confederates, to the end they may haue a more ſpeedier anſwere of the difficulties that may happen. When as the Kings of *France* and *England* were to treate a League with the Princes of *Italy*, they reſolued to treate in *France*, to be the nearer to *England*. Pope *Iulio* the ſecond, meaning to treate with the Emperour and the French King, deſired that the Embaſſadours ſhould come to *Rome*, to the end hee might gaine the Emperours Miniſter by kinde vſage, promiſes, and benefits, to perſwade his Maiſter to diſ-vnite himſelfe

That a treaty ought not to be held firme and aſſured, if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom they treate;

Of the place where the treaties of a peace or a league is to be made.

himſelfe from the French King. The which he of *France* refuſed to doe, being neyther reaſonable nor honorable to treate a peace in the houſe of his Enemy, how great ſoeuer he were. So as the vſuall courſe is to chooſe a neuter place.

But the queſtion is, if an Embaſſadour hauing agreed to goe vnto the Prince, with whom he is to treate, whether the Prince be bound to treate with the Embaſſadour himſelfe; Or depute ſome of his Councell for that effect. This laſt manner of proceeding is the moſt vſuall, as wel to preſerue the dignity of the Prince, which cannot bee maintayned amidſt the conteſtations which happen in conferences; as for that Princes are vſually little practiſed in ſuch negotiations. And the example of the Biſhop of *Gurgia* is not therein to be followed; who going to Pope *Iulio* the ſecond vpon his requeſt to treate with him; and the ſayd Pope hauing deputed three Cardinals to that effect, he deputed three Gentlemen to conferre with them, excuſing himſelfe vpon other affaires: For therein the ſayd Biſhop carryed himſelfe, not as a ſimple Embaſſadour, but as Lieutenant to the Emperour, to the which quality he had beene receiued at *Rome* by the Pope. An Embaſſador going vnto a Prince to treat whether he is bound to treate himſelfe with him, or by Deputies.

The Deputies being aſſembled, their ſeats are conſiderable, they hauing no power to quit any thing of the ranke which their Maiſters ought to hold. The firſt place is at the head or end of the Table, if there be one: The ſecond is the firſt on the right hand; and the third is the firſt on the left hand of him that is at the end. And if there be many Deputies to one Prince, they vſually ſit all on one ſide, to haue the more facility to conferre together, if it be needfull. Of the ſitting of Embaſſadors

The ſeates being reſolued, the Deputies are to ſee the Commiſſions of eyther ſide, and to conſider of them: For that from thence doth grow the aſſurance which they may haue of the proceeding of the treaty; there being Commiſ- Of the power of Embaſſadors on either ſide.

Commiſſions ſo generall, and ſo ambiguous, as thereby they may eaſily iudge, that he which hath giuen ſuch to his Deputies, hath no will to conclude any thing: for that vnder theſe ambiguous and generall termes, he hath a deſire afterwards to ground a new breach. Some deſiring to deferre the concluſion of a treaty, whereof the motion ſeemed reaſonable on eyther ſide, they haue concluded in requiring the Prince of the contrary party to conſent vnto them before they ratifie it. The which Pope *Iulio* the ſecond did, ſeeing himſelfe preſt by the Cardinals, to make a peace with *Lewis* the twelfth, who propounded certaine Articles of an Accord vnto him: whereupon he gaue Commiſſion to the Cardinall of *Fiual*, and to the Biſhop of *Tinolly*, to tranſport themſelues to the French Court, and there to treate; promiſing to ratifie the ſayd Articles which had beene propounded vnto him, if the King conſented. But he neyther gaue them Commiſſion, nor power to conclude them, hauing no will but to gaine time, and to fruſtrate the inſtance which the Conſiſtory made vnto him for this pacification.

Of the clauſes of treaties.

As for the clauſes of treaties, there can be nothing certaine preſcribed, this depending of the differences, for the which the treaties are made, the which are infinite, be it for peace or truce, for the reſtitution of that which they pretend to haue beene vniuſtly taken from them, or for the Ceſſion of rights, or elſe for limits and bounds; the which if they cannot regulate, they put them in ſequeſtration or ſuſpence, or they make ſome Act which may interrupt the preſcription of him that holds them; or elſe for a paſſage, with conſignation of hoſtages, or of Forts for the aſſurance; Or elſe for an offenſiue or defenſiue league, or for neutrality, whereof I will treate hereafter.

Principall conſiderations.

But the principall conſiderations we muſt haue, are not to vſe, nor to ſpeake for a perſon which is odious to them with whom we treate; not to yeeld to the firſt demaunds though

though iuſt, but to reſiſt them ſtoutly: And yet if the danger be eminent, wee muſt not ſtudy ſo much to Negotiate with aduantage, as to prouide for ſafety: And eſpecially to haue a care, that the clauſes may not be Equiuocall and of a double vnderſtanding, or ſo generall and indefinit, as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty. The Spaniards are Maſters in ſuch practiſes. *Iſabelle* of *Caſtille*, and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, circumuented *Charles* the eight when hee reſtored vnto them the County of *Rouſſillon*, vpon condition they ſhould not hinder him in the conqueſt of *Naples*, they adding by another clauſe, that they meant not to be bound to any thing that might preiudice the Church: Reſeruing vnto themſelues thereby a liberty to take Armes, if they were required by the Pope; as Lord of the Fee of the Realme of *Naples*. And in truth after the reſtitution of the County of *Rouſſillon*, they began to exhort the King rather to turne his Armes againſt Infidells, then to make Warre againſt Chriſtian Princes; giuing hope vnder hand to the King of Naples and to the Pope, to be releiued by them; and preparing by theſe exhortations, to breake with King *Charles*, when the occaſion ſhould be ready, and the Pope declare himſelfe.

They muſt haue a care that there be no equiuocation in the clauſes.

The ſame Spaniards deceiued the French in the treaty for the diuiſion of the Realme of Naples, betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth of *France* and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, vpon the equiuocation of the denomination of the Prouinces, made diuerſly and in diuers times; the French thinking the confines ſhould be regulated according to the ancient denomination, and the Spaniards according to the new, which they cauſed to be expreſt in the treaty: They which treated on the French party, neuer conſidering, that in the diuerſitie of Names, they are gouerned according to the preſent vſe. The protection taken by King *Lewis* the twelfth, of *Bentineth*, with *Bolonia*, vpon condition he ſhould not preiudice the rites of the Church, the

the which was interpreted with no better faith. For whileſt the King was an enemy to the Pope, hee interpreted the rites of the Church, for that which the Church enioyed when hee tooke the protection: And afterwards being vnited to the Pope, hee reſtrained this protection to the perſon and goods of *Bentineth*.

That generall clauſes are captions.

Generall clauſes are alwayes captions; as thoſe for the defence of Duke *Sforſe* in the Dutchy of *Millan*, which did not free him, but that they made his proces, for that he had had a part in the practiſes of *Morone* with the Marqueſſe of *Peſquiere*, againſt the Emperour *Charles* the fift; who in the treaty he deſired to make with the Pope againſt the French, propounded ſome generall clauſes, to the end that vpon the difficulties the Pope ſhould make, he might haue time to prouide for his affaires. Theſe are the moſt generall conſiderations, which they may haue in treaties.

CHAP. 51.

Of treaties of Peace and Truce.

Treaties of Peace.

THe treaties which they make with Neighbours, are either with enemies, or with friends; or with perſons which deſire to continue Neuters with vs, or we with them. The treaties which are made with our enemies, are eyther for a time or perpetuall. Perpetuall, as the peace which is made to compoſe all differences, and the Warre that is vndertaken for conqueſt or for repairation of iniuries, or to reſtore the Commerce and Hoſpitality.

Of Truce.

Treaties which are made for a time with our enemies, are called truces, the which are eyther generall for all the Eſtates

Eſtates of the one or the other Prince, for all perſons, and for all ſorts of Commerce : Or elſe they are particular, for certaine places, for certaine perſons, and for the Commerce ; and ſometimes they doe not extend it but of a ſuſpencion of Armes. And when any one is bound by alliance, not to make peace or truce without the conſent of his Ally, and that they doubt of his conſent ; they adde in the treaty, that it ſhall take place for all thoſe which the contracters ſhall name, and they ſet downe no prefixed time, but that it ſhall continue vntill he ſhall refuſe, and ſome Moneths after : As that which was made betwixt King *Charles* the eight, and the King of *Spaine*, and that betwixt Pope *Clement* the ſeauenth, and *Don Hugo de Moncada*, Embaſſadour to the Emperour.

Sometimes a generall truce holds the place of a peace, as that of a hundred yeares, betwixt the *Acarnanes*, and the *Ambracoltes*; and that betwixt *Caſtille* and *Portugall*: And theſe are commonly made betwixt Princes that are equall in power, and will not quit any thing of their rights by a peace ; and yet deſire to liue quietly in the Eſtate wherein they are, ſatisfying by this meanes the point of honour.

That treaties of truce are leſſe Subiect to rupture then thoſe of a peace.

Such treaties are many times leſſe Subiect to rupture, then a peace which is made perpetuall, for that he which finds himſelfe greiued with a treaty that is perpetuall, ſeemes to haue ſome reaſon to leaue it, ſeeing the greiuance cannot be otherwiſe repaired. But if the time bee limited, he hath no cauſe to complaine, for that he may (the time being expired,) perſue that which he thinkes ought to be granted him : And if they haue a will to continue the truce, there is nothing ſo eaſie as to renew it. And admit they were well aſſured of the friendſhip, yet time cauſing friendſhip to grow cold, they haue alſo need to be renewed by new treaties. Seeing that treaties being grounded vpon the intereſt of Princes, which change with the time, it is needfull to change them at the end of the time, or to breake

breake them off wholy, and it would bee a meanes to auoyd the treacheries and periuries, which are committed vsually in the ruptures of treaties.

Diuers intentions for the which they make a truce.

A truce is likewise made to aduance a peace and to treate it. It is in like manner sometimes for the more honest discharge of a league which they haue made with some other Prince, whom they haue accustomed to comprehend therein: so as a peace following it, or the truce being not accepted by him, they take occasion to leaue the league, it being not his fault that leaues it, that the warre was not ended. And although it seemes that a truce cannot by its condition preiudice the pretentions in the principall, yet it is most certaine, that if he which is chased out of a contentious Estate, consents that during the truce, the commerce shall be forbidden to his subiects, hee doth wholy stop that gate; as *Lewis* the twelfth did in the truce which he made with *Gonsalue* after the conquest of the Realme of *Naples*.

Chap. 52.

Of treaties of Alliance.

The treaties which are made with our neighbours as friends, are treaties of Alliance, equall or vnequall: the equall is eyther of simple freindship only, for the entertainement of traffique, or for ayde and succour, that of succours is for the defensiue or offensiue, and sometimes for both together with or against all men, or against certaine Princes and Estates, and their Alliances are contracted, either from Estate to Estate, and for the preseruation of the Estates one of another; in which case by the death of the Prince they may not be interrupted: or else they are contracted betwixt

Prince

Prince and Prince; and then, after the death of one of the Princes, they muſt enter into a new treaty to continue it, if there be not a certaine time preſcribed by the treatie, to the which the alliance muſt continue after the death of the Prince, or elſe they are made from an Eſtate and Prince to an Eſtate, and from an Eſtate to a Prince; where after the death of the Prince, it is neceſſary, if not of a new treaty, at the leaſt of ſome confirmation of the precedents: Sometimes Alliances are contracted for an Enterprize, and for one effect only, in the which the Allies are intereſſed, and it may bee called by the name of a league.

Of defenſiue leagues.

Theſe leagues are commonly defenſiue, but in effect they tend to attempt againſt ſome one; and there are ſecret Articles for it, as in that of *Cambray* againſt the *Venetians*, in the which they borrowed the pretext of Religion and the peace of Chriſtendome. In the league which was made before againſt *Charles* the Eight, betwixt the Pope, the King of *Romans*, the King of *Spaine*, the *Venetians* and the Duke of *Millan*, they borrowed the pretext for the defence of one anothers Eſtate, reſeruing a place for ſuch as would enter, and in the ſecret Articles it was agreed, that the *Spaniards* which were in *Sicily*, ſhould helpe *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* to recouer *Naples*; the *Venetians* by Sea ſhould inuade the Maritine places; the Duke of *Millan* ſhould hinder the ſuccours that came from *France*, and poſſeſſe himſelfe of *Aſti*, where the Duke of *Orleans* was; and that the Kings of *Romans* and *Spaine*, ſhould either of them in their parts inuade *France*, when as *Lewis* the twelfth and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* vnited themſelues for the conqueſt of *Naples*, they likewiſe tooke a pretext that they would afterwards make warre againſt the *Turkes*.

Diuers conſiderations for the treating or making of a league.

But beſides the pretext, there are many things to bee conſidered in the treaty of a league that is to ſay, the

cause why they ioyne in league, be it for offence or defence: The particular interest of euery one of the Leaguers, and his intention which seekes to vnite himselfe: With what Princes or Estates they make it their courage, constancy, faith, and meanes; the commodities of their Estates to assist the League: and how they shall hinder those which present themselues to enter, which are not fit for our Designe: against whom it is made. If hee be a powerfull Prince of himselfe, assisted by Friends, hauing facility to inuade the confederates, eyther by himselfe, or by the meanes of his Friends, and his courage, when they are to make the League, and how they may excuse it, and whether the time of the League be precisely limited to a certaine number of yeares, or whilst the Enterprize shall last. The contribution of Allies how it should be ordered, as well in the leuy of Souldiers, as in munitions of Warre and Victuals, who must first ratifie the treaty among the confederates, if there be many heads, or one alone, for the execution and ordinary causes of the Common-weale of the League.

Ordinary causes of Leagues.

The ordinary causes for the which they make a league, are eyther to facilitate a conquest; as that which was made betwixt *Lewis* the twelfth, and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* for the Realme of *Naples*: Or to ballance the forces of one that is more mighty, in hindring him that he grow not greater, or diminishing his power. The *Athenians* vndertooke to succour the *Ægyptians*, not onely to diminish the power of the *Persian*, as *Diodorus* writes, but to encrease their owne by the alliance of the *Ægyptians*.

A defensiue League which hath no other benefit but a necessary defence, and in the which meane Estates are in a manner equally interessed, last vsually longer then an offensiue League, which is voluntary, and from the which eyther of the Confederates will easily part when hee hath no more interest. So as in ballancing the interest of the

one

one and the other, he that shall finde himselfe accompanied with distrust, and an opinion to bee irreconciliable to the common Enemy, would proue the most firme in the League.

But with all this we must consider the wisdome, courage, and meanes of him with home we ioyne in League. And as we may not choose him so powerfull, as hauing preuayled ouer our common Enemy, he may make no subiect vnto him: So we must not choose one that is light and inconstant, and of small meanes. They write that inconstancy, irresolution, and the timerousnesse of Pope *Clement* the Seuenth, ruined all the affaires of his Colleagues. The *Venetians* would not ioyne in League with Pope *Alexander* the sixt, hauing had ill successe, being ioyned in League with *Sixtus* and *Innocent*, for that Popes comming to dye, they leaue Successors which haue other intentions and designes. Other considerations for the treatie of a league.

But the commodity or discommodity of Estates neare or farre off, is very considerable, as well in regard of those which vnite themselues, as of those against whom they make the League. And vpon this consideration all the Leagues which they haue propounded in Christendome against the *Turke*, haue gone to smoake: The danger of the *Turke* being held by Christian Princes vncertayne and farre off, and regarding more the Estates of some, then of others: Being vnable but with much time and labour to possesse their minds with this necessary ardor to attempt against him.

By the like reason a League with the *Turke* is of small profit to a Christian Prince, who hath his Estate remote from him, vnlesse it be for the trade of the Subiect; as well for the great distance, as for that the manner of liuing of the one differs so much from that of the other, as there can grow no confidence betwixt them.

But if some one seekes vnto vs to bee receiued into

our league, whom wee hold not fit for our deſigne; they may propound ſuch hard conditions vnto him, as hee would loſe his deſire. In like ſort, if we be ſought vnto to enter, eyther wee excuſe our ſelues vpon the feare of ſome Enemy, againſt whom we muſt reſerue our forces; as the *Venetians* did for feare of the *Turke*, when as they were ſought vnto by *Charles* the Eight, or elſe wee will demand conditions of ſuch aduantage for our ſelues, as hee which ſeekes vnto vs may not yeeld vnto.

Of the time when wee are to make a *League.*

To ſay when we are to make a League, it cannot be preciſely done, this depending vpon the condition of affaires: But we may well ſay, that ſome haue held that we muſt not make a League, but after that the greateſt Prince had impoſed hard conditions vpon thoſe with whom they made accompt to ioyne in League, and had by this meanes prepared to vnite themſelues for their diſcharge. This was a Conſideration which Pope *Clement* the Seuenth had, to deferre the concluſion of the League which was treated againſt the Gouernour of *France*, and the Princes of *Italy*, during the Impriſonment of King *Francis* the firſt; thinking (as it happened) that the Emperour (ſeeing the vncertainty of this League) was likely to impoſe harder conditions vpon the King; the which the King would neuer obſerue, and ſo he ſhould be forced to continue in the League of *Italy*, to free himſelfe: Whereas if the League had beene made before his Inlargement, it would haue made the Kings Conditions more milde, and more eaſie for the Emperour, in freeing the King to draw him from the other Confederates. Behold how euery man doth husband the neceſſity of his Neighbour, the which being wiſely examined, may ſerue to iudge of the time when a League is to be made.

Of the time of the cõtinuance of a league.

For the time of its continuance, the League betwixt the *Florentins* and *Luquois*, againſt the *Piſans* was limited

ted by the treaty at three yeares. And the first Leagues which were treated among the *Suizes*, were also limited to a certayne time. Others haue no other limitation but the end of the Enterprize for the which it was made. But the question is, if the Enemy taking the Countrey, for the defence whereof the League was made, whether the Confederates be bound by the League, to assist him who hath lost it in the recouery. Some haue held that the defensiue did not extend so farre. Notwithstanding if there were no treaty which had concerned this conquest, yet it would seeme more reasonable to comprehend the recouery in the defensiue, if it be generall. For as it hath for its end to preserue the Allie in his Estate, and that to attaine vnto it, the forces must not onely remaine in the Countrey of the Allie, to attend the Enemy, but after denuntiation of the War, and other acts of hostility done by the Enemy, they must enter into his Country, to the end to preuent him or to diuert him, from attempting any thing against the Ally; the offensiue being iudged by the agression, and not by that which followes: By a stronger reason they ought to enter into the Country conquered from the Ally for the recouery thereof. So most commonly these excuses are not pretended, but by such as eyther fayle in their faith, courage, or meanes to make the recouery.

That the Collaagues are bound to the recouery of the Countrey of their Allie conquered by the Enemy.

Contribution is one of the points of a League most difficult to regulate. It is made eyther in men or money. The men are entertayned by all; or by him onely that hath need. The defensiue League betwixt the Kings of *France* and *England* against the Emperour, contayned a reciprocall Succours of ten thousand men, if the Warre were made by Land; and of sixe thousand if it were made by Sea: And in all other occasions the French King was bound to assist the King of *England* with twelue thousand Launces, and

Of the contribution of a league.

the King of *England* him of *France* with ten thouſand Foot, at his charge that had the need.

In the League which was made betwixt the Emperour *Charles* the fift, Pope *Clement* the ſeauenth with the other Princes of *Italy* (except the *Venetians*) for the defence of *Italy* againſt the French King, the Emperour was to contribute monethly thirty thouſand Duckets; the Pope with the Florentins twenty thouſand; the Duke of *Millan* fifty thouſand; *Ferrara* ten thouſand; *Genoua* ſixe thouſand; *Sienna* two thouſand; and *Luques* a thouſand; And it was concluded, that beſides this, there ſhould be a ſtocke of the like ſumme, which might not be imployed vntill they ſaw the preparatiues made to inuade *Italy*. In the League of the Citties of *Greece* againſt the *Perſians*, the cõtribution whereof *Ariſtides* made the taxe, mounted to eight hundred thouſand Tallents. In the league which ſome Citties of *Greece* made with the *Lacedemonians* againſt *Athenians*, the contribution came yearely to a thouſand Tallents: And the order for the leuy of ſouldiers was, that two lightly Armed ſhould paſſe for a Man Armed at all peeces; and foure Men Armed at all peeces for a Horſe-man.

Of the place or cuſtody for the contributions of money.

The contribution concluded in money, there are difficulties ſometimes found, for the place of keeping it. The Citties of *Greece* thought that the cuſtody of their contributions was ſafe in the Temple of *Dele*. But the conſideration of Religion could not preuent it, but that vnder the pretext that *Dele* was not ſtrong enough, the *Athenians* found meanes to carry it away, and to imploy it to the particular vſe of the Citty. That which may be ſpoken hereuppon, is not to deliuer the money into the hands of the ſtrongeſt, for feare they ſhall not be able to call him to accompt, nor to lay it in ſo weake a place, as it may bee expoſed to the force and violence of the ſtrongeſt, or to him that ſhall firſt take Armes.

The contribution being ſetled by the confederates they muſt

must name a head of the League, if they will not assaile the enemy but of one side: If of diuers, they must name many. And herein they doe many times find themselues troubled for that the most powerfull of the confederates, desires commonly to haue it referred to him, or to some one of his, who gouerns the conduct of the Warre, according to his Maisters affaires, and not those of the other Allies. The other head of the League of the Princes of *Italy*, with King *Francis* the first, would not assaile *Millan* after the taking of *Pauia*, for feare that *Millan* being taken with the Duke, and the *Venetians*, assured from the Imperialists, they should retire from the League, or contribute more negligently: And therefore he tooke a pretext to goe and free the Pope who was a Prisoner. *Antonio De Leua*, in the League which was made by all the Princes of *Italy*, except the *Venetians*, with *Charles* the fift against the French, was made generall, with charge to stay in the Dutchy of *Millan*, which depended of the Emperour.

Which of the confederates ought to verifie and declare himselfe first.

A League concluded by the Deputies of the confederates, there sometimes falls out a difficulty, who shall ratifie and declare himselfe first. In the League which was made betwixt King *Francis* the first, the Pope, and the Princes of *Italy*, the King refused to ratifie, vntill the Pope and the *Venetians* had ratified before him; and wrought so that he droue the Colleagues to declare themselues, and to begin the Warre, whilest that hee treated secretly for himselfe, to the end he might make his conditions with more aduantage: And for feare lest his Colleagues on their side should shew him the like prancke, he preuented them.

That an offensiue league, and for an Enterprize succeeds seldome according to the hope of the Allies.

That kind of League which is made for an enterprize, succeeds seldome, according to the hope of the Allies, if the enterprize be long. For besides that the preparations be long, the opinions diuers in the pursuit, the resolutions inconstant, the interests of Princes or Estates in League, may

may change with time, or by the practiſes of him, againſt whó they are in League, in withdrawing ſome one of thē, or making him to ſuffer more loſſe then the reſt. For ſeeing himſelfe ill defended by his confederates, as hee did hope, and that he was in more danger to looſe then his companions, he ſtudies to retire himſelfe, and to make his accord apart: As the *Venetians* did with the Turke after the loſſe of *Cypres*.

Of the cauſes of the rupture of Leagues.

The moſt ordinary cauſes of the rupture of Leagues, are diſtruſt, and iealouſie; as if one of the confederates had had conference with the enemy without the conſent of the reſt; If that which ſerueth for the ſafety of one diminiſheth the ſafety of another; If they find inconſtancy, variety, or cowardize, in any one of the confederates; If one of the confederates increaſeth, and makes ſome vſurpation, without the conſent of the reſt; if he treates with the enemy, not comprehending the other Allies, but as adherents. King *Lewis* the twelfth left the League of the *Venetians*, for that they had made a truce with him, and had preſumed to name him onely as their adherent. Sometimes to breake a League, they inuent ſome occaſion, which puts the Leaguers in diuiſion one againſt another. In which caſe as long as he hath hope that this diuiſion may make them diſ-vnite themſelues, he muſt haue a care not to aſſaile them.

Of Leagues betwixt meane Eſtates, and of the defects which are often found.

I haue ſayd that Leagues which are made betwixt meane Eſtates for their neceſſary defences, are vſually moſt durable. Yet they are not without great defects. For they haue not any authority among them, be it Councell or otherwiſe, which may command them all, and reconcile them in caſe of diuerſity of opinions, or a diuiſion; For that holding thēſelues all to be Soueraignes, they will Eſtabliſh nothing aboue them: And to fall by degrees to an accord, in all their differences which may happen, it is a difficult thing yea impoſſible. On the otherſide leauing their differences to grow old, they may bee of

ſuch

ſuch a condition as they draw after them an irreconcilliable hatred,

Another defect is, that to the greateſt part of their Aſſemblies and Dyettes, they ſend men new in affaires, fearing to giue authority to any one among them aboue the reſt. So as moſt part of thoſe which come to theſe aſſemblies, hauing little or no knowledge of affaires, their opinions are to make report to their Superiours, and not to reſolue any thing; this power being ſeldome giuen them. Hence grow many delayes, which in certaine encounters may bee very preiudiciall to the Eſtate. There is another ordinary defect among them, that they ſeldome agree vpon the ſomme of the contributions neceſſary for their defence, nor of the keeping of the common Treaſure: ſo as when there happens any need, they find themſelues troubled to prouide in time.

Of Succours one againſt another among confederates.

But behold how Princes allied, doe ſometimes finde themſelues troubled to gouerne themſelues; which is when as three Princes allied, the one makes Warre againſt another, and demands ſuccours from the third: In this caſe if the treaties of alliance bee only for friendſhip, it is certaine he is not bound to giue any ſuccours. But if the treaties carrie an offenſiue League, hee muſt ſuccour the moſt ancient, allied by a precedent alliance. If the precedent alliances haue beene made both at one time, hee muſt ſuccour him that is allied in an offenſiue and defenſiue League. But if the League be offenſiue and defenſiue of eyther ſide, he may not ſuccour any of them: but he may mediate a peace, and cauſe the difference to be iudged by the common Allies, as it is vſually obſerued: And let him know that will not enter into arbitrament, or being entred will not yeild to iudgment, that hee will ſuccour the other. Notwithſtanding moſt commonly in ſuch occaſions, they ballance their Eſtate: And looking more to ſafety then to iuſtice, they ſuccour him who being ſuccoured may weaken the powerfull, who is more to be feared.

They

Of the defence of one that is not allied againſt an Ally.

They may aide particular Allies, and common Allies, if they be wronged by one of the Allies. But he which is not comprehended in the treaty of alliance, cannot be defended againſt him that is allied without breach of the alliance: That which they may doe for to ſuppreſſe it, is to write vnto the Ally: and to entreate him to vſe him courteouſly: which is the offer which the *Romans* made vnto the *Capuans*, who complained and demanded Succours againſt the oppreſſion of the *Samnites*, allied to the *Romans*. But if the oppreſſed yeeld himſelfe a Subiect, as the *Capuans* did; then the Prince being obliged to the defence of his Subiects againſt all men, he then may and ought to ſuccour them againſt his Allies.

Of the vnequall alliace betwixt Princes and Eſtates: that is to ſay of protection.

An vnequall alliance is that, which is contracted betwixt Princes or Eſtates, vnequall in honour or in power, and with vnequall conditions; the one acknowledging the other not for Maſter or Lord, but by honour, as the more powerfull and the better qualified; And ſome for Protector: And theſe treaties are made with thoſe Eſtates which take or giue penſion, or which put themſelues into protection.

Difference betwixt penſion and tribute.

Wee haue formerly ſayd, that a penſion differs from tribute. For tribute is payd by the Subiect, or by him who to enioy his liberty, payes that which is agreed vpon to him that hath forced him to doe it. A penſion is held voluntary, from him that is in our protection, or from him that is in all other things equall to the treaty of alliance, to hinder the penſioner that he ioyne not with the Enemy, or to haue aide and ſuccours from him.

Of protection.

The true protection is that, whereas one takes vpon him the defence of another freely without reward. Yet ſome haue ballanced honour with profit; and haue receiued a penſion from thoſe whom they haue taken into their protection: And theſe men haue thought that by a pecuniary intereſt, they did bind the protectors more to ſuccour them, then if he were onely bound by Oath.

By

By the Law of protection, hee that is protected, owes all reſpect and honour to his protector: Againſt whom if he attempt, or ſtayes from his Duty, it is lawfull for the protector to aſſure himſelfe, yea, to make himſelfe Maiſter. They of *Genoua* hauing ſubmitted themſelues vnder the protection of the French King, vpon certayne conditions; and being afterwards reuoked, the King changed the conditions into priuiledges, to the end it might be in his wil to depriue them when he ſhould think good. But if the Protector for the good of his Eſtate, finds it conuenient to leaue the protection of him, ouer whom another Eſtate hath ſome pretentions; he may conſent that the difference may be referred to Iuſtice, and to Iudges to determine it: As *Lewis* the twelfth would doe in the difference which the Pope had with the Duke of *Ferrara*, whom he had taken into his protection, and whereof by this meanes he ſought to free himſelfe. In like manner the protector ought to defend and ſuccour the protected, and vſe him well: Otherwiſe if he intreate him ill, hee may withdraw himſelfe from protection, and ſeeke another protector.

Of the mutuall duty of the protector and hee that is protected.

CHAP. 53.

Of the differences which happen betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the deciſion thereof.

AND for that the Alliances not onely of protection, but alſo thoſe which are equall, made it with more powerfull Eſtates, draw after them the ſubiection of the weaker; And that there may betwixt Equals (be it vpon this Subiect or ſome other) happen many differences, which may breed occaſion of breach: they

they muſt in treating prouide for the ſafety and the deciſion of differences. Some haue aſſured themſelues of the mutuall faith ſimply, the which at this day is but weake in many. Others haue demanded hoſtages: the which ought to be of ſuch conſideration, as the Prince or Eſtate which giues them, may not bee long depriued of them, without preiudice by their abſence. King *Francis* the firſt, being freed from Priſon, and after many inhumanities ſhewed him by *Charles* the fift, who let him goe not through courteſie, but for feare of the League of *Italy*; yeilded to giue his children in hoſtage, hoping hee might recouer them, either by accord, or by ſome other meanes, the delay of the recouery being the leſſe troubleſome vnto him, for that they were in their courage: And ſo being at his choyce either to giue his children, or twelue of of his principall Men of his Realme, he deſired rather to giue his children, whom he might ſpare, then the others, which were more neceſſary for his ſeruice and enterprizes.

Of Hoſtages. Sometimes they demand hoſtages of eyther part, when as eyther of them that treates, promiſeth to put ſomething in execution, which they doubt they would not doe without hoſtages: And this ought to be done according to the diſtruſt they may haue one of another. But if the queſtion be, that the one executes before the other, it is for him that is to execute laſt to giue hoſtages. There was a memorable diſpute betwixt the Embaſſadours of the Emperour *Charles* the fift, and thoſe of King *Francis* the firſt, after his diſcharge from Priſon, whether that the French King ſhould retire his Army out of *Italy*, before that the Emperour had deliuered him his children. They promiſed on the Kings behalfe to put hoſtages into the hands of the King of *England*, for the penalty which ſhould be impoſed for want of retiring his Army, after he had receiued his children: And the Emperour made the like offers, to reſtore his children, when the Army ſhould be

be retired ; and to giue Hoſtages for the ſure payment of the penalty, which ſhould be degreed for want of ſatisfying ; Saying that there was no colour hee ſhould truſt the King, who had once deceiued him. Whereunto the French Embaſſadours replyed, that the more he pretended to haue beene deceiued, the leſſe the King ought to truſt him, for that this opinion might induce him to faile the King : And beſides the offers were not alike ; for that it imported the King more to haue his Children, then for the Emperour to ſee the retreate of the Kings Army out of *Italy* ; and therefore the aſſurance were not alike.

It hath happened that without any precedent treaty, then the demand of a paſſage, they haue willingly giuen hoſtages to a Prince, which deſired to paſſe through the Eſtate of another Prince, which was an enemy or ſuſpected vnto him. The Arch-Duke *Phillip*, to paſſe from *Spaine* into *Flaunders*, the King ſent him many of the greateſt Men of his Kingdome, for hoſtages and aſſurance of his paſſage through *France*, the which the Arch-Duke cauſed to be ſent backe againe, as ſoone as he entred into the Realme. Many haue demanded ſtrong places, to aſſure the victors : And others for the ſafety of a paſſage, for a conqueſt which they meant to make. As *Charles* the Eight did going to *Naples*, to many Princes and Potentates of *Italy*. Others haue ratified the treaties by marriage.

Hoſtages for the aſſurance of a Princes paſſage, through ano thers Eſtate.

But the greateſt ſecurity, that the condition incerted in the treaty may be pleaſing to both parties, and fitting for the Subiects of the affaires which preſents it ſelfe, ballancing the intereſt of the one with the intereſt of the other.

The aſſurance of a treaty.

And to preuent that the alliance or protection change not into Subiection, we muſt be very carefull not to receiue a Garriſon, from the allie or protector ſtronger then our owne ; and much leſſe to make him Maiſter of our Forts,

It is dangerous for an ally to receiue a ſtrong Garriſon from his protector, or make him Maſter of his Forts, &c.

Forts, or to make him Guardion and depoſitary of the Treaſure of all the alliance ; as the *Grecians* did the *Athenians*, who conſented, the money which ſhould be euery yeare leuied of the Generall, ſhould be put in *Appollos* Temple, and afterwards carried to *Athens*, there to be kept: So as the *Athenians*, being ſeazed of their Allies purſe, they made themſelues protectors, and of protectors Maiſters; And ſo they not onely became Maiſters of the Treaſure, but they cauſed the appellations of all the other Citties to come before them, at whoſe charge they trayned vp their Cittizens and made them Souldiers.

Eſtabliſhment of Iudges, for the deciding of differences betwixt allies.

As for the diciſion of differences, the ordinary courſe is to conſtitute by the treate a certaine number of Iudges, with power of eyther ſide, in caſe they ſhould be diuided in opinions, to name an Vmpire, to decide differences, and to cauſe the contrauentions which they ſhould pretend to be made of eyther ſide to ceaſe ; Or elſe to agree vpon ſome great perſon, to whom they might referre themſelues. A thing which I confeſſe is very difficult, but yet if it might be done would bee more conuenient. For his authority would mediate an accord more eaſily betwixt them, who being equalls, cannot directly refuſe Warre nor demand peace.

Of compromiſe betwixt Allies, vpon differences which may grow betwixt them.

They haue likewiſe vſually had recourſe vnto compromiſe, when as Iudges are not appointed by the treaties, or when as they are ſuſpect to one of the parties. For although the compromiſe doth ſeldome ſucceed, and comes to be effected, yet it workes this effect, to cauſe all force to ceaſe, and holds the difference in ſuſpence for a time, and moſt commonly the intention of the party is no other, who ſometimes before the compromiſe drawes a ſecret promiſe from the Arbitrator, not to pronounce ſentence without their conſent: as in the compromiſe which was made betwixt the Emperour *Maximillian*, and the *Venetians*, in the Popes perſon

perſon, who was not limited neither for time nor power, by the publque Act which was drawne; the like ſecret promiſe hauing beene formerly made by the Pope to eyther party. Yet in the end the Pope, ſeeing they could not agree, and that this delay was imputed to him, he gaue ſentence, notwithſtanding his promiſe: Yet with this prouiſo, that if the parties did not ratifie that which hee had decreed by his ſentence ſhould be of no effect.

In this compromiſe made in the perſon of the Emperour *Charles* the fift, for the difference which was betwixt the Pope and the Duke of *Ferrara*, as well for the right as for the fact, the Emperour promiſed the Pope, not to pronounce vnleſſe he were preſt by him; and to the Duke of *Ferrara*, that finding that he had right to *Modena* and *Reggium*, hee would giue ſentence; and that finding otherwiſe, hee would ſuffer the time of the compromiſe to expire. And for aſſurance it was agreed, that the Duke ſhould deliuer *Modena* into the Emperours hands, as ſequeſtred. Afterwards Iudgment to the benefit of the Duke, whereof the Pope complayned much, for that the Emperour had not proceeded according to his ſecret promiſe: But the Emperour excuſed himſelfe vpon the purſuit which his *Nuntio* had made vnto him to pronounce.

Of a compromiſe vpon the poſſeſſory.

They ſeldome compromit vpon the poſſeſſory: For hee that is ſpoyled ought before all things to be reſtored. This was the anſwere which the *Florentins* made to the Emperour *Maximillian*, whom he inuited to compromit to his perſon the difference they had with the *Pyſans*, neyther relying vpon his will, nor vppon his authority. Yet they may compromit vppon the poſſeſſory, with charge to pronounce, without adding vnto it the petitory; this being cheifly ruled by the cõfidence which they conceiue in the arbitrator, choſen by the compromiſe, who in a difference of State, is not alwayes found ſuch, as they may wholy rely vpon him.

And

When and how a Prince ſhould deale to reconcile a difference betwixt his Neighbours.

And as peace is generally to be deſired, yet if there be betwixt Neighbours ſome Subiect which trouble their intelligence, as it would bee a pollicie to ſhew himſelfe diſpleaſing; ſo it were wiſedome not to grow paſſionate to reconcile them. They obſerue a notable indiſcretion in the Cardinall of *Amboiſe*, and very preiudiciall of *France*, to haue mediated an accord betwixt *Maximillian* and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, touching the gouernment of *Caſtille*, this accord hauing beene the cauſe that afterwards they ioyned together againſt *Lewis* the twelfth: And nothing but the vanity and ambition which this Cardinall had to attaine vnto the Popedome (in making theſe two Princes fauourable vnto him) made him to enter into this mediation.

The cauſe wherein we muſt labour effectually to reconcile our Neighbours, is, when wee haue need to be ſuccoured by them. So *Lewis* the eleuenth treated a peace betwixt *Sigiſmond* of *Auſtria*, and the *Suiſſes*, to vſe their ſeruice againſt the Duke of *Burgundy*: And *Lewis Sforſe* dealt in the accord betwixt *Maximillian* and the ſame *Suiſſes*, to bee ſuccoured by them. But let vs returne to treaties.

CHAP.

Chap. 54.

Of the breach of Treaties: and of the constancy and assurance of the word of a Prince, in the Treaties.

TO the end we enter not into the rupture for a small businesse, they practise in those which great Men make among them, to draw in all the rest that be lesse to be therein comprehended, as well for the assurance of their Estates, as to entertaine the greatest in an equall ballance, least that the one should rise and oppresse the other. But to make vse in such treaties, the oppression must be speciall and particular: otherwise they may haue iust cause to be e ignorant, that vnder this name of Allies, they which are not named are comprehended: Meanes to assure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture.

And although that the breach of faith bee too much practised in such affaires, yet there are few Princes found, which haue not sought some pretext before they breake: Some haue pretended to be circumuented by error. Others haue excused themselues by the charge of the Estate of affaires, great wrorgs, or ineuitable losse, and apparant danger of the ruine of their Estates. Which are the causes, wherein some say that an oath is not obligatory; the condition by reason of the oath being impossible or vniust. To these limitations they adde, that they must not keepe their faith with an Enemy of the faith, nor with him that hath broken his, nor with a Subiect, nor with a Theise. But if it be not lawfull to keepe a mans faith in all these cases, it is not likewise lawfull to giue it. If it be lawfull to capitulate with such men, it is necessary to hold that Pretext of rupture. Of the obligation a Prince hath to hold his word.

we promise. The which I vnderstand, when the word is giuen by him that may giue it; and that they relye vpon it. For if they take hostages, he that giues them, is freed from his Faith; for that in receiuing hostages, he that receiues them, hath relinquished the assurance which he had in the faith of him that giues them: And if the promise be made by a Captaine for his Prince without speciall Warrant, this word giuen bindes not the Prince.

That force nor feare cannot dispence a Prince of his word or promise.

Some Lawyers would iudge of Treaties, as of particular Contracts, and more inlarge the conscience of Princes. For as a priuate man is not bound to that which he hath promised by force or feare, they haue thought (but foolishly and maliciously) that this Maxime should take place in Treaties, which are made betwixt Soueraignes: which is in effect to banish faith from all such publique Negotiations. For there is no Treaty but is vsually made in Armes, by force, or through feare to lose eyther life, or goods, or liberty, or the Estate; which are causes of iust feare, and may shake the most constant.

Other pretexts of ruptures.

Some Princes desirous to shew themselues more religious in these ruptures, haue taken subiect vpon the ambiguity of some clauses in the Treaty, or vpon equiuocation, as *Charles* the fift did vpon these words, *Eunig* and *Enig*, to retaine the Landgraue the *Hesse*: Or they seeke some other occasions, attempting against those whom their Allie is bound to defend: To the end that drawing him to Field, hee may lay the Enuy of the rupture vpon him.

That the constancy and assurance of a Prince in his word is of great aduantage.

But the most beneficiall course for a Prince or State is, to make himselfe to be knowne constant and firme in his word. For although such an occasion may happen, as he might get aduantage by the breach of his faith: yet the opinion which they may conceiue of him by this action (which he must not trust vnto) will make him lose many aduantages,

adu antages, which a loyall Prince may haue, finding himſelfe diſcharged of many ſecurities, which they demand vſually and iuſtly from one of whoſe faith they doubt.

CHAP. 55.

Of Treaties of Neutrality.

LEt vs come to Treaties of Neutrality, the which ſeemes naturall to Princes, who neither loue nor hate any thing abſolutely; but gouerne themſelues in their Friendſhips according to their intereſts. And in effect Reaſon of State is no other thing but Reaſon of intereſt.

Two ſorts of Neutrality.

Neutrality may be of two ſorts. The one with Alliance of eyther part: The other without Alliance, and without any tye to the one or the other; which is that, that may properly be called Neutrality. The firſt Rules ſubſcribed by the conditions of the Treaty. The ſecond hath no Rule, but the diſcretion of the neuter Prince, who muſt carry himſelfe in ſuch ſort, as he may not make ſhew that he inclines more to one ſide then to another. And for that the Affaires of Princes are not alwayes in one Eſtate, the Difficulty is to know when the Prince ſhould leaue this Neutrality, and when hee ſhould maintayne it.

The aduantages of Neutrality are, that he which is Neuter, is honoured and reſpected of both parties, for the feare that eyther of them hath, ſhould declare himſelfe againſt him: He remaines Arbitrator of others and Maſter of himſelfe: He enioyes the preſent, and according vnto occaſions preuents the future. A Neuter is without any profeſt Enemy, and offends or wrongs no man openly; ſo as giuing no aduantage ouer him,

The aduantages of a Neutrality.

they are troubled to finde a pretext to doe him harme.

Disaduantages of Neutrality.

The disaduantages are, that a Neuter satisfies neither the one nor the other; and so remaines: He doth neyther purchase Friends, nor free himselfe from any Enemies; and in the end is made a prey to the Victor. And many haue held it more aduantage to hazard himselfe to vanquish with a companion, then to remaine in an Estate, where hee is assured to bee ruined by the one or the other.

That a powerfull Prince shouldn't leaue a Neutrality without cause.

To resolue this point, a powerfull Prince hath no neede of Councell. For in what fashion soeuer he remains, he may maintayne himselfe, and prescribe a Law to others. Yet I hold that without great occasion he should not declare himselfe. For that whilest others ruine themselues by Warre, he fortifies himselfe with meanes; he may in the end make himselfe Iudge of their differences, and compounding them mildely with honour, hee preserues their Friendship, and maintaynes their Estate.

That a Neutrality is more beneficiall to a weake a Prince then to imbrace a party.

But in a weake Prince, what part soeuer hee takes, it will be hurtfull vnto him; especially if he be in the middest of two more powerfull Estates then himselfe. Yet I will say, that speaking generally, a Neutrality is more beneficiall to a weake Prince; so as they which make Warre one against another, bee not altogether barbarous and inhumane. For although a Neutrality doth not please eyther party; yet in effect it wrongs no man; and as he which is a Neuter, doth not serue, so he doth not hurt. And then the euent of the declaration which he should make, rather for the one then the other, depending vpon the vncertaine issue of the Warre, he should haue no cause to say, that this part is more safe then a Neutrality. And to change his resolution without an assurance to better his affaires, were not to carry himselfe wisely.

But

But if the Neuter be preſt by neceſſity to declare himſelfe, he muſt doe it for the moſt powerfull of the two parties, following the Councell of that *Romane*; that eyther he muſt make himſelfe the ſtrongeſt, or bee a friend to the ſtrongeſt: Vnleſſe hee ſaw that ioyning to the weaker, hee might ballance the power of the ſtronger, and by this counterpeze reduce them to reaſon. The ſafety of Eſtates conſiſting cheifly in an equall counterpeze of power in the one and the other, and the greatneſſe of a Prince drawing after it the ruine of his Neighbours; it is wiſedome to preuent. Conſiderations to leaue a Neutrallity.

But power is conſidered in this ſubiect diuerſly: Eyther abſolute or conditionall; Abſolute power is that which wee meaſure by the concurrence of the greatneſſe of Forces, Treaſure: Munitions, and other Millitary preparations. A conditionall power is that, the which although it be leſſe then an abſolut, yet it is more fit to ſuccour vs, or to doe vs harme. In this the Neighbourhood is of very great conſideration; for that a Neighbour Prince of meane forces, may more eaſily or ſooner hurt or ſuccour vs, then a great Prince which lies farre off. Neere ſuccours are alwayes ſooner ready and with leſſe charge: For wee may diſcharge a part when as time and occaſions ſhall ſerue: If he be remote, he arriues too late after the occaſions to defend vs, and too ſoone to oppreſſe vs. The greateſt part periſh by the way; and when he is arriued he hath more need of reſt then to battaile; and being vnable to ſend them backe ſo farre, we muſt ſtill beare the charge and oppreſſion.

Hieron King of *Syracuza*, could well obſerue theſe conſiderations, the *Carthaginians* being Maiſters of a part of *Sicily*, he allied himſelfe with them againſt the *Romans*: But the *Romans* being growne the ſtronger in the Countrey, he fell to their ſide, and continued the Warre with them againſt the *Carthaginians*, who were then

more remote from the Iland then the *Romans*. After we haue made consideration of the force, wee must likewise consider of the courage and constancy of the Prince, with whom we are to ioyne. But if hee be light and hath no stay, how powerfull soeuer he be, it is dangerous to engage himselfe with him: But if with these aduantages hee knowes how to prosecute his designes with resolution, they may boldly ingage themselues with him.

CHAP. 56.

Considerations for a Prince that will liue in good intelligence with his Neighbours.

THe Prince that would liue in good termes with his Neighbours, must first consider what Treaty and Capitulation he hath with him, and gouerne himselfe accordingly, alwayes shewing himselfe a Louer of Peace and Concord; desirous to liue in Amity, and a great obseruer of Treaties; not enduring that any breach should be made, how small soeuer; and being done to cause it to be repaired.

How a Prince ought to carry himselfe in a demand made vnto him by one of his Neighbours of some difficulty.

If any difficult thing be required of him, he shall neyther grant it, nor refuse it, but in ballancing their businesse, he shall labour to haue his goodwill allowed for the effect: And if he which seekes hath sent an expresse Embassadour, they shall send him backe with Presents, and promise to dispatch other Embassadours to make answere, And to the end he may auoyde the discontentment, they shall ballance this delay with some benefit, if may be of more importance then that which they haue demanded: For that the Iniury doth not moue so much as the benefit is pleasing.

If

If the Prince treating with his Neighbours, hath need to demand or vse any thing from them, hee must haue a care to maintayne his Dignity, and therefore hee may not be too hasty: for that we shew our selues to be too resolute for something; and they seeing the instance which we make, will hold our necessity to be greater then it is: The which will make them more holding, and make them beleeue, that we shall be the more bound vnto them, if they grant it, although they reape the like benefit themselues. But if a more powerfull man requires something of vs, which being granted doth not much preiudice vs, and being denied, may draw a warre against vs, which he had prepared against another; We must not deny it. This was an Errour which the *Florentins* committed, seeking in the beginning to oppose the passage of *Charles* the Eight, hauing not therein followed the Counsell which had beene giuen to *Cosmo De Medicis*, not to oppose himselfe agaynst *Iohn* of *Anion*; notwithstanding that the Pope and Duke of *Millan* were in League with *Ferdinand* King of *Naples*, against whom *Iohn* of *Anion* made Warre.

To demãd somthing of his Neighbours.

We must not refuse that which is demanded, if it doth not much preiudice.

We must not lightly beleeue that which Princes say, and whereof they make shew; but consider, that their owne interest will make them forget it, and to some their faith, if they haue any collour to breake it. The Prince must likewise fauour the traffique and commerce with his Neighbours, for the good and profit which may redowne to the one and the other.

We must not be too credulous in that which Princes say.

He must consider of the meanes how he may with dexterity nourish the distrusts and iealousies which are, or may be betwixt them; But he must be warie hee bee not knowne to be the Authour. And contrariwise if they haue a conceit, he must be the first that must seeke to take it away; and in all that which may breed some iealousie of him, hee must preuent it in time: And he must excuse the fault which is discouered, and deny

Politiquely to nourish distrusts & iealosies betwixt them.

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that, whereof the Neighbours are not, nor cannot bee hereafter aſſured: Hee muſt ſeeke with all diligence to mollifie the moſt powerfull, by faire deportments and promiſes, and ſomtimes to pacifie the one, and ſomtimes the other, as well to make them the more negligent, as to labour in ſeeking them ſeuerally to caſt them into ſome diſtruſt one of another.

To teſtifie his good will vnto them.

The Prince ſhall offer vnto his Neighbours that which hee cannot well refuſe, before they demand it, to the end they may acknowledge his good will. Eſpecially if there bee neede of ſuccours, hee ſhall ſhew himſelfe ready; yet without giuing cauſe of Iealouſie to others, in making them knowe the Iuſtice of theſe ſuccours, and of his intention, rayſing thoſe whom hee ſuccours from the ſhame, the which doth vſually accompany him that demands. This is the firſt precept to make them haue confidence in vs.

Of the reſentment hee muſt haue of Iniuries receiued by his neighbours.

The ſecond, to breed confidence, is not to enter into any reſentment of iniuries againſt thoſe, whom wee deſire to make confident of vs, vnleſſe it bee a matter of great importance: And wee muſt ſuffer courage to ſleepe, and awake prudence: But if our honour conſtraines vs to make ſome demonſtration of an iniury receiued, wee muſt lay the fault vpon the Miniſter, and complaine of him; ſo as they may not thinke we hold out ſelues wronged by the Maſter. For by the very opinion which a neighbour Prince might haue to haue wronged vs, he would enter into diſtruſt of vs, from diſtruſt into hatred; and hatred it may be, would draw after it another wrong, and an alliance with our Enemies, not onely to aſſure himſelfe, but to annoy vs: The remembrance of an iniury being many times ſtronger in him that doth it, then in him that receiues it; eſpecially betwixt Princes, whoſe ſpirits are very vncapable to take confidence one of another. Aboue all wee muſt bee wary how wee enter

into

into threats. For although our Neighbour be weaker then we are, and that his timerouſneſſe might giue vs cauſe to hope for ſome aduantage by our threats : Yet it might ſo fall out, that from feare he might paſſe to deſpaire, the which doth vſually guide timerous ſpirits, as well into deſperate reſolutions, as inconſiderations doth the raſh. But Misfortune carrying vs to a rupture, and hauing the Embaſſadours of our Enemies neare vs, who then may be ſuſpect vnto vs, wee muſt conſider of the meanes to diſmiſſe them. Some haue therein proceeded mildly, and others more roughly. Some to diſcharge an Enemies Embaſſadour, haue giuen leaue to all other Embaſſadours which did reſide with him ; and then calling backe thoſe of his friends, ſuffered his enemies Embaſſadour to depart.

The Emperour *Charles* the fift, aduertiſed of the Leagne which was made againſt him, would not diſmiſſe the Embaſſadours of *France*, *England*, and *Venice*, vntill his owne were in ſafety : But hee ſet Guards vpon them of *France*, *Venice*, and *Florence*, cauſing them to bee conducted thirty Miles from his Court, with a prohibition not to ſpeake vnto them, nor for them to Write : To him of *Millan* as his Subiect, hee was enioyned not to part from Court ; And as for him of *England*, there was no alteration.

Let vs come to the third point. It is a great aduantage to pierce into the deſignes of his Neighbours, and to haue gained ſome confidence with them : For the entire is ſeldome found. But not able to preuaile by this meanes, he muſt doe it by Diſcourſe, by Wiſedome, and by the Knowledge a Prince ought to haue of the quality of their Eſtates, of the defects and aduantages which are in them, of the humours, deſigne, and inclination of the people, of great Men, and of the Prince ; and principally of this laſt, whoſe

To pierce into the deſignes of his Neighbors.

whoſe principall motions and manner of liuing hee muſt ſeeke to diſcouer, to iudge of his wiſedome and courage; then the diſcontentments, diuiſions, and the heads of parties which are in the Eſtate, their pretexts, credit, of whom they depend, and how farre it may extend, the Councell, Treaſure, Iuſtice how it is mannaged, and with what ſatisfaction of the people or great Men: Moreouer what the forces be, and the number of Souldiers and Captaines, with the ſufficiency of the cheife among them: The ſtrong Townes and Fortreſſes; and to know the defects there are to defend them, and the aduantages to aſſaile them: The Munitions of Warre and Victualls: wherein the commerce and traffique doth conſiſt, and how it may be incommodated: The commodity or diſcommodity of the Entries of the Countrey: The Fertillity Barronneſſe, extents or ſmalneſſe of the Eſtate: and of other Neighbours, his alliances and dependances with other Princes, as well neere as remote: Their actions and deportments paſt, as well towards vs as others: Their preſent Eſtate, and whereunto they ſeeme most incline. In which ſearch, we muſt vſe diligence, [illegible]ome, and ſecrecie, leaſt we giue them cauſe to diſtruſt vs. All this may be learned from friends, which the Prince may haue in the Eſtates of his Neighbours; or by ſpyes, whoſe intelligences he muſt duly examine before hee beleiue them; And by reaſon, intereſt, or apparance, ſound if they be true.

Of the introduction of Embaſſadours or Agents.

But for that all theſe courſes are full of ſuſpition among Princes, and are dangerous for ſuch as imploy themſelues to giue theſe intelligences; euery Prince hauing the like intereſt, to know what is done with his Neighbour, and deſiring to ſhew the confidence he hath in him: Princes haue agreed to receiue Embaſſadours or Agents; who in effect (vnder pretext to entertaine the good intelligence betwixt their Maiſters) ſerue many times to diſcouer the ground of Eſtates, and the deſignes

of

of Princes. Wherefore ſeeing that by this meanes Princ entertaine one another, it is fitting to know the quality, the charge, and the priuiledges of an Embaſſadour or Agent, the which we will ſet downe here, as they haue beene gathered by ſome of this Age.

CHAP. 57.

Of the charge of an Embaſſadour or Agent.

AN Embaſſadour and Agent is the ſame thing, if we conſider onely the function of their Charges: But they differ for the honour and reſpect they beare more to an Embaſſadour then to an Agent. An Agent hath charge to repreſent the affaires onely: But an Embaſſadour ought to repreſent the greatneſſe of his Maiſter, and his affaires. Wherefore for ſufficiency, the Agent ought to haue as much as the Embaſſadour: But for wealth and that which concernes ſhew, it is not ſo neceſſary for him as for the other. The difference betwixt an Embaſſadour and Agent.

Neyther the one nor the other, for that which concernes the Body, ought (if it may be) to haue any imperfection, as to haue one eye, to be pore-blind, ſquint-ey'd, lame, crooked-backt, or extreamely foule and deformed: But contrariwiſe hee muſt be of a pleaſing Encounter, and not counterfeit, leſt hee be ridiculous or contemned. He muſt not likewiſe be ſickely nor dainty, leſt the diſcommodity of the wayes, or the change of the Ayre make him vnprofitable for his Maiſters affaires. His Countenance muſt be graue and ſerious, yet mingled with mildneſſe and a pleaſing aſpect. For his Age, he muſt neither be too young, nor too old, as well for the force and diſpoſition of the body, as for that of the mind. For the conditions Qualities and perfections required in an Embaſſadour.

conditions of Fortune, he ought to be chosen of an honest condition, and Noble if it may be : Princes holding themselues contemned, when they send Men of little worth vnto them ; as *Lewis* the Eleuenth did, who imployed his Barber to execute this charge.

As for the profession whereon he ought to be chosen, that depends of the quality of the affaires whereon hee is to treate, or of the Prince to whom he is sent. For if they treated of meanes to make Warre, it would be no more proper to send a Church-man or a Lawyer, then if they treated of some right of bounds, or made some conference of Religion, to send a man making profession of Armes. For his goods, an Embassadour ought to haue in a meane proportion. A poore or needy man how sufficient soeuer, is nothing fit for charges of expence and shewe. But of all things they must haue a care not to send a poore Embassadour, after one that was rich, and who had made an excesse of expence ; For the first hauing accustomed those of the Prouince to this expence and charge, the other comming after, and not doing the like, he will bee much lesse honoured and respected ; And by consequence doe his Maister lesse seruice. He must not likewise be distastfull to the Prince to whom he is sent, but rather they must choose one that may be pleasing to him : Yet for all this he must not be a subiect, nor dependant, nor tyed by oath, nor any other bond, to him with whom hee is to reside. The example of that which Duke *Sforse* did to the Esquire *Merueilles* teacheth vs, not to choose another mans Subiect for this charge. For the sufficiency, he must haue a quicke apprehension and naturall Iudgment. He must be practised in the affaires of the world, and especially in those of his owne Countrey, and of that where he is Embassadour.

And for that the life of man is too short, to attend a fit experience for the sufficiency which is necessary : hee ought to be conuersant with all sorts of Histories, which he

hee ought to haue read with iudgment, waighing all the Circumſtances of Actions which are there repreſented: To know the diuerſity of the eſtabliſhment of Eſtates, and the reaſons, if it may bee, of this diuerſity; to vnderſtand the right of limits, and repreſailes, the genalogies of Princes, and the pretentions of Kings vpon the Eſtates of other men. Their forces, means, alliances, and manner of liuing, he muſt likewiſe be reſolute & couragious in that which he hath wiſely deliberated; but aboue all hee muſt be ſecret in affaires of importance, and diſcreete in his ſpeech. Hee muſt not detract, nor ſpeake euill, eſpecially of any Maſter, nor of the Prince where hee remaines: Hee muſt ſpeake freely of his Maſters pretentions, if there bee queſtion to maintaine them.

An Embaſſadour choſen with theſe qualities may ſerue worthily and profitably. Yet I will adde hereunto the manner, how ſome of our time haue held he ſhould gouerne himſelfe, but more ſuccinctly. Firſt hee muſt furniſh his Family with modeſt and reſpectiue Men, not inſolent, quarrellers, or ſcandalous: Otherwiſe he is in danger to receiue an affront, either in abandoning his ſeruants, or not being able to ſtay them from puniſhment. This done, hee muſt make an ample inſtruction, leaſt hee bee diſauowed, the which ſhall follow word by word, eſpecially in affaires whereas tearmes ſtrike the ſtroake; not promiſing any more, although he knew he ſhould not bediſauowed: But before the promiſe, he ſhall hold the buſineſſe in ſuſpence vntill he hath power. Moreouer hee ſhall inſtruct himſelfe, from the Mouth of him which had gone before him in the ſaid charge, and ſhall retire from him the Treaties, inſtructions, and papers of importance: And parting he ſhall giue to haue ſome one in the Princes Court, which may Negotiate his buſineſſe, and giue him aduice of all that paſſeth; for many times the Secretaries of Eſtate are ſo imployed, as they haue not leiſure to ſatisfie all.

Inſtructions for an Embaſſadour, how to gouerne himſelfe in a ſtrange Countrey.

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If hee goes for ſome particular affaire, hee muſt ſtay as little as may be vpon the way, as well to preuent the aduice, which might be giuen of the particular ſubiect of his Embaſſie; the anſwere whereof hee ſhould find ready, hauing by his ſtay giuen them leiſure, either to illude it, or to croſſe it: As for that according to the quallitie of the buſineſſe, hee might ariue ſo late, as they would mocke at him. As *Tiberius* did of the Embaſſadours which ariued to condole the death of his Children ſeauen Moneths after: And hee in mocking lamented the death of *Hector*, who was dead many hundred yeeres before. The ſame reaſon requires, that they ſhould demand audience as ſoone as they can, vnleſſe he finds the Court in mourning, or in open Warre, or ſome other accident of importance which ſerues for an excuſe. He ſhall from the beginning ſhew his grauitie, oſtentation or pride in his Countenance or traine, his courteſie and affability, accompanied with an honeſt carriage and modeſty; his expence according to the places where hee is. The Northerne people deſire a Table well garniſhed: *Spaine*, and *Italy*, looke more to followers and attendants, and to that which ſerues for ſhew; In the Leuant the greateſt expence is in preſents: But aboue all hee muſt regulate his expences according to his entertainement, and the meanes hee hath to ſpend. For it is vnſeemely to liue of borrowing in a ſtrange Countrey.

The manner of treating is alſo diuers. In *Germany* & *Suizerland*, they muſt haue more money then words, more good cheere there then Art: In other Eſtates honor, complements, and Orations, are better receiued; and in others the conſideration of Religion hath more force. An Embaſſadour ought to be wary, leaſt by too much diligence and affection, he do not augment the ſuſpition, which they may haue of the ſubiect of his comming, and diſcouer it by too much Art & talke; all things diſguiſed affected and amplified, naturally breeds ſuſpition. They which demand

ſuccours

ſuccours doe many times make their affaires ſo weake, (thinking to moue pitty,) as they are ſo farre from moueing thoſe, from whom they craue ſuccours, as they make them affraid to embarque themſelues with miſerable perſons. In ſuch occaſions he muſt march himſelfe diſcreetly, and waigh his words: And the countenane in this doth ſometime impart more then the thing it ſelfe.

Aboue all things hee muſt not treate with any other Prince, of that which concernes his Commiſſion, but with him to whom he is ſent. This was the anſwere of the Embaſſadours of *Florence*, to the Emperour *Maximillian*, to whom they had beene ſent, he hauing appointed thē to conferre with the Duke of *Millan*, who ſhould giue them an anſwere for him: But they refuſed to doe it, as a thing exceeding their Commiſſion. And although his inſtructions ought to be as ample as may be: Yet affaires being ſubiect to change, in a ſhorter time, then there is betwixt his parting & arriuall, the Embaſſadour muſt, as they ſay, make Warre by the eye: as if hee had beene commanded to vſe mild words, and yet finds it more conuenient to ſpeake boldly or to change, or omitt ſomething mentioned in his Commiſſion, he muſt gouerne himſelfe with great circumſpection. But he may not ſtray from his intention, vnleſſe he ſee that in leauing it, he may preuaile in that which he hath vndertaken. If he be conſtrayned not to doe ſome things contained in his inſtructions, and that the buſineſſe is not ſubiect to delay, hee ſhall import it to two or three of the moſt vnderſtanding Seruants, that his Maiſter hath, (if happily there be any in the Countrey where he reſides) to the end that the buſineſſe ſucceeding ill, he may auoyd the reproach, to haue done it alone and without Councell.

There are certaine things that are ſubiect to diſauow; as proud & inſolent words, which an Embaſſadour might haue vſed; or threats and practiſes which he attempts in the Eſtate where he reſides, if it be without command:

And

And therefore he muſt containe hinſelfe, within the termes of his charge and the modeſtie that is required. It is fitting he ſhould maintaine the Dignity of his Maiſter: But it muſt be without contempt, or offence to him towards whom he is ſent, And to the end he may diſcouer all the paſſages in an Eſtate, hee muſt be frequent and daily in Court, but when as the Prince retires himſelfe priuatly for his pleaſures: For then he ſhould make himſelfe ſuſpect or importune. And in popular Eſtates, he muſt aſſiſt all dyets meetings and aſſemblies: Or if he ſees that this may breed ſome contempt, hee ſhould ſend ſome one of his. Beſides money, which diſcouers the ſecrets of Princes, the entertainment of his Table is of ſome force. And although that all the intelligences which come from this ſort of people which follow Tables, be not alwaies current; Yet ſometimes he ſhall meete with good ones. Wherefore he muſt waigh them, and attend the progreſſe and iſſue before hee Iudge of them; and obſerue not onely what is ſayd, but what is done. He muſt for this effect write often, and to many parts, to the end he may be the better aduertiſed; and neuer reſpect the charge which cannot be better imployed.

He muſt viſit the principall Councellors, the Secretaries of Eſtate, and amongſt others him, who hath the diuiſion of Forraigne affaires; he ſhall doe the like to thoſe which are in credit and fauour with the Prince, although but of meane condition; applying himſelfe in ſome ſort to the cuſtome, and manners of the Countrey, and how others haue done before him. Hee ſhall informe himſelfe diſcreetly of the preſent Eſtate of the Court; and how euery Man ſtands in authority; wherein this authority conſiſts, eyther in reputation and honour, or in effect and contention, euery one according to his rancke and degree, winning vnto him if he may, the domeſtiques and fauorities of thoſe which haue authority. Hauing newes from all parts, he ſhall ſtill find occaſions to diſcourſe and

parley

parley with the Princes, and great men, with pleaſing ſubiects, to be merry with them; or if they be otherwiſe, and concerne them, to condole, or to aduiſe them to preuent it.

He muſt viſite the Embaſſadours and Agents of other Princes and Common-weales, which reſide in the ſame Court; but ſoberly, leſt he giue them occaſion of iealouſie: Hee muſt be wary not to diſcouer himſelfe wholy vnto them, whatſoeuer they be; but rather ſeeke to draw from them, then to leaue any thing of his owne, to the end he may alwayes be the firſt to ſend the aduice and pleaſing newes. And if the affaires which he purſues, ſucceedes not according to his deſire, hee ſhall make no ſhew of it, nor ſeeme to haue any diſtruſt or bad opinion of the Prince and others, with whom hee negotiates. When he ſhall be intreated to doe them any courteſie, he ſhall ſtudy to value it at as high a rate as may be; yet he muſt doe it ſpeedily and freely, letting them know, that he deſires aboue all things to giue them contentment and ſatisfaction. He ſhall commend and magnifie the perſons, the meanes, the greatneſſe, the Countrey, the Lawes, the manner of liuing, and whatſoeuer concernes the Nation; yet with ſuch modeſty and diſcretion, as there may be no ſhew of flattery. He ſhall likewiſe extoll the affaires of his Maſter with the like modeſty and dexterity, to the end they may not grow iealous of him. When he ſhall finde ſome ſtop in that which he deſires to doe, hee ſhall not inſiſt too eagerly vpon it, although he had an apparent reaſon: But he ſhall with dexterity approue the reaſons in part, and by other meanes ſeeke to attaine his Deſigne. When it ſhall be needefull to doe or ſay any thing contrary to their will or liking, he ſhall excuſe it in ſuch ſort, as they ſhall conceiue that it proceeds not from the Embaſſadour, but from ſuch as command him, and that hee is ſorry to doe it, conſidering it doth not pleaſe him; yet iuſtifying the buſineſſe by the beſt reaſons he may, and

giuing them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing vnto them. If they charge him to carry bad and distastefull words, he shall doe better to cause them to giue them in writing, rather then to pronounce the words.

And if he findes that by one meanes he cannot obtaine what he desires, hee shall leaue the businesse for a time, and referre it to some other occasion, which he shall finde they desire of him, or shall haue neede of something; and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand, and so perswade them with grace and mildnesse. When he is to obtaine any thing of importance, he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatcht, but shall sollicite the expedition, yet with mildnesse and modesty: And if it consists in a promise for the future, he shall cause them to set it downe in writing, and contrariwise he shall be carefull not to oblige himselfe nor his Master, but as late as seldome as may be. Intreating and contracting, he must cause the treaty to be set downe in plaine termes, not ambiguous nor captious, according to the termes and clauses of precedent treaties. It is certaine that refusing flatly, or making a business full of difficulties, they offend him whom they refuse: Therefore an Embassadour not able to grant that which they demand of him, he must eyther giue them other Counsell and direction, to attaine to that which they desire; or he shall testifie his good-will by other gracious effects, and honest speeches which may palliate the deniall. An honest man, (such as he ought to be that executes this charge,) must not be found a Lyer, especially in matters of importance; for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more. He must therefore be wary not to deliuer doubtfull things for certaine, nor trust wholy to the word and report of others: But hee must alledge his Authour, or else say, that he had learned it from a good place, when he shall not dare to name the person. He shall doe the like for things which concerne

his

his Maſter, the which he muſt deliuer on his behalfe. When they are ſuch as there is no great certainty, or elſe may receiue a change, he muſt deliuer them with all diſcretion and ſtayednesſe, leſt he be reproached that they are circumuented by this meanes. And if it ſhould happen that he could not well excuſe a contrariety, yet he muſt couer and diſguiſe it with ſome pretext, in regard of his Maſter by all meanes poſſible; and for himſelfe likewiſe, purging and iuſtifying himſelfe, that he had neuer any intent to doe a bad office, nor to make a bad report, nor to be authour and inſtrument of deceit. The which muſt take place, when he is conſtrained either through the neceſſity of affaires, or by the commandement of his Maſter, to deliuer one thing for another. The which hee may not doe often, leſt he loſe all his credit. But it ſometimes falls out, an Embaſſadour lies without thinking of it: For that when one Prince meanes to deceiue another, he firſt deceiues the Embaſſadour whom hee ſends, to the end that deliuering that which he holds to be his Maſters intention, his reaſons may be more forcible, aſſuring that which he ſpeaks more boldly, hauing leſſe intention and aſſurance of that which is diſſembled. Wherein the Embaſſadour is not onely excuſable, but worthy of pitty, in that they are diſtruſtfull of him, and meane to make him carry the Bable, and to ſerue as an inſtrument of deceipt. Moreouer he muſt not rely too much on thoſe with whom he negotiates, neither yet wholy deſpaire for thoſe things which happen; for that affaires change eaſily, and affections likewiſe according to occurrents: And many times that which ſeemed impoſſible at one time, growes eaſie afterwards; and ſo the contrary.

But one of the principall points whereof an Embaſſadour takes care, is to maintaine the ranke and dignitie of his Maſter, eſpecially with the Embaſſadours of other Princes. For Princes doe not ſubſiſt, but by the greatnes and opinion they haue of them: It argues a conſept

if their ranke be contested, and an Embassadour must must rather loose himselfe, then quit any thing: And if the Prince with whom he remaines, fauours him that makes the attempt, after that he hath made instance to be maintayned in his ranke, he ought to retire. And for this point, it is vsually obserued in many places among Embassadours, that they which come first, goe to visite those which came last, although that the first commer goe before them in ranke.

Of the priuiledges of Embassadours.

Let vs come to the priuiledges which the Embassadours haue in a strange Countrey. The principall is, that by the Law of Nations, they are inuiolable, that is to say, in all freedome and safety: But it is in their Countrey to whom they are sent. For that if they passe through the Countrey of one that is Enemy to their Master, although allied to the Prince to whom they are sent, yet it would be necessary to take this pasport, being not in that regard respected as an Embassadour, if he practiseth any thing against the Estate, or the Princes person with whom he resides: For hee cannot defend himselfe by the Law of Nations. And wee must not doubt but hauing violated his Faith first, wherein the Law of Nations doth chiefly consist, but the Prince neare whom he remaines, and against whom he hath attempted, may cause him to be punished. Yet for that it may be that the commandement to attempt, proceedes from the Master, and that punishing the Embassadour, it were to fall vpon the stone, and not on the Arme that cast it. Some Princes haue vsed it more discreetly, contenting themselues to seaze vpon these vndertakers expecting the avow or disavow of the Master: And being vnable to draw eyther of them from him, to presuppose a confession, and then send them to their Master. Moreouer, if the Embassadour commits any priuate outrage against one of the Princes Subiects with whom he resides, vnlesse it be to defend the dignity of his charge,

or

or of his Master, many haue held him iustifiable before the Prince where he liues. For there is a great difference betwixt the Dignity and Authority of a Prince, in the Countrey of another Soueraigne. Hee may well retaine his Dignity, but not his Authority. But the most safe and the more seemely were before he doe reason to the party, to demand it from his Master, who in that case would not deny it him so soone as in matters of Estate, and it is a meanes to free the Prince from slander of Iniustice towards the Ministers of another Prince.

As for his Domesticks, there is no doubt but they may be punished if they doe ill. And if they or any other hauing fayled, retire into the Embassadors house, he may be summoned to yeeld them, and to suffer Iustice to search his house: Otherwise after this deniall the Iustice may doe it, for that the house of an Embassadour ought not to serue for a retreat and Sanctuary to the wicked. Yet this search may not be done by simple Sergeants, no more then the Summons: But it must be executed by the Iudge of greatest Authority in the place, accompanied with men of honour, with excuses, intreaties, and courteous words, as well to testifie the respect which they beare to the Dignity of the Embassadours Master, as to preuent the insolency and indiscretion which doe vsually accompany Archers, Sergeants, and such other sorts of Ministers. But in stead of punishing the Domesticks of an Embassadour, after they haue made their processe vnto condemnation, and caused the Ciuill party to be satisfied, some haue pardoned them in his fauour whose Subiects they are, sending them backe with the processe. Or if there be no such intelligence betwixt the two Princes, as the one will not be beholding to his cõpanion, they may procure some common Ally vnder-hand, to make the demand: To whom the Prisoners being deliuered, he may send them to the Prince whose Subiects they are.

Some Embassadours haue perswaded themselues, that they had all iurisdiction ouer their Domesticknes, euen to put some to death. But this is not grounded vpon a reason, if the Prince with whom he resides doth not giue him leaue; as they say the *Turke* tollerates it with the Embassadours of Christian Princes. Yet they may detaine those Prisoners in their house, which practise against the seruice of their Master, vntill they haue aduertised him, and receiue an answer; prouided that they whom they detaine, be not admitted as Embassadours by the Prince, or Estate where they are: For in that case they are in freedome and safety. Behold how Embassadors ought to gouern themselues with strangers in a strang Coūtry. We must now see being in those charges, how they ought to carry thēselues to their Masters, to whom they serue as eyes and eares.

How Embassadours ought to carry themselues toward their Master.

Some haue held that an Embassadour ought to giue aduice to his Master, of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him, for that the aduertisment may come from some other, then from his Embassadour, who in such things ought to be carefull not to be preuented, wherein we cannot giue any certaine Rules. Yet if the word hath escaped either in choller, or from a passionate spirit, were it the Prince himselfe; being not spoken publiquely, it were more discreetly done to conceale it from his Master, then to deliuer it. For the Master that neither would nor could breake, would seeme offended at such a report, if the Estate of his affaires will not suffer him to demand satisfaction: And on the other side sometimes, in taking exception at an iniury, he seemes to confesse it. But if the Embassadour findes it more expedient to conceale the words spoken by the Prince with whom he resides; he shall let him know, how much his Master would hold himselfe wronged, if they were related vnto him: But that knowing the good which growes to both the Estates, by the Friendship in which the two Princes haue liued, he had rather therein fayle of his duty, in not making this report, then to be the occa-

sion

sion of trouble, and breach for a word spoken in choller.

It is to no purpose to say, that in doing this, it were to shew himselfe wiser then his Master; or that he must deliuer all, and conceale nothing. For that which offends Princes, and inuites them to resentment, is not so much the offence in it selfe, as the opinion they haue, that the world knowes they haue beene wronged; and if they doe not seeke some reuenge, they should make a breach in their reputations, and inuite others to affront and contemne them. So as the wrong being not published and knowne to all Men, and the Embassadour making it knowne that for the good of peace, he would conceale it from his Master, it doth no way touch the reputation of the Prince, who otherwise being held to be couragious, they would alwayes beleeue, that if the report had beene made vnto him, he would not haue endured it without reuenge: There are many things which Princes are glad to haue concealed; but those principally, for the which they cannot prouide, without greatly incommodating their affaires, these ought to be dissembled and concealed from them.

Of their dispatches.

As for dispatches, it is certaine that they seldome know what an Embassadour doth in his charge, but by that which he writes. He must therefore shew himselfe by his dispatches, which must be graue, short, close couched, and mingled sometimes according to the Subiects, with passages of Sentences, yet seldome: And to be the more intelligible, some hold it fit that he should articulate euery priuate action apart, not troubling himselfe with a continuance, and bond of clauses in diuers affaires, and he must acknowledge in all his letters, the reception of those to the which he makes answer. If he enforced to write many letters vpon the same subiect, and to the same place, as it happens vsually, he shall doe well to diuersifie the terms and stile as much as may be, to the end they may not bee like vnto a Notaries Indenture, and that they which haue receiued the like letters, comming to conferre them toge-

ther may not make that he hath intreated them equally; euery man esteeming of himself not onely better then he is, but also more then his companion.

He must haue a care not to write any thing to his Master for true, concerning those with whom hee negotiates, if he hath no testimony by Letters, or that he knoweth it from those in whom his master hath confidence, the which he ought to name: For that the change which may happen in a businesse, might cause a reproach and bad conceit of the minister, with his Master, either of lightnesse, or of little fore-sight. He shall be alwayes esteemed to doe more then to write, and to giue them good hope when he shall see day, before he giue them assurance and certainty of the businesse. As for the particular of the Embassador, as we haue said before, besides the Secretary of Estate, who is to receiue his Dispatches, he must haue some one which may giue him aduice of that which passeth. He with some other friends, must doe him all sorts of good offices, in cõmending and praising his Seruices and dexterity. And the Embassadour on the other side, shall labour to haue others write; especially men vnknowne to commend his industry and labour, absence causing a decay of opinion, and makes them sometimes forget the worth of a man, if by these practises they be not reuiued.

THE

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greateſt and moſt Remarkable Conſiderations ſeruing for the Managing of Publicke Affaires.

PART. II. CONTAYNING THE MEANES how to preſerue an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.

Of the parts and conditions in generall, neceſſary for a Prince and Soueraigne.

HAuing treated of that which is neceſſary for the ſetling of an Eſtate, wee muſt conſider of the meanes how to preſerue it. It is not ſufficient to build a ſtrong ſhip to make a long and tedious Voyage; but we muſt withall prouide a good Pilot to gouerne it, and to ſeeke meanes to calke it, and trim it when it takes water, and to be able to

to reſiſt the waues of the Sea, and the violence of the Winds and ſtormes without ſhipwracke.

The preſeruation of the Eſtate conſiſts in the authority of a Prince.

That which ſerues for the Eſtabliſhment, doth likewiſe ſerue for the preſeruation of an Eſtate; but wee muſt likewiſe haue other meanes to preſerue this order, the which conſiſts eyther in the authority of him that commands or in the remedy which they muſt find, againſt that which might ruine the Eſtate. The Authority of him which commands, proceeds eyther from the loue of the people, or from his owne reputation.

The Loue of the people cauſe the authority of the Soueraigne.

Loue alone would ſuffice him that hath once gotten it, were it not that hee cannot promiſe any thing to himſelfe from the inconſtancy of Men, who loue to day and hate to morrow, without any ſubiect or occaſion. Wherefore hee which commands, muſt aſſure himſelfe of Men long before, and not attend vntill he be reduced to the poynt of neceſſity. For then the danger being eminent, it is no more time, for that their faith is then ſhaken, and by this ſearch hee giues a teſtimony that hee feares: the which many times doth haſten the Princes ruine, and makes them fly from all reconcilment with him.

Diuers meanes to gaine his good-will.

This Loue is gotten by many meanes. The Beauty, Behauiour, Carriage, pleaſing Countenance, and Courteſie, are ſometimes of great force. With others Nobility, and reputation of their predeceſſors hath beene of great vſe, although that they had not any other part that was recommendable. Among the Inhabitants of a Citty or Towne, riches may likewiſe doe ſomething, if they vſe it as they ought.

CHAP.

CHAP. 1.

Of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase the Love of the People.

BVt to treate in generall of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase this good-will, wee will reduce them to three, Mildnesse, Bounty, and Iustice.

From Mildnesse growes the peace of the Estate, the fidellity of the Subiects, and the Establishment of affaires, there being nothing that doth more force the people to honour their Lord, then the naturall mildnesse which he shewes, and practiseth to their good. Rygour makes him to beefeared, and consequently not beloued, and this feare and cold Friendship lasts no longer, then the occasion of feare continues. But mildnesse governed with discretion, remaines in the heart, and produceth its effect, whilest that Men which haue receiued pleasure and profit liue. This mildnesse is practised by the Prince principally, in three points. The first, is to pardon offences, but not those of the Estate; and to pardon those, who being discouered can hurt no more, and by vsing clemency vnto them, may get some reputation; but not to those who may hurte, and who by no meanes cannot be perswaded to submit themselues to reason: Mildnesse to such is cruelty to all others. It is cruelty I say to pardon a wicked Man, if by the impunity which doth follow, we bee forced afterwards to dipp our hands deeper in blood.

Effects of mildnesse in a Prince.

It is a stupid bounty, and a simplicity without discretion, to pardon all, and to suffer all. The excesse of clemency, conuerts it selfe into a soft and effeminate nature: And if this bounty be not mingled with rigour, and facility

with

with authority; it is meere careleſneſſe blamable in a Prince, for that in ſuffering one fault, it ſoone drawes after it another. Clemency is comendable towards an Enemy deiected and humbled: But whileſt hee wauers and ſtands in tearmes againſt vs; it is weakeneſſe, amazement and feare, not to dare to reſent it, hee muſt therefore vſe mildneſſe with diſcretion, yet in ſuch ſort, as they may alwayes find the Prince more inclined to mildneſſe then ſeuerity.

To cherriſh great Men.

The ſecond point, when they diſcouer mildneſſe, is cheifly to cherriſh great Men, and the cheife of the Eſtate, and according to occaſions, others: For that euery Man eſteeming himſelfe of more worth then he is, they grow eaſily diſcontented if they make no reckoning of them. The third point, by the which he which commands may teſtifie his mildneſſe, is in ſhewing himſelfe indulgent in things, wherein the people take delight; Prouided alwayes that they fly exceſſe and diſorder. For by this meanes they mollifie the ſauageneſſe of the Subiect, they diuert him from vndertaking; and make euery one more ioyfull in his vocation. Yet hee muſt not ſuffer himſelfe to be carried away with this indulgence, as through negligence, and the little care hee had to prouide for his Eſtate; but with a deſigne and diſcretion reſtratiue in his time. For this effect he muſt alſo prouide, (as we will ſhewe hereafter) for the abundance of Victualls and commodities, to the end that he may thereby teſtifie the care he hath of his people, and by this care the affection he beares them. For if the people ſhould fall into neceſſity, or into a dearth of Victualls, this mildneſſe and indulgence would proue vnprofitable; and the Prince would looſe much of the Loue of his Subiects: there being nothing that doth ſo much diſcontent them, as ſuch diſcommodities; eſpecially when it growes eyther through the Monopoles of the Prince, or the exceſſe of cuſtome.

CHAP.

CHAP. 3.

Of the liberality of the Prince.

LIberallity is of two sorts, the one practised to the benefit of priuate persons; and the other to the profit and aduantage of the Publique. The one and the other well husbanded, serues to purchase Loue to the Prince. For although hee cannot extend his bounty to all in particular, for that it would bee impossible his reuenewes should suffice: Yet a liberall Prince is beloued of euery man; For that euery man hopes to taste of his bounty according to his degree, making him his Friend; although that the facility of giuing ruines the Estate sooner, then too great sparing. But no Man enters into consideration, how much sparing is necessary for a Prince, for the generall good of his Estate: For that the number of those is small which doth in particular to hinder that which belongs in generall to all. And yet as excesse is blameable in all actions, so it is most preiudiciall to the Estate in this: And we haue seene in our time, that moderate giuing hath beene a weake meanes to purchase the Subiects loue to the Prince: For it reiects more then it gaines; and if it be imployed without respect of merit, it proues a shame to him that receiues it, and is receiued without grace.

Two sorts of liberality.

The excesse of liberality in a Prince most hartfull to the Estate.

The Subiects of a Prince excessiue in gifts, makes them excessiue in expences, and importune in demands. They gouerne themselues not according vnto reason but to custome: That which is receiued is no more accounted of: They loue not liberality but for the future. Wherefore the more a Prince doth exhaust himselfe in giuing, the poorer he growes in Friends; and from excessiue prodigallity, doth vsually grow the pouerty of a Prince: From

pouer-

pouerty exactions and hatred in like manner. For the number of those from whom he takes by exaction, being greater then the Friendship of those to whom he giues; the Prince is in danger not to command long. If then he be reduced to one of these extremities, it were more expedient for the Prince to bee poore and not hated of his Subiects, then to be hated and rich. For although that for a time he may force obedience, yet it cannot be durable: And although that he which spares, seemes in outward shewe to doe good to few, yet not exacting from the Subiect hee doth good to all, whereas a prodigall Prince doth vsually good but to few.

We must therefore be carefull to vse this vertue well, thereby to purchase loue. For although that the gifts and benefits, be in some sort in the liberty and free-will of him that giues: yet it hath certaine distinctions and lawes which restraine it, and especially in that which concernes the Prince; who being but a simple dispencer of the Publique Treasure, he ought not to imploy it without hope of some profit to the Publique. Wherefore hee must consider what he giues, to whom, and when. For it is not needfull to giue to all that demands; as if the demander and deseruer were one and the same thing: Likewise betwixt those which haue deserued, he may not giue to all that begg, for it would be found that they which haue least deserued, haue tasted of his liberality, and not the rest.

Considerations necessary in liberality.

And as the payment of a Bond ought to goe before liberality; otherwise it would be iniustice to giue, at the charges of those to whom we are indebted: So Merit must be recompenced, before we doe good to him that hath not deserued: And before Merits, seruices ought to march; and before seruices, debts and Bonds ought to be discharged. It is the Law of Iustice, not to doe wrong to one, to gratifie another; The which is very ill obserued by the most part of Princes, who therein follow the

nature

nature of other Princes, which is, rather to doe that which proceeds from their owne will, then what is commanded them by Iustice, or that whereunto they are bound: For that in the first they acknowledged themselues Superiours, and in the second Inferiours; the recompence shewing the merit and valour of him to whom it is giuen.

Wherefore the benefit or liberality of the Prince, proceeds eyther from the acknowledgment of seruice, or of merit, or of his owne free-will; or to inuite and draw some one to loue him, or to corrupt him, or to purchase the reputation to bee liberall. Concerning the first two sorts of bounty, they are necessary, as well for the satisfaction of those which receiue them, as for the contentment of the Generall, who by the example would bee inuited to conforme their actions to the good of the Estate. For the acknowledgment of a benefit is no lesse esteemed, then if the liberality proceeded from a free will: For that the good and pleasure which they doe, proceedes many times from the abundance of wealth, and the great power which hee hath that giues, as well as from good-will: But acknowledgement cannot come but from the desire hee had to doe good, so as although to giue and doe good, be more to be desired, yet the content which they feele, is peraduenture more commendable, as proceeding only from a francke & free courage. Diuers kinds of liberality. Of the liberality which is vsed for the acknowledgment of seruice and merit.

And it is that whereof among priuate persons wee haue experience, that the benefit which comes from a bond or debt, is more pleasing then that which comes vnto vs from the free-will of another: For that in this consists the contēt of the giuer, who chargeth vs with a bond which binds vs; and which in some doth rather ingender hatred then Friendship; especially if the benefit exceeds all Satisfaction. In the other, besides the pleasure to receiue the benefit, we receiue content to see that we acknowledge the former good which we haue done them.

and

And although that they which loue vs, deserue to be requited for their good-will towards vs, as being the principall part of the benefit: Yet it deserues rather to be recompenced by a Prince, with kind vsage and good words, then by effects; the which hee must keepe to recompence effects, otherwise his Reuenewes would not suffice. Yet if he finds that some for want of this, withdraw themselues from him, although vniustly and with out cause, it shall be necessary that hee retaine them by the mildest meanes he can, and rather in doing them good, then in imploying threats, who according to their naturall disposition, might be the more incensed.

That a Prince must shewe himself liberall to those which may serue him against his Enemy, be they of a contrary party.

The Prince may also bestow gifts and benefits of those, which may serue him against his Enemy; I say to those which are of a contrary party, to draw them vnto him. For as it is a vice in them to suffer themselues to bee corrupted, so it is a vertue and wisdome in the Prince to corrupt and gaine them. And as some haue not allowed of this expence, for that the aduantage which we expect is doubtfull, hauing to deale with traytors, who may as well betray the Prince which giues them, as him they serue: Yet the generall experience is contrary, being most certaine that the Minister which takes, sells himselfe, bee it that the money binds him, or that the shame to haue receiued, stayes him from failing of his promise; Or that the feare to be discouered makes him to be suspected of him hee serues, and to him that giues him, which were a meanes to ruine him with the one and the other, forcing him of necessity to keepe his word with him that hath corrupted him; being in his heart growne irreconciliable to him whom he hath resolued to betray. Besides few men of quality suffer themselues to be corrupted, vnlesse they bee transported, by some hatred, contempt, or desire of Reuenge, which they haue conceiued against him whom they serue: Or they are not disposed in heart and affection, to loue him which corrupts them, there being none but

but base spirits, or needy persons, which suffer themselues to be corrupted for meere auarice.

The liberality which is vsed to particular persons, to purchase reputation, extends commonly either to strangers, or to subiects, which doe not know nor frequent the Princes Court, who ought to haue in no lesse recommendation those which are remote from his Court, then others which are dayly in his eye: For that the greatnesse and maiesty of the Prince doth not take its foundation and increase to know, but to be knowne of many: And the honour and renowne to aide and doe good to another, should be too much restrained, if his succours and benefits should proceede no farther, then to such persons whom they see and know. Behold wherein vsually the bounty of Princes to priuate persons is imployed. Of the liberality of the Prince to purchase reputation.

In their manner of giuing they must obserue three things. The first, not to giue at the request of a third person, to the end that he which receiues may be bound vnto him, and not to the other, by whose importunity hee giues. The manner of giuing must be in such sort, that although it be for an acknowledgment or recompence, yet they to whom it is giuen, receiue the benefit with an obligation; otherwise the gift were fruitlesse, and is held for a payment, and not a liberality; so as they encourage him that receiues, to demand againe, rather then to acknowledge that which they haue giuen him. The manner of giuing.

The third is, to giue in the view of all men, to purchase reputation. For although that in a priuate liberality this were not commendable; yet this manner is necessary in the Estate, where the Actions of Princes must be apparent and visible, reyther must they be vnfruitfull; And it sufficeth not to doe a pleasure; but you must make him that receiues it, acknowledge that it is done to such an intention. As for the measure of benefits, they must be proportionable to the time, and to the persons, as well of him that receiues, as of him that giues. And for the time, Benefits must be proportionable to the time.

sometime

sometimes a small succour giuen in necessity, obligeth not onely more then a great gift would doe at another time; but sometimes causeth an Enemy to forget all the wrongs he had receiued, there being two things in concurrence in this benefit, either of which may doe much for a reconcilliation, and by consequence for loue. The one is, for the benefit and pleasure he doth him, in the best time that could be; I meane at need. The other is the assurance that he which receiues the benefit, takes of his good will that succours him so opportunely. Thus he must obserue the time to giue esteeme to his benefits, to the end the Debt may be the greater. As for persons, the humours being diuers, the Prince must obserue the humours of his Ministers, not onely as I haue sayd, to impart their Offices vnto them, but also for his recompences: For that some demand honours, others riches, according to the which hee must gouerne himselfe.

Recompences of Honour must bee well husbanded,

And for that there are more men found which affect Riches, then honour; and that being willing to satisfie euery mans desire, he should be forced to exhaust his treasure: He must (as much as may be) encourage his Subiects to seeke for Honours, as recompences which can not impouerish him; and yet vse it in such sort, as it may seeme that he doth not giue them without discretion and election. For when as Honour is imparted to vnworthy men, it begins to be contemned, and to lose this Title of Honour, as likewise he may not mingle it with profit, for that many would make more esteeme of profit, then of Honour.

Liberality of the Prince towards the Publique.

If the liberalities of Princes towards priuate persons, doth get them good-will, not onely from those which taste the fruite, but also from all others which participate in hope: That which the Soueraigne practiseth towards the Publique, as being more profitable, and extending to more persons, should purchase vnto him more generally

generally the affection of the people: As the Succours which the Prince giues in publique calamities, in famine, plague, dearth, burning of Townes, Warre, inuasion of Enemies, Earth-quakes, inundations, and such accidents. For that the Prince alone may giue this reliefe, being necessary to haue meanes which exceede the ordinary: The reason of Estate will not allow that any priuate person, although he were able to doe it, should enter into this kind of liberality, which it may be would aduance him in the loue of the people before the Prince. And in Common-weales and popular Estates, some priuate person hauing attempted to shew their bounty, haue beene punished, as men which sought by this meanes to seduce the people, and to vsurpe the Estate.

The Liberality of a priuate person towards the Publique is not to be allowed.

Seeing then that this liberality is fitting onely for the Prince, he must practise it as much as may be, and not suffer occasion to be lost. There is another sort of liberality, which the Prince may practise to the benefit of the Publique, no lesse importing then the other: which is to aduance to vertue, by the establishment and foundation of Seminaries of Piety and Religion, of Schooles and Colledges for all sorts of Sciences which may serue the Publique: Of Houses of Honour and Vertue, for the practises and exercises which may serue in Warre; and of other places for all sorts of Worke-men and Artizans, for the bringing in of Manufactures, whereof I haue formerly treated.

Liberality of the Prince towards the Publique, which consists in aduancing vertue

Chap. 4.

Of the Princes Iustice.

IVstice is generally beloued and desired: But when they will practise it against priuate persons, the commiseration they haue of a condemned man, or the colour of some contrary reasons, ioyned to interest and obstinacy, make the rigour and seuerity odious to many. Wherefore in a manner in all Estates, the exercise of Iustice hath beene diuided into two parts. That which concernes the punishment of crimes, and the deciding of controuersies betwixt man & man, hath beene left to the Magistrates and inferiour Officers to the Prince, to free him from the enuy and hatred which condemnations draw after them: And that which concernes the distribution of Dignities, honours, charges, recompences, pardons, and rewards, hath beene retained by the Prince, to gaine the loue of the Subiects. Yet the Prince, euen in that which concernes priuate men, may shew himselfe a louer of Iustice, and by this meanes winne the affection of his people, not incurring any enuy by the establishment he shall make of Lawes, necessary to suppresse the fraud and violence of his Age; by the choise he shall make of good men to administer Iustice: And by the care he shall take to keepe them in awe, in prescribing the forme of the administration of Iustice. The frauds most vsually practised in an Estate by priuate persons, are disloyalty, vsury, falshood, frauds, and Monopolies; by the which some grow suddainly rich, & some extremly poore; whence many times grow the despaire of those whō they thrust into innouations; & the insolency of the others which maks thē insupportable: And

Iustice diuided into two parts.

wherein the prince ought to shew himselfe a louer of Iustice in regard of priuate men,

and from the one and the other growes trouble, and in the end the ruine of the Estate followes. Against this kind of disorder and abuse, the Prince must shew himselfe affectionate for Iustice, by the ordayning of rigorous punishments against such as shall be surprised; as also in blaming them in his discourses, according to the occasions which shalbe offered, and by admonitions and exhortations to Iudges in generall, not touching any one in particular, and of persons otherwise odious.

And particularly vsury or interest, (which cannot bee defended) ought to be regulated at much lesse then the ordinary gaine of those which borrow, (be they Marchants or Laborers) may mount vnto; to the end that the poore in borrowing of the rich, may lay, and pay that which they are forced to borrow; and thereby auoyd the ruine of the poore by vsury, and that of the rich by banquerupts whereof they are the cause. As for violence which is committed in an Estate, it is of two sorts, the one is of Theeues and Robbers, who by open force and Armes, trouble the safety of private persons: against the which the Prince hath a double reason to oppose himselfe, as well for that all force ought to be in his hands, as for that he is Established to mainetaine the peace and safety of his subiects, not onely against strangers, but also among themselues, and the Prince which comes and doth not giue order, looseth the loue of his Subiects, and exposeth his reputation to contempt, which makes him in the end loose all his authority; and is in danger that these Theeues seeing themselues strong, will trouble him in his Estate: But this is easily preuented in lending a strong hand to Iustice, and causing those to assist, which are apoynted for the apprehension of such persons.

Against vsury.

Two sorts of violence in an Estate which the Prince ought to suppresse.

The other sort of violence contrary to Iustice, is the oppression of the poore by great Men, be it that it is made by the vnlawfull exactions of money, or of day workes, beating, or other ryotts, to preuent the which,

Of the oppression of the poore.

the Prince must not onely in his ordinary discourses condemne this manner of proceeding, threatning them to be punished, without taking notice of any person in particular; but also that which shall concerne the punishment of priuate men, he must leaue free to the ordinary Iustice, to dispose according to the Lawes, without assisting the delinquents with any fauour or pardon; as many Princes vsually doe, who trouble the order of Iustice by such impunities, and ruine their Estates by maintayning such people. And we haue often seene, that a Prince hath saued the life of some such man, who in a combustion hath beene the first to raise the Subiects, and to draw his sword against him. This is the recompence which such Princes deserue: They come by degrees to pride and disobedience, as to all other vices. He that hath dared this day to contemne the Law and the Magistrates, to morrow will contemne the Prince who hath made the Law, and hath established the Magistrate; and if occasion be offred will attempt against him.

Of the Princes pardon to offendors, and the miseries which ensue.

I meane not for all this to tye the Princes hands, so as he may not giue a pardon: There are cases in which Iustice doth allow it: But besides when as some great and publique profit requires it; as if it bee for a man, from whom the Publique hath drawne great and famous Seruices; or if by the punishment there will follow some trouble in the Estate: The Prince in this case for a greater good, or to auoyde a great mischiefe, may dispence and pardon him. But before he resolue, he must examine duely what he intends to doe, and he must not flatter himselfe in his considerations, to fauour some one against Iustice, which considerations he shall keepe secret, lest they draw vnto a consequence: And moreouer, before he comes to that, if there be any particular interest, it must be satisfied with such contentment, as there may be nothing to be desired, neither from him which hath offended, nor from the Princes Iustice.

Cases wherein a Prince may giue pardon.

Among

Among all the violences and oppressions which great Men commit, the most dangerous to an Estate, and which ought to be lesse supported by the Prince, is that which is done against the Magistrate, eyther in executing his charge, or in hatred thereof. For this is to attempt directly against the Publique, and to ouerthrow the order of Iustice, making (by the impunity of such violences) the Magistrate fearefull in the execution of the Princes will. He that endures these violences, not onely seemes to loue Iustice and the publique good but little, but also makes them thinke that he feares to punish them by the ordinary course of Iustice; and in such conniuences he loseth both the loue of his people and his reputation.

That the grace and fauour of the Prince not extend to haue violence done against the Magistrate.

The second point wherin a Prince may shew his affectiō towards Iustice, is the choise which he shal make of those which shall administer it for him: As cōtrariwise, the indifferency which he shall shew, to make vse of the first commers, will discouer his careleſnesse. I meane to speake here not onely of those which are destinated to iudge the controuersies of priuate persons, but also of all such as vnder the Princes Authority, haue any power or command, according vnto which they may doe something iustly or vniustly. For Iustice is mingled and practised in all actions, be they priuate or publique. Euery man is a Iudge in his charge. And wee must not say, that there being good Iustice, we may not punish those who vnder the Princes Authority shall offend in other Offices. For besides the Difficulty which is sometimes found, the same may they say of Iudges. But the Princes fore-sight may passe farther, and hinder the mischiefe and iniustice as much as may be. It is the last remedy to punish; and wee must doe what possibly wee may not to come vnto it. To preuent all this, wee must vse choyce; whereof few Princes dreame, and the contempt of this choyce in some

Of the choise a Prince ought to make of Iudges & Magistrates.

hēded, he may not ſuffer him to continue in his place, as wel to take from him the meanes of ill doing, as not to make the charge contemptible, and himſelfe odious, in maintayning a perſon therein, who hath beene held of a bad life. There are Princes which haue made vſe of ſpyes, whom they ſent throughout the Prouinces, to inquire of the actions of officers: And theſe for that they were vnknowne, might eaſily enter into all places, and obſerue the actions of one and another, and ſometimes doe bad offices vnſeaſonable for the honeſteſt men, yet the Prince being wiſe and not relying vpon the report, but tying them to a ſecret proofe, and without any brute, may make vſe of it, and ought not to neglect this meanes.

Of Spyes in euery Prouince to inquire of the carriage of Officers.

Lewis the twelfth who was called the Father of the People, for that he held a ſtrict hand ouer Iuſtice, making his ordinary abode in *Blois*, examining himſelfe ſecretly, thoſe which come to Court from all parts of his Realme, and ſometimes paſſengers of that which was done, as they had heard ſpoken in the place from whence they came, and eſpecially of great Men, and of his Officers; and finding by report of many, ſome aduiſoes conformable, againſt ſome one, he cauſed him to bee put into the hands of Iuſtice, to informe of his life, and to puniſh him: And in this manner he contained euery man in his duty. Secret delations haue beene brought into *Scotland*, by an ancient Edict of *Conan* King of *Scotland*, the which they ſay is yet practiſed at this day, and is called *Indict*: But better by the ordinance of *Millan*, by the which in all their Townes there muſt bee a hollow Trunke in the cheife Church, whereof the Gouernour hath the Key, into the which it is Lawfull for any man, to caſt the lybell of accuſation ſecretly, containing the crime committed, the time, the place, the offendors, & the witneſſes; and this ordinance giues a moiety of the confiſcation to the lilator: which is a great meães to facilitate the pũiſhmẽt of crimes.

Secret delations practiſed by King *Lewis* the twelfth to containe his Officers in their duty.

CHAP.

CHAP. 5.

Of the adminiſtration of Iuſtice.

IN the forme of the adminiſtration of Iuſtice, among priuate perſons, the Prince ought to haue an eye of the order, to the ſpeedy expedition, and to the putting off of charges, and ordinary expences, which they conſume in pleading, the which many times exceed the principall. Order is as it were an eſſentiall part of Iuſtice: For where there is confuſion, there can be no Iuſtice; and to auoyd this confuſion, they muſt prouide that no iuriſdiction attempt not againſt another. For the which they muſt haue a care, not onely among thoſe which are of equall power, diſtinguiſhed by places, or by certaine kinds of cauſes: But alſo betwixt inferiours and ſuperiours. Contrarywiſe they muſt ſtrictly bind the parties vpon great penalties, to follow their ſuits by thoſe degrees, and in that place which is appointed for them by the Law: And the Prince muſt hinder, that by Euocations eyther to himſelfe, or to ſome other of his Subiects, there may be no contrauention without great cauſe. Conſiderations neceſſary for a Prince, for the adminiſtration of Iuſtice.

In the ſpeedy expedition, the Prince ſhall teſtifie his affection to the good of Iuſtice, in taking away the power of Iudges to prolong delayes, and fauour thoſe that fly from tryall, in ſhorting as much as hee may, by the aduice of the moſt iudicious of his Eſtate, the ſtile, and forme of their ordinary proceeding, as well in Eſtabliſhing Fines and Amercements againſt thoſe that faile and delay, as in diminiſhing the degrees of Iuridiction, and other tedioufneſſe in pleadiang. As for the expence, the pleader ſuffers in three or foure ſorts. The one, when he is forced to goe farre from his houſe and family: For beſides The expence of pleaders.

ſides that he is not able to attend his domeſtique affaires during his abſence, they periſh moſt commonly in regard thereof; the charges as well of his voyage as of his returne, are much greater then in his houſe. The remedy hereof is, to ſettle in a great Eſtate Iudges in euery Prouince, and if it may be, in the midſt, to the end that the extremities may not be too remote. I meane not only of Iudges, which may iudge in the firſt inſtance, but alſo of thoſe to whō they will giue powers to iudge definitiuely, for ordinary cauſes, and which deſerue not the charge of a iourney of a hundred, or ſixe ſcore leagues.

Of the vocations of Iudges

Another expence is for the vocations of Iudges, who as we haue ſayd, ought to bee honeſtly entertained by the publique, and priuate men freed of that charge. But if they feare that their vocations being reduced to ordinary wages, many amongſt them would neglect to labour: They may conclude that the ſumme appointed by the publique for the payment of their vocation, ſhall bee diuided amongſt them according to their labour, which ſhall bee taxed by the whole company. There being nothing ſo vnſeemely for a ſeate of Iuſtice, then to take money from the hands of one of the parties, yea his iuſt Fee; and yet there is nothing ſo ordinary in this age, in a manner in all Eſtates.

Of taxe of Regiſters, Vſhers, and ſuch other Miniſters of Iuſtice.

Another expence is of Regiſters, Vſhers, and ſuch other miniſters of Iuſtice, whoſe taxes they muſt not onely Regulate, but alſo limit the time, in the which they ought to deliuer the expeditions to the parties, and that vpon great penalties. For a party which ſees that he may ſpend much, will be willing to giue vnto a Regiſter halfe that which it would coſt him, beſides his taxe, then to grow obſtinate, to pay nothing but the taxe, ſet downe by the orders, and to be conſtrayned to conſume twice as much in ſtaying to attend his expedition.

Of the expence of Solicitors, Proctors, and Aduocates.

But the greateſt and moſt exceſſiue expence, is that of Solicitors, Proctors, and Aduocates, which is a very

diffi-

difficult thing to order : And ſome haue held, that we muſt leaue this meanes to thoſe of this quality, to inrich themſelues in ſeruing others, there being Groomes as they ſay of all prizes. Yet if they could ſet downe an order, which might be eaſily executed, it would be a great benefit for Iuſtice : But hauing not bin hitherto found, at the leaſt it would require the fore-ſight and Iuſtice of the Prince, to prouide in ſuch ſort, as poore Men deſiring to recouer their owne, might bee freed from this charge.

For this effect it hath bin ſometimes propounded, to oblige thoſe, which deſire to come in time to great offices of this profeſſion, before they ſhould attaine vnto any, they ſhould vndertake the purſuit of cauſes freely, and that it ſhould not bee lawfull for them to take any Fee ; vpon paine of concuſſion, and to be made vncapable euer to enter into any office for the future. Theſe being commonly Men of meanes, deſirous to winne honor and in an Age when deſire is moſt ardent : will ſtriue in Enuy one of another to protect the poore, when as for their recompence they ſhould prop vnd vnto them, ſome place being voyd of thoſe whereunto they aſpired, to preferre him which had defended the greateſt number. Beſides the benefit which the poore ſhould reape, the Publique ſhould haue aduantage ; in that they which ſhould enter into theſe charges, had giuen ſome teſtimony of their integrity and ſufficiency : Whereas the cuſtome is at this day, to place Schollers comming from Schoole, in the companies of Iudges, with little Learning and leſſe experience, and hauing giuen no proofes of their diſcretion.

There is another poynt wherein the Prince may likewiſe teſtifie his affection to the good of Iuſtice, when he ſubmits his Lawes and Edicts to the iudgment of thoſe, to whom he hath referred the laſt appeales of his Iuſtice, before hee cauſeth him to bee executed. The Kings of *France*

Of the verification of Edicts by the courſe of Parliament.

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France, aboue all others, haue bin curious to bee held Iuſticers: And although that otherwiſe, they haue made profeſſion of Armes and Warre, more then any other Princes, yet they would bee in all places, in their Seale, and in their throne of Iuſtice. But aboue all others they of the laſt race, haue affected this Name to be great Iuſticers; hauing brought in the verification of their Edicts, by their Courts of Parliament, before they wil cauſe them to bee executed; ſtopping the mouthes of ſuch by this formality, as would impugne their commandements with iniuſtice, in giuing more authority to the execution, and preſeruing themſelues from ſurprize and importunity.

CHAP. 6.

Of the Reputation of the Prince.

Of the meanes how a Prince may purchaſe reputation.

THe reputation of a Prince, is the other part which giues him authority. It is gotten by many meanes. But we will begin with the principall, which are Prudence, and Vallour.

Of Prudence and Vallour in a Prince.

Prudence ſerues him as an eye to ſee, and to conſider all things. Vallour ſerues him as a hand. Without the one he ſhould be like a blind Man, and without the other weake and vnable. Prudence giues him Counſell, and Vallour force. The one commands and the other executes. The one diſcouers the difficulties of enterprizes; and Vallour breakes them. The one deſignes affaires; and this finiſheth them. The one ſharpens the Iudgment; and this fortifies the courage.

That a Prince muſt haue a generall knowledge of all Sciences.

Prudence to be ſuch as it ought to be in a Prince muſt be accompanied, with a generall knowledge of all ſorts of Sciences, not exactly, as to make a trade and profeſſion; but

but he muſt know as much as is neceſſary for him, to diſtinguiſh truth from falſhood, and to vnderſtand thoſe which diſcourſe according to occurrents. His profeſſion is not to bee an Engineere, to build houſes, to make a Bridge, or to be a good Canonneere: But to know thoſe that are moſt fit; and iudiciouſly to make vſe of Men of all ſorts of profeſſions. Neyther muſt the Prince bee amazed at this knowledge, which is required in him as of a thing impoſſible, amidſt the variety of affaires and occupations, which they of this quality haue vſually; nor to diſtruſt his vnderſtanding and capacity: For there is nothing therein but is moſt eaſie.

And among other meanes to get this generall knowledge, the principall is to haue about him a good number of Men, great in all ſorts of Sciences, as Diuines, Philoſophers, Mathematitians, and Captaines, for whom (be it at table or elſe where,) he may in few words learne that which cannot be apprehended in many moneths at ſchoole: To giue them a ſubiect of diſcourſe, in walking, bee it on foot or horſ-backe, going a hunting, and in all other occaſions; to keepe them prepared, ſo as preſenting themſelues before him, they may be ready to deliuer ſomething that is rare and excellent. Yet he muſt remember, if he meanes to haue them diſcourſe before the world in his preſence, to aduertiſe them ſecretly ſometime before, of that which he meanes to propound, to the end they may be prepared; for the moſt ſufficient may bee ſurprized: And not to reprehend him before the world; the which would doe wrong to his reputation, and that of the Prince would likewiſe ſuffer, for that they would conceiue he had made a bad choyce. Thus the Prince imploying the time onely, which others ſpend in the encounters of ieſters, he will in a ſhort time bee as learned as ſhall bee neceſſary for him.

Alexander, *Iulius Cæſar*, *Charlemaigne*, *Charles* the wiſe King of *France*, and *Alphonſo* the tenth King of *Caſtille*, The practiſe of many great Princes.

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Caſtille, had not want of affaires and imployments: And yet they found leiſure to read, and ſome to write. *Alphonſo* the firſt King of *Naples*, who in his time had as many affaires and croſſes as any other of his quality, ſayd, that a Prince without Learning was an Aſſe Crowned.

Of experience.

Experience is the Mother of Prudence, for that many things ſeeme grounded vpon reaſon, and eaſie in familiar diſcourſe; the which being put in execution, ſucceed not, as they conceiue: but contrariwiſe they haue found ſome impoſſible. Experience is of two ſorts. For eyther we get it of our ſelues, by that which we obſerue, and whereof we are eye witneſſes: Or by the report of others. The report of others, is eyther of the liuing, or ſuch as are dead. In regard of the firſt, although it extends not farre, by reaſon of time; Yet it may imbrace many places, for that Embaſſadours, Spyes, Marchants, Souldiers, and ſuch like perſons, who (eyther for pleaſure, or for affaires, or for ſome other ſubiect,) haue beene in many places, and haue found themſelues in diuers Encounters, may teach vs many things for our conduct.

Two ſorts of experience.

The knowledge o hiſtory neceſſary for a Prince.

But Hiſtory paſſeth much farther, and with much more profit: For there is ſeene the life of the world, the manners and faſhions of Nations; the diuers Eſtabliſhment of Eſtates; the beginning, progreſſe, middeſt, and end, and the cauſes of the encreaſe, and ruine of Empires. There may bee learned the cauſes, for the which ſome Princes raigne peaceably, and others in troubles and conbuſtion; Some in making war, and others in being prodigall; And ſome ſtayed in their expences with dignity. But to relate here all that is neceſſary to Prudence, we muſt make a repetition of all that is formerly ſpoken, this treaty tending onely to this point, wee will content our ſelues to propound ſome rules, which concerne onely the Prudence of the Prince.

CHAP.

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CHAP. 7.

Rules and necessary instructions for a Prince to be held wise.

A Prince may easily iudge by himselfe what may be the deliberations of all others of his condition. Interest is the part and reason which preuailes, and makes the resolutions bend to that side where it shewes it selfe: And therefore he must neither trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest.

A Prince must oppose himselfe against a mischiefe in its breeding, and resolutely: For that disorders grow, and fortifie themselues in such manner with time, as they surpasse our forces. But when the mischiefe exceeds the forces of the Prince, then he shall doe wel to deferre it, for that with time matters may change: & he that hath time, as they say hath life. Hee may not consent that they put any thing in deliberation, which may cause charge or innouation in the Estate: For that the propositions which are made in the Princes Councell, giue him credit, how strange and pernicious soeuer they be It is a signe that there is some difficulty to discouer the good and euill that is in this subiect, seeing they bring it into consultation.

He must not thinke in his resolutions to be able to auoide all inconueniences: For that cannot bee. There is no generation of things in this world, how good soeuer, but a corruption hath gone before it. But he must weigh the inconueniences, and choose the party wherein there are least, and most easie to preuent. He may not imbrace many Enterprizes at once: For hee that

Eſtates is proceeded ſo farre as Offices are giuen to them that will offer moſt. An apparent ſigne that theſe Eſtates are neare vnto their ruine.

Diuers meanes to make choiſe of thoſe which are to be eſtabliſhed in the adminiſtration of Iuſtice.

Some Princes haue had this care, to propound in publique the names of thoſe whom they meant to ſend into Prouinces, to ſee what might be obiected before they ſent them. Others haue made Rolles, of thoſe that were to be imployed in Offices, cauſing themſelues to be informed ſecretly by good men: And others haue choſen them according to the opinion of the people. But the ſafeſt meanes is that whereof we haue ſpoken, to cauſe them to execute the meaneſt Offices from degree to degree, before they were aduanced to others of great importance. For then more men are able to teſtifie of their Experience and Diſcretion; and their Actions being as it were publique, and apparent to all the World, it is more eaſie to iudge. In petty charges they will accuſtome themſelues to doe well, for the deſire they haue to be aduanced to greater: And admit they would tranſgreſſe, beſides that the euill cannot be great, it may be eaſily corrected.

That the Prince muſt haue a care to preſerue the integrity of thoſe that are to doe Iuſtice.

But this is not all, to haue choſen ſuch as muſt attend Iuſtice (although that it would bee more then halfe the worke, to haue choſen them good and capable men) but man changeth; and many times amidſt the malice of men which are reported vnto him to iudge, he learnes to be malicious. Wherefore the Prince muſt alwayes haue an open eye to maintaine them in Integrity: And this demonſtration which he ſhall make, in reproaching them for ſome fault which they haue committed, will in a manner ſuffice in an Age that is not too much corrupted: But in another, hee muſt according to occurrents adde to his helping hand, to preuent the miſchiefe.

Diuers meanes to preſerue the integrity of Iudges.

One of the meanes to auoyde the euill, and to preſerue the integrity of Iudges, is, after that hee hath made

made choiſe of honeſt men, to giue them meanes to entertaine themſelues in ſeruing the Publique: To the end he may draw them from the thought, which neceſſity might force them to, to gather goods by vnlawfull meanes. Others haue held Officers in awe by inquiries made from time to time. But the Commiſſioners of theſe ſearches being as well ſubiect to corruption as the reſt, this courſe hath not beene long obſerued.

Of the compoſitions with officers, misbehauing themſelues in their charges, and of the inconueniences which follow.

Moreouer, Princes thruſt on by the harpies of the Court, haue many times made vſe of theſe meanes, rather to gather together money, then to reforme diſorders: There hauing beene (vnder the like pretext) a publique concuſſion drawne into many Eſtates, the which hath equalled (by the meanes of generall and particular compoſitions which haue beene made) good men with the wicked; No man how good ſoeuer, being deſirous after a long vexation of impriſonment, and proceeding to run the hazard of a Iudgement of Coramiſſioners; whereof ſome are many times partizans, or depending of partizans for ſuch compoſitions, or rewarded by the Fines and Confiſcations which they make; and for a ſmall matter would hang a man to haue his clothes.

Another miſchiefe which is committed in ſuch compoſitions, is, that by the meanes thereof the wicked remayning ſtill in his Office, vnder hope to be freed another time at the ſame rate, doe worſe then they did before: And hee which is an honeſt man, ſeeing himſelfe compell'd and forced to pay a Fine for an offence which hee hath not committed, reſolues to doe it, as well to re-embource himſelfe, as to haue meanes another time to ſatisfie the auarice of the Authours of ſuch ſearches.

That a Prince hauing pardoned an Officer, may not ſuffer him in his charge.

Wherefore they muſt eyther make no enquiries, or elſe they muſt finiſh them by the courſe of Iuſtice. But if in ſuch things the Prince will ſhew fauour, and pardon ſome one mans life: At the leaſt after hee is reprehended,

CHAP. 9.

Of the reputation of a Prince; and the meanes how to get it.

Valour the cauſe of a Princes reputation.

VAlour is another part which ſerues to reputation, and it is of ſuch importance, as power is much inferiour vnto it. Valour procures power; and without valour power is loſt. This is ſeene in many Eſtates, the which with ſmall forces haue beene conquered by valour; and others for want of valour haue loſt themſelues with their power.

How important and neceſſary it is in a Prince.

And although that valour conſiſts chiefely in the interiour and courage: Yet to maintaine this courage, he muſt haue care of the exteriour. A Prince may well be couragious, if hee be ſickly and incommodated of his health, and that as they ſay, his legges faile him; his courage may be commendable, but very vnprofitable for him and his Eſtate. Wherefore he muſt haue a care of two things. The one to entertaine this vigour of ſpirit, and to keepe it in action, by a deſire of honour and glory, be it by the reading of valiant exploits of Warre, performed by great Princes and Captaines, or by the conuerſation of couragious and wiſe men, putting them often vpon the Diſcourſe of great Enterprizes, which they or others haue done; or be it by the conſideration of that which concernes the Duty of a Prince, and the ſhame and contempt which they ſuffer in this quality run into, which haue beene baſe and Cowards.

Meanes to get and entertaine this courage and valour.

The other care which a Prince ought to haue, is to entertaine himſelfe in health, and to get an able and ſtrong complexion. Sobriety and moderation in Meats, ſerue greatly to preſerue health, as gluttony and drunkennes altereth much. And frō thence proceed indigeſtions, crudities,

ties, gouts, and other diſeaſes. Continency is likewiſe of great force; there being nothing that doth more weaken chaſt men, nor that debilitates the ſpirit and body more, then an exceſſiue laſciuiouſneſſe. The forces likewiſe increaſe with exerciſe, as that of Hunting, or others which conſume the humours of the body. And to frame a ſtrong and able complexion, he muſt in good time accuſtome himſelfe to cold, heate, watching, hunger, to water, wine, and to all courſes of life: The encounters being ſo diuers, to the which a Prince muſt accommodate himſelfe, that one failing, ſometimes this defect makes many things impoſſible vnto him.

There are yet many things to bee done, which may ſerue a Prince to get reputation: As to couer his defects and weakeneſſe cunningly, is a great meanes to to preſerue his credit: To make ſhew (yet without oſtentation) of his forces to thoſe that are more weake: To flye, and ſhew himſelfe an Enemy to vanity and much talking, but to doe more then hee ſpeakes. To talke gravely, and with a ſolid Iudgement: to maintayne his word, the teſtimony of courage and a firme Iudgement: To be conſtant in aduerſity, and moderate in proſperity. Not to hazard himſelfe in enterpriſes, vnleſſe he be aſſured to preuaile; and having attempted one, not to giue it ouer, leſt he ſhew himſelfe to haue had little Iudgement in the beginning, and of as little courage to end it. Not to buſie himſelfe in petty Enterpriſes, but to ſeeke occaſions of great ones, eſpecially in the beginning of his Reigne: For that thereby they ſettle a Iudgement of that which will follow. He muſt not ſeeme to depend on the counſell and will of another; for that were to eſtabliſh a Superiour and companion, and to make his inſufficiency knowne. Diuers other meanes for a Prince to get reputation.

He may not imploy himſelfe in things which are vnder the dignity of a Prince; as *Nero* buſied himſelfe in Singing, to make Verſes, and to be a good Coach-man; *Domitian*

Domitian ſpent his time in Shooting and in taking of Flyes; and *Aropas* King of the *Macedonians*, imployed himſelfe in making of Lanthornes; *Valentinian* to make Images of Waxe; *Rene* Duke of *Anion*, and Earle of *Prouence* to paint, *Chilperic* King of *France*, and *Thibant* King of *Nauarre*, to rime; and *Alphonſo* King of *Caſtille* in Aſtrologie: But he ſhall imploy himſelfe to know his Eſtate, and that which may ſerue for the good gouernment. The vniformity of life in a Prince, and the conſtancy in his commands doth alſo breede him reputation.

He muſt likewiſe treat his affaires with dignity, and not by men which are of a baſe and vild condition. The baſeneſſe of Miniſters doth vilefie his affaires, and the weakeneſſe ruins them; and both the one and the other makes the world beleeue that the Prince diſtruſts great men, or that he feares to be diſcouered, inferiour in affaires, by thoſe which ſhall haue more vnderſtanding, or that he hath no iudgment in making ſuch a choice. But he may not ſuffer great talkers to approach neere vnto him, nor admit them to his ſecret affaires, for feare leaſt they ſhould diſcouer his actions and deſignes, by an itching deſire which ſuch Monckies haue commonly to babble.

He muſt not grow familiar with all ſorts of perſons, nor ſhew himſelfe to often but vpon great occaſions, and with a countenance and behauiour full of Maieſty: And in his extraordinary ioy heauineſſe or choller, hee ſhall not ſhew himſelfe at all; but ſhall paſſe his firſt motion in his Cabinet, and out of the ſight of his followers: His habite muſt be graue and modeſt without extrauagancy, he ſhall auoyd extremities in all his courſes, ſhewing himſelfe neither ſlow nor raſh, but he ſhall rather incline to the firſt then to the laſt; for the firſt hath a dependance of Prudence and Grauity, and the other of lightneſſe and raſhneſſe; he muſt make more accompt

of

of truth then opinion, and haue a care that all that proceedes from him may be great, accompliſhed, excellent and admirable, finally that he doe leſſe and doe it well, that he ſuffer not any diſobedience which may be drawne into example.

That the affaires of importance may depend vpon him alone, without impartirg it to any man what fauour ſoeuer he beare him, as the authority to make Lawes, to giue priuiledges, to make peace or warre, to giue pardons, to make choice of his principall Miniſters, to impoſe Taxes, Subſidies, and other leuies of Money, to fortifie places, to caſt Ordnance, to recompence others out of his Treaſure, to aduance to Dignities or ſuch other things as he ought to reſerue.

By Magnificence he may likewiſe get reputation, as by the ſtructure of publique Buildings, Pallaces, Churches, Fountaines, Fortifications of Townes and ſuch like places, which redowne to the benefit of the publique. Religion likewiſe knowne to be in a Prince, imports him much for his reputation, for ſhewing himſelfe to be full of Piety, the people will conc iue that he will be likewiſe iuſt, and that he will not vndertake any thing but with the aſſiſtance of God: Wherefore it imports him much to make eſteeme of Church-men, which are knowne to haue probity and ſufficiency in them, to retaine ſome about him, to procure a good reformation in the Church by mild and lawfull meanes, without Trouble, Schiſme, or Deuiſion, to diſpoſe of Benefices to capable men, to haue care of the poore, and finally to imploy himſelfe in all workes of Piety.

By theſe laſt meanes a Prince may in time of Peace maintayne his reputation, hauing no neede in time of Warre to ſeeke for other particularities then his owne valour: The which ſhewing it ſelfe in occaſions which ſhall preſent themſelues, will maintaine them alwayes in credit and reputation. But if in the time of Peace they

deſire

deſire ſomething more of him, there being people to whom he muſt giue a ſubiect of diſcourſe, and buſie them in the conſideration of their Princes actions, otherwiſe they contemne them: The Prince muſt imploy himſelfe ſometimes to reforme Iuſtice, ſometimes the Treaſure, ſometimes the diſcipline of Warre, and alwaies to make ſome new Eſtabliſhment which may ſerue the Eſtate. *Auguſtus* hauing brought all his affaires to an end, and finding no more ſubiects to entertaine the people of *Rome* with his actions, he imployed himſelfe to reforme the Callander.

So in the like encounters, the Prince muſt ſeeke all meanes to quicken his reputation in the ſpirits of the ſubiects, and to make them beleeue that he is not idle, giuing them occaſions to ſpeake well of him, and hinder them from detracting and ſpeaking ill.

Hauing diſcourſed of the meanes, by the which a Prince might get or maintaine his authority: Let vs ſee the meanes and remedies, which may bee found for that which may cauſe the ruine of the Eſtate. To know if the remedies bee proper, wee muſt likewiſe know the diſeaſe.

CHAP. 10.

Of the cauſes of the ruines of Eſtates: and of theremedies which may be found.

The cauſe of the ruine of Eſtates.

THe workes of nature faile by two kinds of cauſes: whereof ſome are exteriour, and others interiour. The exteriour are Fire, Sword, and ſuch other violences. The interiour are the exceſſe and corruptions of the firſt qualities. In like manner States are ruined eyther

eyther by forraigne force and violence, or by the corruption and diſorder that is with it; but more rarely by the firſt alone then by the laſt: And we haue ſeldome ſeene any Eſtate ruined by forraigne force, which was not firſt corrupted within it.

Yet let vs ſpeake ſomething of the ordinary meanes, by the which wee may preuent a forraigne force. Eyther the Prince that is aſſailed by this force, is equall in power to him that aſſailes him, and in all meanes and neceſſary aduantages for his defence: Or elſe he is weaker either in meanes or for that hee hath not his forces ready to oppoſe. It hee be equall, he may fore-ſee his enemies deſſigne: And if hee hath any iuſt and tollerable pretext to make an offenſiue Warre, he muſt not ſtand vpon his defence. Among Princes which make Warre, he that layes the cloth (as the prouerbe ſayes) payes the reckoning. For, beſides that his countrey is ruined as well by his owne Army, as by that of his Enemies, the amazement is greater among his Subiects; And hee will not dare to hazard a Battaile, which would endanger his whole Fortune, for that looſing it, he ſhall not onely looſe his men but alſo his Countrey: Whereas his Enemy may aduenture it with farre more aduantage, his Eſtate being ſecure, and whatſoeuer happens he can looſe but men. A remedy againſt the violence of ſtrangers.

But if the Prince be weaker then his Enemy which inuades him, he muſt procure him ſome greater Enemy, or many which may effect that which he cannot doe alone. He muſt likewiſe practiſe factions and diuiſions with his Enemy, and get intelligence with ſome one of his prime Councellors or great Men, and with thoſe that haue moſt authority and credit with his Enemy; to the end they may diſwade him from this Warre, or diuert it, or make it vnprofitable, in ſlacking the executions, or giuing aduice of his deſignes, to the end hee may oppoſe himſelfe in time.

But if the practiſes be ſuch, as they may breed a feare in

knowes what might haue happened, if wee had choſen the contrary party. Finally if wee doubt which is the beſt, or ſhorteſt way: Wee muſt hold the ſtraighteſt.

We muſt not in difficult affaires, diue into all ſorts of inconueniences, nor in accords and treaties, trouble our ſelues with nice poynts, which grow vſually in treating: But wee muſt looke to the maine, and to aſſurances. I might adde hereunto an infinite number of other rules, the which might ſeeme a Prince to make him to be held Prudent in practiſing them. Yet I doe not hold that in matter of State, hee ſhould ſo tye himſelfe to rules and maximes, as he ſhould not peaze and waigh the circumſtances, and particularities of affaires: For hee may encounter with ſuch a circumſtance, as he ſhall be forced to take a reſolution contrary to maximes. But the greateſt figne of prudence in a Prince, is to be ſecret: Otherwiſe he ſhould betray himſelfe; and none of his reſolutions would ſucceed.

CHAP. 8.

Of Cunning or Pollicy.

AND for that they make two ſorts of prudence; the one which is guided by the ordinary maximes of honeſty and Iuſtice, and the other which conſiſts more in ſurprizes and deceipt, which they call cunning: Many haue doubted, whether it were expedient for a Princes reputation, to make vſe of this laſt. Wherein I will ſpeake my opinion here; but I will deliuer that of one of our time, who hath written vpon this ſubiect: Who holds that Fraud, Cunning and Deceipt, if they be without vice or wickedneſſe, may bee allowed

lowed vnto a Prince. for the Publique good, and for his defence and preseruation; but not to offend any man. It is his duty, to procure the Publique good, and the health of the people. This is the soueraigne Law, by the which the Prince ought to gouerne all his actions.

Wicked men should haue too much aduantage, if by cunning they might not repell their cunning. It is lawfull to defend an Estate with the same Armes, with the which they assaile it. It is not tollerable to turne the backe to honesty and iustice, but sometimes to giue about it and coast it. But the more distinctly to explicate this, we will borrow the distinction which he makes, of diuers sorts of cunning and deceipts: Some are light; others great; and some meane and indifferent. The light he not only allowes to Princes but commands them. The meane he tollerates. The greater he forbidds. Diuers sorts of cunning.

Among the light, he puts distrust and dissimulation. Distrust is as necessary in a Prince, as credulity is hurtfull. So it hath beene called the strength of prudence; that is to say, to watch, to beleeue nothing lightly, and to haue an eye to all things. He must therefore trust few Men, and those long knowne and often tryed. And yet hee may not so slipp the line in such sort, as hee doth not alwayes hold it by one end, and haue an eye to it: But hee must couer and disguise his distrust, yea, in distrusting he must make a shew to haue some confidence. For open distrust offends, and inuites another as well to deceiue vs, as too much indiscreet confidence. They haue many times had a desire to deceiue him, whom they haue found fearefull to bee deceiued: And on the other side, an open confidence bindes some to guard loyalty. From distrust they come to dissimulation, which smothes the forehead, and couers the thought; no lesse necessary for a Prince then the first. But he Dissimulation.

must learne how to play this part cunningly, without exceſſe or foolery, making open profeſſion of ſimplicity, cheriſhing thoſe that are free and open, as enemies to diſſimulation; and that in ſmall matters the Prince proceede openly, to the end they may hold him for ſuch in greater.

Of the practiſes and intelligences of Princes in the Eſtates one of another.

Another ſort of deceipt, and ordinary among Princes, are the practices and intelligences which they haue in the Eſtates one of another; drawing cunningly the hearts of their Neighbours, officers, ſeruants, and confidents, to diſcouer their ſecrets, and to croſſe the deſignes of their Maſters, and ſometimes to lend a hand to ſome Enterprize againſt their Maſters perſon. This hath proceeded ſo farre, as it hath ſometimes corrupted euen the Wiues of Princes. This is done by two meanes: Either by perſwaſion, making vſe of the diſcontentments which great men haue of their Maſters: Or by money which is the moſt vſuall courſe. And many haue held this manner of proceeding allowed againſt an Enemy, a rebellious or ſuſpected Subiect, yea, againſt any ſtranger with whom they haue no alliance: But againſt his Friends, Allies and Confederates, as treachery, which ought not to be practiſed as they doe at this day.

Of Equiuocation, faire words, promiſes, letters, Embaſſies, & lies, to obtain ſome aduantage.

There are Princes to whom all ſorts of meanes are iuſt to gaine ſome aduantage, and to attaine to their deſigne: who haue made vſe to deceiue by Equiuocations, faire words, promiſes, Letters, Embaſſies, yea, and by lies, to obtaine that which they could not otherwiſe doe, by reaſon of the difficulty of time and affaires. *Plato* allowes this deceipt, ſo as it be for the good of the Subiects. Yet to make this proceeding iuſt, there muſt be a neceſſity; and it muſt be in a troubleſome and confuſed time; and not onely to aduance the good, but to diuert ſome great miſchiefe, and againſt the wicked.

The proceeding of Princes to defend themſelues and their Eſtates from their Enemies, vniuſt in themſelues, but excuſable by neceſſity.

There are other kinds of proceeding, frequent enough in Princes, to preſerue themſelues and their Eſtate from their Enemies; the which can not be excuſed but by neceſſity:

neceſſity: And the Prince which is reduced to this point, muſt know that it is a miſery for him to ſee himſelfe forced to leaue the ordinary courſe of Iuſtice, for the ſafety of his Eſtate, and he may not proceed but with ſome feeling of griefe, but he muſt carry himſelfe therein like a Father, when he is forced to cauterize, or cut off a member of his Child to ſaue his life. I will ſet downe here ſome examples: As to put thoſe ſecretly to death, and without forme of Iuſtice, which cannot be puniſhed without trouble and danger to the Eſtate. If they deſerue death, the Prince who may diſpence with the other formes, may likewiſe diſpence for the ſafety of his Eſtate. To clip the wings, and ſhorten the meanes of ſome one which mutines and fortifies too much in the Eſtate, and makes himſelfe fearefull before he hath a commodity to attempt. To diue by authority into the purſes of his rich Subiects, in ſome neceſſity and pouerty of the Eſtate. To reuoke the priuiledges giuen to ſome one, or to ſome Communalties, or particular men, to the preiudice of the Soueraigne and the Eſtate. To ſeaze vpon ſome neighbour place, for feare that another holding it, he ſhould make Warre againſt vs and ruine vs.

All theſe things are in themſelues vniuſt; but this iniuſtice is ballanced by neceſſity and publique profit. Neceſſity as they ſay, hath no Law: And the Prince reduced to theſe termes, muſt know not onely how to command according to the Lawes, but alſo how to command the Lawes themſelues. All is, that the Prince doth not forge this neceſſity and conſtraint himſelfe, for to ſatisfie his couetouſneſſe or ambition: For in ſtead of purchaſing the reputation to be wiſe, he will cauſe himſelfe to bee eſteemed an vniuſt and inhumane Tyrant.

CHAP.

imbraces too much, gripes not fast: But hee must assure his Estate before hee attempts a Warre of a long continuance.

Hee may not quarrell with one more powerfull then himselfe, but dissemble the injuries of the mighty, and the offences which cannot bee punished. To yeeld sometimes to time, and rough encounters is Wisedome: And in a strong storme to strike saile, and to accommodate himselfe with the strongest, yea with disaduantage, to preuaile ouer the weaker. And thus the Prince shall increase the courage of his Men, and make himselfe fearefull to his Enemies: it being not Wisedome to commit himselfe to hazard and Fortune, for a light matter.

The Prince may not make any suddaine charge, for that it cannot be done without violence; and violence doth seldome produce an effect that is durable. Being ready for the execution of an Enterprize, he may not deferre it, vnlesse hee finds an apparrant danger in the execution: For time may breede more harme then good. Hee must likewise preferre old things before new, rest before trouble, the certaine before the vncertaine, and safety before hazard.

Hee may not breake nor attempt against powerfull common-weales, vnlesse it bee with great aduantage, and in a manner a certaine hope to prenaile. For the loue of libertie to such as haue it, is so strong; as it is a difficult thing, yea impossible to roote it out: And moreouer the Enterprizes and designes of Princes, die with them; but the resolutions of such free Estates are immortall. Hee may not likewise breake with the Church for a small matter. For that many other Princes, who would bee glad to worke their owne ends, vnder pretext of Religion, and of succouring the Church, will be glad to ioyne with it: And the Warres of Princes against Popes, are of great expences and little profit.

Wee

We haue ſpoken formerly of the election of Miniſters; we will adde here, that he muſt haue a care they may be equall to the affaires, not ſuperiours, nor inferiours. For that they which eſteeme themſelues capable of a greater matter, then that which is committed vnto them, neglect it, and contemne it; and they which are vncapable, and cannot diſcharge the place, diſgrace and are preiudiciall to thoſe that imploy them.

If his Eſtate be great, to diſcharge himſelfe of ſome humors, hee may entertaine a Warre with ſome of his Neighbours: Yet hee may not continue it ſo long, as hee ſhall make his Enemy too Warrelike: But ſhall make a peace with him, although he himſelfe were the ſtronger. For by this meanes hee ſhall giue a Law to the treaty, and may preſerue his aduantages, and then begin Warre with another: He ſhall make himſelfe powerfull and fearefull to all, being ſtill Armed, and hauing Men inured to Warre. This is the *Turkes* vſe with his Neighbours, who hath ſetled himſelfe in his conqueſts by this meanes: It being a great indiſcretion in a Prince, to forbeare to make a peace, vntill hee can make no more reſiſtance. For then all the conditions are to his diſaduantage: And admit hee would not continue the Warre againſt ſome one of his Neighbours; Yet hee may not wholely relinquiſh Armes; for that a diſarmed peace is weake.

But he muſt haue a ſpeciall care not to attempt a War againſt his ſubiects; and if he be preſt to it, let it bee with great aduantage, and end it ſpeedily: For the more the Warre continues, the more his ſubiects are incenſed and eſtranged from him; ſo as they can neither obey him, nor afterwards truſt in their Prince. Wherefore he muſt not oppoſe himſelfe directly againſt a multitude: For admit hee ſhould preuaile (the which notwithſtanding would bee difficult) it cannot be without loſſe of the loue which they beare him. But like

vnto good Marriners, hee ſhall take aſide wind, when as that in the Pope is contrary; and ſhall make ſhew to giue that, which hee cannot hinder nor take from them. But aboue all hee muſt bee warie in diuiſions of his Eſtate, not to remaine partiall; and in the place of Prince to make himſelfe head of a partie. The Enterprizes wherein courage is neceſſary, muſt be performed with Celeritie, the which will giue vs the aduantage which wee want, and which wee cannot haue by our owne forces. Celeritie ſtrikes ſuddainely; and againſt force if wee haue time, wee may fortifie our ſelues with that which is neceſſary to reſiſt.

The one puts an Enemy in diſorder, and the other breaks him: And it is more eaſy to diſorder him and then breake him; then to breake thoſe at the firſt charge, that are in order. Yet there are certaine enterprizes, in the which wee muſt vſe time and patience, not raſh violence; for that delay weakens with time and occaſion; and it is more eaſie to weaken then quite ouerthrow a buſineſſe, then to force it ſuddenly.

Aboue all things the Prince muſt ſtudy to know the oportunity of occaſions, for his enterprizes and affayres; which is no other thing but an encounter of many circumſtances, which makes that eaſy which before ſeemed difficult. Hee may not commit the execution of an Enterpriſe to him, which is not of aduice, it ſhould bee attempted; For that the will cannot bee followed by the effect, if the vnderſtanding doth not incline thereuuto, and ſerue him for a guide: And hee which hath not held a buſiueſſe eaſy before the Execution will find more difficulty in the Execution. Hee muſt conſult naturally of Enterpriſes: But, as I haue ſaid elſewhere, hee muſt leaue the meanes of the Execution, to the diſcretion of him to whom hee commits it. For the Execution depending for the moſt part, vpon oportunity and preſent occaſions

which

which vary continually, to limit it is no other thing, then to intangle the Miniſter, and to ſpoile the buſineſſe.

A Prince muſt not thinke in flying to preſerue himſelfe in miſchiefe and danger; but he muſt oppoſe againſt it; For that in flying, he not only followes, and falls vpon vs; but withall many other dangers grow: Whereas in making head wee ſtay him, and then we repulſe him in time; and the danger moſt commonly diſſolues to nothing. In conſulting of an Enterprize, hee muſt auoid ſharpe Councell and full of ſubtilty; for they ſeldome ſucceed, and a few croſſes make them vnprofitable: As alſo thoſe which haue more ſhew and vanitie then a good foundation. In the Eſtate hee muſt build vpon that which is ſolid and firme: As likewiſe hee muſt fly thoſe which are full of expences, and aboue his forces and meanes. But hee muſt follow Councell grounded in reaſon vpon ſafety, and little ſubiect to be croſt by accidents. Yet he that aſſailes, muſt hazard ſometimes: But when the queſtion is to preſerue, he muſt commit nothing to Fortune. Wherefore ſlow Councels are more fitting for great Princes, which haue more neede to preſerue, then to get, and thoſe which are ſuddaine will bee more proper for conquerours.

But in doubtfull occaſions which are vrgent and precipitate, there is nothing worſe then ſlow and middle Councels. Courage will be alwayes more profitable, and leſſe preiudiciall, vnleſſe they be reſolued wholy to yeeld. In affaires where the reaſons are ſtrong on all parts, and where it is in a manner impoſſible to ſee and chooſe that which is moſt commodious and profitable, (the which breeds in vs doubts and perplexities) the beſt is to incline to that party, where there is more honeſty and Iuſtice. For though it miſcarries; yet we ſhall alwayes haue a ſatisfaction remaining in vs, and a glory outwardly, and to haue choſen the beſt. Beſides, no man

the care of many ; For that many hauing once found the benefit, will not willingly yeild to leaue it : And a multitude being irreſolute among themſelues, tend rather to leaue affaires in the Eſtate they are in, then to change them, vnleſſe they bee thruſt on by ſome apparant profit, or by ſome Man of credit and authority. Hence it comes, that the companies of greateſt authority in an Eſtate, oppoſe themſelues more willingly to all innouations, how good ſoeuer ; And conſent not to the change of the ancient ordinances, although they be accompanied with abuſes.

But for that the ſame men, which made their profit of the abuſe before the reformation, continuing ſtill in thoſe places where the abuſe was committed, will finde meanes ſufficient to fruſtrate it : Some haue beene of aduice to change them, and to imploy them elſe where : and others to attribute the knowledge of the contrauentions, which haue beene committed to the preiudice of this reformation, to other Iudges, then thoſe of that body which they meane to reforme. Yet therein they muſt gouerne themſelues, according to the facility or difficulties which are found in ſuch Eſtabliſhments,

Theſe are the principall conſiderations, which ought to bee obſerued in a reformation ; beſides thoſe which priuate occaſions, and the quality of diſorders may breed in our minds. Let vs now come to the diſorders which proced from the Subiects, and may aduance the ruine of an Eſtate, if they be imbraced by the Enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. 13.

Of the Subiects defects in generall, which cauſe the ruine of an Eſtates

ALthough that naturall Subiects owe all obedience to their Prince, and it is their good ſo to maintaine themſelues: Yet the nature of a multitude is ſo inconſtant, as it cannot long ſubſiſt in one Eſtate. Hauing no imployment, they inuent ſome themſelues, and forge a thouſand deſignes to their owne diſaduantage. The moſt generall defects and pecant humours of a multitude.

Peace and abundance, are the things which ſhould giue a people the greateſt ſubiect of content, and containe them, for that they cannot change this condition without impayring. But the one in the end makes them idle; and idleneſſe being tedious vnto them, they imploy their ſpirits to thinke ill; and which is worſe, to doe miſcheife. The other makes them ſtately, proud, and vntractable; who like vnto pampered Iades, kicke many times at their Maſters that haue fed them. But in danger and feare, they are tractable and eaſie to mannage, louing after their owne pleaſure, and fearing at the diſcretion of another, and neuer iudging but by paſſion. For although that ſome one haue done euill, yet if the people loue him, they perſwade thēſelues that the action had ſome good ground: And if they hate him, although he hath done well and vertuouſly, yet they interpret all to a bad ſence, and attribute a good action to a ſiniſter intention, and a bad deſſigne.

In all that which they affect, they looke rather to an apparant profit, then to that which is iuſt and honourable; And if in ſhewe there be any thing to hazard, or to looſe, although the end may bee happy and ſucceſſefull, yet they will

will alwayes be of opinion to abandon that party. They neuer imbrace affaires but by the ſhewe, without examining the importance, if it be any thing remote; They hate the preſent affaires, as thoſe wherof they are moſt ſenſible; they forget a miſcheife paſt, although it bee farre greater then the preſent; They loue thoſe which are turbulent in their actions and of ſuddaine execution. They vſually ſlander the actions of the Prince and his Gouernours, and complaine; Yet they are eaſie to reduce, when they ſee themſelues forced to obey, and that they haue no head nor any ſeeds of diuiſion. They hope more then they ought, and indure leſſe then they ſhould. They attribute to want of will and iudgment, that which proceeds from the want of power and meanes.

They are deſirous of innouations, and eaſie to moue vpon the firſt wind; Credulous, increaſing reports and newes, and publiſhing vſually that which is moſt forbidden; they follow the multitude, not knowing why; full of Enuy, Suſpition, and diſtruſt: ingratfull for the benefits they haue receiued, and reuengfull of iniuries, yea of another mans; little carefull of the Eſtate, and louing nothing but an vnreſtrayned liberty, whereof they are ſoone weary: finally doing nothing by election, but all by hazard.

Behold a part of the blemiſhes and defects of a people conſidered in generall: Whereon moſt part of thoſe which haue attempted againſt another mans Eſtate, haue grounded their deſignes, making vſe of them by many practiſes, according to occaſion and the condition of affaires. And although there be many among a multitude free from theſe imperfections: yet being drawne together with the reſt, the greateſt number carries it, and moſt commonly they houle (as they ſay) with the Wolues. One foole or raſh man is ſufficient to ſtopp the mouthes of many wiſe, and to make them all looſe the courſe of reaſon. And moſt commonly that which they condemne

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in particular, being in a throng, and with the rest they like of, and allow; bee it that wee are restrayned through feare to oppose our selues to the common way, which is vsually the worst, and sometimes composed of the most fooles, the most impudent, and the most mutinous; or be it that by this contagion, wee feele the like passions which transport the rest, and with the like heate wee suffer our selues to be carried to the same resolutions.

Remedies to cure the Estate of these defects and bad humours.

The Ancients finding all these pecant humours in the peoples minds, to entertaine and busie them, and by this meanes to diuert them from doing euill, haue sought out diuers meanes. The *Grecians* entertayned them with sports, Comedies, Tragedies, Wrestlings, and Olimpique Games. The *Romans* added thereunto Sword-players, representation of Nauell Battailes, and the combats of wild Beasts. The Kings of *Ægypt* busied their Subiects in the construction of Pyramides and buildings, although for the most part vnprofitable. The Christians in some places, when as they feare the peoples disposition to mutine, haue imployed them in Processions, Prayers, in the visitation of Oratories and Churches, with other extraordinary deuotions, as Cardinall *Borromeo* did often at *Millan*, and others in other places. But when as all these meanes haue not beene forcible enough to retaine them, they haue stirred vp a forraigne Warre, not only to diuert the peoples minds by this obiect; but also to entertayne them a little with the feare of a common Enemy, and to free the Estate from those pecant humours, which being still retained might ruine it.

But sometimes the Estate is so composed as it would bee dangerous to entertaine a continuall Warre, eyther for that they are weake of Men and meanes, or for feare that giuing the commandement to some one, he should get vnto himselfe the authority of Armes. The which cannot be but preiudiciall in all Estates: The Prince being vnable to bee still conductor of his Armies, without hazar-

vnusuall, and that in punishing diuers for one fact, there must be an equality of punishments obserued. But if by the death of one alone he may preserue the rest, he ought to doe it. And if there be many that be put to death, he shall cause them to suffer altogether, to the end that by the continuance of execution it may not renew the hatred.

Some haue held it fit to sweeten the hatred of an Execution, to punish the Minister which hath done it, if he be of that quality that he hath deserued it. Yet I hold this manner of proceeding vniust and tyrannous; especially if it tends to death, whereof they ought not to make so slight an accompt. Yet a Prince may in necessity, hauing no other meanes to free himselfe from Enuy, chase him away, laying the fault vpon him, and making shew that he hates him for the same Subiect, for the which he is odious vnto the people: But wholy to abandon him were basenesse. Moreouer he must sweeten rigorous Executions by benefits, yea, by gifts out of the confiscation of the parties goods which is executed, to such as be discontented with the Executiō, to the end it may appeare that not couetousnesse but only Iustice hath brought the Prince vnto it. To remedy the second, he must make it appeare, that the leuies which he raiseth, are grounded vpon the necessity of the Estate there being no Estates without tributs, customs, or Subsedies, the which are necessary to satisfie the expences, without the which the Estate cannot subsist and be maintayned. Impositions must be made with equality, according to euery mans goods and faculties, without hatred or fauour, and with moderation; not insupportable nor sordid; not too frequent nor new, nor vnder vnusuall names; They must be leuied with modesty, without couetousnesse, cruelty, or violence, and by honest men; and he must punish those seuerely that mis-behaue themselues.

A remedy against the Princes auarice.

Finally, he must make it appeare by the expences, that the money is imployed for the necessity, good, and preser-

uation

uation of the Estate, and not for the Princes ryot or prodigallity, to aduance men of no worth, and to satisfie their pleasures.

As for the defects which ingender the Subiects contempt of their Prince, there are diuers sorts. Some grow from weakneſſe of age; as Minority or a decrepit age. Others from nature; as deformity, or a bad aſpect, the naturall dulneſſe of the mind, deafneſſe, and other indiſpoſitions of the body. Others proceed from Fortune; as to be vnfortunate and without ſupport; with ſuch other defects, which can be hardly remedied. Of the Princes defects which cauſe contempt.

The principall remedy is, not to ſhewe himſelfe vpon all occaſions, whereas theſe defects may bee more viſible. *Tyberius* finding himſelfe not ſo affable as *Auguſtus*, would neuer come among the people to Playes and Theaters, as *Auguſtus* did: but kept himſelfe cloſe and retired, and neuer ſhewed himſelfe but in great actions, for the which he had prepared himſelfe long before. So the Prince muſt as much as may bee hide his imperfections; and not ſhewe himſelfe in publique, but well prepared according to his dignity, and if it may be, recompence the defect of nature by ſome aduantage of the mind.

There are other defects, which breed a contempt of the Prince in the Subiects minds, the which proceeds only by his owne fault, and may be eaſily auoyded: As irreſolution in his Councells; lightneſſe, inconſtancy, and iniuſtice in his commands; negligence in his affaires, and ſeeming to depend of another, or tying himſelfe ſo ſtrictly to ſome priuate perſon, as he truſts him with all the affaires of the Eſtate; an ordinary indiſcretion in many Princes. The onely remedy to preuent all this, is to doe the contrary, and to follow that which wee ſay muſt bee done to purchaſe reputation. Other defects of a Prince which breed contempt.

The Princes defects which breed contempt are more dangerous then thoſe which cauſe hatred.

Theſe are the defects which ingender hatred; whereof they which procure contempt are moſt dangerous. For contempt giues courage to thoſe that deſire to vndertake

whereas cruelty and auarice, although they breed hatred; yet ſuch as are fearefull: And moreouer by cruelty you diminiſh the number of your Enemies, and amaze the reſt; and by auarice and exactions you make them vnable. But the moſt preiudiciall defects are thoſe which breede hatred and contempt both together: As laſciuiouſneſſe and drunkenneſſe; the one for its beaſtlineſſe, and the other for the ſcandall and trouble of Families, which it doth vſually draw after it. Wherefore the Prince muſt not onely fly from them, but auoide the ſuſpicion.

CHAP. 12.

Of the defects of Magiſtrates, Officers, and Miniſters to the Prince.

THe defects, abuſes, and diſorders of thoſe which haue any charge and gouernment in the Eſtate, the which may further its ruine, are of two ſorts. For either theſe abuſes proceede from corruption which is found in particular perſons, of whom they haue made a bad choice, or haue beene corrupted with time; or elſe it proceeds from ſome bad cuſtome, the which vnder pretext of good, and by a bad interpretation of the Law, or of an order made in the eſtabliſhment, hath beene brought in.

To remedy the firſt, the beſt courſe will be, that ſeeing the choice was bad, to make another. But therein he muſt vſe his diſcretion: For that all changes are dangerous, and that ſometimes ſeeking to preuent a miſchiefe, the remedy is found worſe then the diſeaſe. *Lewis* the Eleuenth meaning to reforme *France*, changed all his predeceſſors Officers, whom in the end he was forced to reſtore, to auoide a generall reuolte.

A change in an Eſtate is dangerous.

If

If this corruption may be eaſily puniſhed without trouble in ſome of the principall, and that the example of puniſhment may reduce the reſt vnto their duties; he muſt doe it with ſeuerity. But if he cannot effect it, he muſt draw thoſe which nouriſh theſe abuſes from their acquaintance and familiars; And imploy them in ſome other places with honeſt men, who may ſerue as comptrolers and examples to doe well, and to keepe them in awe.

No man is willingly bad for nothing, eyther it is to doe pleaſure to ſome one, from whom he hopes for ſupport; or to reuenge his owne iniuries, or thoſe of his Friends; or for couetouſneſſe, the which he cannot well practiſe without confident mediators. Take him therefore from his acquaintance, and out of the hands of his Enemies; maintaine him againſt the greateſt, to the end hee may not feare any future wrong: There is no doubt that there being no man to whom he may intruſt his corruptions, nor whom hee may diſtruſt, hee will bee indifferent in that regard, and will haue no thought but to doe well: But retire him before he may enter into ſtrict familiarity with any man. And ſo of a man how corrupt ſoeuer, you may make good vſe of him for your ſeruice; if he be not altogether impudent and depraued: In which caſe being eaſie to diſcouer his practiſes, it will be as eaſie for the Prince to cauſe him to be puniſhed.

But if the abuſe be in the bad adminiſtration of Lawes, or of the eſtabliſhment which hath beene made of ſome order; he muſt eyther by interpretation, or by change, or by abrogation of the Law or order, prouide for it. But for that it would be a difficult thing, that they which made their profit by the abuſe, ſhould willingly yeeld vnto it, if they be many in number, he muſt make himſelfe the ſtronger, as *Licurgus* did. For in ſuch affaires they are commonly ill aſſiſted; the partizans of the reformation being cold, and they which profit in the abuſe, who

A remedy againſt the abuſe of Lawes.

(who haue the pretext of Cuſtome and the Lawes for them) are more violent to preſerue that which brings them profit.

Conſiderations neceſſary for a reformation.

But the Prince muſt firſt conſider duly, if that which he meanes to eſtabliſh, will hold: For that abuſes which haue taken a deepe roote, are hardly pulled vp; and ſometime it is more fit to liue with theſe abuſes quietly in an Eſtate, then ſeeking to take them away, to put all into confuſion. It is a body which hath an infirmity, the which you muſt ſtriue to cure, yet in ſuch ſort, as you put not the patient in danger of death. It is a Philme in the eye; yet the eye hath not wholy loſt its ſight: If you cannot cleare it without loſſe of the ſight, it were better to leaue it there.

Aboue all in a reformation you may not make a Law that looks too farre backward, and makes vs enter into the ſearch of that which is paſt long ſince; Neither muſt they eſtabliſh an order altogether new: But you muſt gently and by little and little reduce them to their firſt inſtitution, and not pull vp the Tree to plant another in its place; but ſet it by. The ſtring which makes an Inſtrument out of tune, muſt be gently ſtraind, vntill it be in tune, and not broken. We know the defects and inconueniences of an ancient eſtabliſhment; but we are ignorant of the inconueniences of a new.

But if the order were ſo peruerted, as it were impoſſible to make vſe of it; yet in the eſtabliſhment of a new, you muſt retaine the ſame termes, names, and qualities of the ancient: For that the people feeding themſelues more with the ſhew of truth, the face of antiquity in ſuch eſtabliſhments hath more authority with them; and nouelties are ſuſpected vnto them, and leſſe eſteemed. But if you cannot retaine the ground of this antiquity, you muſt colour the innouatiõ with the names of the ancient eſtabliſhments, to giue it credit, and to make the people thinke that there is little alteration. An aduice which hath bin practiſed

ſed by all ſuch as vnder pretext of reformation haue ſought to vſurpe an Eſtate : But this may be more iuſtly put in vſe by a law full Prince, for the good of his Subiects, and to facilitate the reformatiõ which he intends to make: In the which he hath great reaſon not to ingage himſelfe, if he doe not confidently beleeue to bring it to effect. Beſides the diſgrace which he ſhall receiue, he ſhould by his weakneſſe countenance the miſchiefe, and deſpaire of the remedy. Whereof I ſay that he ought to make himſelfe the ſtronger. The which I meane not onely of an armed force, but alſo of the inclination of the greateſt part of his Subiects. And if it may be he muſt ſo worke vnderhand, as he may be required and ſolicited to prouide for it ; beſides that it will make his deſigne eaſie, all the honour will be due to him. And if there be any enuy, he may eaſily diſcharge himſelfe vpon thoſe which haue required him. But if the Prince doubting the euent of a neceſſary reformation, deſires to make it rather by ſome one of his Miniſters, then to ingage himſelfe : In this caſe ſome haue aduiſed rather to take but one, to whom he may giue all authority, then many. For although it ſeemes more conuenient, that this reformation ſhould be countenanced by many, to the end it might carry the greater waight, and be the better receiued : yet the diuerſity of opinions that is in many heads diuerſly intereſſed, be it for themſelues, or for their Friends and Kinſfolkes, in this reformation ; the length there will bee in making them reſolue ; the difficulty in this plurality to make them keep ſecret, many ſmall ſurpriſes, policies, and cunning, which they muſt ſometimes vſe, to attaine vnto this good ; and in caſe the buſineſſe doth not ſucceed, being more difficult to diſmiſſe many, for to free himſelfe of the enuy and ſhame to haue attempted this reformation without ſucceſſe, then they may doe in one perſon: Wherfore it ſeemes more ſafe for the Prince to imploy but one. But the preſeruation of the order eſtabliſhed, muſt be left to

the

in his Enemy of a reuolt, Treaſon, Sedition, or a ciuill war; they will be much better and of greater force. Defenſiue Leagues with his Neighbours, or with the Neighbours of his Enemy, may be of great vſe, who may grow iealous of his power. For the feare which his Enemy might haue, that inuading one, all the reſt may goe to Armes, would retaine him.

Beſides this, the Prince muſt keepe good guards vpon all the principall paſſages of his Eſtate, and place ſtrong Garriſons in his Forts, who may ſtay the Enemy, and by a long ſiege cauſe him to looſe much time, and many men; and by this meanes conſume his prouiſions, and waſte his Army, whereby he may bee the better ab'e to encounter him; And if he be able to raiſe an Army, he muſt chooſe a ſtrong place at the entry of his Countrey, and lodge it in ſuch ſort, as he may bee neither forced to fight nor to diſlodge, to the end he may hinder his Enemy from paſſing on. But hauing neither forces nor forts vppon the paſſage of this quality; or the Enemies forces being ſuch, as they are not to bee ſtayed by this meanes; Some in this caſe haue themſelues waſted their owne Countrey, on that ſide where the Enemy was to enter, cauſing all to retire into the heart of the Eſtate, depriuing him not onely of all prouiſion of Victualls, but alſo of other commodities, Mills, Ouens, Lodgings, and other imployments, whereof an Army is ſeldome wholy furniſhed. The firſt againſt the *Polonians*, and the ſecond againſt the *Turkes* forces, haue aſſured their Countryes for a time, in laying a great part of the confines waſte. And the *Muſcouite* being in a Countrey which doth abound in Wood, ſhut himſelfe vp in a ſhort time; So as *Steuen* King of *Poland*, meaning to paſſe into *Muſcouie*, was forced to ſpend much time in cutting downe the Woods to make a paſſage for his Army.

And although that he which is aſſailed be the weaker, yet there hath beene ſome, which haue carried the Warre into

into their Enemies Countrey, to make a diuersion as *Agathocles* did, who being besieged by the *Carthaginians* in *Siracusa*, resolued to leaue a sufficient troupe to maintaine the Siege, and to imbarke with the rest, to transport the Warre into *Affricke*. *Boniface*, Earle of *Corsegue*, did the like, in the yeare 822. to retire the *Sarasins* out of *Sicily*. The which succeeded the more happily, for that the *Carthaginians*, the *Affricans*, who were the inuaders, hauing not fore-seene this policy, had not prouided for their Countries. And it is a generall rule, that we must assaile an Enemy where he least suspects.

But if the Enemy be so powerfull, and hath such an aduantage ouer vs, as there is no meanes to resist him, rather then to lose all, it were better to yeeld something: And if he may be freed for ready money, in making as they say a Bridge of Gold to his Enemy, he shall escape good cheape. The which hath beene happily practised by the *Florentins*, *Venetians*, and *Genois*, or else he must seeke the protection of some Prince that is neare or farre off, yet so as he may be relieued in time, or the Enemies Estate annoy'd. So the *Capouans* finding themselues prest by the *Samnites*, put themselues vnder the protection of the *Romans*. The *Genois* were sometimes protected by the *French*, and sometimes by the Dukes of *Millan*. Pope *Iulio* the second, made vse of another policy, to diuert the *French* from the Siege of *Ferrara*, selling it to the Emperour, with hope after the Warre to redeeme it againe for money: So as the *French* hauing no will to breake with the Emperour, gaue ouer their Enterprize.

There haue beene some Princes, who finding no meanes to resist, haue made choice rather to yeeld to Fortune, and to abandon their Countrey, then to see it ruined; hoping that the affaires changing, their Subiects not wholly ruined, would cal them back more willingly then if they had bin chased away by an open rebellion, or that growing

obstinate to maintaine themselues, they had bin punished by the Enemy: This succeeded happily to *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, chased from *Naples* by *Charles* the Eight: To the *Venetians* when they abandoned their Townes vpon the firme land, to the league of *Cambray*: To the Duke of *Vrbin*, who seeing himselfe vnable to make head against *Cæsar Borgia*, abandoned his Countrey, hauing first ruined all the Forts of his Estate; hoping that being well beloued of his Subiects, vpon the first alteration they will call him backe, as they did.

But for that they seeke to surprize him wh ō they meane to assaile by force, and to attaine vnto it, they deuise other pretexts to arme, to the end they may circumuent their Neighbour: And in like manner, when as two powerfull Neighbours make Warre together, and afterwards come to conclude a Peace, eyther of them seekes to free himselfe of his Souldiers, at the cost of some one of his Neighbours: The Prince which shall finde himselfe to haue such bad Neighbours, must presently arme, and stand continually vppon his guard whilest his Neighbours are in Armes.

These are the most generall and ordinary Remedies against forraigne force, the exteriour cause of the ruine of Estates.

CHAP. II.

Of the interiour Causes of the ruine of Estates.

The neare causes of the ruine of an Estate.

THe interiour Causes from whence the ruine of an Estate may grow, are of two kinds: Some are neare, others are remote. The neareſt are conspiracies against the Prince, or against the chiefe Magistrate, vnder whole authority the Estate is gouerned: The

The treaſon of Townes, ſtrong places, or Armies: The Rebellion of Subiects againſt the Prince; and the Diuiſion into factions and parties. But for that theſe cauſes grow from a precedent corruption in the Eſtate, being but the effects of remote cauſes; we muſt ſeeke the miſchiefe farther off to prouide a Remedy. The cauſes which produce theſe effects, proceede either from the defect of the Soueraigne, or of the Magiſtrates, and others which haue the chiefe charges in the gouernment of the Eſtate; or through the defect of other Subiects, which are conſidered either in generall vnder the name of people, or relatiuely by the reaſon of their ſubiection: Some being borne ſubiects to the Prince to whom they obey; others are ſubiects by conqueſt, that is to ſay, borne vnder another Prince, but haue beene ſince conquered by him to whom they obey, or elſe they are conſidered according to their condition, quality, and power, which they haue to trouble the Eſtate.

Of the remote cauſes which ruine Eſtates.

Among the defects which may be found in the Soueraigne Perſon, thoſe which may breed the Subiects hatred and contempt againſt him, are moſt preiudiciall. Thoſe which ingender hatred, are cruelty and couetouſneſſe. Cruelty ſhews it ſelfe in the executions of ſuch which he cauſeth to be puniſhed. Auarice in the leuying of money and exactions vpon his Subiects. To remedy the firſt, he muſt deale as little as may be with the puniſhments of his Subiects: but referre the Iudgement of ſuch things to the ordinary courſe of Iuſtice. But if for the good of the Eſtate, and for the little aſſurance there is in Iudges, he be forced to interpoſe himſelfe, he muſt doe it ſeldome, and make it knowne that he doth it vnwillingly, and onely in conſideration of the publique good, to the end he may retaine good men in their duties, and diuert the wicked from their bad intentions: Neither muſt he ſhew any choller, and aboue all things he muſt forbeare to be preſent at Executions; That the puniſhments muſt be ordinary, and not

Of the Soueraigne defects which ingender the Subiects hatred.

A remedy againſt the Princes cruelty.

to the end they might force them mildly to learne it.

Hee may not change the Lawes and Religion of the conquered countrey but with great iudgement.

As for the Customes and ancient Lawes of the Countrey, which concerne onely the ordring of priuate mens goods, and not the Estate, nor the obedience due vnto the Prince, he may not change them: Or if he doth, it must be done by degrees. For what iustice soeuer there be in a new Law, the people being not accustomed vnto it, will suspect it. But if the change of Lawes be preiudiciall to a Conquerour, the change of Religion is much more, there being nothing wherein the people grow more obstinate, then to retaine their ancient Religion. Yet this will be no hinderance, but by the erecting of Colledges and Seminaries of Piety, the Conquerour may bring in Learning and Knowledge, by meanes whereof gaining dayly some one, he may by little roote out that of the Countrey without force. And if he cannot speedily attaine to his designe, at the least he shall haue this aduantage, that those of the conquered Subiects which adhere to his Religion, will be confident vnto him, and making shew to fauour them, the rest will be soone reclaimed.

But whatsoeuer the Conquerourbe to bring in newly among a conquered people, be it Religion, Customes, Tributes, or Lawes: the establishments must bee made whileſt the amazement of the conquest last; and that the people are in feare of worse. For if you suffer them to know themselues, and to grow assured; besides the difficulty you shall finde to make them taste these Innouations, it is to be feared they will make vse of it for a pretext of reuolt.

Force is a powerfull meanes to containe conquered subiects in their duty.

But if all these meanes proue too weake, (as they will be with an vntamed multitude) to keepe such people in awe and obedience, there is no other meanes to containe them, then to make vse of the same force which conquered them. The *Romans* haue imployed whole Armies: yet mutinies being too ordinary, and of a dangerous

consequence

conſequence in theſe great Bodies, this example hath not beene followed by the wiſeſt Conquerours: But in ſtead thereof they haue made vſe of ſtrong Forts and good Garriſons, well commanded and gouerned. And ſome haue therein imitated the *Romans* in planting of Collonies, the which are of leſſe expence, and ſeeme more milde; but in effect they are more vnmuſt in their eſtabliſhments: For that you muſt ruine many people to ſettle them with commodity; and moreouer, they are difficult to ſettle, as well for the choice of men which you are to ſend, as for the planting of any good order amongſt them, to make them liue in peace. If you ſend of the chiefe men of your Eſtate, you vnfurniſh it, if they be many in number; if few, they will make themſelues Maſters of the reſt. If you take them all poore, as the *Romans* did, diſorders will eaſily grow amongſt them; and to liue at their owne pleaſures, they will at neede ioyne with them of the Countrey againſt you; as many Roman Collonies haue done againſt the *Romans*. But if you gather them out of diuers parts of your Eſtate, they will hardly agree.

The planting of Collonies more vnmuſt & difficult.

Yet if the conqueſt were of ſo great an extent; as the expence would proue exceſſiue, to maintaine them in their duties by force, you may make vſe of this meanes with theſe conſiderations; Firſt your Eſtate muſt be ſuch, as ſending a good number of your Subiects to that end, you may not vnfurniſh your ſelfe: That the Warre had ſo vnpeopled the conquered Countrey, as after the conqueſt you ſhould not be forced to commit ſo open an iniuſtice, as to ruine part of the Inhabitants for the planting of Collonies. Theſe ſpoyles and vnpeoplings are excuſable during the time you are in Armes: But afterwards they can admit no excuſe, what conſiderations ſoeuer are brought to the contrary, and this vnpeopling made during the Warre, giues place and excuſe to a Collony.

Conſiderations for the ſetling of Collonies.

The third consideration is, that you must send Souldiers which haue beene accustomed to liue in discipline and order: The which must not be so old, as they cannot accustome themselues to the place where they shall be planted; nor yet so young, as they shall be incapable of Discipline; but being mingled one with another, they may liue together with some good order and equality.

Other meanes to containe conquered subiects in their duties.

Besides this meanes they haue added three others to containe vntamed Subiects. The first is, to abate and mollifie their courages: The second to weaken them of forces, and to take from them all meanes to doe euill, when you cannot make them loose the desire. And the third to keepe them from assembling together, or from ioyning with their Neighbours. To attaine vnto the first,

To mollifie the courage of a conquered people.

some as the *Turks* hath ruined the Nobility and the Princes, to take from the people all meanes to assemble, and make a head vnder some Commander of courage. Others haue suffered them to abandon themselues to drunkennesse, and to all sorts of incontinency and pleasure. But these meanes are tyrannicall and filthy. *Numa* who was wiser and more moderate, to mollifie this barbarousnesse, which *Romulus* had entertained among the people of *Rome*, made vse of Religion, to the end he might retaine by the feare of the Gods, those whom the feare of men could not containe; and for this effect he caused Statues and Altars to be erected at the Corners of Streets, to the end that the people might generally be retained by the presence of Religion which they had before their eyes. In the Christian Religion diuers sorts of Orders and Rules haue bin instituted, the which besides the good which concernes Religion, purge the World of many sauage humours, which happily would doe much mischiefe. Others haue inuited people to giue themselues to all Mechannicke Arts. For besides that the mind is diuerted from euill by this imployment most commonly they which are bred vp in shops, haue no desire of troubles,

troubles, nor Warre: And admit they should affect it, they should find themselues vnfit, neither would it be successfull, there being more losse for them then gaine. Others vnder pretext of priuiledges, exempt a conquered people from going to the Warre, and by little and little make them vnprofitable by this exemption.

Some haue held that imbarking them in the study of Sciences and Learning, it was a good meanes to make them desire rest. Yet in bringing in the study of Sciences, you must distinguish them: For those which may serue for the Warre, must in no sort be imparted to the people, nor those which teach to command: But onely such as are fitting studies, as Diuinity, Phisicke, Astrology, or such like, the which so entertaine their minds, as they ioy in no other thing when they know them, and make their spirits melancholly, depriuing them of that viuacity which is necessary for military actions. Some others haue held that busying a riotous and contentious people in suits, was necessary, not onely to imploy their minds, but also to giue them meanes to vomit out this bitternesse and bad humour, whereof euery one hath a part, without troubling the Publique: And in regard thereof they haue fill'd Estates with diuers Offices, in some sort to content the most ambitious; and by the iealousie of the maintaining of their authority, to binde them to the preseruation of the Publique. But in the practice of all these meanes, they must first obserue the humour of the people with whom you are to deale; and make vse of that wherunto you shall see them inclined, and accomodate your selfe accordingly, as occasion and time will giue you leaue. As for the disarming of a conquered people of their forces and meanes, they proceed after diuers manners. The first is, to take from them all sorts of Armes: And not onely the vse, but also the matter and making of them; for in a mutiny and combustion, they may make vse of it: As also the vse of Horses and of Ships of War.

To weaken a conquered people.

Warre. To keepe their commanders about you, eyther for Councell or vnder collour of some charge: To imploy the Youth which haue beene already trayned vp to Armes, out of the Countrey: as *Cesar* did, meaning to passe into *England*, who carried with him all the Young Men, assuring himselfe by this meanes of the *Gaules*, and making vse of them against those of great Brittaine. He likewise vnder the collour of hostages, vnfurnished the Townes of their principall Men, and of such as might either serue for conduct or Councell. The Emperour *Heraclius* to weaken the *Sarasins*, entertained foure thousand *Arabians*, which were their principall force. We haue sayd that the Turke weakened the Christians, in taking their Children to be instructed in his Religion, and by this meanes fortifies himselfe. The *Desmanteling* of Townes and strong places, which a Prince will not or cannot keepe, is also necessary; For fortresses in Townes haue many times incouraged the Inhabitants to a reuolt, as *Tacitus* writes of *Ierusalem*.

To hinder the vnion of a conquered people.

There remaines the third meanes, which is to hinder these people from vniting themselues, and making a head; for their vnion will hold the place of force. Some Kings, or rather Tyrants of *Egypt*, haue made vse of the diuersity of Religions, to keepe their Subiects in diuision; Others haue entertained iealousies and distrusts among them, and sometimes hatred betwixt Neighbour Prouinces. Others haue kept their Subiects in feare: by certaine secrets and hidden searches, causing him to bee punished speedily, which was found to haue any will to Mutine: And some haue written that the inquisition in *Spaine*, although in shewe it were Established for Religion, yet they haue sometimes made it serue for an instrument of Estate.

Some haue of a Conquered Prouince made three or foure; as the *Romans* did of *Macedony*, which they deuided into foure, that is to say, *Amphipolis*, *Salonica*, *Pella*,

la, and *Pellagonia*. And besides this *Paulus Æmilius*, commanded the great Men to passe into *Italy* with their Children, and after this diuision, the Prouinces were forbidden to contract any alliances one with another. Others haue forbidden a conquered people all sorts of assemblies, allowing them neyther publique Councell, nor Comminalty, nor Brotherhood; as the *Romans* did at *Capoua*, leauing them no forme of publique command. The Turkes in like manner hath forbidden Bells, not onely to the Christians, but through his whole Empire, fearing (as some hold) that at the sound thereof, the people should gather together for some designe then for deuotion. The *Souldans* of *Egypt* fearing the multitude of the Inhabitants at *Caire*, croſt the City in many places with trenches, and broad and deepe ditches, to take all meanes from the people in a Mutinie to assemble suddenly together.

But to hinder a new conquered people, from vniting themselues with others, besides these meanes they haue restrayned them from all commerce with strangers, forbidding them to goe out of the Countrey without leaue, as some write of *England*, *Muſcouie*, and *China*, and not suffering any strangers to enter without passport, keeping guards and secret spies vpon the Ports and passages. But if you cannot preuaile by these meanes, some haue bin of opinion to transport them to other places, as they of the mountaines of *Genoua*, were drawne into the plaine by the *Romans*. *Aurelian* transplanted the *Daces* on this side the *Danowe*; *Charlemaigne* the *Saxons* into *Flanders*, and the Turke many people of *Asia* into *Greece*.

These are the meanes, whereof they haue made vse to preuent a future mischiefe, that is to say, the effects of these first causes of the ruine of an Estate. But if they haue beene forgotten, or proue too weake to stay the Subiects minds, and to keepe them from running to neerer courses to ruine the Estate: then

you

forced to put his Sonne to death, for ſome iealouſie hee had conceiued of him; yet this is not ordinary. And the Kings entertaine themſelues with their kinſmen, making much of them, and intreating them courteouſly, yet not truſting them with all their forces, which may giue them meanes to attempt, nor yet cruſhing nor diſgracing them, to the end they may not diſpaire: And by this honeſt and courteous courſe, they take from them both the meanes and deſire to doe euill.

They which are great in meanes and Reuenewes, are the ſinewes and ſtrength of an Eſtate, whom they may not in any caſe ruine, as ſome Miniſters of Tyranny haue conceiued, but they muſt bee preſerued to maintaine the Eſtate. And thoſe Eſtates where there bee not any, are expoſed in Prey to the firſt loſſe of a Battaile: For that hauing no Man that hath credit to draw them againe together, being vnfurniſhed of ſupport and councell, they preſently reſolue to yeild vpon the firſt amazement. The which hath beene often ſeene in *Aegypt*. Contrariwiſe thoſe Eſtates which haue beene powerfull in Nobility, although they haue beene often ouerthrowne, yet they haue eaſily recouered themſelues. *France* and *Perſia*, the *Engliſh* and *Spaniards*, with thoſe of *Tartary* and the *Turkes*, haue ſometimes beene oppreſt and brought low: But by the meanes of the Nobility, who haue more courage and conduct to maintaine the Eſtate then the people, they haue alwayes recouered themſelues.

And to ſay that ſuch kind of people may trouble the Prince, this may ſometimes happen, if the Prince bee a Tyrant, which ſeekes to oppreſſe them, or wants councell & courag: As they whom the *Carliens*, and *Capets*, cauſed to retire from the gouernment of the Eſtate. But neuer an able and ſufficient Prince, who knew how to make vſe of Men of this condition, ran any bad fortune with them. The meanes to make profitable vſe of them, is to countenance them with Maieſtie, to doe for them, in occa-

occasions which may be offered; to imploy them neare his person with honour and magnificence, rather then to commit his forces and all his authority into their hands: And they which shall be suspected of lightnesse and inconstancy, to cause them to be accompanied by men which may watch and obserue their actions. This is the Councell (as they write) which the Emperour *Charles* the fift gaue vnto the deceased *Philip* King of *Spaine*, to imploy great men, and to retaine them neare vnto his person in the most honourable places, and giue those of Command to men of a meaner condition: But his Sonne neglecting this aduice, in the person of *Don Iohn* of *Austrea*, drew himselfe into danger of an inconuenience.

Of great men which haue force and credit with the people by reason of his imployments in great affaires.

As for the two other sorts of great men, they cannot be such but by the Princes meanes. Wherefore it is easie for him to preuent the inconueniences which this greatnesse may cause; and the fault must be imputed to himselfe, seeing it was in his power to hinder it. The meanes which may be vsed herein, are common to eyther. For some haue beene made great, and haue gotten credit, for that they had the force and authority in their hands; And the others are great by reason of their birth. The principall meanes then to preuent the inconueniences which may grow, is in the choice, wherein the Prince must obserue foure considerations.

Considerations to aduance some one in authority.

The first is, that he commit not his forces and authority to any that are borne great; as they of whom we haue formerly spoken: For that he cannot adde so little to the greatnesse of such men, but he shall equall them vnto himselfe. The other considerations are, that he make not choice for a great command, or to lead a great Army, of a man that is audacious and vndertaking, or of one that is too cunning and subtile: Much lesse of a person that is inconstant and light, inclined to feare and hope, and subiect to follow the Enterprizes

terprizes of another, or to bee surprised by some one.

The second meanes is, not to continue great Charges, as the gouernments of Prouinces, of stron places, and of a great troupe of Souldiers lo gin one and the same person, to the end hee may auoyde three inconueniences. The first, lest that gouernments by little and little be not made hereditary and patrimonicall, as they haue done in all places of Fees; and in *France* of the ancient Earledomes, Dutches, and Marquesats. The other inconuenience is, that the Prince depriues himselfe vnaduisedly of the meanes to make vse of a better subiect, who may in time discouer himselfe vnto him. The third is, that it may be he to whom he hath giuen this charge, may through indisposition grow vnable, or by Age vnfit, or through passion or some particular designe, be preiudiciall to the Estate. The fourth meanes is, neuer to giue the great command of a Prouince to any one that is borne there; lest that by the meanes of his Kindred, Alliances, and Friends, with the fauour he may haue from the Prince, which will purchase him many seruants, he findes not meanes to perpetuate himselfe.

Inconueniences proceede from the continuation of great places in one person.

But if eyther by a bad establishment, or some bad custome, the Prince findes his Estate otherwise disposed, he may gently prouide for it, in suppressing and drawing to himselfe this great authority and power; or dismembring it into diuers charges, which may depend immediately of himselfe. And if he cannot reduce the Gouernours to such termes as he holds it fit for his safety, some haue held opinion, that he should strip them by little and little of his forces, in prouiding for his places of strength, and causing the Garrissons to be changed euery three yeares; and in like manner to haue the Gouernor assisted by one or two of his chiefe Councellors, without whose aduice he might not resolue any thing: Thinking that by this meanes they should not onely preuent the

Gouernours

Gouernours Enterprizes, but also make them more carefull to doe that which concernes the Princes seruice, seeing their actions obserued.

Of the poore and needy.

The poore and needy are no lesse dangerous to the quiet of the Estate then great men, and great men which haue had a will to matine, haue made vse of them: For that the present Estate being contrary vnto them, they desire a change, hoping to change their condition; and amidst the disorder and violence to free themselues from the necessity wherein they liue. The meanes to shelter himselfe on that side, is to hinder this necessity in an Estate; but principally excesse and vsury; for that excesse begins pouerty, and vsury brings it to extremity. Necessity may likewise be preuented, bringing in abundance; And especially by imploying the common people in all sorts of Manufactures, as *Vopiscus* writes they did in *Alexandria*, where the gouty and blind found meanes to get their liuing.

Meanes to containe the common people in their duties.

Excesse and Vsury the chiefe causes of pouerty.

Solon in *Athens* bound the Fathers to teach their Children a Trade, vpon a penalty to be depriued of all succours and respect which the Children owe vnto their Fathers. In *China* the Children are bound to follow their Fathers Trade, and for such as had not any, they imployed them about their publique buildings; as *Augustus* and the Kings of *Ægypt* did. To conclude, they must imploy such men, and not leaue the Estate in the hands of the needy, and of men which haue nothing to loose. And thus much concerning the restraint of naturall Subiects.

Chap. 15.

Meanes to containe conquered Subiects in their duty.

THe Subiects which haue bin conquered eyther by force, or by treaty, are vſually more difficult to gouerne then the naturall. Wherefore beſides that which we haue ſpoken concerning the Naturall, we muſt obſerue with theſe more diſcretion and precaution. The principall and moſt generall meanes to containe the Subiects by conqueſt, in the obedience of the Prince which hath conquered them, is to giue them ſuch intereſt in his gouernment, as they may haue a feare to change, left they ſhould impaire their condition: Otherwiſe the peoples inclination being contrary to the Conquerour, the Principality will be like vnto a Tree without roots, which owes his fall to the firſt winde.

To giue conquered ſubiects in intereſt an the gouernment.

The meanes which we haue ſayd are neceſſary for a Prince to purchaſe loue and reputation, will much import him with this kind of Subiects: And amongſt others mildneſſe and clemency. Hee muſt likewiſe fauour Religious men, and ſuch as be learned and vertuous, which ſhall be found in the Country, for that the people doe commonly gouerne themſelues to good or euill, according to the conſciences of ſuch kind of men. He muſt in like manner make much of great men, and imploy them in honorable charges; Yet out of the Country of conqueſt: And in like manner to giue them Eſtates and Seignouries elſe-where: He muſt obſerue the contracts, conuentions, & priuiledges vnder which the Country was yeelded; for that one breach made by the Prince, makes them to feare the leſſe of the reſt. Hee muſt breed vp many Yong men of their conquered Countrey, after the manner of his naturall Subiects: As *Alexander* did thirty thouſand

Mildneſſe and clemency.

He muſt fauor religious men and learned.

Hee muſt obſerue the contracts made with the country conquered.

He muſt breed vp youth like vnto his naturall ſubiects.

thousand young *Persians*, of whom he made choice, to be instructed after the *Macedonian* manner.

The *Romans* erected Colledges and Seminaries, vpon pretext to ciuillize the Nations which they conquered; but in effect it was to imploy them otherwise then in the Warre, and to traine them vp after the *Romans* manner. And they which were best conceipted of their intentions, sayd, that it made a part of the Seruitude, vnder which they reduced the Prouinces which they conquered. The *Turke* holds another course in the breeding vp of his *Ianizaries*, the which although it seems violent, yet it is grounded vpon reason and iudgement. For choosing them among the Christians Children, he fortifies his power, in weakning his Subiects which are most suspected vnto him. Marriages and Alliances helpe much to ioyne and vnite a conquered Prouince with the naturall Subiects. *Alexander* purchased much loue of the *Persians*, hauing married a *Persian* Lady. And as *Titus Liuius* sayth, there was nothing did so much hinder the *Capouans* from accommodating themselues with *Hannibal*, then the priuate alliances they had contracted with the *Romans*.

You must make Marriages betwixt them and his naturall Subiects.

The *Romans* also made vse of another meanes, hauing interessed in the preseruation of their Estate, the greatest part of the neighbour Prouinces conquered by them, receiuing them into their City, giuing sometimes to priuate persons, and sometimes to a whole Prouince the right of Burgeoisie, and making them sharers in the honours of the City. But to reduce them wholy to the forme of naturall Subiects, by little and little they brought in their owne Language; as since the *Arabians* haue done in all their conquest. And *William* the Conquerour, and before him the *Saxons* in the greatest part of *England*, not suffering the Lawes to be written or published but in their languages, nor the audiences for the dispatch of affaires and Comissions for Letters patents; The contracts of priuate men were past in the same language,

The Conqueror must bring his owne Language into the conquered Countrey,

hazarding of his perſon too much, and leauing a great part of his Countrey ill prouided for. In a Commonweale this would be of more dangerous conſequence; if they doe not gouerne themſelues in that reſpect like vnto the *Suiſſes*, who deſiring rather to make Warre for another, then for themſelues, ſend forth their moſt buſie and turbulent Men to ſerue Princes, to purge the Countrey.

Behold the moſt ordinary remedies which are practiſed, to preſerue themſelues from theſe bad humours of the people, conſidered in generall. But there are others which are particular, according to the diuers conditions of perſons, whereof the people conſiſts; and others which muſt bee practiſed with a people Conquered.

CHAP. 14.

Of diuers ſorts of humours among the Subiects, according to the diuerſity of their Conditions.

Three ſorts of perſons in all Eſtates.

IN all Eſtates there are three ſorts of perſons. Great Men who haue power, credit, and wealth: The poore and miſerable who want all, and the meaner ſort. Theſe laſt are vſually more quiet and eaſie to gouerne: The reſt are more difficult, for that great Men by the commodity which riches brings with it, doe hardly abſtaine from doing Euill. The miſerable for the neceſſities wherein they find themſelues, are commonly vicious and capable of all parties.

The Credit, alliances, and wealth of great Men, makes them vntractable, little obedient, and ſometimes inſupportable; and pride and preſumption giues them courage to vndertake: Contrariwiſe the miſerable, are eaſily moued to any inſolencie. The actions of great Men

are

are accompanied with violence: Those of the poore and needy with fraud and malice. But the meaner sort, having neyther so great meanes which might make them grow proud, nor power to attempt; Neither being in such necessity, as they should be thrust into extraordinary actions, they desire rather to preserue the certaine, then to runne after the vncertaine: and so they are neither transported with ambition, nor oppressed with necessity. Presupposing then that this sort of Men continue in their duyes, let vs examine the two others.

Meanes to containe great Men in their duties.

There are seuerall sorts of great Men: Some are so neere vnto the Prince by alliance or kindred, as they may in time pretend vnto the Estate. Others, who being Lords of great possessions, enioy in the Princes Estate, Lordships, and Reuenewes of great consequence. The third kind is of those, who by their vallour or wisedome in the gouernment of important affaires of the Estate, haue purchased credit and reputation with the people, or among the Men of Warre. The fourth are they, to whom the Prince hath committed his forces, his gouernments, and his cheife places.

Of great Men allied to the Prince.

Many Princes before they had any subiect of suspition of an Enterprize, haue growne iealous of their neere kinsmen. *Alexander* meaning to passe into *Asia*, put all his neereſt kinsmen to death, except one of his base brethren, whom hee had no cause to feare. This villainous and barbarous custe hath past for a rule of State among the *Turkes*. The Kings of *Ormus*, before they were expel'd by the *Portugalls*, put out the eyes of all their neereſt kinsmen. The which it may be they learned from some Emperours of *Constantinople*. The Kings of *China*, & those of *Æthiopia*, shut them al vp into one place, from whence not any one comes forth, but he that is to succeed in the Estate.

Christendome is more happy: For although wee haue seene that *Philip* the second King of *Spaine* hath bin forced

So ashoping they should alwayes haue time to execute their designes, they deferr'd it. But when they saw that they separated them, sending some one way, some another, they resolued to put it in execution as they did. The which they would not haue done, if after this first policy they had taken order to haue beene the stronger before they had diuided them. Wherefore a Prince that wil haue time to discouer or punish a Treason, hee must cause the conspirators to haue an opinion to finde a more fit occasion to execute their designes: And he must not be rash in such things, if the danger be not apparant in staying. For the punishment is made for two principall ends. The first is to free himselfe of such dangerous persons; and the second to terrifie others by the example of punishment, from attempting the like. Whereas by haste the Prince not onely looses the fruits of the punishment, but also he hazards his person.

And although that punishments seeme necessary; yet if the subiect or the condition of the businesse be such, as mildnesse and clemency may bring more reputation and safety to the Prince, then the impunity of the danger, he shall doe well to shew it in such an action. *Augustus* pardoned *Cunis* three times, and by the last assured his life more then he had done by the punishment of all others, whom he had caused to be executed for the like attempts. The vnexpected Clemency of a Prince to some one, the which proceeds not from feare and cowardize, doth not onely binde him to be faithfull, but doth mollifie the bitternesse of his Enemy, who grow the more incensed by punishments; the which being held vniust, by such as hold the same opinion of the Prince with the vndertakers, they thinke it lawfull to be reuenged, as they would be of an injury or some violence done to the Publique, or to some priuate person.

CHAP.

CHAP. 17.

Of the treaſon of Places, Townes, and Armies, and other forces of the Eſtate: and of the remedies to preuent the effect.

BY the Treaſons which are practiſed vpon ſtrong places, or vpon Townes of importance, or vpon Armies or principall forces, Eſtates are brought to their ruine. The onely remedy is in the fore-ſight, by meanes of the choice which they ſhall make of thoſe to whom they ſhall giue the command: And he muſt haue a ſpeciall care to chooſe men that are not couetous, ambitious, cunning, or diſſemblers, light, or inconſtant; or eaſily ſubiect to diſcontentments; or men that haue great ſupport and credit, and are vndertakers.

Hauing thus prouided for the Election you muſt ot ſo ioyne the authority of command with the forces in one man, as when you would you ſhall not be able to ſeparate them: And not onely he which hath the Authority, but alſo they which command the particular forces, muſt depend immediately of the Prince, with charge notwithſtanding to obey him, to whom the Prince hath giuen the authority of command, vnleſſe hee receiue a Counter command. And it is of no force to ſay, that if they which are to depend not wholy vpon him that is to command them, he cannot anſwere for that which they giue him in charge. For if the Prince truſts him, hee muſt likewiſe truſt; and watching ouer the forces, aduertize him if they doe not as they ought, and doe not obey that which is commanded them according to the duty of his charge.

Some in like manner (as I haue formerly ſayd) haue

held it fit, not to continue great commands in owne man, especially in one place, whereby the custome of obeying him, the Subiects may tie themselues too strictly to him, and giue him meanes to dispose of the Prouince where he commands. These are the remedies to preuent the greatest treasons: For the rest which are made by intelligences with petty companions, as in corrupting a Centinell or a Corporall that shall be in guard to seaze vpon a Port, they may easily auoide it, in drawing the guards by lot, and by the care and dilligence of the Captaines. And if they be aduertized of some practice which the Enemy makes with the Souldiers and Inhabitants of a Towne, they may cause some to make shew to be of the intelligence, who addressing themselues to those whom they haue reason to distrust, they may easily discouer the truth.

Chap. 18.

Of Rebellions, and of the meanes to preuent them.

Conspiracies and Treasons are most commonly secret and hidden, and are plotted by few men, the which makes them more difficult to discouer, and more easie to punish. Contrariwise Rebellions and Factions are made more openly; but as they cannot be attempted without great numbers, so they are with more difficulty pacified and punished; and doe more vsually draw after them the ruine of the Estate then the former. But to know how a Prince ought to gouerne himselfe in a Rebellion, he must consider whether he be stronger or weaker then the Rebells; and he must hold himselfe the weaker, although they were equall in forces; for that he may not hazard his authority vpon a doubtfull euent, as it is ordinary

ordinary among equals. If hee bee the stronger, hee must prevent it in the beginning speedily and secretly; cutting off the Heads and chiefe Commanders, before they know they are taken; and then present himselfe with courage to suppresse it, to the end he may amaze the Rebels: And if he be farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must approach, as the Emperour *Charles* the fift did, who passed from *Spaine* into *Flanders*, to suppresse the rebellion of the *Gantois*, the which succeeded happily. For to abandon the place where the Rebellion begins, or to retire farre from it is held a feare, the which blemish and impaire the credit & authority of the Prince, and encourage the heads of the party, and makes the People more bold and insolent. But if he finde not himselfe the stronger, and to haue some great aduantage; without retiring himselfe too farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must make shew to haue a will to yeeld to that which the people desire of him, to giue them time to grow cold; especially if they haue no Commanders of credit and authority.

Sometime a small matter may be able to reduce a people to their duty. And in such Encounters subtile and inuentiue spirits are fit, as likewise those which are popular and eloquent, to entertaine and to draw a mutinous multitude to their duty, by feare, distrust, and hope. That familiar and popular course which *Menenius Agrippa* obserued with the people of *Rome*, by a Comparison of the diuision of the members from a humane body, succeeded better to pacifie them, then if hee had falne vpon more serious reasons. The inuention which *Calaminus* the *Capouan* made vse of, to saue the Senators of *Capoua* from the hands of the people, was no lesse witty: For ioyning himselfe to their party, and applauding them in all things, seeing them resolute to put their Senators to death, hee propounded vnto them that they should begin first with him that was most odious

vnto them, but withall he let them know that the Estate must not remaine without gouernment, & that before they put him to death they must make choice of some other in his place. So not able to agree, and passing from one to another, they found that they whom they meant to put to death, were much better then the others whom they intended to choose in their places: And so the people were pacified.

Sometimes in such mutinies and combustions, they haue made vse of the occasion of an Eclipse, or of some extraordinary signe from Heauen, or of some vnexpected misfortune; wherewith the people being toucht and amazed, suffer themselues to be perswaded to returne to their duties. A Man of authority and credit with the people, may preuaile much in such occasions. *Soderin* Arch-Bishop of *Florence*, comming forth in publique with his Pontificall Robes and his Clergie pacified the *Florentans*, who were in combustion one against another. And as in some places Preachers haue beene the Firebrands of sedition, and the trumpets of Warre, in others they haue serued to pacifie them, and they haue made good vse of them. But if the people cannot be suddenly reclaimed, and that the popular mutinie passeth into Rebellion and a setled reuolte: you must then seeke to reduce them by degrees, disuniting them, and gayning some of the commanders vnderhand, by promises and benefits; or putting them in distrust of the people, and in iealousie one of another.

If neither of these remedies will preuaile, hee must yeild to that which the people demand, either in all, or in part: For that loue and reputation being the foundation of the Princes Authority, if the Prince in yeilding seemes to diminish his reputation in some sort, yet thereby hee shall preserue the affection of the people, who being pacified, he may by other meanes recouer his reputation. And yet in such occurents hee may so carry himselfe, and vse such dexterity, that accommodating him-

himselfe mildly to the peoples inclination, he shall seeme to grant that willingly which they extort from him by force; being necessary that the Prince to maintaine his authority, make shewe to will and desire that which hee cannot hinder, and so to apply his will to his power. And to the end he may make it knowne that it is a thing which he desires, he must seeke to draw some apparant aduantage for his greatnesse: There being few actions in the Estate, from which the Prince either in effect or in shew may not draw some aduantage; although in another thing he be damnified: And it shall be a part of Wisedome, to shew himselfe more ioyfull of the aduantage which he receiues, then discontented for the disaduantage which his Enemies sought to procure him.

The *Turkish* Emperours although they be powerfull, haue beene many times constrayned to yeeld some of their Ministers to the *Ianizaries* to be put to death: The which a well aduised Prince should neuer doe, if his Ministers had not otherwise highly offended; but seeing himselfe reduced to this extremity, he should giue them meanes to escape, yet dissembling that it is with his consent. For besides that it were a cruell Iniustice, to deliuer an innocent man into the hands of a furious multitude, the shame will redowne vpon him, with a disdaine, and a distrust of all others, whom hee should call to serue him, who will rather gouerne themselues according to the will of those which had credit with the people, then to his desire. But if the Ministers are found to haue carried themselues ill, the Prince may take this occasion to cause them to be punished by Iustice, to pacifie a popular mutinie: Although it were more discreetly done to preuent it, then to stay vntill hee were vrged to doe that by force, which for his owne good he should haue formerly done.

CHAP.

by the Adoption of ſucceſſors in many degrees, ſupporting and ſtrengthning his Gouerment euen by this meanes.

The deſire of Liberty.

The deſire of Liberty doth likewiſe produce a powerfull and ſtrong effect in the minds of Men, who are otherwiſe ill affected to the Prince, and he muſt haue a very ſtrong bridle to reſtraine them, when it is once entred into the minds of a multitude, who haue the more courage, when they conſtantly beleeue that all meanes are lawfull to diſpoſſeſſe an vſurper, or a Prince whom they hold vnlawfull: This it is which hath produced in former time, ſo many Murtherers of Tyrants, and with the like deſire they were thruſt on, which conſpired againſt the Dukes of Florence.

The inconſiderate zeale of Religion.

I am aſhamed to put Religion in this number, and to make it the cauſe of ſo many wicked enterprizes, as hath beene practiſed againſt Princes; there being nothing ſo impious, nor ſo contrary to Religion, as ſuch Murthers. Yet the *Iewes* Bookes affourd ſuch examples: And in truth it is contrary to Religion, to beleeue that God would puniſh wicked Princes, and free his people by this meanes, and that the Diuine iuſtice make vſe of ſuch inſtruments, as Men doe of Hangmen, to execute his decrees: But if for this reaſon the end haue beene ſometimes good, and the euent to the honour of God; yet the action in it ſelfe is bad: They be Rods, which after the puniſhment are good for nothing but the fire, ſo the *Iewes* to hinder the conſequence of ſuch actions, haue repreſented them as done by the expreſſe commandement of God: And yet certaine Diuines, fuller of malice then Piety, haue ſought to draw conſequences from thence: and of a Religion full of Piety and mildneſſe, haue made an Altar of impiety, pouring for the bloud of Kings and Princes, vpon pretext of a contrary Religion, wherein they haue followed the proceeding of the old man of the Mountaine, who bred vp many yong men

Men to such enterprizes, promising them another life full of vnspeakeable pleasures and ioyes: who being transported with the hope thereof, exposed themselues freely to death: And without any other Army, his Estate (although of a small extent) kept all other Monarches and Potentates in feare to be murthered, forcing them to seeke his Friendship, and some to pay him a Tribute to liue in safety: So as in the end the Kings of *Armenia* were forced to roote out this Race of *Assassins*.

To preserue himselfe from all these sorts of vnder- takers, you must vnderstand, that all conspiracies doe not alwayes succeed, by reason of some defects, whereof some one doth vsually fall out in such attempts. The first is, for that hauing resolued to obserue a certaine order in the execution, most commonly the particularities which they haue foreseene, doe not impe, and will doe lesse, if the Prince doth not impart to any man, whether he meanes to goe, or what hee intends to doe long before; but doth so vary in his actions, as none but himselfe is able to deuine of the time when he meanes to part, nor of the place whither he intends to goe, nor where he meanes to stay, nor how he will bee accompanied. The second defect is, that many times the Executioners heart failes him, either by an amazement which seizeth on him, seeing the Prince to looke on him, and to obserue his countenance; or his courage failes him and growes milde by the good countenance he shewes him. Ordinary defects in conspiracies.

Wherefore many Princes suffering all men to approach neare vnto them, doe not forbeare to obserue such as are vnknowne vnto them: So as he which hath a will to attempt, is easily discouered in lifting vp his Armes, or in approaching too neare vnto him; and his constant looke would be sufficient to make him grow into distrust that hee was discouered, and diuert him from his Enterprize.

Other

Other Princes hauing ſuſpition of ſome, haue purpoſely caſt forth words of diſtruſt, which notwithſtanding might be interpreted in a double ſence, and ſpeaking them they haue obſerued the countenance of thoſe whom they diſtruſted, to the end they might diſcouer their hearts. The third errour is the little diſcretion of him that attempts, as he that meant to kill *Commodus*, entering into the Ampitheater; before he gaue the blow began to cry out, behold what the Senate ſends thee: For theſe words aduertized *Commodus*, and gaue his guard meanes to preuent him, wherefore Guards are neceſſary for a Prince, not onely for a ſigne of his greatneſſe, or that being accompanied with force he may haue the more authority: But likewiſe to preſerue him, and to obſerue the countenance of ſuch as approach neere vnto him.

The manner of paſſing before Princes, although it ſeemes to be practiſed onely for honour, yet it was beneficiall to *Pandolpho* Tyrant of *Syenna*, againſt whom *Iulio Belanty*, his Sonne in-lawe, had laid an ambuſh in his houſe, by the which *Pandolpho* was accuſtomed to paſſe, to goe and viſite a Friend of his which lay ſicke; But *Pandolpho* ſtaying in his lodging, to ſpeake to ſome one, it gaue time to them of his traine to goe before; who by this meanes without thinking of it, diſcouered the Enterprize: Whereas if after his accuſtomed manner, hee had gone firſt, he had beene in danger to haue beene ſurprized.

The fourth Errour is a falſe imagination, or an accident not foreſeene. They which had reſolued to kill *Cæſar*, ſeeing *Popilius* one of their companions to diſcourſe long with him, they had a conceipt that he ſpake of the Enterprize; which made them reſolue to aduance their deſigne, feareing that in ſtaying longer they ſhould bee diſcouered. A word may ſometimes diuert ſuch Men. An accident not foreſeene diſcouered the Treaſon intended againſt *Iames* King of great Brittaine; and a letter ſent by one

one to a friend of his, not to be present at the assemb'y of the Estates, not giuing him any other reason, made them carefull to visite all places about the House at *Westminster*, where the Prince and Peeres were to assemble: Where in a Cellor vnder the great Hall, in the which the Peeres were to sit, (where the King with the Queene and their Children, were to assist in person) they found a great quantity of Gun-powder, and Fagots, to blow vp the Chamber and the whole assembly.

Some Princes haue gone priuily armed when they went in publique; as they say, *Cosmo de Medicis* did. The *Turcish* Princes after that *Baiazet* had beene in danger to be slaine by a *Dervis*, haue not suffered any vnknowne person to approach neare vnto them, which is not accompanied by two *Capigies*, or Vshers, who hold those that goe vnto him by the Armes: And this custome is practised with the Embassadours of Princes. There are many other meanes which are diuersly practised, according to the persons, time, and place. Yet the most generall is, to haue a good eye to the Enterprises which may be attempted openly. But that which is most to be feared in Princes, is poisoning: the essay which is taken of his Meate and Drinke, cannot warrant a Prince. Some haue accustomed themselues to take Counter-poison, as *Mitridates* did. But the safest way is to haue faithfull and vigilant persons about him, to haue a care of it, besides the ordinary Officers; which are appointed to prepare the Princes Meate and Drinke: And these must not be knowne if it may be, lest they should corrupt them, as they may doe the ordinary Officers. He must likewise haue confident persons to watch and obserue the actions of such as they may distrust, (which is the third remedy to frustrate the effect of a conspiracy) And if they be such as they ought to be, it will be a difficult thing but they will discouer what is practised.

Conspiracies are discouered by two meanes; either by The discouery of Treasons.

the report of another, or by coniecture. Report proceeds either from the little fidelity, or from the little discretion of those to whom the Treason is imparted. This little faith is vsually found among men: For such a businesse cannot be communicated but to him that is a deare friend to the vndertaker, or to one that is discontented with the Prince, against whom they conspire. To find such a Friend that will willingly expose his life to an apparant danger, it is very difficult: And admit you finde him, yet you cannot be assured of his Courage, although you haue tryed him in other affaires. Moreouer to measure a mans fidelity in this subiect, by the discontentment he hath of the Prince, were great indiscretion. For the vndertaker haui g discouered his intent ons to this discontented person, he giues him meanes to recouer the Princes fauour. Wherefore the hatred hee beares vnto the Prince, must be exceeding great, or the vndertakers must haue much authority and credit with him, to make him to keepe his Faith: For the malecontent desiring nothing more then the Princes grace and fauour, he shall haue a good occasion to hope for it by the discouery of the enterprize.

By the little indiscretion which is likewise in such men, conspiracies are commonly discouered, either in speaking too much, or before such as he ought not: like vnto *Brutus* Sonnes, who hauing conferrd with the *Tarquins* Embassadours before one of their Seruants, they were discouered by him, to haue conspired against their Countrey. *Cataline* acquainted *Fuluia* with his designe, who discouered it to *Cicero*; *Dinis* discouered the Treason which he had plotted against *Alexander*, to a yong youth named *Nichomachus*, who reuealed it to *Cibalinius*, and he to *Alexander*.

The Treason of *Sceninus* against *Nero*, was discouered by coniecture; *Sceninus* hauing the day before the Execution of the Enterprize, made his will and comman-

commanded *Milichus* his freed man to sharpen his Dagger; he enfranchised all his Bond-men, and caused many Rowlers to be made for the binding vp of wounds: So as this freed man doubting that these preparations were for some such Enterprize, aduertised *Nero*, who by his meanes discouered the other conspirators. In like manner Spies prying vp and downe, may by the indiscretion, lightnesse, or malice of another, or by coniecture, haue some light of that which passeth; and they must especially obserue the actions of discontented persons, and of such as may better their condition by the Princes death.

Of the punishment of conspiracies.

It remaines now to know, (after the discouery of such Enterprizes) how to punish them fitly and seasonably. For many times it may be done vnfitly: And in stead of amazing the confederates which are not yet discouered, you shall thrust them on to effect their designe. Sometimes they shall incense and inuite others to make attempts, in stead of diuerting them by the punishment of the first. The Prince being aduertised of some Enterprize against his person, before he publish it or seeke to punish it, he must seeke to discouer it with all the particularities and circumstances, if it be possible, measuring the condition of the conspirators with his owne. If the Conspirators be strong, he must resolue vpon some other pretext to make himselfe the stronger; and in the meane time he must dissemble, bestowing fauours and gifts vpon the Conspirators, lest that finding themselues discouered, they attempt not openly.

In the conspiracy of the two Legions (which the *Romans* had left for the guard of *Capoua* against the *Samnites*) who had resolued to sacke the *Capouans*, the Senate hauing giuen charge to *Rutilius* the new Consull to preuent it; to kill them asleepe, he caused and commaunded it to bee proclaimed, that the Senate had decreed they shou'd continue there still in Garrison:

you must of necessity, vse remedies fit for euery one of these causes, to preserue it.

Chap. 16.

Of the neerest causes of the ruine of an Estate. Of a Conspiracie against the Princes person: Of the Causes thereof: Of the meanes to auoyd it: Of the discouery and Punishment.

Conspiracy against the Princes person.

As the Prince is the Axeltree whereon the Estate turnes; so a conspiracy against his person succeeds acording to the desire of the conspirators, or drawes after it many times the ruine of the Estate, to preuent the which they make vse of foure meanes, the first is, not to doe any thing that doth vsually inuite the Subiects to such conspiracies, the second to cause himselfe to be guarded, and not to suffer any vnknowne person to aproach neere vnto him, the third is to obserue the actions of his guards and of his familiars and great men, the fourth to cause such as shalbee surprized, to bee duly punnished.

Meanes to preuent.

Causes of a conspiracy.

In regard of the first, the causes which draw men vsually to such wicked designes are these: an iniury receiued from the Prince or a feare to receiue one; the ambition of great men and of fauourites, the desire of liberty, and the zeale of Religion.

The iniury which they feare to receiue from the Prince

An Iniury is of three sorts, for either it concerns life, honour or goodes; and they which haue beene thrust on through feare of their liues, haue most commonly preuailed in their enterprize: for the despaire wherein they are, makes them to hazard their liues more freely, to saue it by the losse of the Princes, who seekes to take away

theirs,

theirs, running no worse fortune in this hazard then to loose that which could not otherwise preserue: and therefore a Prince should not reduce any man, be he great or small in that extremity. And iniury done to the honour is great in a person of courage, and *Bodille* testified it, who slew *Childeric* which had caused him to be whipt: But of all iniuries, that which concernes the honour of Woemen and the Bed, is one of the most powerfull in such enterprises, whereof there are many examples; An iniury which concernes mens Estates is not so violent, and few men to recouer their goods, or in reuenge of that which hath beene taken from him, will hazard their liues: and yet in a great courage, the reueng of any iniury whatsoeuer is much to be feared.

As for the ambition of great men and fauourites, it doth produce more conspiracies then iniuries, for that the weake although they haue receiued an iniury from the Prince, they cannot hurt him for want of comodity and support; But great men who haue both the one and the other, and ambition withall, which is sometimes no lesse violent then reuenge, giues them more meanes to preuaile in such designes: yet there are seldome such enterprises, but when as the Prince hath suffred some one to grow to that power, that hee wants nothing but the Crowne.

Wherefore the first meanes to auoyd this danger, is to humble such men by degrees; as if he cannot suffer them to liue without hazard to make them away speedily: As *Tiberius* did of *Scianus*, the Second is to appoint successors after him, if he hath no Childeren: be it by Adoption or Election, prouided alwayes that the Lawes of State allow it: But these successors must not be so great and powerfull, as they may haue a will to make the like enterprises, desiring rather to make themselues Maisters of the Estate, then attend the succession; For the which *Augustus* knew well how to proui de by

Chap. 2.

Of the increase of an Estate by the Preservation of Children.

BVt they striue in vaine to increase an Estate by the manuring of the Land, and peopling of Townes, if they doe not prouide to husband it, and to fauour the generation, breeding vp, and education of Children; being the onely meanes we haue of our owne, to people both Countries and Townes. *Augustus* after the Ciuill warre, found this care not onely worthy of himselfe, but necessary for the Estate, propounding great priuiledges to such as had three Children, and yet to fauour a single life as much as might be.

Of Poligamy.

Some people haue thought they had prouided well by *Poligamy*, allowing one man to haue many Wiues; as well not to tye the fruitfulnesse of a man, to the barrennesse of one Wife, as to multiply generation. Yet experience hath taught vs, that whether that a man being imployed in many places, cannot commonly get Children which liue long; or not able to extend the care of a Father to so many Children through necessity, or otherwise they cannot attaine to ripe age; the Countrey which make vse of Poligamie, finde not themselues better peopled then others. The *Turkes* raise greater Armies then the *Christians*, but this growes from the extent of the Countrey which they possesse, for that they make no other profession but Armes. For he that shall compare the people which is now in *Greece*, with that which it was before the *Turke* entred, shall finde it much lesse peoled then it hath beene.

Celibate.

It is true that Celibate or a single life indifferently allowed

ed to all sorts of men, is many times the cause of the decay of people in an Estate. *Charlemagne* being borne in an Age full of deuotion, in the which the greatest Men made themselues Monckes or Clergie Men, although that otherwise hee was much respectiue to that which concernes Religion, hee held it not fit to suffer any one that would, to make himselfe a Moncke. For besides that you may not allow good Men to abandon the Estate, it is a madnes in making profession of a single life to loose the race. Good Men come from good, and the valliant as they say produce their like; and therefore they must make vse of them for the good of the Estate. But as a single life is seemely for men of the Church, and that there must bee some: it seemes necessary to cut off, or at the least to hinder hereafter this infinite number, which vnfurnish the State of Men which would be very conuenient and fit for other places, and who for the most part become a scandall and reproach to the Church; Experience shewing sufficiently, that such an excessiue multitude, is not capable to bee reduced to its first order and institution: And whereas a small number well entertayned may edyfie by their example, this great number incapable of discipline ruines all; and are a shame to their Mother which hath brought them forth and entertayned them.

But for that many times they make vse of their retreates, rather to discharge Families which are poore, then for any deuotion, for the which they were cheifly instituted; and likewise that an infinite company of poore are kept from marrying, least they should leaue their children miserable: It seemes that the erecting of Seminaries in all professions, (which we haue formerly mentioned) should preuẽt this feare & the incõueniẽces which it breeds; letting thẽ in such sort, as no one should want a retreate

nor entertaynment in serving the Publike: whence would grow its encrease, and the peace of Families. These are the meanes to encrease and multiply our owne, by our owne.

CHAP. 8.

Of the encrease of an Estate by the Union of another Mans to ours.

Diuers meanes to vnite another mans to ours.

THe lawfull meanes to draw another mans, and to vnite it to our owne, are of many sorts. The *Romans* knew how to mannage them with great wisedome and dexterity. The first whereof they made vse, was to draw and vnite vnto them the people whom they had conquered; as they did them of *Alba* and the *Sabins*. The second was to ruine the Neighbour Citties, and by this meanes force the Inhabitants to retire to *Rome*. The third, to grant the right of *Romane* Burgesses, to the greatest and most powerfull of their Neighbours, vniting them by this meanes to their Estate, and binding them to the defence thereof. The fourth to treate equall alliances vnder the name of Society, as with the *Latins*; or vnder the name of Friendship, as with the Kings of *Ægypt* and *Asia*. They haue also made vse to increase their Estate by the protection of the weaker; as they did taking that of *Capoua* against the *Samnites*, and of *Messina* against *Hieron* and the *Carthaginians*.

Protection of the weaker.

Some Princes of our time haue made good vse of this meanes, hauing changed the protection into an absolute Seigneury; some vnder colour of the disloyalty of the *Anones*; others by the consent of the *Auories* themselues; Some vppon pretext, that they had not beene satisfied, certaine summes of money which they had imployed for the Defence thereof: And some for the onely con-

consideration of conueniencie, and to serue for a defence to their Estate.

The *Romans* haue also made vse for their encrease, of the benefits of Kings, their Friends, and Allies, who haue made them heires of their Kingdome by Testament, as *Attalus* King of *Asia* did; and *Anichomede* King of *Bythinia*. The *Genois* had *Pera* in gift from *Michael Paleologne* Emperour of *Constantinople*. *Cabo Ioanin*, likewise Emperour of *Constantinople*, gaue *Metillin* to *Francis Cataguse*, a *Genois*. The *Venetians* had *Veggia* from *Iohn Phano*; *Francis Forse* had *Sanonne* from *Lewis* the Eleuenth. The Emperour *Frederieke* the third, gaue *Modena* and *Rhegium* to *Borso* Duke of *Ferrara*: The *French* Kings haue had *Dauphinie* by the Donation of *Humbert* the last *Dauphin*; and *Prouence* by the Testament of *Charles* of *Anion* the last Earle of *Prouence*. Gifts and benefits.

Other Princes haue enlarged their Estate in purchasing from their Neighbours that which lay conuenient for them, there being no Traffique more beneficiall, nor more honourable to a Prince, then to purchase that which cannot bee valued. Pope *Clement* the sixt, tooke *Auignon* and the County of *Venice*, in payment of the arrerages due by *Ioane* the first, Queene of *Naples*, and Countesse of *Prouence*, in regard of the pention which shee ought for *Sicily*; Others haue written for the Realme of *Tunis*. *Sforse Attendulo* had *Catigola* from Pope *Iohn* the thirteenth. The *Florentins* had *Arrezo* from the Seignour of *Cosse*, for forty thousand Florens of Gold; and *Liuorne* from *Thomas Fregose* for one hundred and twenty thousand Duckets. They haue also purchased *Cortona* for *Ladislaus* King of *Naples*, and *Pisa* from *Gabriel Visconte*.

Some haue taken their Neighbours Estate in Mort- Engagements.

gage, the which lying conueniently for them, they haue not reſtored, the ingagement being paſt into a meere alienation. The Electors of the Empire, ſold their voyces to the Emperour *Charles* the fourth, to chooſe his Sonne *Veneſelaus* King of the *Romans*, for one hundred thouſand Crownes a peece, the which the Emperour being vnable to pay, hee ingaged vnto them ſixteene imperiall Townes, the which they haue euer ſince enioyed with the Title of Soueraignty. *Lewes* the Eleauenth of *France*, held in Mortgage the County of *Rouſſillon*, from *Iohn* King of *Aragon* for foure hundred thouſand Crownes, the which King *Charles* the Eight yeelded vp afterwards for nothing: whereby hee loſt an occaſion to enlarge his Territories: But hee had a better conſcience then the *Florentins*, who retained *Borgo Di San Sepulchro*, which Pope *Eugenius* the Fourth had pawned vnto them for fiue and twenty thouſand Crownes. The *Polonians* retaine *Liuonia* by engagement, for ſixe hundred thouſand Crownes, which they diſburſed in the Warre made for the *Tenton* Order, againſt the Duke of *Muſcouie*, in the Yeare 1558. But ſince the Warre was ended, they neyther ſpeake of re-emburſment nor reſtitution.

By Marriages and Alliances the Prince may likewiſe enlarge his Eſtate, the houſe of *Auſtria*, which comes from the Earles of *Aſburge* in *Suiſſerland*, who were about foure hundred yeares ſince of little accompt, haue by this meanes encreaſed in Eſtate, as wee ſee at this day: That is to ſay, by the Marriage of *Itha*, Heire to *Raoul* of *Pfulendorfe*; of *Bergantia*, with *Albert* of *Aſburge* Sirnamed the Rich; of *Hetingis* Heire to *Vlrich Liburg*, Landgraue of *Alſacie*, with *Albert* called the Wiſe, Sonne to *Albert* the Rich; of *Elizabeth* Heire of *Auſtrea*, *Carnithia*, *Tirol*, and *Coricya* with the Emperour *Albert* the Firſt; of *Mary* the Heire of *Burgondy*, *Flanders*, *Brabant*,

Brabant, and other Prouinces of the *Netherlands*, with the Emperour *Maximillion* the firſt; Of *Ioane* the Heire of *Caſtille*, *Aragon*, *Sicily*, and *Naples*, with *Philip* Arch-duke of *Auſtrea*; Of *Anne*, the Heire of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, with the Emperour *Ferdinand*, Brother to *Charles* the Fift: And of *Iſabel* of *Portugal*, Mother to *Philip* the Second, King of *Spaine*, with *Charles* the Fift. This example ſhall ſuffice to verifie the increaſe of Eſtates in a Prince by this meanes. Adoption is another kinde of portion, by meanes whereof they of *Anion*, and afterwards they of *Aragon* haue beene made Kings of *Naples* and *Sicily*, hauing beene adopted by *Ioane*. Adoption.

The *Polonians* haue inlarged their Eſtate by the election of their Kings, chooſing them among the neighbour Princes who had their Eſtate neere vnto them: and ſo they of the houſe of *Iagellon* being called to gouerne their Eſtate, they haue wrought ſo as they haue ioyned *Lituania* vnto it, whereof they of *Iagellon* were Dukes, and in making the Nobillity of *Pruſia*, and *Podolia*, equall to that of *Polonia*, they haue increaſed and aſſured their Eſtate with theſe two Prouinces; But to returne to the Election, if it be a Prince which ſeekes by this meanes to increaſe himſelfe, hee muſt not ſo much relye vpon the inclination of the people, and the conſiderations which they may haue for their priuate aduantage; but hee muſt bring that which may aſſiſt and helpe him in this purſuite, as Money, Force, and Intelligences: Eſpecially if there be Competitors, who are to make vſe of the like meanes, and that the affaires and perſons are thereunto diſpoſed. Election.

Conſiderations neceſſary for a Prince which deſires to make himſelfe great by Election.

The ordinary courſe in the Election of Popes, is to giue their voice to that Cardinall which is moſt in credit, ioyning thereunto the conſideration of priuate Intereſt, of Friendſhip, and the remembrance of Bonds

he haue ruined his opposite: wherein the Prince shall haue a double losse; the one is he shall lose a great part of his Subiects; the other is, that the head of the faction being fortified with credit, he may cause him to lose the rest, and vsurpe his Estate. But if both parties be equall, they will containe themselues through the feare they haue one of another. And the Prince hath no other remedy, then to breed a iealousie and distrust among the Commanders of one and the same party, making many equall in in honour and dignity, to the end they may not agree to obey any other Head then the Prince; or aduancing some of those which obey the Heads of parties, to greater dignities then their Generals, to the end they may disdaine to obey them. This must be practised with such as haue many followers.

THE

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greateſt and moſt Remarkable Conſiderations ſeruing for the Managing of Publicke Affaires.

PART. III. CONTAYNING THE MEANES to increaſe an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.

Of the increaſing of an Eſtate by the enlarging of Townes.

AN Eſtate is increaſed either by multiplying or husbanding that which is our owne, or by adding vnto it, and drawing vnto vs that which is another mans, by lawfull meanes. Our owne is multiplied either by manuring the land; or by enlarging of Townes, eſpecially thoſe which may ſerue for defence, and to make head againſt

To increaſe our owne by our owne.

against an enemy; or in taking care of the procreation, breeding vp, and education of Children: In regard of the manuring of the Land and that which depends thereon, it hath beene recõnended formerly, in treating of the wealth and the reuenues of the Estate.

Diuers meanes to enlarge and amplifie Townes.

As for the enlarging and amplifiyng of Townes, it is done after diuers manners, either in drawing together people dispersed here and there in the Fields, in many scattered Houses and Villages, and reducing them into one place, as *Theseus* did at *Athens*, and as they say it is practized at *Bruxeele*, as well to Ciuillize that people, as to haue the better meanes to instruct them in the Christian Faith: Or else people fearing the inuasion of some strange Nation, haue reduced themselues into some place that was strong of Scituation. By this meanes *Venice* was amplyfied and built. The ancient *Spaniards* retired themselues to the Mountaines of *Biscay* and *Aragon*, when as the *Moores* held *Spaine*. The *Persians* flying before *Tamberlaine*, some retyred themselues to Mount *Taurus*: others to *Anti-Taurus*, and some to the Ilands of the *Caspian* Sea, where they peopled many Townes. *Pisa* was enlarged by the Ruines of *Genoua*, when it was sackt by the *Sarrasins*. The comming of *Attilla* was the cause of the beginning and foundation of *Venice*, the greatest part of the best families of *Italy* being retired into the Townes of the *Adriatique* Sea, to auoyd the fury of so powerfull an Enemy. *London* and many Townes in *England* haue beene peopled by *French* and *Flemmings*, being chased out of their Countries in regard of their Religion.

The pleasantnesse of townes.

The pleasantnesse and beauty of some Townes, for their Scituation or their buildings, haue drawne many to frequent them. The structure of the *Pyramides* in *Alexandria*, the bounty of the Aire of *Mitilene*, *Smirna*, and *Rhodes*, made many *Romans* resolue to leaue *Rome*,

Rome, and to make their abode there: The which hath beene the cause of the increase and amplyfying of those places. But profit is that which drawes most Men to liue in a place: The which although it bee of diuers sorts, yet it proceeds from three principall causes, the which must concurre for the enlarging of a Towne; The commodity of the scituation, the fertility of the Countrey; and the facility of commerce.

Profit drawes Men wonderfully to liue in townes.

Principall causes of profit in a towne.

The commodity of the Scituation consists in two things; the one to send forth that whereof wee haue aboundance; and the other to receiue that from others which wee want, which two must concurre together in one place, to people it and make it great. Otherwise if it were but a simple passage, it would not be enlarged no more then the Ilands of the *Tercores*, the which although they serue the *Portugalls* for a passage to the *Indies*, yet are they nothing the better peopled: And *Flushing*, although it bee a great Hauen, where many Ships ariue; Yet it is but a very small Towne. Whereas *Venice*, *Lisbone*, *Genoua*, and *Antwerpe*, hauing both Commodities ioyned together, haue made themselues great.

The commodity of the Scituation.

The fertility of the Neighbour Countrie, makes not a Towne to bee the better peopled, but helpes to maintaine it being peopled from other places: For wee haue seene and see daily, many Townes Scituated in a barren soile, as *Genoua*, who haue made and maintayned themselues great: Necessity sharpening and quickening the Inhabitants spirits to labour and industrie,

The fertility of the Countrey.

The facility of cõmerce proceeds from the easie transportation of Marchandize, be it by water or by land, in a plaine Countrey, or a hilly, they hauing the commodity of carriages: Yet the conduct by water is more easie & of lesse charge. Nauigable water is either by Sea, or riuers, or lakes, or chanels, made with mens hands with some stops; or

Of the facility of commerce.

or Pooles, as that of *Miree* in *Ægypt*, which they write, had fifty Miles in compasse. But of al the transportation by water, that by Sea is much more commodious and profitable: And the Towne which hath it, and is accompanied with a good Port, whereas Ships may ride safely from winds and the violence of stormes, may make it selfe great with little industrie.

Religion a meanes to enlarge a Towne.

Religion hath sometimes serued to inlarge the Citty of *Ierusalem*: For the *Iewes* sacrifice being Celebrated onely there, euery Man ranne thither, and many made choice of it for their abode: And many Villages haue of late beene made Townes, in regard of the Religion which they haue tyed vnto them by Pilgrimages.

The Establishment of Schooles and Vniuersities.

The erecting of Schooles and Vniuersities, of all sorts of Sciences, haue serued others to amplyfie them, being a meanes which Princes haue practised, not onely to stay their Subiects, who going to study out of their Estate, carry forth the money, and bring home strong manners, most commonly pernitious to their Countrey; but also to people those places where their Elections were made, by the succours of their Subiects and strangers.

The Erection of Seates of Iustice.

The Election in like manner of some Seats of Iustice, whose Iurisdiction hath a great extent, and is well peopled, may also serue: Especially in that sort as it is vsed in most of the Estates of Christendome, where they must spend much time, and disburse much money to recouer their owne. For the frequentation of those which come from abroad, with their long stay, cannot but bring great meanes which remaines there. The Erecting also of Manufactures, if there bee any, or of stuffes, which are particular to a Towne, and sought for by others, may also increase it. Some Townes haue beene peopled by the exemptions and priuiledges of Princes, who haue drawne Inhabitants from all parts: They vsed this meanes to people New-Hauen; and the

Erecting of Manufactures.

Duke

Duke of *Tuscany* doth the like for *Liuorne*. The residence and the abode of the Nobility & Gentry in Townes, serues likewise to enlarge and amplifie them. For besides that such Townes are commonly better built; the Nobility are more curious to haue policy entertained, then when it is composed onely of Merchants, who dreaming onely of their gaine, and to doe their businesse, haue most commonly little care of the Publique, vnlesse there bee many rich men which haue the gouernment. For then the wealth and commodity which they enioy, giues them the same courage with the gentry, and they gouerne themselues after the same manner. But besides this, the Prince must assist them with some publique Reuenewes to that effect. The comparison of the Townes of *Italy* with those of *France*, shews what difference there is betwixt Townes inhabited by Gentlemen, and those which are not. And the Townes of *Flanders* and *Germany*, which are in the hands of rich Merchants, yeeld nothing in beauty to those of *Italy*. Residence of the Nobility.

The residence and abode of the Prince for a long time in one Towne, doth much encrease and amplifie it; whereof the example is but too familiar in all Estates: And the reason is for that the affaires and the treasure are brought thither as to its Center; the which doth not onely draw those which are necessary for the Princes seruice, but also Merchants and Artizans, who goe where there is commodity and gaine. The residence of the Prince.

Chap. 19.

Of Factions and of the meanes to hinder the effects;

THere remaineth now to speake of Factions, for the last and most ordinary causes for the ruine of Estates. They are seldome framed among the people, vnlesse great men be of the party: For they grow eyther from the priuate quarrells of great men, who imbarque the people on their sides; or from the subiect of some reformation; or for the gouernment of publique affaires. If they grow from particular quarells, the Prince must speedily force them to referre the cause to his iudges, or to Arbitrators, without making shewe to fauour the one more then the other. This was that which King *Francis* the first did, in the suit depending betwixt Madame *Lonyse* his Mother and *Charles* Duke of *Bourbon*, who reuolted vpon this subiect.

But if the controuersie cannot be reconciled, for that the proofes faile on the one side, although that by strong presumptions, the fact be in some sort apparent; or if it concernes the honour of one of the parties in the decision of the businesse; the Prince must separate them, imployeing them out of his Estate in some honourable charges, the one farre from the other; And hee must Entertayne them thus diuided, vntill that eyther their credit bee diminished with the people, or that time hath made them forget, or at the least temper their hatred. If, (as it happens often) to the priuate quarrells of great Men, they adde some publique pretext, as of reformation, Liberty or Religion: The Prince not able to hinder the course of these factions, hee must ioyne with the stronger to

ruine

ruine the weaker : Wherein having once prevailed, he must free himselfe by diuers meanes (yet lawfull) of the cheife Commanders with whom hee had ioyned, eyther imploying them out of the Estate, or causing them to bee punished for their priuate offences.

But if the Prince comes not in time to ruine the one nor the other, for that they are equall, and that his Counterpeace cannot waigh downe the ballance ; hee must attend that by the Euent of some misfortune to the one, they may find the weaknesse of that side, to ruine him whom he feares. Yet if in this case the heads of the Factions, and not the Prince, bee to reape the Honour and fruits of the Victory of one of the two partyes ; the Prince shall doe more wisely to ballance the one with the other, and to make himselfe rather an Arbitrator or a Iudge of their pretentions, then a party : For that hee should make himselfe to those, against whom hee should declare himselfe : and should not thereby gayne any Authority or credit amongst those, whose party hee should imbrace, into the which hee should not be receiued by the partizans, but to countenance their designes, and not for any affection they beare him, hauing already ingaged themselues to him, who had first aduanced his standard, and had presented himselfe vnto them to bee their Leader, and to assist them in their designes ; And they will attribute to the credit of their Commander, that which the Prince should afterwards doe for them.

The principall Remedy must bee vsed in the beginning : For that when as the parties are once framed, the Prince must rather study how hee may liue in this corruption of State, then to thinke of the meanes how to take it away. For if eyther of the parties haue an aduantage, hee will not abandon his Armes, vntill he

for benefits receiued, with hope to be fauoured for the ſame election by him to whom he giues his voice, if he happens to faile of it. But as they which run a Race, many times hinder one another, and whileſt they ſtriue, a third man gets to the Marke before them; ſo commonly we ſee, that they whom they thinke ſhould be preferred before the reſt, ſticke faſt by the way: Wherefore they muſt not onely relye vpon credit. *Charles* of *Auſtrea*, who after was choſen Emperour, to attaine vnto this Dignity, he not onely diſtributed two hundred thouſand Crownes among the Electors, (as King *Francis* had done for his part) but hee cauſed Leuies of Souldiers to bee made in *Germany*, and his Army being ready, he made it approach to *Frankford*, vnder colour to keepe the Election from being forced; whereby hee encouraged his owne party, and cauſed them to yeeld vnto him which wauered, and he terrified *Brandeburge*, who held the party of *France*, ſo as hee durſt not diſcouer his intentions. As for practizes, *Charles* carried himſelfe more cunningly then *Francis* the firſt, for hauing firſt of all laboured for the excluſion of *Francis*, he had thereby aſſured himſelfe of the Electors, who he knew would neuer agree to chooſe one amongſt themſelues, by reaſon of their emulations and diſſentions; and that oppoſing one againſt another, they which ſhould be excluded, would more willingly giue their voices to a third man, then to him that had oppoſed againſt them. Contrariwiſe the *French* Embaſſadours labouring not for the excluſion of *Charles*, but feeding themſelues with the hope which the Arch-biſhop of *Mentz*, and the Marqueſſe of *Brandeburge* gaue them, that this election would ſucceed to the benefit of King *Francis*, remained abuſed, wherein Pope *Leo* did in ſome ſort helpe, yet contrary to his intention: For although he deſired not that King *Francis* ſhould be made Emperour, no more then the King of *Spaine*, but ſome third perſon, he entertained the firſt with hope, to the end that when he

he should see himselfe wholy excluded, despight should make him imploy his practizes against the King of *Spaine* in favour of some *Germans*; and that having purchased no credit with him, he might not grow distasted, but might then favour this designe openly.

We will therefore conclude, that in every Election the first consideration must be, to labour for the exclusion of Competitors; being certaine that many will sooner agree for the exclusion of one, then they will for the Election of another; and yet ingaging them by this meanes to offend the Competitors, you bind them to thinke no more of them. But if many agree to reiect you, you must haue recourse to time, and delay the Election as much as may be, to the end they may grow weary and separate themselues.

CHAP. 4.
Of the encrease of an Estate by Conquest.

BVt the most ordinary meanes to enlarge an Estate, is by Conquest: And to attaine vnto it you must know how to attempt it, to make warre and to auoide it.

Of the enterprize of Warre.

For the Enterprize of warre, you must fly two things: Iniustice and rashnesse. To the end the Warre may bee iust, he that vndertakes it must be a Soueraigne, and the cause and end must be iust. The iust causes to make War are our owne defence, and that of our Friends: the reuenge of our iniuries and theirs: The iust pretentions we may haue to an Estate, and our Diuines adde not only the defence of our Religion, but its aduancement and propagation by the way of Armes, and some the extirpation and rooting out of a contrary: But others hold that Warre is a bad meanes to plant piety.

The iust causes of a Warre.

As

A Warre must be vndertaken with discretion, and not rashly.

As for rashnesse he must likewise auoide it: and for this effect before he resolue to warre, he must see eyther some apparent profit, or that he is forced by some great necessity, but aboue all things before he vndertakes it, he must assure his Estate both within and without. Within, in giuing contentment to his subiects, iustifying his taking Armes, and making them to allow of it, to the end that if neede be, they may assist him: without in renewing the Leagues with such as may assist vs, or annoy our Enemies, or with those that may succour them, diuerting them from their Friendship. They must also resolue, whether is most profitable, either to make warre by Sea, or by Land, or by both, and in what place. Wherein although there be no generall Rule, yet it would be of great aduantage to strike rather at the head, then at the armes or legges; and at the place where the Head of the State remaines, then at any part more remote. As likewise he must consider the place where the Enemy feares most to be inuaded. The which the *French* vnto this day, (in the Warres which they haue had with the *Spaniards*) haue little obserued. For by many examples it may be verified, that the thing which the *Spaniards* haue feared most, was left the *French* should inuade him by *Spaine*. King *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, although he were inuaded by the County of *Rousillon*, and was then stronger then the *French*, yet he would not entertayne the Warre vpon this frontier, as *Guicchardin* sayth. And the same Author writes, that the said King hauing taken *Nauarre*, more by the amazement which the *English* forces gaue, then by his owne, he would proceede no farther; holding it no discretion to begin a Warre on the other side of the Mountaines with the *French* King, least hee should remaine in the subiection of the people and great men of *Spaine*, who being armed within the Countrey, might haue sought to aduance their owne Estate: And therefore

seeing

seeing the forces of *France* turne towards *Italy*, hee dismist his Army which was vpon the frontier of *Nauarre*, without inuading *France* as hee had promised to his Colleagues, being vnited for the defence of *Italy* against King *Francis* the first.

It serues for no purpose to pretend to the contrary, the bad successe of the voyages of *Perpignean* and *Nauarre* by the *French*: For in effect there is no History which doth not attribute that misfortune to the want of fore-sight and negligence of our Kings, and to the bad conduct of their Ministers: For admit they should not finde victuals sufficient in *Spaine* to entertaine their Army, yet *France* which ioynes to this Frontier, is not so needy, nor so farre off, but by Sea or Land they might be easily relieued; and *Spaine* on that side being more barren, it is certaine that the want will be greater for the *Spaniard* then for the *French*.

But to returne to generall considerations, they must fore-see and prouide for all the inconueniences which may happen in such an Enterprize, waighing exactly, and comparing our forces with those of the Enemy. And for that a Prince doth seldome conquer by force onely, hee must obserue if there be in the Estate which he meanes to inuade, any of those defects which is sayd might serue for the ruine of Estates, to the end he may make vse of them.

To make Warre, hee must haue recourse to, Military wisedome and iudgement, which deserues a more ample discourse, and therefore I will now leaue it. But to auoide Warre, one of the principall considerations is, to imbrace a fit time to treate a Peace to his aduantage: And therefore hee must not haue an obstinate desire wholy to conquer a Prouince, what hope soeuer good Fortune hath giuen him, but hee must study how to make profit of his aduantages, and to assure

A consideration to auoide War.

aſſure that by peace which he hath conquered : In imitation of the *Turke* who holding this Maxime hath neuer reſtored any thing of Importance which hee hath gotten ; but all remaining in his poſſeſſion, in leſſe then three hundred yeares hee hath built an Empire fearefull to all his Neighbours.

But the conſideration a Prince ought to haue in his encreaſe, is that hee make his profit of it ; it many times falling out, that if an Eſtate newly conquered, be not gouerned with great diſcretion and Iudgment, it doth rather weaken, then make the new conquerour more powerfull, eſpecially if this encreaſe, miniſters matter of iealouſie to the Neighbour Princes : For thence grow many deſignes and Leagues againſt him. Thus drawing into conſideration the aduantages of a conqueſt, he muſt likewiſe haue a care of the meanes to maintaine and preſerue it, whereof we haue formerly ſpoken.

FINIS.